Gaza and Beyond-4: For what purpose is Iran showing its flag in the Mediterranean?

Which country wants to be in the Mediterranean and why?

In part 1 of Gaza and Beyond, I explained the historical development of Gaza. In parts 2 and 3, I tried to explain the aims of some countries in the region with the sections "Which Country Wants to be in the Mediterranean for What?".

In this section, I will talk about Iran.

The Importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East for Iran 

Iran is a country in the heart of the Middle East. It is located in the Persian Gulf. It is bordered to the north by Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, to the east by large countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and India, and to the west by Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq-Syria and Saudi Arabia.

Iran has the second largest natural gas and third largest oil reserves in the world. In its latest report on statistics on world oil and gas reserves, the US Energy Information Administration estimated Iran's total oil reserves at 209 billion barrels by the end of 2021. This is more oil reserves than any other country in the world except Venezuela and Saudi Arabia.

In the ranking of the size of world oil reserves, Venezuela ranks first with 304 billion barrels of reserves and Saudi Arabia ranks second with 262 billion barrels of reserves. Iran ranks third with 209 billion barrels. 

According to the 2021 report of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Russia has the largest proven natural gas reserves in the world with 47 trillion cubic meters. Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world with 34 trillion cubic meters. With 17 percent of the world's proven natural gas reserves, Iran needs additional investments to develop its large gas fields. However, unilateral US sanctions prevent Western companies from making any commercial deals with the country. 

The natural gas and oil reserves in the Middle East and Iran have turned the region into an energy production center. Iran is at the top of this production center. 

Authorities in Iran, the country with the second largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, have called on its people to conserve natural gas in the face of the harsh winter conditions that affected the country in the last days of 2022.

According to Iran's official news agency IRNA, on October 18, 2022, Minister of Petroleum Javad Ovci, in a speech to the Majlis, warned that the country needs $80 billion of domestic and foreign investment to avoid a shortage of natural gas in the winter months and that the country may face a shortage of natural gas this winter.

Iran, the world's second natural gas reservoir, is unable to extract enough natural gas from these reserves due to its inability to make new investments and calls for austerity even within the country.

The nuclear deal between the United States and Iran entered into force in January 2016 after lengthy negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, known as the P5+1 - the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, France and Germany. 

Under the agreement, Iran would limit its production and storage capacity of enriched uranium, allow inspections of its nuclear facilities, and modify or shut them down completely upon recommendations.

In return, sanctions that have long burdened the Iranian country and economy would be lifted.

In May 2018, President Donald Trump decided to withdraw from the deal signed by the United States during the Barack Obama presidency, despite the objections of the other P5+1 countries, on the grounds that the agreement was weak and did not cover Iran's ballistic missile program.

At the same time, Trump reimposed sanctions on Iran. In response, Iran has gradually distanced itself from the deal and started enriching uranium above the set limits.

Settling in the most strategic regions of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East or having a say in this geography in a certain sense are among the geopolitical goals Iran wants to achieve. For this reason, although Iran established some relations with the Lebanese Shiites during the Shah's reign, these relations remained limited. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran pursued an ideological foreign policy and tried to achieve this goal through the Lebanese Hezbollah. 

However, Iran was prevented from reaching Lebanon through the so-called land corridor, which it established on the Iraq - Baghdad and Syria - Damascus highways, due to the events in Iraq and Syria. Iraq under Saddam was Iran's regional enemy and Syria under Bashar al-Assad had some interests in Lebanon. Therefore, Iran had to provide its support to Hezbollah by air.

In the post-Saddam period that began with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the rise to power of Shiite regimes friendly to Iran increased Iran's influence in Iraq. Moreover, the instability in Syria in 2011, the loss of control over the country by the Bashar al-Assad government, and the US initiation of talks with Tehran over Iran's nuclear program have created new geopolitical opportunities for Iran to achieve its expansionist goals in the region.

The fact that the fight against DAESH in Iraq and Syria has become a priority international objective has provided Iran with a great opportunity to connect to the Eastern Mediterranean by land. The IRGC, which has great influence over Baghdad and Damascus, has taken control of the logistics line from the Iran-Iraq border to Lebanon by land.

Although the Syrian civil war and the developments in the Middle East and the Arab Spring have created some opportunities for Iran, the instability in Syria has also hindered Tehran's political and economic projects in the region. 

As I explained in Chapter 2 on Gaza and Beyond, Tehran aimed to transfer Iranian oil and gas through Iraq and Syria to the Lebanese coast via Iraq and Syria, and from there to European markets via Greece. To this end, a memorandum of understanding was signed in 2011 between Tehran, Baghdad and Damascus for the construction of a natural gas pipeline. However, the instability in Syria thwarted these Iranian goals. 

Although the Syrian civil war paved the way for Iran to become an effective power in Syria, the involvement of the US, France, Russia and the UK in the events in the region prevented this. Iran's influence in the region has been limited by the fact that the construction of the natural gas and oil pipelines that Iran needs to use to transport the oil and natural gas it produces to the Mediterranean via pipelines has not been completed or the existing ones have been destroyed due to wars. 

The fact that the nearly 100,000 pro-Iranian armed militias in Syria are linked to Iran only through a single land transportation line also indicates the weakness of this line. Taking advantage of this weakness, Israel has been conducting operations with the Israeli Air Force to damage the shipments made through this logistical line. If this strategic line is cut, it is inevitable that Iran's power in Syria will weaken.

Neither the US nor Israel can afford to take such a risk, since a ground operation against Iran's land corridor in the region would mean a full-scale conflict with hundreds of thousands of armed Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq. 

Therefore, in order to weaken Iran's political influence in Iraq, the US and Israel are trying to inflict maximum damage on Iran at minimum cost by launching airstrikes on the existing land corridor through Iraq and Syria. 

Conclusion

As a result, it seems very difficult for Iran's current Eastern Mediterranean strategy to be successful as the ever-changing balance of power in the Middle East is unfavorable to Iran.

The risk of Iran losing control over the 1860-kilometer land corridor, a very powerful tool at its disposal to pursue its Eastern Mediterranean strategy, is growing every day. Who will then control the 100,000 armed militias in the region? Or who will use these militias as their own military? This will be the main question for Iran. The death of Qasem Soleimani is the beginning of this question.

The term Shiite Crescent, which emerged as a result of Iran's aim to unite all Shiites under a single banner, mainly covers Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Yemen and western Afghanistan, where the Shiite population is majority or near-majority. 

Iran wants to have nuclear weapons in order to somehow maintain its presence in the region and to realize its ultimate goal of the Shiite crescent.

It wants to use the sectarian differences among Muslims in the region and dreams of ruling Sunni states with a Shiite understanding. For this purpose, it is in a constant struggle with Saudi Arabia and its allied countries. Moreover, in its struggle with Yemen, Saudi Arabia has started to voice its allegations that Iran is supporting the Houthis more loudly. Saudi Arabia has begun to see Iran as a major threat against it in the region.

Iran wants to transport its oil and natural gas reserves to the Mediterranean via pipelines and sell them to EU countries through the ports located there. With this trade, Iran wants to develop its economy and turn the formations in the region in its favor.

Iran wants to break all kinds of embargoes imposed on it by the US and its allies.

It wants to close the wounds in its economy as a result of its war with Iraq by operating in these commercial routes.

Iran sees Israel as the biggest source of problems in the transportation of oil and natural gas lines to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Iran defines Saudi Arabia as a rival because it is the largest oil producer in the region and because of its sectarian differences.