When will the F-16s be delivered to Ukraine? When ready, Can F-16s Change the Fate of War?

US Flexibility in Third Party Contracting for F-16s to Ukraine

Since Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the F-16 aircraft, is a US company, any country wishing to sell/donate its 'outdated' F-16s to another country must first shake hands with the US. This is because, in accordance with the bilateral agreements made prior to the purchase of the aircraft from the US, a so-called Third Party Agreement (TPA) is also signed between the parties. In fact, such a contract is not dictated by the US alone. It is a situation that is put forward when necessary by every country that is the original producer of a good. It is a common practice, especially among defence industry manufacturers. In this context, a third-party contract refers to a new contractual situation that takes into account a third party added to the current contract between two parties. Therefore, it is not legally possible to reach an agreement with this third party without the consent of the original manufacturer/seller, or for the second party to sell the goods produced by the first party to the third party. There are visible and invisible sanctions.

An example of this is the sale of T-129 Atak helicopters produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) to another country with the permission of the USA. In this context, the sale of T-129 attack helicopters, which use US-made engines (LHTEC), to Pakistan has not been possible for years due to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) legislation implemented by the US, for example, on the grounds of protecting engine technical data. Third party agreements do not permit this, and the export restriction continues to the detriment of Turkey. On the other hand, since the United States permitted the sale of the same helicopters to the Philippines, TAI was able to export T-129 Atak to the Philippines.

At this point in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, Ukraine states that it needs F-16 aircraft for its air defence needs. President Zelensky has expressed this need many times. The United States, which initially did not favour this request, has recently given the green light to give F-16s to Ukraine, which will be taken out of the inventory of countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands. I believe that this authorisation was deemed necessary as part of a general policy of support for the war. 

It was important for the US, which is one of the obstacles to the delivery of F-16s owned by European F-16 user countries to Ukraine, to announce that it has given the necessary permission as an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) country. For the time being, the US administration has only authorised the sale of the aircraft owned by the Netherlands and Denmark to Ukraine, but it is known that all 11 EPAF (Europian Participant Air Forces) member countries have an expectation to sell their F-16s to other countries. This is because EPAF countries want to utilise the F-16s they keep in their inventories. Otherwise, they will have to send these aircraft to the 'F-16 graveyard', which is the last thing they want. Romania procured 17 second-hand F-16 A/B fighter jets from Portugal between 2016-2021. A similar agreement was signed between Norway and Romania. Due to this agreement, Norway announced that it would give its aircraft to Romania, but not to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the sale of 12 F-16s belonging to Norway to the American Draken company was agreed between the parties last May. In the light of the latest developments, it is rumoured that the US will probably soon allow Denmark to sell F-16 A/B to Argentina.

President Zelensky, who made official visits to Denmark and the Netherlands last Sunday, announced on Twitter (X) that the two countries had agreed on the transfer of F-16s. Accordingly, Ukraine plans to receive a total of 61 F-16A/Bs, 42 from Netherlands and 19 from Denmark. Denmark plans to deliver the first 6-aircraft F-16 package to Ukraine in the first months of next year. In this context, experts believe that the delivery of these aircraft will take 18-24 months. I also agree with this view, and it may take even longer for the complete delivery.

The F-16 decision of the USA and the almost finalisation of the Dutch-Danish package of 61 aircraft, which followed, was a decision that relieved the Ukrainian administration. However, there are still some potential problems and the search for solutions to these problems, which I will describe in the following paragraphs. In the context of the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine, numerous interrelated problem areas have emerged and are emerging.

Who and How Will Maintain the F-16s to be Transferred to Ukraine?

