Analysis of the Drone War in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 (Part-4)
Azerbaijan used some of the drones used and shot down in Libya and Syria. This difference in results begs the question: Why did the drones succeed in Nagorno-Karabakh and fail in other regions?
Our readers who did not have the opportunity to read the previous chapters can use the links below:
Why Drones Failed to Revolutionise Air Warfare (Part 1)
Analysis of Drone Warfare in Libya in 2019-2020 (Part-2)
Analysis of Drone Warfare in the Syrian Civil War between 2011-2020 (Part-3)
In this section, the Drone War in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 will be analysed.
The cover photo shows how the Azerbaijani Army hit the Armenian position with the UCAV. There are 9 Armenian soldiers in the centre and 5 more Armenian soldiers just above the centre. The ammunition fired from the Azerbaijani UCAV causes a very powerful explosion. Armenian soldiers near the centre of the explosion are unlikely to survive.
Nagorno-Karabakh is a region internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. It has been under Armenian control since the 1991-1994 war. On 27 September 2020, Azerbaijan tried to reverse this situation with the event known as the "44-day war". Azerbaijan's extensive and successful reliance on drones has led many analysts and scholars to argue that this military conflict represents a turning point in the war. For some, "Azerbaijan's drones owned the battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh." Others argued that the systematic use of drones led to the destruction of the tank and that drones were the decisive factor in the war. As in the earlier cases of Libya and Syria, the empirical record does not support this interpretation. On the contrary, this further strengthens the validity of the modern use of force system for understanding the success and failure of drone operations.
Offensive advantage
In the early days of the conflict, Azeri drones overwhelmed Armenia's mobile air defences, lending initial support to speculation about a drone revolution in military affairs. However, Azerbaijan used some of the same drones that were used and shot down in Libya and Syria. This difference in outcome begs the question: Why did the drones succeed in Nagorno-Karabakh and fail in other regions? The answer lies in Azerbaijan's superiority over Armenia in the application of modern systems of the use of force in aerial warfare.
First, Armenia did not have a layered, integrated air defence system capable of countering multiple threats, both short- and long-range, low- and high-altitude. Second, its personnel lacked the necessary skills. Third, Armenia's surface-to-air missile batteries were mostly obsolete, early Soviet (1960s-1970s) platforms, with significantly less capability than most of the air defence systems deployed by Turkey and the UAE in Libya and by Russia in Syria. Some of these Soviet-era systems are unable to detect, track or attack small targets because they lack advanced signal processing functions. Other systems have these capabilities, but their electronic countermeasures have not been updated, making them vulnerable to interference from the enemy's electronic warfare systems. Fourth, Armenia's limited electronic warfare capability cannot disrupt or hack Azeri communications on which the remote control of drones depends. Fifth, due to limited data integration between different sensors and systems, Armenian short-range air defence systems have sometimes detected but not intercepted Azeri drones using altitude to reduce exposure to enemy fire. Finally, we see a clear gap between the Armenian and Azeri armed forces in terms of concepts of operations, competence and skills.
Azeri forces employed tactics and technologies to deceive, blind, locate and destroy Armenian air defences, which allowed Azeri drones to enter Armenian airspace and operate with relative impunity. In particular, Azerbaijan converted a large number of Soviet-era Antonov An-2 light aircraft into remotely piloted aircraft and used them as decoys to detect and locate Armenian air defence systems. The Armenian air defences fell into the trap, and by illuminating these decoys, the detection radars gave up their positions and thus became themselves the target of Azerbaijani anti-radiation missiles and stray munitions. These tactics and technologies, together with the Turkish electronic warfare system that blinded the Armenian radar systems still in operation, allowed Azeri drones to breach the area defended by Armenian air defence systems and hit targets in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan converted Antonov An-2 light aircraft into remotely piloted aircraft and used them as decoys to detect and locate Armenian air defence systems. Satellite imagery from June 2018 shows a total of 62 Antonov An-2s nicely lined up at Yevlakh airfield. The use of the Antonov An-2 as a decoy aircraft had strategic consequences.
In the photo above, the total number of Antonov An-2s at Yevlah Airport is 61, according to this photo from 26 August 2020. In the photo dated 3 October 2020, the number of Antonov An-2s is 26.
