Israel's Strategic Goal for a Century: Litani River-Lebanon

During the mandate period, much effort was made to increase the capacity of Palestine to accommodate more immigration. At that time, the Litani River was included in the French Mandate territory and was not included as part of the future Jewish Homeland.

A 1927 edition of the magazine Palästina contained a report by the agronomist Herman Hirsch on the fertiliser situation in Palestine (1). It mentioned the possibility of developing means of producing saltpeter, a process that would require a lot of electricity, but that "perhaps the Litani in northern Palestine might be suitable for this purpose". The reference to a water source outside the borders of the Jewish Homeland demonstrated the strong position the Litani River held in Zionist thinking. This interest continued afterwards.

The Litani was not forgotten by the Zionist leadership. Speaking at an extraordinary Zionist conference in 1942, David Ben-Gurion, then head of the Jewish Agency (i.e. the cabinet), outlined his views on the future of Palestine after the Second World War. Among the topics discussed was agricultural production, and according to Ben-Gurion, the greatest potential lay in the Negev desert in the south of Palestine. The rivers from which water could be brought were considered to be the rivers in the north (Yarkon, Jordan, Yarmouk, Litani)" (2).

The subject has already been briefly touched upon, but strong Zionist strategies for obtaining water from outside the Jewish Homeland also emerged.

The Zionists also invited the US soil conservationist Walter Clay Lowdermilk to help develop the land resource. Walter Clay Lowdermilk's Palestine: Land of Promise, published in 1944. This report would play an important role in Israel's later water plans. In the report, Lowdermilk also summarised his proposals for improving the capacity of the Palestinian territories to accommodate Jewish immigrants (3).

In his report, Lowdermilk proposed the establishment of a Jordan Valley Authority, modelled on the US project for the Tennessee Valley Authority. This proposal involved treating the Jordan River basin as a whole and finding comprehensive solutions for all water uses.

The Water Security Plan at the Founding of Israel

With the 1917 Balfour Declaration, Zionist leaders, having received the promise of a 'Jewish National Home' to be established in the mandate territory of Palestine, demanded in 1919 to change the borders drawn after the Declaration. More precisely, they demanded that important water resources be included in the Palestine mandate and then in the Jewish state.

The Zionist leaders tried to draw the borders of Israel, which had not yet been established, according to the water basins and to include the Litani River within these borders. This demand was rejected and the water problem became urgent as the population in the region increased considerably as a result of Jewish immigration. In order to solve the water scarcity problem, Israel implemented a project that violated international agreements. The Lowdermilk Plan (1944) envisaged unilaterally diverting the waters of the Jordan River and diverting them out of the basin, providing water to Jewish settlements and irrigating the Najaf Desert to make it suitable for agriculture. Begun in 1953, the Israeli National Water Carrier, which is still in operation today and which has caused conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbours, was constructed according to the Lowdermilk plan. With this 130-kilometre-long water carrier, consisting of giant pipelines, open canals, underground tunnels and pumping stations,Israel connected water resources in the north of the country with agricultural land in the south.

The impact of the Litani River on Israeli politics

The Litani River has a special place in Zionism and was a strategic objective pursued before and after the establishment of Israel.

There were two different Zionist and Israeli perspectives on the Litani River. Although the goal was the same, the reasons for this goal differed. Those who viewed the issue from the perspective of water security emphasised taking the water of the Litani River and were relatively less interested in the South Lebanese territories.

Those who were interested in South Lebanon prioritised the purchase of land there, and attached more importance to the Litani River from a military strategic point of view. These tendencies became evident as early as the Paris Peace Conference. In 1919, the agronomist Aaron Aaronsohn pioneered this path. He had studied Palestine and South Lebanon and was convinced that the Litani River was necessary to secure the future of the Jewish Homeland. His main concern was economic, and this meant water supply. Weizmann, who had shown great interest in the town of Sidon until the conference, finally accepted and supported Aaronsohn's proposal to demarcate the southern line of the town. There were those who, for political and strategic reasons, still argued for a more northerly border, but their ideas were not accepted.

Throughout the Mandate period, differences of opinion on this issue became more pronounced, but still in the form of different tendencies rather than outright opposition. During this period there were reports advocating the use of the Litani as if it flowed through the territory of Palestine. The Israeli approach of extending its interests northwards, towards South Lebanon, seemed to be generally approved on both sides.

The Zionists began to develop hydroelectric power projects. These plans either did not take the Litani into account or proposed co-operation with Lebanon for the joint use of the river. These reports suggested border adjustments to include the tributaries of the Jordan River.

However, the Litani belonged to a different basin and controlling it at its source was not among the proposals. This was in contrast to the proposal of David Ben-Gurion, who spoke of diverting the Litani into the Negev Desert. According to Ben-Gurion, the Jewish Homeland extended to the Litani, but his interest in the river was primarily due to its military strategic importance. He had made this point as early as 1918, and throughout his long political career he did not change this view. In the period between his two terms as Prime Minister, he further developed this idea. His new plan was to occupy South Lebanon as far as the Litani and, in alliance with the loyal Maronite government in Beirut, to take the first steps towards breaking up the Arab unity against Israel.

In the 1948 war, the Israeli Army (IDF) reached the Litani, but did not attempt to occupy all of South Lebanon and withdrew under ceasefire agreements. The approach of later expansion into Lebanon was not generally approved in Israel (a view also expressed by Ben-Gurion). The reasons for this difference of opinion were explained at the time as the many difficulties such an expansion would entail, as well as the hope for an agreement with Lebanon.

