Will there be an American attack on Iran?

Not a day goes by without another event dropping like a bombshell onto the agenda as we assess developments around the world and especially in our region, and before we have even finished analysing the first event, we are already sailing towards the next.

Our new topic is Iran. Is it next in line? Almost all news channels and talk shows are overflowing with faces seeking the answer to the question: after Venezuela, is Iran next? Everyone, whether relevant or irrelevant, knowledgeable or ignorant, journalists or non-journalists, retired soldiers or retired soldiers who are supporters, is discussing this topic.

The issue is not whether it is Iran's turn, but rather realising that eventually it will be Iran's turn and, when that time comes, discussing what we as Turkey should do and what measures we should take, guiding those in power in line with their expertise, reminding them, and highlighting details that may have been overlooked. It seems that the healthiest approach is for every writer, cartoonist, and television commentator to listen to and examine the views of other experts in their fields, filling in any gaps and making additions where necessary. This does not imply that these analyses are not being carried out by state bodies or that those in relevant and authoritative positions are unable to consider the measures to be taken, but I believe that civil society should contribute to the country's politics and security like a think-tank organisation on important issues that concern all of our futures and should be considered an indispensable part of DEMOCRACY within the framework of raising public awareness.

We soldiers evaluate the intelligence information we obtain on the battlefield and, before engaging in combat with the enemy, analyse everything that happens, starting with the task assigned to us in a format called the Unit Movement Control Procedure (UMCP), and arrive at a CONCLUSION/DECISION. Two points of the Unit Movement Control Procedure constitute its most crucial part. The first is the listing of at least three Enemy Capabilities (EC) and, ultimately, the Commander's prediction of which of these capabilities the enemy will employ, resulting in the establishment of the Enemy Capability Probability of Acceptance (ECPA). The second is our Own Movement Patterns (OMP). A movement pattern is developed to counter each EPC, and our Own Movement Pattern that counters the EPCID, which is the movement pattern most likely to be chosen by the enemy, emerges as the DECISION.

In fact, KSİU consists of eight (8) items, and each item has many sub-items, including weather and climate conditions. This procedure is prepared MENTALLY in small (tactical) units, but in writing in large (operational and strategic) units. Don't be fooled by how easily I write about it here; tactical unit commanders in the thick of battle, especially squad, platoon and company commanders, must quickly process dozens of items in their minds like computers and make decisions in a short time. This decision-making process creates such pressure on small unit commanders that the slightest mistake could cost the lives of dozens of soldiers. That is why the officers and non-commissioned officers who will protect the country are SELECTED, required to have a certain level of intelligence, and entrusted with the soldiers after undergoing long, rigorous training. You cannot train personnel to whom you will entrust the army for a year, or even three or five months, by selecting them as if you were choosing watermelons at the market. After this brief and concise explanation of military terminology and information, I would like to point out that the countries going into battle also analyse this in much greater detail and make their decisions based on the conclusions they draw from this analysis. Therefore, whichever side analyses this with more accurate information and, most importantly, gets the TIMING right, has a higher chance of success.

Returning to our main topic, let us first imagine what will happen when it is Iran's turn, first from Iran's perspective and then from the perspective of Iran's adversary or adversaries (Israel and the US).

Iran will classically target the military bases, oil facilities, infrastructure, and energy facilities of the adversary forces with its large stockpile of missiles and drone swarms. Iran, which lacks the electromagnetic and cyber warfare capabilities necessary to neutralise Israel's ‘Iron Dome’, has neither the means nor the need to destroy targets with 100% accuracy, even by penetrating through windows and locating targets as far as bedrooms, as Israel does. Instead, it has proven many times that it is very powerful, but the operability of the air defence system is limited by the number of missiles/stockpile at hand. Overcoming this system is only possible with low-cost, low-precision strikes but with a large number of missiles fired and, again, in the words of our soldiers, ‘TIME ON TARGET’ meaning that the first weapon fired and the last weapon fired hit the target AT THE SAME TIME. Consequently, we will again watch the missiles being fired and their destruction in the air, as well as the attacks by drone swarms, on our screens. Of course, Iran is also expected to attack US bases in other countries in the region, which it views as adversaries.

Another instrument is that Iran will once again deploy its proxies, who continue to maintain their presence in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, where there are Shia populations, despite Israel reducing their effectiveness with its attack on Gaza and subsequent operations.

In addition to these tactics, according to 2025 data, the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-third of the world's oil trade and one-fifth of liquefied petroleum gas is transported by sea, will be closed to traffic. We know from open sources that the US Navy has positioned itself in this region to prevent this and to support Israel. Another noteworthy fact is that 70% of this trade is conducted with Asia-Pacific countries (China, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines).

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz to traffic would, as anyone can predict, cause Brent oil prices, currently at around $60, to increase at least two or threefold, approaching $200. Furthermore, if we consider the pressure the US is exerting on the European Union to end oil and natural gas purchases from Russia, this would lead to a slowdown in the global economy, a decline in production, an economic crisis, and consequently, other global powers would exert international pressure to bring the war to a swift end.

https://tr.euronews.com/businnes/2025/06/16/israil-iran-krizi-hurmuz-bogazi-petrol-piyayasi-icin-ne-kadar-hayati (Israel-Iran crisis: How vital is the Strait of Hormuz for the oil market? | Euronews).

