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Can Turkish and Russian Navies Face Each Other in the Black Sea for the Grain Corridor?

The most important feature of the Grain Corridor Treaty was that it allowed ships loaded with food to pass safely through mined areas in the Black Sea and, under Moscow's guarantees, to cross the Black Sea without being attacked and to use Ukrainian ports.

The Grain Corridor Treaty initiated under the leadership of Turkey has ended as of today, at least for the time being. However, when the 1000th food-laden ship Lady Marel, which departed from Ukrainian ports, arrived in Istanbul on 8 July 2023, about 10 days ago, there were still high expectations and hopes that the Russian side would extend the treaty. 

Why didn't Russia extend the Grain Corridor Treaty?

Yesterday, Russia's Deputy Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations Dmitry Polyansky announced to the world that the decision on the grain agreement was final and no further negotiations were planned. Moscow said, "The Black Sea Grain Treaty will expire on 18 July. Russia is withdrawing its security guarantees for (grain) ships and closing the humanitarian corridor at sea. We can consider returning to the Black Sea Grain Treaty if we see concrete results, not just promises." It is believed that Russia may return to the Grain Corridor Treaty if the West stops imposing sanctions on Russian food and fertiliser.

Undoubtedly, there were reactions from the world to Russia's shelving of the treaty in a sense. In particular, the United States and the United Nations have expressed their discontent that this humanitarian aid corridor has been disabled by a unilateral decision. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that "millions will pay the price for Russia's withdrawal from the agreement", while the Washington administration said, "We warn Russia to reconsider its decision."

Ukraine, which is the most important party to the Grain Corridor Agreement after Russia, started to look for a way out. President Vladimir Zelenskiy expressed his expectations regarding Russia's withdrawal from the Grain Corridor Agreement, saying: "Everything must be done so that we can use the Black Sea corridor even without Russia." In the summer of 2022, he stated that he sent official letters to Erdogan, who led the signing of the treaty with Guterres in the summer of 2022, about what can be done to continue an agreement similar to the Black Sea Grain Corridor Agreement. According to Zelensky, Ukraine, the UN and Turkey could jointly ensure the operation of a food corridor and inspection of ships in the Black Sea. Apparently, Kiev hopes to continue grain supplies even without Russia. Neither Turkey nor the UN has yet responded to the Zelensky administration's expectations.

Previously, the treaty had been extended twice (27 November 2022 and 19 March 2023) for four months each, mainly on Erdoğan's initiative. On 18 July, it was considered that a third extension could be made, but it did not happen. Now it is back to the period before 22 July 2022. The functioning of the Grain Corridor Agreement, the compliance and inspections of the ships were carried out by the centre established in Istanbul. Representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the UN were working together in this centre. The most important feature of this treaty was that it allowed food-laden ships to pass safely through the mined areas in the Black Sea and to use Ukrainian ports by crossing the Black Sea without being attacked under the guarantee of Moscow. 

Now that the treaty is no longer valid, the Russian navy can prevent the exit of food products, especially grain, from Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea. It can attack ships carrying Ukrainian grain sailing in the Black Sea. This possibility always exists. On the other hand, many countries of the world, especially European countries, are in need of Russian and Ukrainian grain. The 22 July agreement paved the way for the export of grain from both countries. However, since Russia's banks, companies and accounts in many countries were blocked by the Western countries led by the USA, Russia, whose economy was hit by other sanctions, was expected to continue exporting food products at least by taking advantage of the grain corridor agreement. However, the Western sanctions continued to block Moscow's expectations. Therefore, it feels the need to use the card of terminating the Grain Corridor Agreement. If the Kremlin comes back to the table, it will certainly want to do so by expanding its playing field in the export of food products. The extent to which the Western world will acquiesce to this expectation has not yet become clear. For this, first of all, the waters in the Black Sea need to calm down.

Will Turkey come back into the picture for the Grain Corridor?

