India's Future Place, Russia-China Axis or Western Camp?

Modi's Visit to Putin

Nowadays, there are countless readings, analyses and evaluations that the world is heading towards a great war. Within the framework of these arguments, it is possible to say that the international system flows in its own natural course and that history repeats itself in cycles. In this context, I am of the opinion that if there is to be a great war, first of all, the states of the world should split into two big camps among themselves and turn towards alliance. In this respect, I consider that the Western alliance has largely matured militarily under the roof of NATO, and that it is in the interests of Western countries to preserve the status quo. I believe that the possibility of reshuffling the stones in the world can come to the agenda if and only if China is at the centre of the greatest power that will implement revisionist policies and ideas against the status quo. In this respect, I see the fact that the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation structures do not yet offer a China-centred power-building model as a chance for our world, at least in the context of preventing a major war. However, the way things are going, sooner or later, there is a serious expectation that the China-centred structure will turn towards revisionist policies and put an end to the West's 500-year order of exploitation and imperialism. However, we need to see that a China acting with the dynamics of Western imperialism cannot be a saviour to end the order of exploitation in the world.

In this context, I consider it useful to understand the nature and function of alliances, to make efforts to anticipate change, to calculate systemic risks, to avoid them when necessary, and to work towards this end. If wars drive the course of history, we can say that alliance dynamics directly or indirectly drive wars by changing the balance of power and creating opportunities for geopolitical adventures or imperial projects. For example, one of the most important questions in international relations today is the future of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) bloc I have just mentioned. Intertwined with this is the even more critical strategic issue of what is sometimes referred to as the China-Russia ‘axis’, ‘alignment’ or even ‘alliance’. The question of how India, as a member of the loosely organised BRICS, views and will view a real China-Russia axis is important. On the road to a possible major war, the side India will take and the attitude it will adopt will be of central importance.

In this respect, I think it would be useful to keep an eye on India and Modi, who is at the helm of this country and who is sitting in the prime minister's chair for the third term. Modi made his first foreign visit to Russia after being sworn in, to visit Putin. This visit was not unexpected. Yet, it was greeted with serious concern and curiosity in geopolitical circles around the world. Apart from routine bilateral issues such as energy, connectivity, trade payments system, healthcare and defence cooperation, the focus of Modi's visit this time was expected to be on a highly critical and sensitive factor - China.

What Can Russia Benefit India?

After the 2020 border clash, relations between Delhi and Beijing deteriorated and never got back on track. I assess that India prefers to resolve border issues through negotiations and diplomacy rather than fighting with China. While there are benefits and drawbacks to India's alliance with the West against China, in the near term, India's priority may be to open a back-channel dialogue route to Beijing through Moscow. Regardless of the outcome, Russia's ‘invasion’ of Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, has divided the world in terms of alliances, and the divisions in the international system have become almost clear.

It seems that Russia has no choice but to side with China. It has become almost impossible for it to act alone and maintain its strategic autonomy. Due to Western sanctions, Moscow is dependent on Beijing's policies for its energy revenues. For Russia, China stands out as its key ally against the West. An important pillar of Putin's vision of a multipolar world order (revisionist discourse), which challenges the US-led Western world order and which has been frequently voiced by Putin since 2007, is the world policy pursued and to be pursued by Xi. Therefore, in the event of a possible war between China and India, Russia's support for India against China is not seen as a very likely option. It is known that India has been seeking to further improve its relations with the Western World especially after 2014. Despite the historical, special and privileged partnership between Delhi and Moscow, especially in the defence industry, I think the Modi administration does not expect Russia to stand by India against China.

Nevertheless, it may be beneficial for Delhi to keep the Moscow channel open in the context of a potential Sino-Indian conflict. New Delhi's strategic autonomy, its geographical location, its developing technological power, its large and increasingly powerful army and its rapidly growing economy shape Indian policies. Having become a stronger and more credible international actor than in the past, India has the potential to be a game-changer for all the world's great powers seeking alliances. Whether it is Russia and the West, Iran and Israel, or the countries of the ‘Global South’, the opposing powers have to constantly take New Delhi into their calculations. Winning India will make the winning side stronger. India's rising unique position in world politics is a matter that will be shaped depending on Xi's victory over Modi, if a strong Russia-China axis is to be built. Therefore, China's progress without ‘losing’ India is first and foremost directly related to its own high interests. In this context, Moscow can indirectly listen to New Delhi and play an important role in conveying India's messages to Beijing with the right arguments.