In this photo, the Antonov An-2 belonging to the Azerbaijani Army, which has successfully completed its mission used as a decoy shot down by the Armenian Air Defence systems, is seen about to crash to the ground.
In sum, the shortcomings and weaknesses in Armenia's air defence systems, and the infrastructure and operational support provided by Turkey to Azerbaijan, explain why, in the early phase of the conflict, Azeri drones were able to enter and operate in Armenian airspace with relative impunity. The situation changed later in the war when Armenia introduced more advanced systems, such as the Russian Polye-21 electronic warfare system, which proved to be very effective. Similarly, Russian forces used the Krasukha electronic warfare system based in Gyumri, Armenia, to intercept Azeris' deep reconnaissance and intercept signals linking drones to guidance stations. Finally, the Armenian armed forces successfully intercepted and shot down a number of enemy drones using the Buk-M1-2, Buk-M2 and Tor-M2KM air defence systems. With these more advanced air defence systems, the offensive advantage of Azeri drones was reduced, but they were "deployed too late in the conflict, limited in number and vulnerable to attack" to turn the tide of the war.
Stabilising Effect
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, far from being a weapon of the weak or a balancing force, drones systematically favoured the strong side, namely Azerbaijan. In the two decades preceding the conflict, Azerbaijan had significantly increased its defence spending, thanks to its natural gas reserves and sustained economic growth. In 2000, Armenia and Azerbaijan spent almost the same amount on defence ($152 million and $141 million respectively), while in 2020 Azerbaijan outspent Armenia three times over ($2.2 billion and $638 million respectively). As a result, at the beginning of the conflict, Azerbaijan's armed forces were superior to Armenia's in quality and quantity.
Secondly, Azerbaijan is not only economically and militarily stronger than Armenia, but also receives extensive support from Turkey, a regional power, whose assistance during the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was instrumental in the systematic use of drones. According to some sources, the drone operation was supervised by Turkish commanders. Turkish support included the supply of drones, electronic warfare units, target acquisition aircraft, long-range artillery, skilled Turkish troops operating these platforms, and the transfer of Syrian fighters to the theatre of operations for ground combat. Turkey also shared its expertise and experience in the application of modern tactics and operational concepts with Azerbaijan, which used decoys to detect and strike the enemy's air defence systems on the ground; used special operations forces to penetrate deep into enemy territory to provide geographical coordinates of the target through laser designators for precision strikes; and coordinated the use of different systems such as drones and long-range artillery.
In addition to being the weaker side, Armenia did not receive significant external support. Contrary to the thesis of the UAV revolution, it did not turn to UAVs to compensate for its numerical and qualitative military weakness on the battlefield. In fact, Armenia deployed a relatively modest fleet of small indigenous reconnaissance systems such as the X-55, Krunk, Russian-made Orlan-10 and HRESH mobile ammunition. However, as a last resort, Armenia turned to ballistic missiles against Azerbaijan, a counterintuitive epilogue to the drone revolution thesis, which assumes that drones are cost-effective and efficient. As for Azerbaijan, its drones were foreign-made and supplied: Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAVs (number unknown); Israeli ISR drones: 2 Hermes-900, 10 Hermes-450, 5 Heron, 14 Aerostar and 5 Searcher; and Israeli kamikaze drones: 50 Harop, 80 Orbiter 1K, 10 Orbiter-3 and 100 SkyStriker.
Close Combat and Use of Force
Contrary to the expectations of the drone revolution thesis, the deployment of drones on the battlefield did not eliminate close combat and did not override traditional elements of force employment. In fact, during the conflict, "many casualties were still inflicted by armour, artillery and multiple launch rocket systems.
Firstly, melee, far from disappearing, also played a key role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict of 2020. Despite the widespread use of ballistic missiles, loitering kamikaze UAVs and other precision-guided munitions, as well as UAVs, infantry units proved crucial for maintaining defensive lines and advancing on the front line. Mercenary groups and regular forces fought on both sides in World War I-style trenches located a few metres away from each other. According to some analysts, Turkey's deployment of Syrian mercenaries to support Azerbaijan was a game-changer. Fighting in coordination with other elements of the force structure, these mercenaries contributed to the crushing of Armenian defensive positions, which ultimately forced Russia to intervene diplomatically.
