Erdogan Dances with the West in Vilnius, Will he Bring F-16s to Turkey?
Approving Sweden's membership in the Turkish Grand National Assembly before the American side fulfills its tacit F-16 promise would mean that Erdoğan would be putting a bullet in Turkey's foot. We expect Erdogan to put a bullet in the air during the celebration ceremony when the F-16s arrive, not in his own heel.
Ahead of the NATO summit in Vilnius, Erdoğan emphasized that Turkey has always been in favor of NATO enlargement and an open door policy, and continued to call for Ukraine to join NATO. He boarded the plane that would take him to Lithuania, in a show of restraint towards the West, saying "pave the way for our EU membership and we will pave the way for Sweden's membership". He declared to those at the top of Western diplomacy that he would not make any concessions in Vilnius and in a way, he took the initiative, albeit temporarily, before the summit and dictated Turkey's position.
Erdoğan was quite right when he told the Western capitals, which were in a hurry about Sweden before the summit, that "North Macedonia was kept waiting at the door for 16 years just because of the name issue". Sweden can wait a little longer, don't get on our backs.
Turkey has always maintained its claim to progress by adhering to the roadmap set out in the trilateral agreement signed in Madrid at the end of June 2022 on Sweden and Finland's NATO membership applications. On April 4, 2023, Erdogan emphasized before the summit that Finland, which became a member of NATO on April 4, 2023, was able to become a member with Turkey's support after fulfilling the commitments in this roadmap. As for Sweden, he argued that the process should continue. He underlined that Sweden's accession to NATO would depend on the fulfillment of the points recorded in the trilateral agreement.
Erdoğan's political character is generally based on taking a maximalist position at the negotiating table. It is typical of Erdoğan's diplomacy to communicate his key demands to his interlocutor in advance, to mobilize as much of his own public opinion as possible, and to agree to move forward if he receives a favorable response to his demands.
The Erdoğan administration has always supported NATO enlargement. It has long maintained this line, both in public and in private talks. In the past, Turkey has in principle supported the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO, even though it never materialized. It endorsed Finland for its full support of NATO's open door policy. Turkey is now expressing a desire to see Sweden in NATO if its anti-terrorism laws are fully implemented. For Turkey, which is guided by the principle of peace at home and peace in the world, the bigger NATO is, the better the organization. But the nature of the enlargement is of great importance for Turkey, which is under a serious terrorist threat. These issues are well known to everyone.
Did Erdoğan get what he expected in Vilnius?
The summit in Vilnius ended on a positive note and with the narrative that Erdoğan got what he wanted. Did he really? The real question to ask about the outcome of the summit was this: Did Erdoğan get the 'yes' from the US on the fight against the PKK and the F-16 package to advance Sweden's candidacy?
According to many commentators, Erdoğan endorsed Sweden's membership during the Summit. Although Erdoğan did not say so, he expressed his intention to take the issue to the Turkish Parliament, where the People's Alliance has a majority. To many people, this means 'approval of membership', but there is still no finalized diplomatic promise of membership from Erdoğan. Therefore, Turkey retains the option of withholding or delaying final membership if Sweden fails to deliver on the ground in the fight against terrorism or if the US reneges on the F-16 deal.
At the summit, Erdogan reinforced Turkey's image as a supporter of the Atlantic Alliance's policies, but he did not give up all the trump cards that Sweden holds in the accession process. On the other hand, contrary to expectations, Erdogan did not allow a rupture between Ankara and Western capitals. Thus, the issue of Sweden's membership was placed in the category of "successfully managed business" on the NATO agenda. This relief allowed allied leaders, including Erdoğan, to focus on the main issues of this summit: how to support Ukraine and how to implement NATO's revised security concept.
The Alliance had the opportunity to work on a carefully calibrated roadmap or statement of principles that sets out strong military support for the defense of Ukraine, which is a security guarantee, but does not imply near-term involvement, escalation or NATO as an organization joining the current defensive war against Russia. On the second issue (the security concept), technical progress was made on how to allocate responsibilities and resources more fairly.
Can Turkey's Problem also be NATO's Problem?
