Can Developments between Tehran and Riyadh End US Hegemony in the Middle East?

Iran is at the forefront of the 'nuclear threat' perceptions of the US and Israeli administrations in the Middle East. After the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Khomeini regime in Iran, which was read as a development that could overshadow American and indirectly Israeli interests in the Middle East, could not be worn down despite the Iran-Iraq war. While the regime in Iran has built its existence on its demonized anti-Israel and anti-Americanism, the Sunni-Shiite rivalry has been used as the biggest argument by the US administration to provoke Middle Eastern regimes against Iran. In the polarization between the Islamic countries in the Middle East region, the US-backed Saudi Arabia and the Russian-backed Iran have been counted among the 'living crises' in international relations as a visible problem.

Iran, which wants to be a part of the rising graph of the BRICS countries, has endeavored to be in some way involved in all formations that feed on anti-Americanism. On February 24, 2022, Iran unquestionably sided with Russia in the Russia-Ukraine War, ignoring the sanctions imposed by the Western world against Russia, and continued to meet Russia's drone needs in the Ukrainian theater of operations, especially by selling unmanned combat vehicles to Russia, which has been subjected to American sanctions for years. 

On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, it has become evident that the United States, which has had difficulties in shaping the Middle Eastern countries to the extent it desired, is a hegemon and superpower that serves the destabilization of the region rather than its peace. This situation has shown the world that the colonial legacy that the US inherited from the British in the Islamic geography is no longer sustainable and that Washington's hegemony over the Arab regimes and its influence over the peoples of the region is eroding. 

The Abraham Accords and American Expectations in the Middle East

During his visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2017 as part of his visit to Middle Eastern countries, Trump emphasized the regional Iranian threat and agreed to work together with the Saudi government on terrorism and security issues. With this visit, the US administration focused on turning a new page in the Middle East and launched the Trump Peace Plan inspired by former President Trump. This new initiative, also known as the Project of the Century, with its economic and political aspects, was a plan developed after the failure of the $500 billion Neo-Mustakbel (NEOM) project announced by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in October 2017. The Peace for Prosperity dossier prepared at the time ostensibly emphasized the theme of bringing a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the lack of official relations between Israel and the majority of Muslim and Arab countries was presented as a factor fueling the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. In this context, the Abraham Accords, which aimed to normalize Israel's relations with Arab countries, were used as an effective terminology and began to be signed between Israel and willing countries in line with the encouragement and guidance of the United States. On August 13, 2020, the process was initiated with the Israel-UAE treaty. Thus, the unifying quality of Prophet Abraham in the Abrahamic religions was emphasized. Since Ishmael, the elder son of Abraham according to Muslims, and Isaac, the younger son of Abraham according to Christians and Jews, were considered important, the assumption that the Muslim Arab and Israeli peoples, who are brothers in essence, could live together in the Middle East in peace and prosperity with the Abrahamic Covenants was accepted. This assumption ignored two problems: First, Zionist expansionism at the expense of the Palestinians and the hostility of the US and Israel towards Iran, a Muslim country. Perhaps for this reason, normalization with other Arab states has largely failed, with the exception of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. Meanwhile, the Abraham Accords, which brought a partial détente to the Middle East and led Jordan and Egypt to revitalize their stagnant economic and political relations with Israel, remain important.

At a time when there were growing fears of an open confrontation between Israel and Iran, which is expected to acquire nuclear weapons soon, under Netanyahu, who came back to power in December 2022, no one denied that Washington and Tel Aviv shared a common desire to maintain the now traditional 'enmity' between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Nevertheless, Riyadh, which had kept its distance from the Abraham Accords and developed a silent attitude towards them, on March 10, under Beijing's mediation, showed its willingness to put an end to the hostility with Tehran.

This rapprochement after years of militant rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is expected to do more for regional peace and prosperity than the Tripoli Peace Plan. But reactions in the United States and Israel suggest that the outcome and perceptions of it are more complex. While expressing satisfaction that Riyadh has kept Washington informed about the progress of the Tehran-Riyadh talks, the Biden administration is no doubt still uncomfortable with the fact that it was Beijing that brought the Saudis and Iranians together. Contrary to expectations, US President Joe Biden's visit to Saudi Arabia was cold and Biden did not find what he expected. The Riyadh administration, which treated Biden coldly, showed great importance to Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the Gulf countries, which took place only three months after this visit, and gave him a warm welcome. While this was interpreted as a score that gave Beijing a '1-0' lead in the Sino-US rivalry in the Middle East, Washington's anger became more visible. In fact, the end of American hegemony in the Middle East is now being talked about.