For India, Russia is a reliable strategic partner. I find it significant that during the recent India-US tensions over India's purchase of Russian oil, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, in defence of India's decision, said:

"Russia has never harmed India's interests. Powers like Europe, the US, China or Japan have had their ups and downs in their relations with Russia. We have had a stable and always very friendly relationship with Russia. Our relations with Russia today are based on this experience."

Uncertainty Persists in India's Geopolitical Orientation

However, in a possible Sino-Indian war, Russia could remain neutral for a while, but given its current dependence on Beijing, it is arguable that Russia cannot remain neutral indefinitely. In this case, in line with Beijing's expectations, the Kremlin could stop selling oil and defence equipment to India, which could trigger a major collapse for the Russian economy, which is already under pressure from Western sanctions. Russia's possible orientation in this direction would push India to strengthen its ties with the West. In the end, India's complete shift towards the US camp will harm Russia.

In this context, in Putin's vision of a multipolar world order, India, which was once the leader of the third world countries in the bipolar Cold War environment, is a strong candidate to become an independent pole. India's overt shift towards the Western camp would bring about consequences that would undermine Russia's vision of a multipolar world. Russia also has a history of border disputes and wars with China. China is Russia's geopolitical rival in Turkestan and Eurasia. China's expansion in these regions, which have traditionally been Russia's political and cultural domain, is always a source of concern for Moscow. In this respect, India can be a key counterweight for Russia in its policies towards China in these regions. Losing India to the West would eliminate this possibility for Russia and make Russia even more vulnerable vis-à-vis China and increase Russia's dependence on Greater China, a candidate to become the world's central power.

On the other hand, for New Delhi, conducting diplomacy through Washington could provoke China and further increase its distrust of India. On the other hand, a Russia that appreciates India's dynamics and future vision may see it as a more realistic policy to side with India against China when necessary. This is why Modi's visit to Moscow was important. However, given Moscow's dependence on Beijing, it is to be expected that Beijing will continue to keep Russia close by for its anti-India influence operations through back-channel dialogues.

Keeping this reality in mind, it can be argued that the Russian channel will not work out well for India. An alliance with the US may be seen as the only way to counter China. Considering that Modi's traditional line is to pursue a pro-US policy, I believe that he continues to see building a strong bond between Washington and New Delhi as a top priority. On the other hand, considering India's security-intelligence needs against China in the near term, I believe that Modi also sees engagement with China through Moscow as imperative.

Conclusion

In geopolitics, no one foresees the development of permanent solutions. Problems can only be kept at a manageable level until conditions change. Final solutions can only be achieved at the cost of very big wars. Therefore, in the short term, the challenge for India is to manage the border problems in the Himalayas without a war with China. Avoiding conflict, but perhaps being sufficiently prepared for it, could be the main idea of this strategy.

However, India may definitely have to choose its side in the next 10 years, if not today. With the ruptures in the Indo-Pacific region and the US-led quest for containment and strategic balancing of China, India is expected to be in the Western camp. Preventing any hegemon from dominating the region may be a priority foreign policy orientation for India, and resorting to subtle means of external balancing may yield small gains for New Delhi. Instead of fully aligning with a single bloc, India may wish to pursue multiple alignments and endeavour to increase its weight in global politics. On the other hand, New Delhi is aware that it is difficult to make progress on technological development, climate change, economic growth and defence without strong engagement with Western powers. For India, which seeks to engage on equal terms through multilateral forums and without being bracketed within them, being in the Western camp would be tantamount to trying to navigate a minefield. New Delhi, which is expected to move forward without stepping on landmines, needs to read the main fault lines and ruptures in the Indo-Pacific region well.

In this context, every step to strengthen the Moscow-New Delhi line will be beneficial for India to gain strength against China. Being aware of this, Modi's first visit to Moscow and his message to Putin ‘I support your multipolar vision’ have been in India's interest in order to achieve palliative outcomes in the near term. In the long term, if the Russia-China axis is actually built, I expect India to be tested with a fork in the road. New Delhi will try to act with the discourse of a multipolar world until the day when it will have to say either the Western alliance or the Russia-China alliance.