The security challenge in Europe arising from the Russian threat is also a NATO challenge. This NATO problem has to become Turkey's problem, and Turkey's problems have to be perceived as a NATO problem by the European allies. On the one hand, Ankara maintains commercial and diplomatic relations with Russia, and at times strategic cooperation. On the other hand, together with its allies, it is pursuing a policy of dissuading Russia from its dreams of imperial rematch. Turkey has to play a balancing act. It is not possible for the Turkish Foreign Ministry to trust Putin completely. Turkey absolutely needs a functional relationship with Russia. However, Turkey belongs to the Western world. This has always been the case from past to present. There is a Turkey that can find more common ground with the West. Turkey shows at every opportunity that it can act as a part of the Western Alliance as long as it receives the necessary support from NATO member countries for its own security. For this reason, it is out of the question for Turkey, which sees itself as a part of the West and wants to be seen as such, to say 'No' to Sweden's membership. I believe that the picture of Turkey that emerged at the summit should be seen as an extension of this dichotomous Turkish stance (torn between Russia and NATO).
What Turkey wants to see in the NATO context is that Sweden fulfills its commitments against the PKK and Washington does not make Ankara wait any longer for F-16s. Everything else is just talk, empty talk. If Turkey does not get what it wants on these two points, history will record the "yes to Swedish membership" deal as a bad deal for Ankara. It is an opportunity for Erdogan to throw the ball to the Turkish Parliament and not ratify anything directly. For Turkey to get a happy ending to this deal, Erdogan needs to play the parliamentary trump card well.
Sweden gets rid of the uncertainty that lies ahead. It is not clear how long the country's accession process will take, but the agreement removes the risk that Sweden will remain in limbo - close to the Alliance but not fully involved. NATO can go full speed ahead with its military and political arrangements for Sweden's accession, which is beneficial not only for Sweden but also for the defense of Northern Europe, where Sweden can play a very important role. Erdoğan's green light also serves to facilitate Finland's integration as a new member. According to experts, the security and defense of the two Nordic countries are highly interlinked. As Finnish President Sauli Niinistö has pointed out, Finland's NATO membership would not be complete without Sweden.
Turkey has given the green light for Sweden to join NATO as the 32nd member. Stoltenberg described July 10, 2023 as a "historic day". The agreement signed between Sweden, Turkey and NATO during the Summit means that Sweden will join the Alliance as the thirty-second member as soon as possible. No one wants to interpret it otherwise. In a way, it no longer makes sense for Turkey to have the Turkish parliamentary trump card. This trump card has always been there. It was just that it had never reached the voting stage in the Turkish Parliament before, and therefore it had never been on the agenda. For the first time during the Summit, Erdoğan declared that Sweden's membership would be discussed in the Turkish Parliament. I think that if Erdoğan was not so close to ratification, he would not have promised the TGNA. So Sweden's ratification will be done very soon. But how 'soon?' Probably the summer vacation break will be used as an excuse, while the steps to be taken by Sweden and the US will be awaited. They will be expected not to play spoiler here. Although the Madrid roadmap will continue to be valid without Finland, if Sweden and indirectly the US stick to the Vilnius agreement that goes beyond Madrid, Erdoğan will ensure that the issue is discussed in the Turkish Parliament after the holidays.
Will this conditional game have a happy ending for Turkey?
Turkey has succeeded in forcing Sweden and NATO to take a step forward on counterterrorism measures. Moreover, Erdoğan managed to get the EU involved. Sweden's decision to back Turkey's demands for the European Commission to restart the accession process appeared to seal the NATO deal. The F-16 package, long held up by Congress, was seen as linked to Sweden's membership. Although the membership and F-16 issues are seen as separate, the US policy of selling F-16s is more important here than Turkey's attitude.
The American policy of "give membership, take F-16s" will now be put to a serious test. Despite the positive winds blowing, it is not yet clear whether Turkey will get the F-16 fighter jets it has long wanted from the US. No one has made any promises to Turkey. There are readings of intentions, mutual political stances and their repercussions.
Let me emphasize this one more time: Approving Sweden's membership in the Turkish Grand National Assembly before the American side fulfills its tacit F-16 promise would mean that Erdoğan would be putting a bullet in Turkey's foot. We expect Erdogan to put a bullet in the air during the celebration ceremony when the F-16s arrive, not in his own heel.
