Analysis of Drone Warfare in Libya in 2019-2020 (Part-2)
How were the forces of the Government of National Accord in Libya able to destroy 9 Pantsir S-1 air defence systems with drone attacks in 4 days during operations against Haftar's militias in the east of the country?
Why Drones Failed to Revolutionise Air Warfare (Part 2)
Drones are seen as game changers in modern battlefields, but do they reflect reality? These specialised weapons are reshaping the future of warfare, disrupting traditional methods of warfare. At the centre of this change is the heated debate between proponents and sceptics of the drone revolution.
So what changes are drones bringing to the battlefield? How is modern force employment evolving in aerial combat? How are drones affecting the firepower revolution? How are air defences adapting to these new threats that can penetrate them?
The impact of drones is not limited to the technical field. Do they also affect the distribution of power by upsetting the balance between offence and defence? Whether they reduce the importance of close combat is still a matter of debate.
While searching for answers to these questions, we should not overlook the transformation that drones have brought about in military strategy and tactics. The headings in the first part of our article help us understand how drones can affect the course of war and future conflicts.
For those who have not read the first part of our article or for those who want to re-read and remember it, I leave the relevant link below.
Why Drones Failed to Revolutionise Air Warfare (Part 1)
A more comprehensive analysis of the impact of drones based on concrete examples will be presented in the following sections of our article. Thus, we will try to understand and explore how drones are redefining the battlefields and how they may affect future wars.
In this second part, we will analyse the drone warfare conducted in Libya in 2019-2020.
21.05.2020 The GNA (Government of National Accord) neutralised 9 Pantsir S-1 air defence systems in 4 days during operations against militias loyal to Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the illegitimate armed forces in the east of the country, as a result of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artillery shelling. Infographic AA
Drone War in Libya, 2019-2020
In 2011, the NATO military operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector ended Muammar Gaddafi's forty-two-year rule in Libya. Soon after, a civil war broke out between multiple factions, tribes, mercenaries and the Islamic State (ISIS). The GNA (Government of National Accord), based in Tripoli and led by Fayez al-Sarraj: This government controls the western coastal region of Libya. It was recognised by the United Nations and supported by Turkey. The Libyan National Army (LNA), based in Tobruk and led by General Khalifa Haftar, controlling the eastern coastal and continental area and supported by Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt. In this section, we analyse the widespread use of drones in the 2019-2020 Western Libya military campaign, in which the GNA and LNA fought for control of Tripoli and the western coastal part of Libya (Tripoli). Between April and November 2019, there were more than 1,040 drone strikes recorded during this military campaign, prompting Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Libya, to refer to "the world's largest drone war". The Western Libyan military campaign therefore represents an ideal example to test the drone revolution thesis. Moreover, some proponents of the drone revolution have argued that the use of drones in this conflict was a "game changer" with implications for the "future of warfare". Our analysis does not support this interpretation. Drones did not provide an offensive advantage, did not strengthen the militarily weaker side, and did not eliminate the need for close combat and ground operations.
Offensive advantage
In the military campaign in western Libya, drones were unable to penetrate enemy air defences and therefore provided no offensive advantage against capable adversaries. Far from operating "with impunity", as the drone revolution thesis suggests, drones suffered "a relatively high attrition rate from ground-fired missiles". Between early 2019 and mid-2020, the GNA (Government of National Accord) lost 22 of its 24 drones in operations. Similarly, the LNA (Libyan National Army) lost between a third and a half of its estimated drones. Second, attrition rates among UCAVs (Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) are related to the presence and capabilities of the enemy's air defence systems. In the first phase of the conflict, the LNA had access to Russian short-range air defence systems (Pantsir S-1) provided by the UAE. As a result, the LNA's drones were destroyed, bringing its operations to a standstill. In contrast, the GNA had only inferior anti-aircraft weapons and man-portable air defence systems, which could shoot down some of the LNA's drones, but could not stop the entire Western Libyan military campaign. However, the tables were turned in November 2019 when Turkey deployed two HAWK II surface-to-air batteries and KORAL advanced electronic warfare systems at Misrata and Mitiga airports in support of the GNA. While the former enabled the GNA to repeatedly shoot down the LNA's drones, the latter blinded the LNA's air defences, thus allowing the GNA to continue drone operations and attacks.