The Battle of Shusha/the battle for the city of Shusha is a striking example: "the most important battle of the Nagorno-Karabakh war", because "when Shusha fell, Armenia surrendered and entered into a disproportionate settlement, ceding a large part of the territory it had previously held. "To carry out this offensive, the Azerbaijani special operations force of about 400 soldiers marched for five days through forests and valleys, climbing rocks and cliffs to reach the city without alerting the enemy's defences. As soon as they entered the city, the Azeri forces "engaged in fierce street battles with the defending Armenians at close range." Azeri drones could not be used to destroy or disable Armenian armoured vehicles, as fog had descended on the city when the offensive began. This allowed the 2,000 Armenian soldiers to rely on heavy artillery, as well as maximising the use of T-72 tanks and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. As a result, without effective UAV support, Azerbaijani special forces had to rely heavily on rocket-propelled grenades, mobile anti-tank guided missiles, multiple launch rocket systems and artillery. Once again, drones were unable to eliminate distance or ground combat.
Second, drones did not override traditional force employment. Azerbaijani forces, for example, skilfully exploited the geography of the conflict to their advantage. Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region. Proximity to mountains and other natural or artificial obstacles significantly reduces the effectiveness of ground-based air defence systems because it interferes with the line of sight between the radar and the target required for detection and produces unwanted radar returns that make detection difficult (i.e., "ground clutter"). Azerbaijani forces took advantage of the morphology of the terrain to limit or delay their exposure to enemy radar and thus minimise the risk of interference. Furthermore, as already mentioned, Azerbaijani forces also effectively employed tactics and technologies aimed at weakening and suppressing Armenian air defence systems.
Geography also proved to be an asset for Azerbaijan's offensive operations. Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave within Azerbaijan, which means that Azerbaijan faces limited logistical and infrastructure challenges. In addition, by gaining control of Mount Gish, Azerbaijan gained a strategic position on the road linking the front and rear of Armenia's offensive (i.e. between the cities of Kalbajar and Agdere). Once Armenia's air defence systems were neutralised, Azerbaijani drones could easily destroy all targets passing along this road. Azerbaijan also made effective use of its special operations forces for drone operations. Equipped with laser designators to detect valuable but hard-to-detect targets deep inside enemy territory, Azerbaijani special operations units enabled them to carry out precision strikes against assets of interest, such as weapons depots and communications centres.
While both sides struggled with certain aspects of modern tactics and operations, the Armenian forces performed comparatively worse. Moreover, their lack of a layered air defence system further hampered Armenia, leaving its ground forces vulnerable to enemy fire. Armenia's problems were massed movement in the open air, in broad daylight, without air defence, which left troops, vehicles and platforms exposed to Azerbaijani air power. Once the inherent weakness of the Armenian air defence system was exposed, its troops were still employing inadequate countermeasures and counter-tactics such as dispersal or camouflage to avoid being exposed to enemy fire. In fact, for several days after the start of the conflict, Azerbaijani drones continued to target Armenian troops in non-combat mode and in convoys. Moreover, Armenia further limited the effectiveness of its air defence systems by positioning them too far forward on relatively exposed fixed positions in a mountainous region where air defence is particularly difficult. This difference in the use of force explains why Armenia suffered so many casualties and why about a third of its tanks were destroyed.
In sum, contrary to what many believe, drones were not a silver bullet in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. This is not to say that drones are unimportant. In fact, when used in conjunction with other systems such as manned aircraft, ground-based artillery, electronic warfare systems and ground-based radars, as Azerbaijan did, they proved to be an important force multiplier. However, without such infrastructure and operational support, drones are vulnerable to air defence systems, as in Libya and Syria. Relying on UAVs alone, including kamikaze UAVs, would therefore be a strategic mistake. Their deployment depends on the mix of combat systems and how they are used.
References
https://sofrep.com/news/armenian-azerbaijani-drone-strike-footage-graphic/
https://www.scramble.nl/military-news/azerbaijani-unmanned-an-2-biplanes
https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/turk-f-16lari-azerbaycanda/1928123
