What is the Weapon Family that the Turkish Infantry Needs First?

Traditional Weapons of the Infantry:

• Guns
• Shotguns.
• Light Machine Gun and Personal Defense Weapons,
• Infantry Rifles.
• Sniper And Anti-Material Rifles.
• Machine Guns.
• Anti-tank weapons
• Fixed Position and Under Rifle Grenade Launchers.

With this article; I would like to focus on the subject of anti-tank weapons, especially anti-tank weapons, and draw the attention of those in authority, who are interested in anti-tank weapons, which is one of the operational requirements of the infantry class in the Turkish Army, and which I think is almost impossible to postpone.

What Previous Wars Have Taught Us:

In the 1973 Yom Kippour war, Arab armies used a huge number of first-generation, wire-guided, anti-tank missiles. Namely, these missiles were designed to give infantry a chance to counter armored units. Therefore, they were used only for their intended purpose.

In the Falklands War of 1982, the possibility of Britain to support its infantry in this distant geography with heavy firepower vehicles such as artillery and tanks was very weak. For this reason, Milan ATGM missiles were often used for non-production purposes in order to provide high firepower to the infantry. Non-purpose uses arising from such a need may be accepted later. Anti-tank guns are a good example of this.

RPG-7 and LAW Weapons:

The statements about the increasing importance of anti-tank weapons in today's world should be related to the periods when weapons such as the RPG-7 on the Russian side and the M-72 LAW on the American side became popular. Although these are weapons in the unguided rocket class and can be carried in limited numbers, they provide a serious firepower support to the infantry. The infantry class, which has a firepower that can be used directly, has taken the use of these weapons among its priorities. If the strength in his hands is not enough, he demands the support of other weapons he is accustomed to. It calls external elements such as mortars, artillery, howitzers, and close air support for help and support when necessary. In short, unguided or guided, the first thing the infantry will quickly consume is their own weapon, which provides heavy firepower.

Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War:

When we look at today's Ukraine front from this aspect, the view we see almost exactly coincides with the usage concept that I tried to describe above. Ukraine on the battlefield; against a regular, heavily armored Russian Army equipped with deep operational capabilities; There is a Ukrainian Army consisting of a large number of amateur units in the management and training of professionals, adopting a style close to the asymmetrical form of combat. While the Ukrainian forces allocate their artillery to valuable targets in the depths of the enemy with the help of UAVs, they prefer to provide the close and heavy firepower needed by the infantry with the weapons allocated to these amateur units. Maybe he had to. As a result, an enormous consumption need of Ukrainian military units has emerged on the field. Ukraine's war stocks and inventory were far from providing such logistical support. NATO countries came to the rescue of Ukraine and European countries, acting on a voluntary basis, armed the Ukrainian Army from outside.

Status of LAW Weapons of Turkish Armed Forces:

In the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces, there are M-72 LAW (Light Anti-tank Weapon) weapons, which have a very old design. The Turkish infantry does not have close heavy fire support means other than LAW. Nor are the 40 mm grenade launchers sufficient to meet the new generation warfare needs we see in Ukraine. I don't think there's any need to reckon with rifle grenades that are outdated. However, Turkish military units, familiar with RPG-7-like weapons seized from terrorists, especially within the scope of internal security operations, are no strangers to weapons in the Ukrainian operation area. On the other hand, when the partial failure process of the Eryx guided rocket is taken into account, it can be said that the issue still maintains its importance for the TAF. The Turkish Defense Industry has not yet been able to fully develop the desired solutions for a set of operational requirements that spanned nearly 40 years, or it did not want to give its priority to the development of these weapons.

Importance of Well Trained Soldier:

In any case, something as important as the weapons is your trained human resources. Soldiers who are trained in the military service with the weapons they will use during the war and who master these weapons make a difference in a real war.

For this reason, it remains important to allocate weapons to the use of soldiers in peacetime, to provide sufficient training opportunities, and to make the use of weapons a habit. Our soldiers, who received ordinary infantry training, have been deprived of the heavy firepower training they will use on the front line in the past forty years, as well as the skill and experience in using these weapons. In today's combat conditions, where today's infantry has become self-sufficient, an 'infantry use' that can be based on a movement style or warfare that expects firepower from outside contains some arguments that can put the Turkish Armed Forces in trouble. The behavior pattern of the infantry, which makes it a habit to ask for support from mortar support or artillery elements; It can damage the autonomy and initiative expected from the infantry in the battlefield of the future, and reduce the effectiveness of the infantry in wars.

