After July 15th, the mandatory service periods of F-16/F-4 pilots who returned to the Air Force are coming to an end. Why Aren't Improvements Being Made to Retain Jet Pilots?

Turkish Air Force Pilot Training System

The Turkish Air Force is in need of qualified pilots trained in new tactics and techniques, who must use modern weapons and equipment at the most appropriate time and place. Turkey is one of the few countries in the world that can train its own pilots and even those of friendly and allied countries.  The Turkish Air Force continues to train the jet, transportation, helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle pilots it needs with the Pilot Training System it implements at NATO and US Air Force standards. A flight training program compatible with the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) model is implemented by the Turkish Air Force.

Within the scope of the training called Student Selection Flights (ÖSU), which is carried out prior to the entrance to the Air Force Academy, prospective cadets are required to fly 13 sorties under the supervision of an instructor in a two-seater T-41D (Cessna 172 equivalent) aircraft stationed at the Airport Command in Yalova, and then fly the 14th sortie on their own as a solo flight. Afterwards, Air Cadets who are eligible to study at the Air Force Academy are given incentive flight, glider flight and parachute jump training in T-41D aircraft as part of their four-year academic education. During the school year, they are required to fly an average of 15 sorties according to a specific plan, and 7 sorties during the summer semesters. At the end of this phase, it is aimed to have a cumulative average of 22-23 sorties of incentive flights per pilot candidate.

Stages of Jet Pilot Training

Pilot candidates, who graduate from the Air Force Academy with the rank of Lieutenant, start their Initial Flight Training on Italian-made twin-seat SF-260D aircraft in the inventory of the 2nd Main Jet Base Training Center Command in Çiğli, İzmir, to receive pilot training, which is the foundation of the Turkish Air Force Pilot Training System. During this training period, which lasts 5-6 months in total, 30 hours/25 sorties are flown, including solo flights. 

After successfully completing the Initial Flight Training, the pilot candidates, within the scope of Basic Jet Flight Training, fly approximately 100 hours/75 sorties in a training period lasting 6-8 months in Çiğli with the high-performance South Korean KAI KT-1T propeller aircraft. After successfully completing Basic Flight Training, the pilot candidates are then put into Advanced Jet Training with American-made T-38A twin-seat jet aircraft. At the end of this 6-8-month flight period, which lasts approximately 110 hours/85-90 sorties, pilot candidates graduate from Çiğli as pilots, having reached the level of competence to adapt to combat aircraft.

To summarize, at the end of a long marathon, pilot candidates who complete their flights at the 2nd Main Jet Base Command in a total of 240 hours/190 sorties and 17 months of training, are entitled to wear the pilot's badge and make the transition from pilot candidate to jet pilot status.

In the near future, Pakistan-made PAC MFI-17 Muhshak aircraft are expected to replace SF-260Ds, TAI-produced Hürkuş aircraft will replace KT-1Ts, and Hürjet aircraft, which is also being developed by TAI, will replace T-38As. 

Lieutenants who graduate as jet pilots become F-16 pilots by undergoing approximately 8-10 months of flight training at the 9th Main Jet Base Command (Balıkesir) with F-16 aircraft, covering an average of 80 hours/65 sorties, during the transition to combat readiness in jet aircraft (lead in flight). New combat-ready F-16 pilots who successfully complete this training are assigned to F-16 Squadron Commands within the Turkish Air Force. From the time a newly graduated lieutenant starts flight training in Çiğli until he/she is ready for combat in the F-16, it takes 25-30 months. In some cases, the flight training period can extend up to 36 months in total. In this respect, the pilot training system of the Turkish Air Force complies with international standards. Considering that pilot training is a 3-4 year process in the US Air Force, it can be said that the Air Force's time management regarding pilot training is quite successful.

Transportation and Stages of Helicopter Pilot Training

After successfully completing the Initial and Basic Flight Training phases, pilot candidates start their developmental flight training in CASA CN-235-100M transport aircraft instead of the T-38A. This is a six-month flight period of approximately 90 hours/60 sorties. At the end of an average of 210 hours/160 sorties, they are transferred from pilot candidate to Transport Pilot status. Some of the fliers with transport pilot status start flying on C-130 and C-160s based at the 12th Air Transportation Main Base Command (Kayseri). They become combat ready in six months with an average of 70 hours/35 sorties. Some of the fliers become combat-ready in CASA CN-235s within an average of 40 hours/25 sorties and three months.

Helicopter pilot candidates transition to helicopter piloting by flying 75 hours/60 sorties with the AS-532 helicopter during the development phase, similar to the transportation aircraft. They serve as search and rescue pilots with AS-532 helicopters in the troops.