Is this the end of American hegemony in the Middle East?

According to some analysts following the region, fears of American decline are exaggerated. China cannot replace the US in the Middle East (and in fact has no interest in doing so). The US remains the region's largest security provider, not only as the largest arms seller, but also in terms of its military presence on the ground. But while Washington spends its time and resources overthrowing regimes and governments in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, and destroying Syria and Iran, China prefers to invest in infrastructure and relationships. The Middle East is big enough for both China and the United States, and there is some validity to the assessment that Washington would be better off trying to compete with Beijing beyond the military sphere, rather than panicking over China's every move.

Indeed, despite Beijing's growing importance in the Middle East, it is the United States, not China, that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates want to defend themselves against regional threats. From this perspective, the US security umbrella remains in place. Israel's concern that developments along the Tehran-Riyadh line could have consequences that are contrary to its interests is not entirely unfounded, but it is not unmanageable. A rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, similar to the détente seen in the outcome of the Abraham Accords, will serve to reduce regional tensions, which in many ways will open up new opportunities for Israel. Saudi (and Chinese) pressure on Iran to take steps to strengthen regional peace and stability could result in Iran's intransigence in favor of Israel. If Tehran ignores these calls, it will be isolated internationally and Israel will benefit. 

Although a 'hot-line' has been opened between Tehran and Riyadh, it is not forgotten that about 10 years ago, then Saudi King Abdullah called on the United States to "cut off the head of the Iranian snake". Moreover, in September 2019, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had the audacity to launch a drone strike against Saudi oil facilities. At the time, this attack caused Riyadh to halve its oil production. In 2022, ballistic missiles and drones launched by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen reached Saudi and United Arab Emirates cities, further heightening security concerns in the region. Iran's alleged near-possession of a sophisticated nuclear weapons capability troubled Riyadh as much as Tel Aviv. Prior to March 10, Riyadh was adamant that it would normalize its relations with Israel in exchange for US guarantees of Saudi security and assistance to the Saudi nuclear program. 

In any case, it is something else, rather than security vulnerability, that is driving the Saudis to de-escalate tensions with Iran. The continued existence of the Saudi regime is directly linked to its harmonious relationship with the American administrations. Recognizing this, Riyadh strongly avoids confronting the United States. At the same time, it wants to take advantage of the Chinese winds that are blowing strongly in the Gulf and prevent Beijing from looking at the region through a Tehran-oriented lens. Therefore, it is not indifferent to Beijing's diplomatic moves that serve regional prosperity and peace. It is unrealistic to see the Tehran-Riyadh rapprochement as a shelving of all problems between the two countries. Therefore, it is not indifferent to Beijing's diplomatic steps that serve the prosperity and peace of the region. It is unrealistic to see the Tehran-Riyadh rapprochement as a shelving of all problems between the two countries. Instead, it may be better to see it as a new Abraham Covenant that China is offering to the region. The Washington administration should be expected to continue to closely follow the developments on the Tehran-Riyadh line, which have lowered tensions in the Middle East, to support Riyadh's efforts to reach a new security architecture with Iran, and to strengthen its position according to the new economic and political outcomes that will emerge. Therefore, in the near term, American hegemony in the Middle East is likely to continue, at least in terms of security.

Bibliography:

Şerife Akıncı, "Abraham Accords in its second year and the point reached", Analiz, Anadolu Agency, 22.9.2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/ikinci-yilinda-abraham-anlasmalari-ve-gelinen-nokta/2691849

Adam Lammon, "What Saudi Arabia and Iran's Détente Really Means", The National Interest, 10.3.2023, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/lebanon-watch/what-saudi-arabia-and-iran's-détente-really-means-206295

Kemal Inat, "The So-Called Ibrahim Treaty and Turkey's Attitude", SETA; 15.8.2020, https://www.setav.org/sozde-ibrahim-anlasmasi-ve-turkiyenin-tavri/