How Israel can strike Iranian nuclear facilities "unseen" with F-35I Adir

Israel has been a de facto F-35 Lightning II user since 2017

On 22 May 2018, Israeli Air Force Commander Amikam Norkin announced that the F-35I stealth fighter jets were flying two combat missions simultaneously on "different fronts" and that they were the first country to use F-35 fighter jets in combat. The commander shared a photograph of an F-35 flying over Beirut with the press members as proof. However, he did not share details about the content of the missions. However, it is known that the incident referred to by the Air Force Commander was on 9 May 2018, when F-35Is took part in air strikes against Iranian forces in Syria. This was the first time that F-35s were used in a combat mission, and by the Israeli Army.

In fact, the F-35I Adir (Mighty One, in Turkish Muktedir) was built as an almost brand new F-35 variant according to the additional requirements and specifications of the Israeli Air Force. The F-35Is have a different refuelling port and parachutes for short field landings. In addition, the F-35s purchased by Israel have been modified to carry more payload and have a larger operational radius than conventional F-35s. With these modifications, Israel had to pay a high price of 110 to 125 million USD per F-35. In today's conditions, when the F-35A's have fallen to approximately 68 million USD, it is estimated that the amount Israel will pay per aircraft for the F-35Is could be 85 million USD.

Such additional specifications adapted to the F-35Is are actually not a new practice for aerospace companies. In the past, modifications have also been made to fourth generation fighter aircraft such as the Su-30, F-15 and F-16 in line with customer requirements. Depending on a country's air force doctrine and strategic priorities, additional improvements can be made in addition to avionics and weapons. This is how special variants began to appear in fighter aircraft. Within the framework of this understanding, the F-35I Adir was produced as a new variant based on the F-35A by Lockheed Martin with the approval of the US Government. Although the Israeli aircraft are still officially recognised as F-35A, it is known that these aircraft are almost a new variant and are called F-35I Adir.

Israel 'indigenises' fighter jets traditionally purchased from foreign countries

The Israeli Army traditionally requires modifications to be made to the fighter aircraft it purchases according to its own needs. These modifications can sometimes be carried out by the Israeli Aerospace Industry (IAI), if the manufacturer agrees. For example, Israel currently operates F-15I Ra'ams ("Thunder"), which are modified F-15s, and a special variant, the two-seat F-16I Sufa fighter aircraft. In 1981, for example, Israel modified the then-new F-15A Eagle air superiority aircraft, which did not have bomb-dropping capability, to convert them into bombers. According to some allegations, the F-15I Ra'ams, which were given bomb-dropping capability, bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in the same year, together with F-16s. Currently, the Israeli Air Force has 25 F-15Is and 50 F-15s of other F-15 A/B/C/D variants in its inventory.

Although Lockheed-Martin is a programme partner of F-35 user countries other than the United States and has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to the development of the aircraft, Lockheed-Martin does not agree with the specifications requested by any of these countries in the F-35, and does not allow special modifications in this context in principle. For this reason, it cites the additional costs and delays that would result from creating separate variants specific to user countries as justification. Indeed, managing the production schedule of this multinational fifth-generation joint bomber, producing the parts needed for the maintenance and sustainment of the aircraft, and managing the overall logistics flow without disrupting the overall logistics flow are already extremely challenging for Lockheed Martin. I am of the opinion that if the special production F-35s come into play, it may become almost impossible to manage the F-35 programme, which is still running slowly.

Nevertheless, Israel has managed to create an exception. Although it was not an investor in the development of the F-35, Tel Aviv nevertheless did not delay in joining the programme with an initial order of 50 units. It has also signed an agreement, on very favourable terms for Israel, under which billions of dollars worth of F-35 wings and sophisticated helmet kits will be produced in Israel, and the funds for this will be transferred from US military aid. With this agreement, it was also decided to establish one of the factory-level maintenance facilities of the F-35 in Israel. 

Israel Increases the Number of F-35s in Its Inventory to 75

The milestones of the F-35 procurement programme under the agreement signed between Israel and the United States were as follows:

2010: Israel became the first country to select the F-35 through the US government's Foreign Military Sales process

2016: Israel Air Force receives its first F-35I ADIR in the USA

2016: The first Israeli F-35, known as the F-35I ADIR AS-1, flew in Fort Worth, TX

2016: The first two F-35 "Adir" arrived at Nevatim Air Base

2017: Israel Air Force declares Initial Operational Capability (IOC)

In this context, the first nine F-35 aircraft belonging to Israel were deployed in combat readiness at Nevatim Air Base near Be'er Sheva on 6 December 2017. The remaining six aircraft were delivered in 2018. Thus, the first Israeli F-35I squadron was activated at this air base. Israel has so far added 39 F-35 fighter jets to its inventory. In accordance with the agreement, 11 more F-35 aircraft will be delivered to Israel until the end of 2024 in accordance with the contract schedule. Thus, the Israeli Air Force, which has activated two F-35I squadrons, has declared to the Israeli Government that it needs a third F-35I squadron. In this context, the Israeli Government announced that a contract worth 3 billion USD was signed with the US Government in early July 2023 for the purchase of 25 F-35 Lightning II fighter jets and additional systems/weapons. Meanwhile, it was reported that these aircraft will be financed by the defence aid package that Israel receives from the United States. With the new order, it is aimed to increase the number of F-35s in the inventory of the Israeli Air Force to 75 and to increase the number of squadrons to three.