UAV pilots who will use unmanned aerial vehicles such as ANKA, AKSUNGUR, AKINCI and recently Kızılelma and ANKA-3, which have recently entered the Air Force inventory in recent years, start to use these aerial vehicles after successfully completing UAV pilot training in a special program that lasts about four months.

After July 15th, Actions Taken to Meet the Pilot Requirement in the Turkish Air Force

Among the state institutions and organizations, the Turkish Air Force has probably suffered the most from the attempted coup d'état in Turkey on July 15th. Following the 'cleansing' process initiated by the relevant organs of the state, it naturally became clear that there might be a serious weakness in the number of combat-ready jet pilots needed for fighter jets according to the standards and requirements of the Air Force. In order to prevent any weaknesses in the country's defense, new solution proposals, which had never been on the agenda before, were evaluated as of August 2016, and steps were taken over time to increase the number of jet pilots. I will briefly mention these efforts within the framework of the pilot training system, without mentioning some critical information.

Meeting the Flight Instructor Needs of Training Squadron Commands

The training squadrons, which are the backbone of the Air Force's pilot training system, have been assigned as many experienced pilots as possible to be trained as instructors from other flight units. In this context, efforts were made to fill the instructor pilot positions of the 123rd Squadron (SF-260D), 122nd Squadron (KT-1T) and 121st Squadron (T-38) in Çiğli and 143rd Priority Squadron (F-16) in Balıkesir. 

Procurement of Pilots from Internal Sources (from within the Air Force)

Prior to July 15, it was decided that among the officers who were eliminated for various reasons during the pilot training in Çiğli before July 15 and therefore could not become pilots and were assigned to air-ground classes and branches, it was decided that those who were at the rank of major or lower and who were willing to take pilot training again. In this context, a flight training plan was made for the candidates in Çiğli according to the type of aircraft they were eliminated from, the number of flights they had flown during flight training and their current rank. Thus, among the candidates identified, those who did not have any health problems were included in the pilot training system in Çiğli in groups according to a schedule.

When the practice of training pilots from internal resources is evaluated, expectations were initially very high. This was because the pilot candidates knew how the flight training system in Çiğli worked and what they needed to do to be successful. They were aware that in order to become a pilot, they had to undergo rigorous training, that they had to act with a disciplined work approach, and that the standards applied during this training were quite high. First, training groups were formed, starting with older pilot candidates. 

The biggest problem with the internally recruited pilot candidates was that most of them had low motivation. In addition, most of them were married. They had a routine they were used to with their families. They were not able to adapt to a flight training life focused on studying like a newly graduated lieutenant and patiently, for example, making a 'dream flight'. Despite their willingness, they found it difficult to endure this challenging training process. In short, many of them found it difficult to show the patience to finish this challenging training process, and before long, many of them chose to leave flight training voluntarily, saying 'I will not continue flight training'. The number of those who gave up flight training was much higher than expected. 

Internally, there are combat-ready pilots who successfully completed the Çiğli and Balıkesir processes and are currently serving in the Air Force, primarily in F-16 and other aircraft types. This is undoubtedly an achievement. However, it would have been possible to train more pilots from internal resources, but this was not possible for the reasons I have mentioned.

Reopening of the Air Force Academy

After July 15th, for obvious reasons, there were no students left in any class at the Air Force Academy. The Air Force decided to reopen the school as soon as possible and recruit new students for the intermediate classes. In September 2016, the process was initiated with a decree with the force of law for students in the second and third grades of engineering departments of universities to transfer to the Air Force Academy. The number of applicants was quite high, but as the recruitment process took a long time due to the conditions of the time, it was observed that most of those who initially showed willingness changed their minds in time to continue their undergraduate education at their own schools. In total, 250 students were targeted to be admitted to each class. 

In the meantime, in a first for the Air Force, it was decided that flight training in T-41D or equivalent aircraft (such as the Cessna 172S) would be provided by flight schools in Turkey for the Student Selection Flights (SSF). Thus, successful candidates who passed the medical examination and were able to fly solo were enrolled in the 2nd class (100 students) and 3rd class (80 students) of the Air Force Academy, which reopened in February 2017 after a short military training. Another reason for the failure to enroll the targeted number of cadets in the Air Force Academy was the elimination of the military health system, the necessity to conduct medical examinations with civilian doctors, the length of the medical examinations, which normally take two days, taking almost two weeks, and administrative problems such as the elimination of candidates who fell below the expected running standards in the tests conducted in closed gymnasiums in winter conditions for physical competence. 

As of October 2017, high school graduates who were successful in the ÖSU process were enrolled in the school and started their undergraduate education as Air Cadets. In the same year, the number of students in the 2nd and 3rd grades was completed, reaching the target of 250 students each. In the following years, the officers who graduated from the Air Force Academy as lieutenants and passed their medical examinations were initiated into the pilot training system in Çiğli, and the stones of the broken system were largely put in place in a short period of time.