The first of these problems is the lack of certainty as to who will carry out the maintenance, sustainment and repair of the F-16 fighter jets after they are delivered to Ukraine and entered into the inventory of the Ukrainian Air Force. As it is known, although the F-16 is the fourth generation, it is essentially a modern fighter aircraft with a complex structure. The fuselage hours of the F-16s in the hands of European countries, which are planned to be sent to Ukraine, are probably almost expired. Therefore, it should be expected that the fuselages of the aircraft will be quite old, and the probability of failure in terms of the fuselage will be quite high compared to the F-16s subjected to structural improvement or the new production F-16Vs. In order to keep the F-16s flying, trained aircraft maintenance personnel and technicians will be required. It normally takes 5-10 years for aircraft maintenance technicians with a high level of licence to be trained and then gain experience in the field. Therefore, it is unlikely that F-16 maintenance personnel can be trained in a short period of time, as if they were dipped in and out of a paint pot. Such trainings are among the trainings that should be spread over time and should not be rushed. Is it possible for Ukrainian personnel to provide maintenance support to the operations of F-16s to be used in warfare with a few months of short-term user training? Of course not!

In fact, the United States, which normally provides user training to pilots and aircraft maintenance personnel of countries that purchase F-16s or similar fighter aircraft, is now expected to provide such training for Ukraine. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements require this. However, these trainings are pre-planned combat readiness trainings, which are carried out in accordance with a planned process over a period of months or years. Although this kind of training schedule may be valid for Ukrainian pilots in the short term, it seems unlikely for maintenance personnel. At least until the Ukrainian aircraft maintenance personnel complete their training and gain sufficient experience on the continent, the most plausible solution is to provide the maintenance of the F-16s that the Ukrainian Air Force will use in the war through civilian subcontractors or contractors. 

The Probability of Damage to Foreign Personnel in case of Russian Strikes on F-16 Bases

Meanwhile, the air base where the F-16s will be deployed will become a clear Russian target. It will be a priority target for Russian cruise and ballistic missile attacks. Therefore, as far as possible, Ukrainian F-16s will probably be dispersed to a number of airfields in the western part of the country, based on considerations of the survival of operational missions and the safety of the rear support zone. This means that operational missions will be conducted using a distributed basing concept. Compared to a single or centralised airbase, managing a distributed base is more problematic in terms of the use of resources such as human, material, equipment, financial, etc. resources. First and foremost, more spare parts stockpiles, more ground support equipment, and a larger number of aircraft maintenance technicians, supply personnel and maintenance managers will be required. 

While operational security and survivability considerations dictate the deployment of a distributed base, it is possible that foreign civilian personnel stationed at the airfields in the western part of Ukraine could be harmed, injured or killed as a result of possible Russian attacks. This makes it politically and militarily risky for Western contractors to be present in the country to support Ukraine. According to reports in the world press, we can say that special forces personnel from Western countries are actually taking part in the war on behalf of Ukraine, but there is no intelligence information or statement confirming this. In a way, what I have stated here is only a guess. On the other hand, since the beginning of the war, NATO and the USA's principle of not being a direct party to the war and not having troops on the Russian-Ukrainian front is still valid. 

Can American Companies Play a Role in User (Pilot and Maintenance Personnel) Training?

Nevertheless, I believe that the possibility of US contractors, which have been supporting operational missions under contract (as already seen in Iraq and Afghanistan), playing a role in the Ukrainian rear zone may be on the agenda in the future, if not today. On the other hand, Washington may not be keen on US defence contractors operating inside Ukraine. However, it can be said that Washington will have no objection to military training. In this context, I believe that the US-based Draken company, which is familiar with F-16 operations, even flies its own F-16s and provides training assistance services to the US Air Force, can play a leading role in providing user (pilot and maintenance personnel) training to Ukraine.