According to the original contract, the first 19 F-35s received by Israel were supposed to be identical to the standard F-35As used by the US Air Force, while the next 31 were to be modified F-35Is. However, most media sources claimed that all aircraft would be F-35Is and that the F-35s would operate in Israel in accordance with Israeli standards. As a matter of fact, as soon as the first batch of F-35s arrived in Israel, they were retrofitted with an open architecture Israeli Command, Control, Communications and Computing (C4) system.

As is well known, the sophisticated flight computer and the global logistics system ALIS on the F-35, which force user countries to depend on the US, are seen as a problematic area by many F-35 user countries. Users want more access to the source codes of the F-35's mission computer. Thus, they want to be able to plan and execute operational missions in line with their own national needs without the knowledge and involvement of the US, and in a sense, without permission from the US. On the other hand, Lockheed Martin does not want to give full access to the source codes to any country for commercial, confidentiality and flight safety reasons.

Lockheed Martin Gives F-35 Source Codes to Israel

While Lockheed Martin has not given this access to anyone else, it has opened, or had to open, the doors wide to Israel. Israeli F-35Is will have an Israeli-made C4 programme running "on top" of Lockheed's operating system. One of the F-35's core capabilities comes from its superior ability to collect data with its sensors and share it with friendly forces. Israel would like to be part of this sharing group. Israel attaches importance to the compatibility of its own system with the data links used by friendly air and ground forces, and considers it necessary to receive the location information of enemy surface-to-surface rocket launchers and surface-to-air missile systems from the F-35 common information pool, and does not want to lose this right. Therefore, Israel is the only country that has the right both to use its own national mission computer and to benefit from the F-35 data bank of allied countries.

The new system also allows the IDF to install defensive avionics systems such as Israeli-made data links and radar jamming pods. The IDF places particular emphasis on the flexibility to install defensive countermeasures, such as jamming pods, on a "plug and play" basis as they become available and appropriate. Israeli companies Elbit and IAI, Israel Aerospace Industries, are among the main developers of such systems. However, due to the F-35's highly "unified" avionics, such plug-and-play support must be built into both the F-35 software and, apparently, into the airframe. The attachments are mounted in special openings in the lower part of the fuselage and on the leading edge of the wings. 

Israel has also developed two different external fuel tanks to extend the operational radius of the F-35. The first of these is the 425-gallon external fuel tanks developed by Elbit's subsidiary, which are carried under the wing. These fuel tanks can be jettisoned while approaching enemy airspace. Thus, the aircraft's low visibility will be regained when entering enemy airspace, and it will be possible to increase the range when visible with external fuel tanks. IAI, together with Lockheed, has developed bolted conformal fuel tanks (similar to F-16 conformal fuel tanks) that "hug" the F-35 fuselage (similar to F-16 conformal fuel tanks) in order not to compromise low visibility and airframe aerodynamics.

The F-35I can also carry the 60-mile range SPICE family of ammunition, notably the Python-5 short-range heat-seeking IR air-to-air missile, as well as important Israeli-developed weapons in the internal weapons bay.

Israel is not the only country that has been granted the right to integrate its own weapons into the F-35. The British Royal Air Force and Navy can also use the Meteor and ASM-132 air-to-air missiles of the F-35s in the country's inventory. Meanwhile, it is known that Norway's and Australia's F-35s can carry the Norwegian Sea Attack Missile, enabling them to successfully perform maritime control missions. The US, which sometimes finds special integrations in this sense favourable from its own point of view, may ask some of its NATO partners to purchase specially modified F-35s (incurring more financial burden) in order to be able to drop B-61 nuclear bombs.

What is Israel's Strategy in the Adir Context?

Norkin's announcement of F-35 operations was as integral to Israeli strategy as the actual deployment of the fighter jets. Tel Aviv wanted to show that the new F-35 fighter jets in the inventory of the Israeli Air Force are now capable of infiltrating the airspace of its potential enemies (mainly Iran, Syria and Hezbollah) without anyone noticing. He wants them to know that these low-visibility stealth aircraft can 'come out of the blue' and that enemy radars will not be able to detect them until the first bomb dropped from the F-35s hits its target.

