Analysis of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine within Neorealist and Neoliberal Theoretical Frameworks

After gaining independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine's political position changed depending on the current leaders' proximity to Russia or the European Union. Viktor Yanukovych, a Russian-born Ukrainian leader, opposed strengthening ties between Ukraine and the European Union while supporting the establishment of better relations with Russia. In 2013, the decision not to sign a political union and free trade agreement with the European Union due to his pro-Russian stance led to large-scale protests by the Ukrainian people and resulted in the overthrow of the government and Yanukovych. During these events, the Crimean autonomous government and separatists in the Donbass region supported Yanukovych and demanded better relations with Russia instead of the European Union. On 27 February, Russian troops entered Crimea and annexed the region following protests and unstable internal conditions in Ukraine. After this event, tensions between Ukraine and Russia never subsided, and relations between Ukraine and NATO in particular became problematic and unacceptable for Putin. Vladimir Putin's revisionist policies are based on objecting to Russia's lack of a clear share in Euro-Atlantic security, and Putin also objects to the global order that ignores Russia's legitimate security concerns. These policies have been termed the ‘Putin Doctrine’ by Angela Stent. In fact, some neorealist thinkers, such as John J. Mearsheimer, have always found Putin's security concerns ‘rational’ and have warned the United States about a possible war in Ukraine due to these security concerns. Therefore, Russia's intervention in Ukraine in 2022 has confirmed neorealist assumptions about this situation and the role of the system in such actions. However, while neorealism is an excellent tool for analysing the reasons behind Russia's intervention in Ukraine in 2022, it is not sufficient to define all the reasons on its own. Therefore, in this article, neorealist and neoliberal explanations of Russia's intervention in Ukraine will be analysed by showing the strengths and weaknesses of the two theoretical frameworks.

Before proceeding to the analysis of the case using the neorealist theoretical framework, a brief overview of neorealism is necessary. As a theory of international relations, neorealism focuses on the international system as its level of analysis. According to this approach, the main actors in the anarchic international system are rational unitary states that pursue their interests by focusing on security issues, which realist thinkers refer to as ‘high politics’. Unlike neoliberals, neorealists, particularly those such as Mearschimer, are highly sceptical that international norms or institutions can mitigate competition and conflict between states. It is argued that power is the fundamental concept, expressing states' ability to pursue their interests or exert influence over other actors. One of the most important neorealist assumptions, particularly regarding Russia's attack on Ukraine, is the concept of the balance of power. While some classical realists, such as Henry Kissinger, emphasise voluntarism in achieving a balance of power, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz emphasise determinism in the balance of power, because, according to this view, freedom of choice is limited by the actions of others. This assumption is particularly relevant to the case of Ukraine, as deterministic neorealists argue that Putin's decision regarding Ukraine was a result of the actions of other actors, such as NATO or the European Union.

In 2014, eight years before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, John J. Mearsheimer published an article on this conflict, blaming NATO and US actions for the escalating tensions. In fact, Putin's post-2014 policy on Ukraine was consistent with what neorealists would expect from a rational actor. NATO has been expanding along Russia's borders for decades, and Ukraine's potential membership in NATO represents the limit of this expansion from Russia's perspective. Russia views Ukraine as its own backyard, and a potential NATO base and nuclear capability in Ukraine could spell disaster for Russia's interests and security. Therefore, Putin's reaction to Ukraine's participation in the Western front is rational from a neorealist perspective, as NATO has already expanded to Russia's borders with the participation of ‘the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia’. Therefore, it can be said that a crisis was created in Ukraine rather than a natural one, because building a fortress in Russia's backyard naturally causes Russia to act harshly towards Ukraine. In fact, these expansion policies and the promotion of liberal democracy in Europe were a result of realpolitik being underestimated due to neoliberalism as the dominant paradigm.

