Would Putin really use the tactical nuclear weapons?

According to the Russian doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons, Putin can use nuclear weapons "at will" in Ukraine and even against Eastern European countries, for example, if he perceives NATO troops as a threat to his existence, citing Russia's national security interests. It would be a big mistake to expect Russia to end this war without taking half of Ukraine's territory and without ensuring the withdrawal of NATO military presence in Eastern Europe. Moscow seems ready to set the world on fire for Russian interests. 

On February 24, 2022, the invasion of Ukraine began, and despite the stagnant course of the war, the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia were annexed to Russia. Thus, Russia annexed approximately 15 percent of Ukraine's territory after Crimea. Calling on Kiev to return to the negotiating table, Putin said, "Neither Ukraine nor the West can break our unity and integrity. Millions of people have made up their minds." Moscow now considers these four regions, like Crimea, as its own territory, and Ukraine, which was expected to try to reclaim them, has become, in Putin's mind, an "aggressor" country. In this respect, Russia has gone on the defensive and has begun to talk, albeit in rhetoric for now, about its right to use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary to protect "its territory".

Indeed, there are many reasons to believe in the Russian use of nuclear weapons and to perceive it as a threat. First of all, what the Western world should know about the use of nuclear weapons is this: Contrary to the Western understanding, Russia does not have an understanding or doctrine that "we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons". 

Putin actually has nothing to lose in the Russia-Ukraine War. In that war, no one attacked Russian territory (except for limited Ukrainian air strikes by helicopters). The aggressor was always the Russian army. However, with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 after the referendum and the four new regions joining Russia, the Russians are now technically in a "defensive" rather than a so-called offensive position in the ongoing war. Indeed, despite the declaration of mobilization, it seems unlikely that the Russians will be able to launch a new offensive into Ukraine during the winter months with the forces available. However, during this period, the Russians may launch limited naval attacks on the port of Odessa and its surroundings. Therefore, we can say that a new offensive of the Russian Army, which is expected to remain on the defensive from now on, into the Ukrainian interior could be carried out in the spring of 2023 at the earliest, under favorable weather conditions for a new large-scale operation. Until then, it is in the Russian Army's favor to remain predominantly on the defensive.

In the meantime, we are witnessing the Ukrainian Army reclaiming some of the lost territories, especially in the Kherson region. It is possible to say that the Ukrainian Army will achieve similar regional successes in the winter months, which will increase the resistance of the Ukrainian people, whose morale is already high, against the Russians. However, a total success and the recapture of all territories from the Russians seems unlikely for the time being. Ukraine's weapons are more suited for defensive rather than offensive warfare. Western countries are not expected to provide the weapons support that would completely dismantle the Russians.

On the other hand, there is a possibility that NATO might take the threat of Russian nuclear weapons use seriously and, based on intelligence gathered, consider striking selected air bases west of Moscow that host Russian nuclear weapons (notably the Olenya Russian Air Base near the Finnish border) with preemptive air strikes to dissuade Putin from doing so.

NATO countries, which provide anti-tank weapons, HIMARS-like artillery systems, tactical and/or mini UAVs, and strong reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence support in ground battles, are reluctant to take steps that could lead to becoming Russia's "enemy" under the NATO hat. 

Russia is a country that has calculated in advance to resort to the doctrine of using nuclear weapons in the event of defeat by the Ukrainian Army or in the event of losing a conventional confrontation with NATO forces in the event of a potential war. In a sense, Russia could use the nuclear weapons option to end the war if this regional conflict jeopardizes its vital interests. 

In the post-Cold War period, especially under Putin, Russia has made significant investments in the modernization of its nuclear weapons. In other words, Russia has continued to maintain the highest level of nuclear war preparedness to use nuclear weapons if necessary. There are reports in the international press that Russia possesses approximately two thousand tactical nuclear weapons. 

Putin's recent claim that "Ukraine is developing nuclear bombs" should be read as a sign that Russia may resort to nuclear weapons even for a "trivial reason". The Russian leadership will have no difficulty in finding justifications for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, once the nuclear confrontation begins, it is difficult to predict in whose favor it will play out. However, it is certain that many countries, including Turkey, will suffer more or less from a possible use of nuclear weapons. 

The ongoing war has shown that the Russian military's conventional weapons capabilities, equipment and equipment are outdated. The whole world has seen up close that for Russia, the only force with which it can compete with its adversaries and provide deterrence is its nuclear power. The fact that it continues to modernize such weapons is a sign that it sees them as an alternative to its outdated conventional weapons. For Putin, nuclear weapons are the exit door in this war. Because the Putin administration is not ready to lose this war. Therefore, it seems that he has defined a role for nuclear weapons in his road map. At a time when Western politicians and strategists dismiss the possibility of nuclear weapons being used in contemporary conflicts, Putin has brought the "balance of terror" back to the Western world. What has stunned the world is the possibility of Putin resorting to this real threat. Because for years the Western world had chosen to ignore this possibility.

Since it is said that it will be used, let's take a look at the issue of nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons are subject to definitions such as "tactical" and "strategic", it should be kept in mind that the detonation of any nuclear weapon, regardless of its yield, would have a strategic impact. Ultimately, any use of nuclear weapons will have strategic and political effects that ripple through the international community. However, strategic effects do not only stem from strategic weapons. There is certainly a difference between nuclear weapons used by strategic military forces (intercontinental missiles, strategic bombers and nuclear submarines) against a country's critical infrastructure and nuclear weapons used by small-scale military units against enemy troops on the battlefield. However, a small nuclear weapon can also have strategic implications.