While the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is expressed here in a single word, how would this be achieved in practice?

As seen on the map above, the width of the Strait of Hormuz varies between 33 km and 95 km. Although it seems impossible to physically close such a wide strait to traffic completely, in my opinion, the first course of action would be to lay mines, another would be to close it by force using naval forces, and considering the depths, the traffic would be disrupted by setting fire to oil-laden tankers in the strait using watercraft sunk at certain points. Considering the time, location, and phases of the operation, combining these approaches appears to be the most reasonable and correct option.

In contrast, the tactics of the joint US-Israeli operation would begin with a cyberwar to disrupt Iran's communications capabilities, followed by the targeting of nuclear and infrastructure facilities, military bases, and especially missile launchers and radar installations, oil production and refinery facilities, and energy facilities and pipelines, using conventional methods. Furthermore, thanks to the advanced technological capabilities at the disposal of Israel and the US and the fifth column activities they foster within Iran, it is a fact that they will attempt assassinations of both political and military high-ranking officials in Iran, as has been experienced before.

During the assessment of all these courses of action, ground operations have been disregarded due to the fact that the United States and Israel do not share a land border with Iran. Instead, given that Iran is home to different ethnic groups and that the Kurds among these ethnic groups are susceptible to recruitment as a result of the activities of PJAK, the Iranian version of the Separatist Terrorist Organisation (STO) in Turkey, it is likely that the Iranian Kurds will be encouraged to revolt against the regime. The Baluchis, who are not taken into account due to their small numbers, recently caused friction and border clashes between Iran and Pakistan. Given that it would be easy to recruit individuals from this ethnic group, Iran could be forced to deal with internal turmoil while engaged in a regional war.

According to a CIA report published in 2011, 61% of Iran's population are Persians (including Mazandaranis and Gilaks), 16% are Azeris, 10% are Kurds, 6% are Lurs, 2% are Turkmens (including Iranian Turks), 2% Arabs, 2% Baluchis, and 1% other ethnic groups (Tatars, Talysh, Assyrians, Armenians, Georgians). The CIA has since ceased publishing reports on Iran's ethnic composition (https://tr.wikipedia.org.wiki/iran_demografisi). Other sources indicate that the Farsi population is around 50% and the Turkish population around 30%. Therefore, it is debatable how accurate and reliable many population data, including that of the CIA, are in terms of showing the Iranian people in percentages according to their ethnic origins.

After all these assessments, I would like to mention a possibility that may have been overlooked due to Israel and its collaborator, the US, not having a physical border with Iran; this possibility is the actual occupation of the Bander Abbas region, which controls the Strait of Hormuz, and the islands and islets that dominate the strait, such as Kish, Hormuz and Hengam. Oman, where the US has military bases, plays a critical role in the security of the Strait.

Looking at developments from Ankara's perspective, the question of what Turkey should be prepared for in this context is, as I stated at the beginning of my article, the most important issue from our point of view.

In light of my analysis above, it is clear that in the event of a possible intervention in Iran, attacks will be launched against US military bases and assets surrounding Iran. In this context, the Kürecik Radar, Incirlik Air Base, NATO headquarters stationed in Turkey, and American personnel working there are at risk. No country should be in a position where it is unable to protect foreigners on its territory, especially those on official duty.

Since there are no physical borders between Iran and the countries mentioned (except for the possibility of an occupation of the Strait of Hormuz; if I were the US, I would physically occupy this area in the first phase), the incitement of internal events in Iran and the Kurdish uprising, which will be seen by the world public as an issue of oppression and autonomy/independence, and the fact that Iran supporting the separatist terrorist organisation PJAK by convincing them that they have been deceived by the pretence that they have laid down their arms, when in fact the terrorist organisation militants have not laid down their arms and are being sent to Iran (a revolt demanding regional autonomy), along with a rumoured but plausible possibility; it is highly probable that other courses of action will be staged, such as the transfer of Salafi jihadists from areas abandoned by the SDG/YPG in Syria to Iran, with the aim of supporting internal dynamics that consider the regime in Iran problematic and in need of change, in order to provoke internal chaos and an uprising aimed at overthrowing the oppressive regime. To confirm the accuracy of these assessments, Iranian border violations must be scrutinised.

In light of these assessments, we must be prepared for a wave of migration that could flood into Turkey due to internal turmoil in Iran. Precautions must be taken now against the Afghan and Kurdish representatives in Iran whom intelligence organisations want to bring into Turkey, both in terms of humanitarian aid and security.

Another apparent consequence of intervention in Iran would be an oil-related economic downturn and crisis in the markets. Therefore, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey must immediately implement measures to increase foreign exchange reserves and reduce foreign exchange outflows from our country, and take steps to ensure that the flow of oil we need to Turkey is not interrupted.

In short, an action plan covering the issues mentioned above and others not mentioned must be prepared immediately and put into practice for any intervention in Iran.

I conclude my writing with a reminder to the Turkish State Bureaucracy: In international relations, friendship, camaraderie, and personal contacts between states are certainly important to a certain extent, but states ALWAYS prepare and act in accordance with their OWN INTERESTS.