Israeli water or territorial strategies towards South Lebanon

Both at the time of the signing of the ceasefire agreement and in the first few years afterwards, there was hope for such an agreement in Israeli circles. It was thought that Lebanon might be willing to accept both peace and water co-operation. This approach proved predominant among those who saw the issue in terms of the Litani water. By the mid-1950s, however, it became increasingly clear that there would be no co-operation with Lebanon. The Israelis argued for the inclusion of the Litani River in the US Johnston Plan for the Jordan River initiative, but without much success. In the second round of talks, Johnston rejected Israel's claim to the Litani, but recognised another key point in the negotiations: It was agreed that Israel should be allowed to divert Jordanian water out of the basin to irrigate the Najaf Desert. This was bound to provoke Arab protests. Neither the Litani issue nor the question of out-of-basin utilisation was raised again in subsequent negotiations. The Johnston Negotiations did not lead to any formal agreement, but became an important reference point for how the Jordan River Basin could be shared among the riparian states.

With these developments, the Litani River became politically inaccessible, the orientation towards South Lebanon shifted towards a land perspective and Ben-Gurion's grand plan came to the fore. The different Israeli perspectives of "Water and Land" for South Lebanon were in line with Israel's policy differences. Sharett, representing the dovish wing of the parliament, would have eagerly followed Litani in the Johnston negotiations, but strongly opposed Ben-Gurion's calls for the use of force. The hawks, on the other hand, were not opposed to diplomatic efforts to increase the amount of water available to Israel from a military strategic point of view, but they were still in favour of gaining direct territorial control over the Litani River and South Lebanon.

During this period, those who believed in the "water perspective" were generally more prepared to honour agreements and achieve their goals diplomatically, and were more interested in cooperation. The proposal of the Litani as a war objective came from the land perspective camp, where water played a less important role. However, although Israel was then, as now, the militarily stronger side, it was politically challenged by the fact that the Litani River flows entirely within Lebanon's own borders. Lebanon still holds the political upper hand on this issue.

UNITED STATES: Let the Litani River flow to Gaza

After theJohnston Plan, the United States mentioned to Israel the possibility of discussing the Litani River waters at a later date. Despite Israel's postponement of its claims and its involvement in the Litani River project, the United States was still open to considering the diversion of the Litani, and in February 1955, the American Embassy in Israel pointed out that the Litani waters could improve the situation in the Gaza Strip.

Prospects for the area were bleak, and the report suggested that the only solution for economic development and the permanent settlement of refugees in the Gaza Strip would be the use of the Lebanon River. It noted that this proposal would be made possible by Israel's willingness to allow the diversion of water and Lebanon's willingness to share its water with other Arabs. It was also said that the venture would be expensive, but "no more expensive than Israel's Jordan River water project for the neighbouring Negev. However, the Litani water could not be transferred either to Gaza or to the Negev desert.

Litani River is always on the agenda

The Litani River flows through the history of Zionism and Israel. However, it is difficult to claim that this river is the driving force behind every strategic decision taken by Zionists and Israelis in this region. During Israel's founding period, the Litani River was on the agenda on several occasions, then shelved, only to rise to the top of the agenda again.

For example, Israel's Litani objective was reborn from the ashes of 1956 and in 1978, the Israeli Army entered South Lebanon in an operation with the striking name 'Operation Litani'. In 1982, Israel permanently occupied South Lebanon up to the Litani river. It was said that among a number of factors behind these decisions was Israel's desire to possess the Litani River. Although Israel used the Litani water during this period, it did not divert it to other areas. Although Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, it has not completely abandoned its plans for the Litani.

It is highly likely that the objectives of the expected Israeli military operation in South Lebanon will be different from the previous ones. Depending on the military and political objectives of this operation, Israel may implement its age-old strategy regarding the Litani River. Israel will make its future military security and water security plans according to which lands the Palestinian population in Gaza and the West Bank will be directed to live in.

Will the Negev Desert Alternative come to the agenda?

In October 2023, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi mentioned the Negev (Najaf) Desert as an alternative location for the transfer of Palestinians from Gaza until Israel ends its operations in Gaza.

The area has been mentioned in projects for the mass evacuation of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or in different forms of what are known as 'land swaps'. Experts note that since the 1950s, the idea of the Negev Desert has been proposed as an alternative destination for the expulsion of Palestinians, but to no avail.

The Negev Desert covers more than 14,000 square kilometres in the south of the occupied Palestinian territories, but according to Palestinian estimates, its population does not exceed 100,000. The population of approximately 46 villages here varies between 400 and 5 thousand.

This time, Israel's occupation of Gaza and its planned military operations in South Lebanon will have different lasting objectives from the previous ones. Some of these goals may include shifting the burden of the Palestinian population in Gaza and the West Bank to neighbouring countries, or taking permanent steps towards this goal. However, this is as difficult to achieve today as it was in the past. In this case, Israel could initially partially redirect the Palestinians to the Negev desert. In this way, it can more easily implement the project of social-demographic change and absolute military security in Gaza. It could also shelve previous plans for the water needed in this region. Therefore, Israel's operation in South Lebanon will be a step towards the implementation of the medium and long-term plans prepared on many issues, including the water equation in the region.

Footnotes

(1) Hermann Hirsch. "Palästinensische Düngungsfragen" Palästina Heft 12 1927, www.compactmemory.de, 572-581. "Vielleich wäre dafür der Litani im Norden Palästinas geeignet".

(2) David Ben-Gurion, Palestine in the post-war world: address (London: The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1942), 5-7; Morris 2000, 106-111, 167-173.

(3) See e.g.: Lowi 1993, 45-47; "Hydrostrategic" Territory in the Jordan Basin: Water, War and Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations, 75-76.

References

Anders Grini Hamre (2011) Unforgettable Litani The Litani Rıver In Zionist And Israeli Water Strategy 1881-1956. M.A. Thesis In History Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History. University of Oslo Spring 2011