In the past, the American and Russian governments, in their bilateral nuclear arms limitation talks, have categorized a number of weapons and forces as "strategic nuclear forces". For example, land-based missiles with a range of over 5,500 kilometers, modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers have all been listed as delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons. Nuclear capabilities outside this classification were labeled "tactical". 

The Russian Federation's own definition of this issue also remains important. Russia defines tactical nuclear weapons as "capabilities designed to strike objects at the tactical depth of enemy deployment (up to 300 kilometers) to accomplish a tactical mission". Accordingly, the nuclear weapons to be used against Ukraine would therefore fall under the tactical category.

The American perspective is different. The US does not fully clarify the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. However, in the US Nuclear Deterrence report published in 2018, it was pointed out that the US could use a low-yield nuclear weapon against Russia as a deterrent against a possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia. The US Air Force is working on the concept of "integrated use of conventional-nuclear weapons" for use in conventional operations against a nuclear-capable enemy. The US Army considers scenarios in the context of "limited use of nuclear weapons in a conventional attack scenario" in its generic planning studies.

However, it is not correct to expect that a possible use of nuclear weapons will necessarily lead to a Russian-American nuclear war. Such an expectation is predominantly based on a Cold War-era assumption. An American-Russian war is not yet on the agenda. Would a Russian nuclear weapon fired at Ukraine require a mandatory US response? It is impossible to know, but my personal opinion is that it would not. But it could seriously raise the question of the US going to war against the Russians.

In this context, if we were discussing, for example, a Russian-American war, we would first need to address the "escalation" dimension of conventional warfare. A nuclear-armed state has the potential to determine the rate of escalation of a crisis with another nuclear-armed state. Therefore, predicting the reaction of one side while avoiding an all-out strategic war is really just a scenario or military conjecture. How countries would behave under conditions of nuclear war has yet to be tested, and is nothing more than a theoretical construct. When will nuclear weapons be deployed? We do not know this. 

But we do know that Russia's strategic deterrence concept focuses on "escalation". Russia will use both military and non-military measures in a coordinated and open manner to shape the enemy's decisions. So, as Putin is doing today, Russia is taking military and political steps by saying in advance what it is going to do, and proceeding accordingly. It prefers to increase the degree of the use of weapons in accordance with its escalation strategy. The American side, on the other hand, is not as open and transparent as the Russian side. The US is basing its actions on a "calculated ambiguity" in order to cast doubt on its adversary. It is careful to remain behind the nuclear smokescreen, not showing its hand like the Russians.

By the way, a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine would not directly target US or NATO forces. But it would certainly be a direct signal to the countries supporting the conflict in Ukraine. One can imagine a scenario in which Russia detonates a low-yield (e.g. less than five kilotons) nuclear weapon on a mechanized brigade stationed outside Kiev. Such a nuclear weapon delivery technique is important because it would have a small area of impact and the fallout would have no long-term effects on the inhabitants of that area. Moreover, a Russian nuclear attack would not require NATO to launch retaliatory strikes and/or trigger an Article 5 emergency, as Ukraine is not yet a NATO member.

Despite the US government's massive military assistance to Ukraine, there is no commitment to defend Ukraine in the event of a nuclear attack. Therefore, if Russia were to use nuclear weapons against the Ukrainian military, there would be no reason to expect that it would be confronted by American nuclear weapons. In other words, the US would certainly not want to trade New York for Kiev. At least this is the Russian expectation, and my personal opinion as well.

Nevertheless, the Biden administration may further increase the American military presence in Europe, deploy American strategic bombers in Europe in greater numbers, and conduct nuclear test flights. However, it is impossible to predict today whether a limited Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine would draw the Western world into an all-out nuclear war scenario.

The question is this: Could Putin, who, contrary to predictions, attempted to invade Ukraine on February 24, actually use tactical nuclear weapons after all? It seems possible. After all, it would not be difficult for the Putin mind, which has led the Russian army into Ukraine with the claim that Ukraine is historically Russian territory, to find a justification for the use of nuclear weapons. For example, he could claim that "Ukraine is carrying out a program to develop weapons of mass destruction". 

In his desire to overcome the Ukrainian insurgency as soon as possible, to prevent NATO from supporting the country, and ultimately to restore Russia's past glory, Putin might be tempted to use nuclear weapons to bring the Ukrainian army to its knees, where conventional weapons have failed. If his conventional options fail completely, he may resort to tactical nuclear weapons as a last resort to achieve his political objective. 

Should this possibility materialize, it is unlikely that the US military would respond proportionately against Russian forces, unless there is a direct attack against NATO. Instead, I think the US would prefer to emphasize diplomatic actions while consulting with its allies to determine what the next step should be. 

In conclusion, world leaders should not ignore the possibility of Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. According to its military doctrine, Russia has a war strategy that allows it to use conventional weapons as well as nuclear weapons when necessary. In this respect, Russia's use of tactical nuclear weapons, limited to the geography of Ukraine, is a major threat not only to this country but also to the entire Western world, including the United States and Turkey. If the Russians cannot be given a proportionate response, Russia's nuclear deterrence will emerge as the biggest threat to regional peace and disrupt all balances. In the event of such an eventuality, it may become essential for Turkey to take steps to develop its military capability to establish nuclear deterrence, taking this scenario into account.