Upon Ankara's invitation, the Erdoğan-Zelenskiy meeting took place on 7 July 2023 at the Vahdettin Mansion in Istanbul. After the meeting, Erdogan said, "In July last year, as a result of the mediation we carried out with the UN, we implemented the Black Sea Grain Initiative with the signatures signed in Istanbul. I wish that the duration of the initiative, which delivered nearly 33 million grains to those in need in 1 year, which will expire on 17 July, will be extended again. We will be in an effort to extend the period to two years." He had used these expressions. However, before the Vilnius Summit, Erdoğan emphasised that Ukraine deserved NATO membership and that Turkey supported it, which had a cold shower effect on the Russian side. Moreover, the release of the members of the Azov Battalion, who were being hosted in Turkey, as a gesture to Zelenskiy caused tension between Moscow and Ankara.

According to UN data, 625,000 tonnes were shipped from Ukraine as part of the grain deal for humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. More than half of the wheat purchased by the World Food Programme in 2022 came from Ukraine. Although these poor countries are waiting for good news about the reopening of this corridor, Erdogan needs to meet Putin, who has the power to block the Black Sea, and convince him. Erdoğan's expectation is that there will be different corridors in the Black Sea. It is necessary to ensure that Russia does not shoot at the ships transporting food. Erdoğan makes no secret of the fact that he is uncomfortable with the fact that this issue is solely at Putin's mercy: "... this grain corridor should not depend on the wishes of only one state." 

In recent days there have been reports that if Russia does not extend the treaty, Turkey will protect the ships carrying Ukrainian grain with its own naval assets in the Black Sea. Time will tell whether this is feasible. In fact, such assessments coincide with Erdoğan's statement that there should be different food corridors. Meanwhile, Russia continues to protest against Zelensky's visit to Turkey and the release of members of the Azov Battalion. Moreover, Lavrov's statement to Fidan that the continued delivery of military equipment to Kiev is "destructive" is seen as part of this. Defence-related contacts between Kiev and Ankara, including the future of Baykar's UAV production factory in Ukraine, are disturbing the Russians. As a result, there has been a cyclical tension in bilateral relations between Ankara and Moscow in recent days. Some argue that the Turkish side's alternative route assessments on the corridor issue should be seen as an extension of this tension. 

Conclusion

Can Turkey take the initiative to use its navy to guarantee food shipments through Ukrainian ports (Chornomorsk, Odesa and Yuzhny/Pivdennyi)? Is Ankara ready to take the risk of a confrontation between the Turkish and Russian navies against a possible Russian attack in the Black Sea? I consider this possibility to be very unlikely. Last year, there was also talk of a NATO joint force in the Black Sea and the protection of Ukrainian ships by this NATO force, but Turkey rightly did not favour this. Since then, there have been no developments (except for the recent artificial tension) that would cause Ankara to change its policy towards Russia in the Black Sea. Nevertheless, Turkey, whose economy is ringing alarm bells, continues to 'look for money' from everywhere. Erdoğan is looking for money in the Gulf today. Previously, Cevdet Yılmaz and Mehmet Şimşek had visited the Gulf countries. It is likely that the positive signal from them will pave the way for Erdoğan to persuade Gulf capital to agree to various investment deals. Similar searches are also known to be ongoing with Western financial institutions. If there is a large financial input from the West, the Turkish-Russian status quo in the Black Sea may be shelved in favour of Kiev. At least, I believe that the recent statements and Turkey's more 'NATOist stance' in Vilnius point to this.

References

Ahmet Yiğit Kale, "Black Sea Grain Corridor Treaty", Küresel Siyaset Merkezi, July 13, 2023, https://www.kureselsiyaset.org/karadeniz-tahil-koridoru-antlasmasi/

Visegrad24, 9 July, https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1678101901085229058

Dr. Hüseyin Fazla
Ph.D. Hüseyin Fazla
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  • 18.07.2023
  • Time : 5 min
  • 1864 Read

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