analysis-and-reports

Analysis of Drone Warfare in the Syrian Civil War between 2011-2020 (Part-3)

As in Libya, the use of drones in Syria has attracted considerable attention, leading to speculation about their revolutionary impact on modern warfare.

For those who cannot read my article on the use of drones in the Libya Operation, which I discussed in the second part, I provide the link below.

Analysis of Drone Warfare in Libya in 2019-2020 (Part-2)

https://strasam.org/analiz-ve-raporlar/analiz/libyada-2019-2020-yillarinda-icra-edilen-dron-savasinin-analizi-bolum-2-3333

After the Arab Spring in 2011, the unrest in Syria turned into a civil war. The Syrian civil war has been fought on three different fronts: The conflict between the Syrian government, its allies and various opposition forces, such as Daesh and Al-Nusra; Turkey's military operations against the YPG in northern Syria; and the international coalition's efforts to defeat Daesh. Russia, Iran and Hezbollah supported the Bashar al-Assad regime, while the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others supported various opposition forces, and the United States and its allies also fought against Daesh.

UAVs have been widely used on all three fronts, with Syria seeing "military, commercial, hobbyist and home-made models taking to the skies from all sides". It has been described as "the most intense drone conflict to date". As in Libya, the use of drones in Syria has attracted much attention and has led to speculation about their revolutionary impact on modern warfare. However, as we show in this chapter, the Syrian case does not support the drone revolution thesis: drones did not provide offensive advantage, did not empower militarily weaker actors, and did not cancel close combat.

Offensive advantage

If drones are to have an offensive advantage, they must either suffer limited attrition or be able to attack successfully despite enemy air defences. Our research shows that this is not the case in Syria, as it was in Libya. In December 2013, Syrian anti-government rebels shot down the Iranian small UAV Yasir in Qalamoun, and from 2015 to 2019, both Turkish and US air defence systems repeatedly shot down several heavy Iranian drones, such as the Shaded 129. Similarly, Russia's Orlan-10 drones were destroyed by both Turkish air defence systems and poorly equipped Jaish al-Izzeh rebel forces. For example, in 2017, drones reportedly "fell from the sky like flies".

During the Syrian civil war, Russian air defence systems suffered significant losses, leading many to conclude that drones have an indisputable offensive advantage. The available evidence warrants caution against drawing such conclusions. On the one hand, Russian air defence systems have neutralised most drone threats. For example, in January 2018, Russian short-range air defence systems destroyed seven incoming drones and "Russian specialists of electronic warfare units managed to take control of the remaining drones" launched by anti-Assad groups against Russian bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. From 2018 to 2020, Russian air defences disabled more than 150 drones, and in 2019 alone, Russia neutralised around sixty drone and missile attacks on the Khmeimim airbase. Similarly, in March 2020, Syria deployed Russian short-range air defence systems in Idlib, and within a few days its forces shot down 10 Turkish-made drones, allegedly "stabilising the balance on the battlefield". On the other hand, Russian air defence systems were not always able to intercept incoming drones or survive their attacks. However, as we discuss in the next section, this ineffectiveness had more to do with force employment than with the drones' capabilities.

Balancing Effect

If the drone revolution thesis is correct, drones should have strengthened the weaker actors in Syria. In fact, as in Libya, this was not the case. First, both rebel groups and non-state actors used drones, an epilogue that many interpreted as revolutionising military affairs. However, most drones had little impact on battle outcomes. For example, ISIS drones were easily neutralised and, in general, they inflicted relatively limited damage and casualties on Russian armed forces and equipment. Similarly, Syrian rebel groups have mostly used their small and primitive UAVs for surveillance or dropping small bombs with limited impact on the battlefield.

Second, drones have reinforced, rather than reduced, asymmetries in military power. For example, the US armed forces have used UAVs against Daesh for targeted killings, shooting down light armoured vehicles, hunting snipers and detecting hidden explosives. Similarly, Turkish drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 have successfully carried out such missions against poorly equipped adversaries such as the YPG and similar groups.

Turkish intelligence teams, who started a regional study in Ayn al-Arab in Syria, opposite Suruç district of Şanlıurfa, detected that terrorist Filiz Aslan was in Helince village with a group of YPG terrorists. On 23 June 2020, Filiz Aslan (47), a PKK member with the code name "Leyla Agiri" was neutralised in a UAV and UCAV operation. In addition to Filiz Aslan, female terrorists named Zehra Berkel (33), Mizgin Halil and Emine Veysi, who were PKK/Kongra-Star members and senior military wing officers of YPG, were also killed in the operation. For 18 days, the terrorists were tracked step by step by Turkish UAVs and were killed by ammunition dropped by a Turkish UCAV on 23 June 2020. It is stated that Filiz Aslan, who joined the PKK in 1993, constantly changed her location in the triangle of Turkey, Iraq and Syria and has been active in Syria since 2015. In the photographs, the bodies of the killed terrorists are seen wrapped in blankets together with the house where they were shot.

In the photograph, Sakine Cansız, one of the founders of the PKK, and Filiz Aslan are seen in the same frame.