Recruitment of Civilian Pilots to the Air Force within the Scope of Procurement of Pilots from External Sources (Outside the Air Force)

Among those who graduated from universities and voluntarily took pilot training at flight schools and became pilots, those who were under a certain age and willing to do so were recruited as pilot officers in the Air Force. However, the fact that most of the applicants were still in the process of training at flight schools made it unlikely to recruit the desired number of pilots. After a while, a second call was made and the process was initiated with new applicants. However, some of the 30 or so applicants who wanted to serve as military pilots were eliminated at the medical examination stage. Others withdrew their applications before even completing the 3-4 month officer basic training in Kütahya. These candidates were already pilots who had no problem in joining airlines. Being an additional military pilot probably did not appeal to them due to both the salary and the difficulty of the task. Even those who tried it soon gave up. Therefore, not a single person from this process could be employed as a military pilot.

Recruitment of Former Jet Pilots to the Air Force through Voluntary and/or Compulsory Recall

Aware of the Air Force's need for jet pilots and having completed their compulsory service or having been forced to leave the Air Force for various reasons, there were some former military pilots who wanted to voluntarily return to the Air Force. The fact that these pilots voluntarily left their airlines to serve in the Air Force would have been a valuable contribution, but unfortunately the number of voluntary returnees was not sufficient to meet the need. It was no longer possible to meet the need in this way. For this reason, in addition to voluntary return to the home, a decree law was issued for former jet pilots under a certain age who met the health conditions and return criteria, thus paving the way for former military pilots to serve in the Air Force again. 

Within this framework, pilot salaries have been improved to a certain extent compared to the past. The returnees were given the right to wear the same rank as their colleagues who never left the Air Force. For example, there were some pilots who left the Air Force as First Lieutenants and returned to the Air Force with the rank of Colonel, or even those who served for a year and were promoted to Brigadier General by the High Military Council. In addition, arrangements were made for them to be assigned primarily to training squadrons (in Çiğli and Balıkesir). As far as possible, each returning pilot was ensured to serve at the Base and Squadron Command of his/her choice, except for the filling of mandatory pilot positions. Willingness was taken as a basis.

In addition to this, during the return of jet pilots and during the period they served, there were some problems that were not caused by the pilots themselves, but by the lack of coordination between the relevant organs of the state and/or the lack of understanding of the seriousness of the issue. I find it necessary to briefly mention some of these. 

In particular, the compulsory service of the returning personnel was initially determined as an additional four years and they were entitled to retire at the rank of Colonel at the end of four years. However, in the course of time, in line with the decisions taken at the level of the General Staff and/or the Ministry of National Defense outside the Air Force, the compulsory service period of 15 years after the Air Force Academy, which was initially envisaged, was first increased to 17 years and then to 21 years with a decree with the force of law, disrupting all the balances in terms of pilots. Pilots who returned to the Air Force for 4 years 'compulsory' were demoralized and their family life was further disrupted. The Air Force had great difficulty in getting efficiency from these pilots. The repatriation program started to turn into a torture program for jet pilots. 

Nowadays, some of the jet pilots, who have been compulsorily reintroduced into the system as of 2017, are about to complete their 21 years of compulsory service. According to some rumors, increasing the compulsory service to 23 years instead of 21 years is being discussed in the corridors of the Ministry these days, but it is known that no one believes in the feasibility of this. Even if it is implemented, it is seen by everyone that it will no longer be a solution.

In my opinion, 21 years was a wrong implementation, especially 23 years. There is no example in the world. 8 years have passed since 2016. The state had to develop a solution to this issue that would retain pilots. I don't know if there is still a shortage in the number of jet pilots, but even if there is, the bill for this should not be cut to the F-16/F-4 pilots who have been serving the Air Force for 7-8 years despite all the difficulties.

I believe that it would be wrong, inefficient and may invite flight insecurity to further torment jet pilots who have to wear their military overalls again upon their mandatory return, at the expense of disrupting their established order in Istanbul, Izmir and Antalya. Even if there is still a need for jet pilots, I believe that the method should not be compulsory, such as increasing the number of years of compulsory service. 

What could be done to retain jet pilots?

Considering the requirements of professional life, I believe that some solution methods should be applied to increase motivation and improve social conditions, and in this context, I still maintain my belief that some of them can continue to stay in the organization if the necessary is done.

