Is India Integrating into the West?

Given the increasing Chinese investments on Indian soil in recent years, and the development of bilateral relations even in the defense industry, the China-India axis was no longer about conflict, but about cooperation and joint economic development and growth. However, in June 2020, in the Galwan Valley, a rugged terrain along the two countries' disputed common border, there was a limited-scale clash between the Chinese and Indian armies. It left 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers dead. In fact, the clash almost disrupted bilateral relations between the two countries, which had been building for years. 

However, record bilateral trade and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to India in March 2022 gave more weight to the idea that the two countries could put aside the border dispute and continue to boost bilateral ties and strengthen common bonds. Subsequently, Chinese and Indian officials met in the Ladakh region in September this year. They agreed that Indian and Chinese troops holding positions on both sides of the border would withdraw to their pre-conflict positions. These were always read as signs that relations between the two countries were beginning to normalize.

However, some analysts do not see this rapprochement as realistic and believe that it does nothing more than cover up the existing fractures and fault lines between the two countries. This is because Indian policymakers, shocked by the outbreak of the conflict in 2020, have been accusing China, albeit indirectly, of returning to its aggressive policies in relation to the latest conflict. India's domestic and foreign policy is therefore aimed at reorienting itself to a growing Chinese threat, within the framework of the threat perception affected by this conflict. Contrary to appearances, New Delhi is therefore unlikely to support the restoration of the previous status quo in bilateral relations. For the foreseeable future, India's view of China has tended to change. In the words of former Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, India has now shifted from "coexistence in the shadow of arms" to "competitive coexistence" in its relationship with China. 

China annexed Tibet (Himalayan province), which belonged to India, in 1951. Since then, Tibet and other border disputes have led India to perceive China as a threat. These disputes led to a full-scale war in 1962, which resulted in India losing territory. However, after a crisis in 1986-87, New Delhi and Beijing made a concerted effort to overcome their differences. A relatively peaceful period began. This détente also allowed for greater Sino-Indian cooperation, especially in the economic and multilateral arenas. However, after Chinese President Xi Jinping took office in 2012, there were minor military clashes between the two countries in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2017. In these years, China and India competed for positions in bilateral relations with South Asian countries and in international organizations. This rivalry in foreign relations has put border disputes back on the agenda of the two countries. 

Especially after the conflict in 2020, as the Indian side saw China's growing power and the rapidly growing Chinese defense industry products in comparison to its own, it started to worry that Chinese forces could one day enter Indian territory with a massive attack. This breakdown of trust and unease on the Indian side, rather than the Chinese, will inevitably have long-term implications for the broader relationship between the two countries.

Beijing, for its part, believes that the two countries can overcome their differences. Indeed, China considers that the withdrawal of troops from some points of friction should be seen as an opportunity. In this context, Beijing has called for the border crisis to be put aside and diplomatic, defense and economic cooperation between the two countries to resume. 

However, India does not believe that the border issue can be put aside. It sees peace and tranquility on the border as a prerequisite for a normal Sino-Indian relationship. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's failure to meet Xi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in September, the first time such a meeting has not taken place, is a clear sign that India is not yet willing to do business as usual with China.

The 2020 conflict has hardened the view of China in India, including among the new generation for whom the 1962 Sino-Indian war is a distant memory. The border clashes have convinced many Indians that China is an imminent and serious threat to their country. Indeed, recent events have raised questions about the validity of the idea that the two countries can ease political tensions through border agreements and economic cooperation. 

New Delhi is showing signs of shifting more and more towards the Western axis. In its bilateral relations with the United States on strengthening certain military capabilities, infrastructure and partnerships, India is now showing signs of moving away from the fear of provoking China. China, uncomfortable with this situation, prefers to reinforce its troops along the Indian border. Thus, India continues to perceive China as a hostile and unreliable actor. In terms of international relations, the "security dilemma" problem started to emerge between Beijing and New Delhi after the conflict in 2020.

The fact that both sides are no longer willing to reduce military measures on the border between the two countries points to a protracted insecurity. The fact that both sides have reinforced their military presence on the border, deploying more troops in the border region in a state of advanced readiness than before 2020, plays a role in triggering possible new conflicts between the parties. The Sino-Indian border has also tended to turn into a "military structure" similar to the Pakistan-India border. Beijing and New Delhi are increasing their military buildup and continue to construct military infrastructure along the entire border region, facing each other. 

The growing concern about China is also reflected in India's domestic politics. The Modi government has shifted from initially seeking to increase economic ties with China to imposing restrictions or more rigorous scrutiny on a range of Chinese activities in India. In a way, this approach seems to be aimed at separating India from China; while not eliminating economic ties, it aims to help India identify vulnerabilities in critical sectors and increase national corrective measures. Despite New Delhi's approach, bilateral trade between the two countries is already at a record high. However, it is noteworthy that India's trade with China grew about 15 percent slower than its trade with the rest of the world last year. 