In 2014, eight years before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, John J. Mearsheimer published an article on this conflict, blaming NATO and US actions for the escalating tensions. In fact, Putin's post-2014 policy towards Ukraine was consistent with what neorealists would expect from a rational actor. NATO has been expanding along Russia's borders for decades, and Ukraine's potential membership in NATO represents the limit of this expansion in terms of Russia's interests. Russia views Ukraine as its own backyard, and a potential NATO base and nuclear capacity in Ukraine could spell disaster for Russia's interests and security. Therefore, Putin's reaction to Ukraine's participation in the Western front is rational from a neorealist perspective, as NATO has already expanded to Russia's borders with the participation of ‘the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia’. Therefore, it can be said that a crisis was created in Ukraine rather than a natural one, because building a fortress in Russia's backyard naturally causes Russia to act harshly towards Ukraine. In fact, these expansion policies and the promotion of liberal democracy in Europe were a result of realpolitik being taken lightly due to neoliberalism as the dominant paradigm.

Neorealists such as Mearsheimer predicted that Russia would potentially act aggressively towards Ukraine, blaming such policies fuelled by neoliberal assumptions. On the other hand, the US's actions can also be justified by the realist tradition, but Mearsheimer ignores this. According to Kofman and Kendall-Taylor, Russia had always posed a persistent threat until 2014. Russia pursued a policy based on erroneous assumptions about its declining power. Therefore, by weakening Russia through such a conflict before it became a more significant security threat alongside a rising China, the US confirmed realist assumptions and triggered Russia's response in the Ukraine conflict. Thus, although Mearsheimer blames NATO for the Ukraine crisis, the US also made rational choices during the conflict.

As mentioned above, although the neorealist theoretical framework is quite effective in understanding Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this conflict also reveals some of the weaknesses of neorealism. Neorealist explanations are not sufficient on their own to understand the causes of the conflict, as neorealism overlooks the importance of domestic politics, which also influences leaders' decisions. According to McFaul, Russia's foreign policy decisions towards Ukraine did not become more aggressive because of US actions, but because of changes in Russia's internal dynamics. From this perspective, Putin's gains are limited to his realist actions in Ukraine, as these actions have led to the emergence of a more unified, more pro-Western and more anti-Russian Ukraine within its borders. Therefore, McFaul states that Russia's foreign policy decisions in the Ukraine crisis cannot be explained solely by realist explanations.

Consequently, the developments McFaul mentions, combined with changes in Russia's domestic politics and increasing pressure on Putin, have led to increased anti-American rhetoric and aggressive foreign policy decisions in order to consolidate public opinion. Furthermore, another weakness of neorealist theory has been filled with neoliberal explanations. Neorealist thinkers focus on competition, conflict, and zero-sum games in world politics. However, there was a period when cooperation between the United States and Russia increased and was based on win-win outcomes. The neoliberal tradition offers absolute gains rather than relative gains and focuses on cooperation between actors. However, neoliberal explanations also have some weaknesses. Most of these have been analysed by Mearsheimer and mentioned above, but there is another important weakness that has emerged with the current crisis. The neoliberal school predicts that competition between interdependent states will decrease and argues that the complex interdependence between states makes wars very costly. However, despite the high level of interdependence between Europe and Russia, Putin was able to decide to attack Ukraine and did not back down despite all the sanctions.

Ultimately, theories are merely frameworks that create certain conceptualisation opportunities for international politics. As seen in this article, the same international issue can be explained by different theoretical approaches, conceptualised through certain fundamental points of the theories. Both neorealist and neoliberal explanations of the war in Ukraine have their strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, there is no such thing as the ‘correct theory’; these are tools that provide academics with roadmaps and opportunities for conceptualisation.

References

John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), pp. 77-89.

Kimmage, Michael, “Time for NATO to Close Its Door,” Foreign Affairs, 17 January 2022: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-01-17/time-nato-close-its-door

Michael Kofman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “The Myth of Russian Decline: Why Moscow Will Be a Persistent Power,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 100, No. 6 (November/December 2021), pp. 142-152.

Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, and John J. Mearsheimer, “Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?” Foreign Affairs Vol. 93, No. 6 (November/December 2014), pp.167-178.