Third, actors with weaker forces have not turned to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to offset combat losses or general inefficiencies. The Assad regime, the YPG, Daesh and other rebel forces were at different stages of the conflict to the point of collapse, but did not quickly produce, purchase or deploy drones to launch counterattacks. In contrast, regional and major powers such as Iran and Russia have deployed troops and conventional military assets in support of the Syrian government. The US, on the other hand, has supported the YPG and other rebel forces to resist Daesh and the Syrian government. Although analysts have debated ISIL's use of drones, the organisation has not relied on military drones to disrupt enemy advances when surrounded. Finally, the finding that most of the drones used in the Syrian conflict were produced, procured and used by foreign actors runs counter to the "Drone Revolution Thesis".

The TAI Anka-Ss in the Turkish Air Force inventory, which have proven themselves in operations in Syria, are more resistant to electronic jamming and deception in the field thanks to the satellite communication system. Photo by the Ministry of National Defence

TAI Anka-S of the Turkish Air Force is seen in a hangar. Photo by the Ministry of National Defence

Close Combat and Use of Force

In the Syrian case, we find no evidence that close combat has disappeared or that combat proficiency has become less important in determining combat outcomes.

First, the intensive and widespread use of close combat during the Syrian civil war is a further refutation of the drone revolution thesis. Overall, the conflict has led to between 100,000 and 500,000 deaths and "more than half of the pre-war population has been displaced, with 6.2 million people internally displaced and 5.3 million registered as refugees, primarily in neighbouring countries, but increasingly in the status of a global diaspora." This devastation was not the product of drone strikes, but the result of continuous cycles of advance, encirclement, frontline fighting, retreat and counter-attack, as epitomised by several key battles in Damascus, Waham, Al-Yaarybiyah, Aleppo, Idlib, Yarmouk and Raqqa. The indiscriminate use of air power by drones and, more generally, by the Syrian armed forces, their Iranian and Russian backers, through artillery, attack helicopters and surface-to-air bombers, could not eliminate close combat. In fact, in most cases, they continued their strategy of siege, starvation and attacks on towns and cities. Moreover, ISIL and other rebel groups have relied heavily on guerrilla tactics and modern approaches to warfare to penetrate enemy lines and gain territory. Finally, both the Syrian government and Iranian forces fired ballistic missiles against the rebels in 2012, 2017 and 2021, while the Syrian government used more than 80,000 barrel bombs from 2012 to 2021 and carried out several attacks with chemical weapons. If UAVs are so easy to use, so fast and cheap to produce and procure, and so effective, why are the actors fighting in Syria using economically and politically more expensive alternatives instead?

Second, combat skills and proficiency remained fundamentally important throughout the conflict. The alleged vulnerability of Russian air defence systems to rebel drones is an ideal example to test the effectiveness of drones. While it is difficult to detect, track and engage small targets flying at low altitude, especially for ground-based, long-range systems, asymmetries in the modern force employment system explain the successes and failures of drone operations. On the one hand, the limited experience and relatively poor skills of Syrian personnel in using air defence systems exposed their positions to enemy fire. On the other hand, the enemies of the Syrian government proved to be quite capable of suppressing enemy air defences. The battle for Idlib in northeastern Syria from December 2019 to March 2020 demonstrates the importance of modern power system employment in air combat. Turkish troops effectively used different platforms, systems and countermeasures against Syrian surface-to-air batteries: They hacked the phones of Syrian soldiers to locate them, deceived and blinded Russian air defence systems using the advanced KORAL multifunctional electronic warfare systems. Bayraktar TB2 and Anka-S unmanned aerial vehicles were used to attack and destroy targets or to provide the enemy's geographical coordinates to artillery systems (e.g. T-155 Storm). However, when the Syrian Army and its local allies adopted stricter operational security measures, such as halting the use of mobile phones and switching to paper-based communication, Turkey suddenly lost its military advantage as its sensors could no longer easily track and detect enemy targets.

More importantly, Turkey's widespread and effective use of drones in coordinated fleet strikes in the Idlib battle was a result of Turkish troops' mastery of the modern system of exploiting geographical and topographical factors, rather than the characteristics of drones. Idlib's proximity to the Turkish border made it relatively easy for the Turkish armed forces to conduct ISR target acquisition and successive strikes. Using fleet drone strikes, Turkey could conduct "high-precision long-range strikes that allowed it to bypass Idlib airspace and succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on Syrian Arab Army targets". As the former director of international relations at Turkey's Undersecretariat for Defence Industries put it, "You take off from Turkey and you are there in minutes. The targets are also very close to each other, which means you don't have to spend hours looking for them." Moreover, the Syrian armed forces have shown little ingenuity in concealing their air defence systems from Turkish air strikes.

T-155 Fırtına Howitzer in the Turkish Land Forces inventory These howitzers, which have a high precision strike capability with instantaneous information from UAVs and UCAVs, use various ammunition and M107 (HE): 18 km/ M549A1 (RAP/HE): 30 km/ ERFB/BB: 40 km They have taken part in successful operations in Syria.