We do not have a magic formula, but at least the Air National Guard pilot employment system in the USA could have been taken as an example. As a matter of fact, I have heard that there were studies in this direction at the Air Force headquarters for a while. For example, a military jet pilot could have flown on F-16 aircraft for six months, completed the required number of combat readiness standard flights (e.g. 120-180 hours) during this period, earned the annual incentive flight compensation, and then continued to fly as a civilian pilot for the remaining six months of the year as a contracted airline pilot, thus maintaining his combat readiness on the F-16 and immediately taking part in the defense of the country in case of need. In this cycle, he could have continued to fly in the Air Force as a half military and half civilian pilot, at least until he reached the age of 60. This practice could also have been applied as half military and half civilian life for 15 days each month. At the very least, it could have been adopted as a pilot practice for the instructor pilots serving in the training planes in Çiğli to serve as 'civilian pilots'. The way could have been paved for the employment of jet pilots who were willing to return to civilian airlines in Çiğli. 

There could have been other similar practices. But unfortunately, none of them happened. Why not? Probably the Turkish Army, the Air Force and the Ministry of National Defense were not ready for the 'cultural change' to implement such a flexible arrangement. The pandemic conditions may have played a part in the failure to take such radical decisions. Decisions that should have been taken may have been postponed in the pandemic environment. Then it may have been too late to put them back on the agenda. 

Finally, in the meantime, former jet pilots who were forced to return to the Air Force due to the compulsory service periods increased by decree-laws may have developed a distrust of the system. This may have caused them to no longer wish to remain in the Air Force, even if conditions were improved.

Conclusion

The Air Force pilot training system is a continuous training system that starts from the moment of entry to the Air Force Academy and is valid until the pilot retires. The Turkish Air Force Pilot Training System is a modern system designed in accordance with NATO standards to ensure that pilots reach the level of competence to perform the missions within the scope of the general mission of the Air Force Command. Those who successfully complete this training perform their flights in accordance with the flight hours (per pilot) determined according to the annual combat readiness requirement. As it is known, according to NATO standards, a jet pilot, especially new combat-ready F-16 pilots, is expected to fly a minimum of 180 hours per year, and if possible more. In this context, in line with the manpower plan defined in line with the strategic target plans of the Turkish Armed Forces, the need for pilot candidates is determined on a yearly basis, including the fighter aircraft owned and/or planned to be owned, and pilot candidates are admitted to the Air Force Academy as students and undergo undergraduate engineering equivalent education. Graduates of the Air Force Academy receive approximately three years of training in the military pilot training system, which qualifies them to serve as pilots in F-16 or other aircraft.

When the training structures of the developed countries of the world are compared, Turkey is one of the few countries that has succeeded in making a self-sufficient pilot training system, which is considered exemplary in NATO, operational. In fact, this system is a modern system unique to our country, which was developed by taking the pilot training models of the USA and Canada as an example, with the transition of the Turkish Air Force to the jet age in 1951. However, prior to this, it is a system that has been subjected to continuous improvements based on the accumulation of more than 100 years of experience in the flight schools that have been opened within the Air Force in our country since the Air School established in Yeşilköy in 1912. As a result, it is known that the Turkish Air Force's training system is one of the most advanced training systems in the world with its modernized aircraft, facilities, equipment, flight instructors and management staff.

Aviation and especially military piloting, especially jet piloting, is a skill. It is a lifestyle. The unity of understanding that keeps risk management alive in its nature, and requires taking responsibility for the lives of others, is given to military pilots as an output of the pilot training system. Jet piloting, whose experience is very valuable, is a special profession that is expensive, difficult to train and requires a long process. Even though its essence is professionalism, military piloting is and should be seen as a phenomenon beyond a profession, practiced with a little chivalrous spirit and a lot of amateur spirit. As a former F-16 pilot, I consider it vital to build and preserve this spirit. 

After July 15th, the pilot training system was restored in a very short period of time without compromising the desired standards. Priority was given to filling the shortage of flight instructors at the training squadrons in Çiğli and the F-16 Priority Squadron in Balıkesir. Among the internally recruited air ground officers, those with the appropriate qualifications were retrained in the pilot training system, and those who successfully completed the training were made jet pilots. In addition, the Air Force Academy initially recruited students for intermediate classes, and then switched to the normal education and training process. In order to meet the need for trained jet pilots (F-16 and F-4/2020), new regulations were made through decrees with the force of law, allowing former military jet pilots to return to the Air Force through voluntary and then compulsory return from among airline pilots. In the course of time, the compulsory service for these pilots was first increased to 15, then 17 and finally, unexpectedly, to 21 years, in a sense 'forcing' them to remain in the Air Force.

Now, at the end of the day, it has been seen that this cannot be done by 'force'. I would like to believe that it has been seen. I consider it imperative and necessary that incentive solutions (including the US Air National Guard system and/or arrangements that will allow former military pilots to serve as civilian pilots in the majority of the flight instructor staff at Çiğli) be implemented as soon as possible in order to retain experienced jet pilots who have left airline piloting and returned to serve in the Air Force and are in the process of returning to airline piloting after completing their compulsory service. I hope that the relevant organs of our state will take the necessary steps without further delay, and that they will realize that they have to take these steps and do what is necessary as soon as possible.