A Model: Carl Gustav M4 System

I think that Turkish infantry units should be given some skills. For example, I believe that the Carl Gustav M4 model can be examined in this sense. This 84 mm weapon system is essentially a portable recoilless cannon. It can use many different types of ammunition. It can be used for pit fire against armored vehicles, anti-infantry particle or thermobaric ammunition, smart and delayed projectiles against buildings and emplacements, as well as fogging, lighting and many other purposes. Therefore, this weapon family; It can more than meet the infantry's need for direct heavy fire support. In this respect, it is obvious that it is a multi-purpose and multi-role platform. Because fire and forget systems; Although they have some technological advantages, they cannot replace the experience and habits gained through education. If you are likely to encounter symmetrical, that is, regular armies, this becomes even more important.

Other Similar Systems:

It should also be emphasized that the 84 mm AT4 “throw-forget” ammunition family was developed based on the Carl Gustav system. Because design, production and other logistical advantages could be maximized in this way.

Another important point is that Javelin, Raybolt or Metis use Milan style guided missiles. It is considered that our country will be able to meet this need in a short time with the Karaok project. However, the existence of such smart, capable and expensive systems will certainly not be enough to meet all the demands of the Turkish Armed Forces in this area. Because, in the event of a war, such weapons, which should be consumed by the infantry units of the Turkish Army, such as chickpeas, also require replacement by other means in terms of combat economy and sustainability. At least the backup logic dictates this.

NLAW Commonly Known in Ukraine:

Another prominent system in the Ukrainian war is the 150 mm NLAW system. This system, which can predict the direction of movement of the target it follows for approximately 4-5 seconds, is designed to destroy the target at the meeting point, and in this respect, it draws attention as a "semi-intelligent" system. In general, it focuses on destroying its target by 'guiding' to the weakest peak of an armored vehicle rather than direct fire. Because this semi-intelligent system is equipped with sufficient computational algorithms to predict the route of the armored vehicle and to fire the puncture pen about one meter above it.

If today's wars are examined in depth, it will be seen that the overwhelming majority of unguided munitions cannot hit their targets, they miss. There are many reasons for this, but usually human-made errors are the leading one. Because, in the high tempo of the war, it is a very difficult and difficult matter to face the enemy, to make himself a target, to aim calmly, and to wait for the right aiming conditions to occur most of the time. Because the adrenaline secreted by inexperienced and uneducated soldiers in war conditions naturally causes the hands and hearts of the soldiers to tremble. This is where the true power of the NLAW weapon comes into play, I think. Because detonation or splitting of NLAW ammunition on the weakest and most sensitive part of the target can minimize the "human errors" of the soldiers using this weapon. Therefore, by 'exploding' in a wider area than the guns that go directly to the target, they can absorb the errors to a certain extent. This gives this weapon a significant advantage over the others, and allows the Mehmetçi in the operation field to eliminate the possibility of making mistakes.

Conclusion:

Taking the Carl Gustav M4 system as a reference, I consider that the Turkish defense industry needs to focus on the production of a similar weapon and that an urgent project should be started on this issue. I think it should be put on the agenda as a lesson learned from the Russia-Ukraine War. I believe that the Turkish defense industry already possesses the necessary human resources, knowledge and technology to carry out such a relatively simple project.

A Suggestion to the Turkish Defense Industry:

In this context, the points that can be evaluated at the initial stage may be:

• As with the Carl Gustav M4 system, it is a base that can be used continuously, with a composite structure on metal.
• 90 or 100mm. such as suitable and a different ammunition diameter. (Which is ideal for higher impact, without sacrificing portability.)
• A family of ammunition that covers the entire range of non-destructive uses such as fog and lighting.
• A simple yet effective sighting system that will allow even a regular infantryman joining his unit on a mobilization order to use it.
• Relatively inexpensive guidance or guiding systems that take their minds off the sight, allowing for error correction on ammunition.