Balancing Effect
Throughout the military campaign in western Libya, drones did not strengthen the militarily weaker side. Instead, drones exacerbated existing battlefield imbalances, a result consistent with the modern system of force employment in air warfare.
First, it was the stronger, not the weaker, side that utilised drones more widely and more successfully. The LNA took over and captured a significant part of the Libyan government's military equipment, and in the first part of the military campaign, in early 2019, it also received support from the UAE, Russia and Egypt in terms of logistics, communications, drones, air defence systems and other military equipment such as fighter jets. MiG-21s, MiG-23s, Mirage 2000s, F-16s and allegedly Rafales, among others).
Second, drones did not help the weak side, the GNA, overcome its tactical and strategic incapacity. Lacking complementary military capabilities and external support, the GNA was not even able to conduct drone strikes in the initial phase of its military campaign in western Libya. Some of its drones were shot down by the LNA's air defence systems, while others were destroyed while parked on runways.
Third, the introduction of drones did not change the balance of power on the battlefield. Between May and July 2019, Turkey provided 12 Bayraktar TB2 drones to the GNA. However, these drones did not allow the GNA to counter the LNA's air and military superiority. Instead, the LNA "almost completely eliminated the GNA's newly acquired drones from the air battlefield" within a few months. The tactical balance shifted when Turkey provided the GNA with air defence, electronic warfare systems and competent personnel that addressed the GNA's vulnerabilities and enabled its forces to offset the LNA's capabilities. The GNA was then able to launch its own campaign of drone strikes, which ultimately helped to change the military balance and thus the course of the conflict.
Fourth, we found no evidence to suggest that the weaker actor could quickly and cheaply produce or acquire military drones to offset combat losses or tactical incompetence, or to change the operational imbalance. In addition, all drones used during the conflict were produced, supplied and operated by foreigners.
Close Combat and Force Recruitment
Finally, according to the UAV revolution thesis, long-range precision drone strikes will eliminate the need for close combat and reduce the importance of force deployment. However, our empirical research does not coincide with this perspective.
First, close combat has not disappeared. For example, on 4 April 2020, the LNA attempted to retake Tripoli. However, given the risk of urban warfare and the associated heavy civilian casualties, the LNA used a "cat-and-mouse military manoeuvre trying to lure anti-LNA forces to the open or outskirts of the city", where the lack of buildings exposed targets to enemy weapons. In addition to artillery and air power, throughout the Western Libya military campaign, both the LNA and the GNA relied on infantry units and mercenaries to seize control of and defend strategic infrastructure such as airports, motorways and major intersections, launch ground attacks, retake terrain or conduct mop-up operations. From May 2019, the GNA's military leaders began recruiting foreign fighters from Chad and Darfur. In December 2019, Turkey began deploying mercenaries from Syria to support al-Sarraj's forces, which grew from around 1,000 in January 2020 to around 15,000 in the summer. Likewise, the LNA hired troops from the Toubou ethnic group of Libya, as well as from Sudan and Chad, to defend oil installations, fields and airstrips. In August 2020, the private military company Wagner Group provided the LNA with additional tactical assistance and ISR operations for artillery and air strikes. Similarly, Turkish support to the GNA (e.g. deployment of surface-to-air missile batteries at Misrata and Mitiga airfields, electronic warfare systems and frigates for offshore detection) not only halted the LNA's air superiority, but also allowed the GNA's ground forces to counterattack, thus ending the siege of Tripoli. It prevented the Libyan capital from falling into the hands of the LNA.
Secondly, combat capability has not lost its relevance in modern warfare. For example, Turkey's electronic warfare system helped the GNA forces to detect, locate and target the LNA's air defence systems. However, in May 2020, the tactical balance shifted again when the LNA's air defence system operators prevented Turkish electronic warfare interference and detection by disabling their radars and switching to electro-optical sensors. As a result, "several Turkish UCAVs [operated by the GNA] were shot down. [Yet] it was too late to have a real impact on battlefield dynamics."
Finally, conventional military assets and equipment are still essential, both to enable drone strikes and to fight against capable adversaries. In the battles for the west coast of Libya, drone operations proved "useful, but not decisive". The final outcome of the military campaign, the end of the siege of Tripoli, was largely due to Turkey siding with the GNA and insufficient external support for the LNA.
In the third part, I will describe the operations carried out with unmanned combat vehicles in the Syrian civil war between 2011 and 2020.