Compared to earlier fourth-generation jets, the F-35 Lightning II is seen as a 'mediocre' aircraft in terms of speed and manoeuvrability, and has been criticised for its poor flight performance compared to some fourth-generation aircraft. The F-35 is expected to engage in dogfights with high-performance fourth-generation fighters at line-of-sight distances, using IR air-to-air missiles and, when necessary, machine guns to eliminate enemy aircraft. The F-35, which was not built for dogfighting in line of sight, and is therefore not naturally very good at it, is criticised. Its supporters, on the other hand, argue that the F-35's low visibility, sensor fusion and long-range missiles will enable it to easily outmanoeuvre its more manoeuvrable, agile and agile opponents from a distance, strike targets in a high-intensity threat environment without being damaged, easily evade enemy missiles, that its primary function is to strike its assigned surface targets without being seen, and that the F-35's capabilities have been optimised to perform a wide range of air operations missions.

From the Israeli perspective, they would like to see a more effective war machine for air-to-ground bombing missions. This is because the emphasis on air-to-ground attack is a priority mission area for the Israeli Air Force. Historically, since 1948, when Israel declared its independence, the Israeli Air Force has mostly defeated its airborne opponents in air-to-air battles. However, in bombing missions, the situation can be somewhat unfavourable to Israel. For example, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Air Force suffered heavy losses against Soviet-made air defence weapons and systems deployed on the ground. Since then, Israeli jets have found it necessary to be always on the alert against enemy SAMs before their numerous bombing missions to Lebanon and Syria. To this end, they have emphasised intelligence activities based on ELINT capabilities to learn the locations of SAM and anti-aircraft positions. Only thanks to this care, the operational plans were successfully implemented.

Nevertheless, 100 per cent success is not always possible. In February 2018, for the first time in decades, Israel lost a fighter jet when Syrian S-200 missiles shot down an Israeli F-16. After entering Israel's inventory, there were rumours of F-35s participating in such strikes, but it was risky to appear over enemy territory at this early stage with F-35s that were not yet ready. Neither Israel nor the United States could risk losing an aircraft over Syria or Lebanon. From this point of view, most of these rumours were probably untrue.

What are the chances of an unseen attack on Iran with F-35I Adir?

Apart from a brief period in between, Prime Minister Benjamin Nethanyahu, in power since 2009, has continued to favour the use of military force to suppress Iran's nuclear research programme, opposing negotiated solutions and openly undermining them when necessary. For years, Tel Aviv has basically made no secret of its desire for the United States to be part of such a strategic offensive. Now, with the F-35Is in its possession, capable of reaching longer distances than regular F-35s, it is likely that, from now on, elements of the Israeli Air Force will be able to strike Iranian nuclear facilities without the United States.

Of course, such an operational mission is still not easy. In order to reach Iranian airspace six hundred miles away, Israeli aircraft would have to pass through Turkey or Jordan and Syria to reach Iraq, from where they could strike Iran. In addition, additional flights and bombing raids could be carried out to reach targets deep inside Iran. Such a mission requires planning that exceeds the operational radius of the current combat-loaded fourth-generation fighter jets. Therefore, aerial refuelling tanker aircraft are needed to carry out such a mission. In addition, Israeli warplanes need to clear the corridors through which the aircraft will pass, neutralising or destroying Iranian air defences. All this requires an intertwined range of missions and aircraft planning in accordance with the requirements of the missions.

In September 2007, Israeli jets violated Turkish airspace, allegedly to destroy a nuclear reactor in northern Syria. I assume and accept that in those years there was some prior coordination and/or information with the Turkish authorities about the use of this airspace. However, in the current circumstances, striking Iranian nuclear facilities requires a more complex operational planning than striking Osirak in 1981 or Syrian targets in 2007. It would require the use of the airspace of more countries, and obtaining such authorisations in today's conditions is, above all, not guaranteed. Political negotiations for authorisations would make a raid-style air campaign against Iran almost impossible. Even the deaf will hear what will be done and when. Iran makes the necessary preparations and welcomes the Israeli aircraft. The chances of a successful operation are greatly reduced.

Here, F-35I fighters seemingly come to Israel's rescue. However, F-35Is cannot carry external payloads and/or external close-in tanks without compromising low visibility. If F-35Is are to be sent to the target area with external fuel tanks (beastmode), they will undoubtedly have a larger operational envelope than conventional fourth-generation bombers. Moreover, F-35Is can penetrate Iran's air defences more easily than fourth-generation jets, and can also use their airspace without being detected by neutral countries. The bombing of nuclear facilities by F-35I7s means that the number of aircraft in the package strike arm to be formed in this context should be as few as possible, so that a mission can be planned with a smaller package that is less likely to be visible to enemy radars.

Conclusion

In any case, I believe that it is unlikely that Israeli aircraft will be able to strike Iranian nuclear facilities unseen in the near future, despite the advantage of the F-35Is' larger operating radius and higher weapons carrying capacity. On the other hand, I foresee that, with a secret agreement with the Iraqi government, Iranian nuclear facilities can be easily struck unseen by F-35Is to be temporarily deployed in northern Iraq. Let's see what time will show.