According to some media reports, Daedalus, a company based in the Netherlands, has undertaken the task of finding and recruiting F-16 aircraft maintenance personnel to be assigned to Ukraine. Currently, this company is in direct contact with personnel who have previously served as aircraft maintenance technicians in their Air Forces in some F-16 user countries, and whose competences (including their level of English) are known. In this context, it is known that they have also contacted retired F-16 aircraft maintenance personnel from the Turkish Air Force, and that they have conveyed information to the invited Turkish personnel, explained the nature of the work, and talked about possible assignment options. However, following the US announcement that it had given its approval for the transfer of the aircraft to Ukraine, LM Aero, probably as a direct result of direct guidance from the US administration, indirectly declared that Turkish personnel would not be assigned to train Ukrainian personnel in the role of 'trainers'.

Why might LM Aero have taken such a decision? According to one assessment, Turkey has the largest number of F-16 aircraft (around 235-240) after the USA. The Turkish Air Force, which has been using F-16s since 1986, has a serious accumulation and experience of aircraft maintenance personnel. LM Aero may see Turkey as a competitor in this respect. In order to provide these user trainings in Europe, LM Aero may, in a way, consider it necessary to provide new job opportunities for American citizens from Texas. On the other hand, the Netherlands, which wants to benefit from the pool of experienced Turkish aircraft maintenance personnel, considers that this method is necessary to provide user training at a lower cost, and is endeavouring to convince LM Aero. 

Where will the user trainings be provided? How long will it take?

In the end, I believe that American Draken and Dutch Daedalus are cooperating for the user trainings to be given to Ukrainian personnel. Pilot trainings are planned to be given at an air base in Poland or Denmark, and aircraft maintenance personnel trainings are planned to be given at Borcea Air Base in Romania. However, the location of the training centres has not yet been officially announced. 

The F-16 pilot basic training course, also known as the B-Course, typically requires nine months of training for new pilots who have completed their pilot training. For experienced pilots of Su-27, MiG-29 and similar fighter aircraft, combat readiness training within the framework of type change can take up to 6 months. As a footnote, I foresee that Su-27 pilots can more easily adapt to F-16 type combat readiness training, especially in the air-to-air role. 

In general, user trainings are given in simulators and real aircraft in the form of adaptation trainings to the aircraft and subsequent missions together with academic courses. Aircraft maintenance personnel trainings are provided in a similar manner in simulators and on the flight line in the form of on-the-job training. 

This is the duration and content of the trainings to be given on paper. However, the main unwritten issue is the difference in 'war culture' between Eastern and Western countries. Although there are similarities, the culture, notion, weapons, tactics and techniques of using fighter aircraft in terms of fighter pilots in general are quite different between the two sides. Although Ukraine is a country that has contacts with the air forces of NATO countries within the scope of its contacts with NATO, no one can gain the skills and knowledge of using fighter jets that can be gained through short-term contacts in terms of personnel and by serving together in exercises. It is only a 'sense'. This situation is valid for both sides. Therefore, the culture of using Western-style fighter aircraft, which is expected to be acquired after the pilot and aircraft maintenance technician trainings, will take years.

Without prejudice to this issue, in addition to finding aircraft maintenance personnel/instructor pilots to act as trainers from outside and providing these trainings through temporary employment through a subcontractor company, it may be considered as a different option for the countries that will provide the aircraft to provide direct user trainings.

Another option, but a risky one from the point of view of the personnel of the sending countries, is to have experienced aircraft maintenance personnel (nonUkrainian nationals) operating the F-16s in the Ukrainian rear. The two countries that are almost certain to send F-16s to Ukraine are the Netherlands and Denmark. The first solution that comes to mind is that these countries should also carry out the maintenance of the aircraft they will provide to Ukraine, and send their technicians to Ukraine for a period of time together with the aircraft. In this context, if either or both of the two countries take such a decision, I believe that there will be no problem in the maintenance and sustainment of the F-16s to be purchased by Ukraine, except for the possibility of foreign personnel being harmed by Russian attacks. Of course, no country will or can officially take this risk. 

In the event that foreign personnel are somehow sent, Ukrainian aircraft maintenance technicians who have completed their F-16 user training can work together with foreign personnel. They can gain experience in F-16 flight lines and maintenance workshops in a short time. 

