Why Drones Failed to Revolutionise Air Warfare (Part 5)
To test the modern system of force employment in air combat, we focused on three dependent variables: whether UAVs provide an offensive advantage; whether they have a balancing effect on existing power imbalances; and whether they cancels close combat.
This article is written in five parts in total. The first section provides an overview. In the second, third and fourth parts, the impact of drones used during the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh and their contribution to the results of the wars were discussed.
Readers who did not have the opportunity to read the previous chapters can use the links below:
Why Drones Failed to Revolutionise Air Warfare (Part 1)
Analysis of Drone Warfare in Libya in 2019-2020 (Part-2)
Analysis of Drone Warfare in the Syrian Civil War between 2011-2020 (Part-3)
Analysis of the Drone War in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 (Part-4)
This section draws on these examples to provide an Ultimate Analysis of Drone Warfare.
The authors of this article argue that the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has not achieved a major revolution, and that drones have failed to achieve a significant transformation in air warfare that could lead to a second firepower revolution. Starting in the 1960s, such a revolution led to dramatic improvements in detection, communication, precision and destruction, making air warfare extremely lethal. The need to avoid the enemy's lethal firepower has led to a competition between the air force and air defence to find the hider. Actors who do not master the set of tactics, techniques, procedures, technologies and capabilities necessary to limit exposure to enemy fire while successfully detecting and targeting the enemy, i.e. using the modern use of force system, will suffer serious consequences.
To test the modern use of force system in air warfare, we focused on three dependent variables: whether UAVs provide an offensive advantage; whether they have a balancing effect on existing power imbalances; and whether they cancels close combat. For each of these dependent variables, we identified observable outcomes of the modern system of the use of force and the drone revolution thesis. We then tested these observable expectations by looking at three recent conflicts (Libya, Syria and the Nagorno-Karabakh region) where drones have been used extensively.
The evidence we gathered does not support the idea of a subsequent drone revolution. Because we have investigated conflicts where drones have been used more extensively, there is little reason to believe that we should observe the transformation of warfare as many have described it in other situations where drones have been used more sparingly. While the evidence presented in this paper is not conclusive, our empirical analysis shows that drones do not tip the military balance towards offensive, do not have an equalising effect between strong and weak states, and do not eliminate close conflict. We conclude that drones can be effective if operated by skilled military personnel and integrated with other multi-layered and conventional systems (e.g. attack and ISR aircraft, radar and electronic warfare systems, artillery and ground units).
Our analysis contributes to fundamental debates on the study of war, states' defence policies and postures, and the evolution of the international system. Firstly, we present a new way of understanding the role of drones in modern warfare. The theoretical framework we develop explains why drones are effective in some traditional conflicts but not in others; a variation of outcomes that existing studies cannot explain. Moreover, by adapting Biddle's modern use of force system to the requirements and unique circumstances of air penetration and air defence, our framework provides a way to assess and understand a broader subset of conflicts than Biddle originally envisaged. Our framework also provides guidance beyond a specific drone warfare situation. It can help scholars and practitioners understand the impact of other so-called disruptive and emerging technologies, as well as the dynamics in traditional conflicts, such as Russia's limited use of air power in the early months of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Second, our framework highlights factors that are often overlooked in academic and public debates on drone warfare and emerging technologies but are critical to military operations, such as military personnel proficiency, electronic warfare and air defence systems. On the issue of personnel, academics and practitioners have interpreted drone warfare and military robots as an example of the substitution of labour (soldiers) with capital (advanced technology). But they have largely neglected that "high-tech weapons require high-quality personnel". With regard to air defence, our article focuses on a range of technologies, such as radar systems, anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles, which have had transformative effects on air warfare but have received little attention from security studies scholars.
To understand the dynamics and outcomes of recent conflicts, our framework focuses on the relative effectiveness of air defence in the face of air penetration, rather than on which sides possess armed drones. Our empirical analysis thus offers insights into how both regional and great powers should respond if their allies are targeted by drone strikes. By deploying air defence systems and electronic warfare systems with skilled personnel, regional and major powers can significantly weaken and possibly stop a military attack that relies heavily on the current generation of military drones.
Third, our analysis contributes to policy debates on armed forces restructuring and defence acquisition. States contemplating radical changes in their force structure in favour of cheap and small platforms, or reconsidering their defence posture based solely on technological considerations, need to be wary of such actions. Our study suggests that for states facing a much more powerful neighbour, such as Eastern Europe and South East Asia, the current generation of military drones has inherent limitations. For example, prior to the start of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022, some analysts concluded that Ukraine had "learnt the lesson that it must invest heavily in drone technology, both domestic and outsourced, to counter Russian superiority". Our analysis suggests that drones alone are not enough to overcome conventional military weakness.
Admittedly, our evidence is not conclusive and our analysis has not addressed some important questions. We have restricted our focus to the operational level of warfare, thus omitting the strategic implications of the competition between air defence and air penetration that we have identified. Our discussion of the competition that is hiding suggests that conducting modern warfare will become more cumbersome, difficult and expensive, let alone easier or cheaper. Based on existing research, future studies should explore these implications in more depth. Moreover, we have limited our focus to the current generation of drones, a natural limitation given the rapid pace of technological change. Unless technological advances significantly alter or end the hidebound competition between air defence and air penetration, there is little reason to believe that the future of warfare will be any different from the past. But some practitioners and academics have warned about such an epilogue. Further research should examine this issue.
Bibliography
https://umilesgroup.com/en/rpas-uas-and-uav-what-are-they-and-how-do-they-differ/