The most important outcome of the shift has been that Indian authorities have begun to impose restrictions on Chinese investment, Chinese access to public procurement in India, and the activities of Chinese companies or organizations in critical economic, technology, telecommunications, civil society and education sectors. Indian state governments and state-owned companies have suspended or withdrawn from a number of deals with Chinese companies. India has banned several popular Chinese apps, including the social media platform TikTok, within Indian borders. It excluded Chinese telecommunications companies from its 5G network. Indian enforcement authorities have also started targeting Chinese companies for alleged tax or data transfer violations.

Tensions with Beijing are pushing New Delhi to reduce its economic dependence on China. The Modi government has pushed for bilateral trade and investment agreements with Australia, Canada, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the European Union. India has also stepped up its pursuit of investment not only in the West but also in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. Meanwhile, the aim is to boost domestic production in sectors such as solar energy, pharmaceuticals and electronics and reduce over-reliance on imports from China.

New Delhi prefers greater engagement in defense, economic security and critical technology with countries that can help strengthen its position vis-à-vis China. These partners include Australia, France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In the new situation, New Delhi has tended to move away from its long-standing approach of "maintaining its strategic autonomy" and "refusing to enter alliances". India, in particular, is no longer as averse as it used to be to being part of alliances. India now seems willing to cooperate more closely with the US, even at the cost of angering China. This also suits the Biden administration, which is trying to make almost all countries in the Indo-Pacific region its allies against China.

India signed an intelligence agreement with the United States in October 2020. The Indian military began conducting high-altitude intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance exercises with the US military near the Sino-Indian border. New Delhi has become more engaged in the Indo-Pacific partnership (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) and has not hesitated to conduct joint naval exercises with these three countries, despite Chinese and Russian objections.

It also signed a logistics sharing agreement with Vietnam in June 2022. In January this year, it reached an agreement to sell BrahMos missiles (jointly developed by India and Russia) to the Philippines.

The Modi government has also taken a series of decisions that could be read against China in the international community, showing that it is not as attentive to China's sensitivities as it used to be. Modi openly held talks with Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. India has taken a stance criticizing China on East Turkestan. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs shifted its policy to emphasize that the UN human rights report highlighted the "serious mistreatment of minorities" in China and that Beijing should take corrective action. There has been a shift to criticizing China on Taiwan. It refused to support the One China policy and warned China not to take unilateral decisions.

With the 2020 border crisis, New Delhi has become more receptive to US military power and presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. In recent years, New Delhi has welcomed the US-Maldivian defense agreement, allowed the refueling of an American reconnaissance aircraft in the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, supported the US-Nepal Millennium Challenge Corporation agreement aimed at facilitating infrastructure development, and warmed to the AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) formation established in September 2021 to counter China. India has also tended to support new diplomatic, security and economic initiatives against China and to increase cooperation with other countries, such as the United States and Japan, in the context of countering the growing Chinese influence in neighboring South Asian countries.

It seems that India is now more interested in rapprochement with the United States and the hegemon's traditional allies. Meanwhile, New Delhi appears to be gradually weakening its ties with international groups and organizations backed by China and Russia. It is distancing itself from the non-Western platforms of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), RIC (Russia, India and China) and the SCO. Previously, India felt ignored by the West and saw value in being part of these organizations. Today, however, India sees China as a greater constraint on its regional and global interests than any Western country. 

In a way, India has accelerated its break with China, but it is difficult for India to break with Russia, especially in the short term. It is already dependent on Russia as a defense trade and technology partner. This is not expected to be overcome immediately. For this reason, New Delhi, which does not hesitate to criticize China in a balanced manner on Taiwan, is hesitant to openly criticize Moscow, which began its occupation of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and to support sanctions against this country contrary to American expectations. From the perspective of Indian policymakers, the flexibility to make moves that could anger Russia does not yet seem possible.

As India's policy vis-à-vis China and Russia is becoming clearer, it is nonetheless not in the interest of long-term Indian policy to confront these two countries head-on. New Delhi still needs to see and test how far American policies can coincide with its own interests.  Up to this point, India has wanted to pursue a balanced policy; in the near term, it seems that siding with the West against China is more in line with India's rights and interests. However, it would not be correct to say that Mode's policy, which is nowadays oriented towards the West and has become almost fully aligned with the US in particular, will end with full integration into the West for the time being. India's traditional political and military posture will not allow this, unlike today's India, which is trying to be part of the Western picture. Because of its past leadership capacity towards third world countries, its ability to steer the non-aligned movement, and its willingness to maintain its strategic autonomy and flexibility, I believe that India will aim for and maintain as much balance as possible in global political and military mobilization.