On the other hand, it should also be noted that the air forces of these two countries are simultaneously procuring F-35s while removing their old F-16s from their inventories. This means that it must be assumed that the aircraft maintenance personnel supporting the F-16s to be given to Ukraine will not be wasted, and that they will be scheduled for F-35 user training at Lockheed Martin facilities in the USA and then support F-35 operations in their own countries. 

Who bears the financial burden for the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine?

Another issue is who will provide the necessary resources and financial support for the operations of the aircraft to be transferred to Ukraine. It is not yet clear whether the three countries that are expected to provide the aircraft will receive support from the United States in return or whether they have any demands in this direction. The US continues to provide general military assistance to Ukraine under the authorisation of the US Presidency. However, as far as we know, this assistance does not yet include the F-16s that are to be provided to Ukraine. However, no one expects that the financing of the F-16s to be provided by these three countries will be covered by Ukraine. The financing will most probably either be voluntarily provided by the countries sending the F-16s, or the US will unilaterally bear the entire financial burden.

Even if the maintenance/supply problems such as aircraft maintenance personnel, materials, equipment, parts and ground support equipment etc. are solved, the training of Ukrainian F-16 pilots, their gaining sufficient experience in the aircraft, and their progress in the tactics and techniques to be applied in the war will require a very intensive workload. I do not think it is necessary to be a clairvoyant to say that there will be a need for Dutch or Danish pilots and military intelligence officers to be assigned to Ukrainian flight squadrons as 'advisors' in the background. 

Possibility of Russian intelligence acquiring the techniques and tactics of the weapons to be used by the F-16s 

Another issue is the need for variants of the AIM-120D AMRAAM long-range air-to-air missile, which is not in Ukraine's inventory, and stand-off air-to-ground ammunition such as JADM, JASSM, etc. for air-to-ground missions. Since these missiles will be used for the first time in this war, there will be an increased likelihood that information about the missiles, the tactics and techniques used will fall into the hands of Russian and/or Chinese intelligence. How prepared is the United States for the possibility of sensitive information about these missiles being compromised? Can it afford to take this risk?

Previously, there was information that HARM defence suppression (SEAD) missiles were integrated into the MiG-29 aircraft in the hands of the Ukrainian Air Force and even used in combat. The HARM missile, codenamed AGM-88, can detect a target with minimal aircrew input, steer to the target, some models can hover over the target for a certain period of time, and disable/destroy an active RF source when the time comes. The missile's guidance system, which focuses on enemy radar emissions, has an antenna and a seeker head mounted on the nose of the missile.

Based on this experience, it can now be assumed that HARM missiles to be fired by F-16s can be used effectively by Ukrainian personnel without any problems. In reality, the HARM issue is even more prominent than the evaluations regarding AMRAAM and JASSM ammunition. Because, in order for Ukrainian pilots to effectively use HARM missiles against targets such as RF emitting radar, they will need Targeting Pods (HARM Targeting System-HTS). In 1996, when we assume and accept that even the Turkish Air Force, which purchased HARM missiles and started to use them after receiving training from American pilots, was not 'sold' HTS pods by the US for various reasons, I consider that the transfer of HTS pods to Ukraine and the subsequent HTS user training is a puzzling issue. If HARM is used only in HAS (HARM as a sensor) mode through the sensors on the missile tip, the expected efficiency and effectiveness of this very expensive missile cannot be achieved. When the missile is directed to the target with full accuracy according to whether the RF signal source is activated or not, the probability of disabling the target source will increase considerably. In this context, providing HTS to Ukraine and integrating it into F-16s is seen as a necessity for HARM missile success. However, I believe that the HTS issue may make the US uneasy in terms of intelligence. Because, based on ELINT (electronic intelligence) data of Russian and/or Chinese intelligence units, there is a possibility of decoding the RF coding logic, the way HTS uses coding, the HTS-HARM communication algorithm, etc. Again, the same question arises: To what extent is the US willing to bear this risk?

Although not deep into Russia, F-16s with HTS can be of great benefit in clearing the way for possible Ukrainian Air Force aircraft (Su-24 and Su-25) attacks on airfields, fixed radars and SAM radars in western Russia, and in silencing Russian defence weapons and systems in advance, and can play a role in increasing the survivability of the aircraft. However, the F-16s to be given by the two countries in question may need HTS cabling, or even additional modifications required to be able to launch HARM. Moreover, all of the F-16s planned to be given are early version F-16s, A and B variants. Most of these F-16s, probably all of them, were subjected to the MLU (Mid-Life Upgrade) modernisation process. For this reason, I assume that the necessary modifications have been made to these aircraft to be able to launch AMRAAM and JDAM. However, it can be said that additional modifications will be required for JAASM, HTS and HARM, which will take additional time, without prejudice to the cost. Nevertheless, I make these evaluations assuming that these modifications have been made at least on a few F-16s to be given to Ukraine.

F-16s can also be used in the air-to-air role, but for Ukraine, which has around 50 Su-27 and as many MiG-29 aircraft in its inventory, F-16s will not make a meaningful contribution in an ongoing war, since they will not be able to provide network-based operational support. 

Conclusion

Zelensky, like an 'incorrigible' child, has been asking the Western world for F-16s for more than a year. While the EPAF capitals responded positively to this request, Washington offered various excuses. Moreover, no one expected that Ukraine's 50-60 F-16s would change the fate of the war. It would not be a 'game changer' contribution, but Zelensky still said "I want it!". 

As a result, the USA showed flexibility in the third-party contract for a total of 61 F-16A/B MLU versions, which the Netherlands and Denmark were already planning to take out of the inventory and which they were planning to give to Ukraine in this context, and gave the necessary permission. In fact, this was an expected development. However, this authorisation does not solve the problem of F-16s to be given to Ukraine. 

Now, it is necessary to decide how and by whom the maintenance of these F-16s will be carried out. According to some, there is a need for the temporary employment of experienced F-16 aircraft maintenance personnel by a contractor company to be assigned to air bases in the Ukrainian rear region in the future. The possibility of Russian strikes on the F-16 airbases where these personnel will be stationed, or of foreign personnel being harmed during such strikes, may require joint decisions involving the political authorities of countries not directly involved in the war, if foreign personnel are stationed within Ukrainian borders, so that Ukrainian maintainers can gain experience after the user training of Ukrainian personnel. In the meantime, it is known that the American Draken and Dutch Daedalus companies continue to search for foreign personnel with aircraft maintenance experience for the user trainings to be given in Romania, the Netherlands or Poland. 

Apart from user training, another issue that stands out is that it has not yet been decided who will bear the financial burden required for the delivery of F-16s to Ukraine. The fact that the United States has not yet shown a direct willingness to do so, I see as a factor delaying the deployment of F-16s in Ukraine. 

Moreover, once the F-16s begin to fly in the skies over Ukraine, the US will want to develop measures against the possibility that the Russian intelligence may acquire the techniques and tactics of the weapons to be used by these aircraft. Perhaps for this reason alone, the United States may consent to the delivery to Ukraine of F-16s equipped with only limited capabilities (JDAM, LGB, AMRAAM, etc.). I think that in the short term, the United States will not agree to the delivery of modified F-16s with more complex capabilities and weapons (HARM, JASSM, HTS, etc.). 

Ultimately, I do not expect Ukrainian F-16s to be used against Russian positions and/or Russian aircraft in the air before the spring of 2024. It seems difficult to deliver even the first batch of 6 F-16s until the spring of 2024. I maintain my belief that the war can and should be over by then. I see this as a need and a necessity for Turkey's regional interests in particular, for the peaceful environment in our region to be established as soon as possible and for the Black Sea to become a sea of peace again.