Military-Political Relations in the Second Century of the Republic and Their Reflections on the Effectiveness of the Armed Forces

Origins of Military-Political Relations

In its hundred years of existence, the Republic of Turkey has experienced military coups and interventions in politics. As a member of NATO, the Turkish Armed Forces have adopted and implemented certain standards militarily, but military-civilian relations have not reached the standards required in democracies. The coups that took place after the transition to a multi-party system and the coup attempt of July 15, 2016 have taken their place in history as the intervention of the military in politics. In democracies, coups are indefensible, but it is important to note the responsibility of the civilian authorities who did not resist the coups except in the last case.  The fact that after each intervention, regulations have been made to increase the representation and control powers of the military in political and social life and institutional structures has also been the source of the military tutelage debate. 

The Helsinki summit of December 10, 1999, when Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU were decided, was a turning point in civil-military relations. After this date, regulations were introduced to strengthen the control powers of the political authority over the military within the framework of concepts such as civilian or democratic control of the armed forces, citing membership standards as justification. For example, Article 35 of the Internal Service Law was amended as it was considered to be a basis for coups, the way was paved for soldiers to be tried in civilian courts, the EMASYA (Security and Public Order Assistance) plan was canceled, and the number of civilian administrators appointed to the MIT increased dramatically. 

Along with these developments, the process of discrediting the military in the society started in the same period with trials such as Sledgehammer, Ergenekon and Casusluk. Despite all these efforts, the failed coup attempt organized by a group of FETÖ members within the Turkish Armed Forces in 2016 once again demonstrated the sensitivity of political institutions to this threat. The radical amendments made by Decree Laws and Decree Decrees (KHKs) very soon after this event are also a sign that the political will had already prepared these amendments in advance. In terms of content, these changes go far beyond the norms of democratic control of the armed forces, which have been on the agenda in previous periods, and give the appearance of making the regime and political leadership more resilient against military coups. 

Changes and transformation of the armed forces have always been on the agenda of the world's militaries, based on the experience gained from wars and advances in technology. While some countries have decided on rapid and major transformations, others have adopted more conservative methods of change and transformation in order not to jeopardize security due to the threats they face (1). In the change and transformation of armies, the civilian authority generally influences through decisions on issues such as the identification of external threats to security, military alliance preferences, personnel structure, military system and resource allocation.  On the other hand, it is the soldiers themselves who are the main planners of change in specialized areas such as the structure and organization of forces, weapon systems, training and doctrine.  

Since the end of the Cold War, the Turkish Armed Forces have been working for change and transformation in line with the changing security needs, but have adopted an attitude that has kept a distance from radical changes and protected the status quo. As a result, it has been late in making some institutional changes. Although there was a "defense reform" initiative by the political authority under the auspices of the Presidency in 2013-14, it was not implemented. Therefore, the radical changes made after the FETO coup attempt may be seen as the civilian authority taking the initiative in the change and transformation of the armed forces, but practices show that the main idea was to protect the government against coups and to make the TSK incapable of attempting a coup again. In this process, soldiers were not in a position to comment on how the changes would affect the institutional functioning of the army, its command and administration and its combat capabilities, as they were seen as responsible for the coup.

What is the Concept of Democratic Civilian Control of the Military?

Even though different practices have emerged depending on the history, military culture and traditions of each country, in the twentieth century, the concept of Democratic Civilian Control of the Military (DCCM) has been used to regulate military-political relations in the functioning of democracies. It is difficult to claim that the criteria taken into account in this context are universal norms. For a while, these criteria were among the conditions sought in countries that would become members during NATO's enlargement process. The main points that stand out in the content of this concept include the following:

-Military officers should be subordinate to the President, Prime Minister or Minister of Defense, who are the head and representatives of the executive. 

-The parliament should have oversight and control over senior military appointments, the allocation of the defense budget, military spending and the conduct of armament programs.

- The military should be accountable to power, politics and society, and should embrace democratic values, open to scrutiny by civil society and the media. 

Despite the justification of harmonizing with the above-mentioned, the changes implemented through the emergency decrees issued in a short period of time have radically changed military-political relations in Turkey. Considering the content of the amendments that will be discussed later, it is difficult to say that they were inspired only by practices in advanced democracies. A review of the literature also reveals concepts such as "coup-proofing the regime, preventing or deterring coups, coup prevention strategies" (2). When the risk of losing power through a coup is high, the idea of coup prevention cannot be ignored in civil-military relations. Measures taken by states/regimes that do not have the basic protective tools necessary for a democratic civilian administration may go beyond the above-mentioned concept of the AESC and turn into an effort to make the regime and the government "coup-proof". This view is basically based on the notion that if the military and its leadership do not have enough power, they cannot stage a coup. It cannot be overlooked that some of these considerations were taken into account in the amendments introduced by the emergency decrees.  

The sources analyzed point out that these measures may eliminate the danger of a coup, but in practice they may also bring other risks. Efforts to keep the armed forces under control in a centralized structure without overpowering them so that they cannot stage a coup negatively affect the fighting capacity of the army. Armies that are overpowered to protect the regime or whose effectiveness is reduced through excessive control measures are more likely to fail in protecting the country's interests against external enemies. Then, not only the regime but also the survival of the country is at risk. 

The aim of this study is to reveal the similarities between the anti-coup measures implemented in other countries and the measures taken after July 15 and to draw attention to the negative effects that these changes may have on the combat effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Anti-impact strategies and key measures 

The sources mentioned in the footnotes on the subject have been analyzed. Instead of referring to each of them separately, the prominent points in these sources are given below. Those deemed important are as follows:

-Creating parallel military and semi-military structures to balance each other. Creating forces and institutions that can perform similar functions with a divide and rule logic. Creating a second armed force capable of counterbalancing the military and breaking its hegemony. 

-To limit communication and interaction between forces and institutions. Reducing the authority of commanders by establishing control over each unit and giving little initiative to subordinate elements. Centralize decision-making powers to the maximum extent possible.

-To make arrangements for civilian control of recruitment, promotion and appointment of military personnel.  

- Changing the existing military culture and rewarding those whose loyalty has been tested by nepotistic and patronizing policies, such as rapid promotion and patronage. In this way, instead of a culture of work, initiative and risk-taking, a culture of non-criticism, silence, loyalty and rewards will prevail. 

-To change and transform military culture by closing down military education institutions, reorganizing the curriculum, destroying the existing military culture, devaluing and dishonoring the military. Closing long-established military schools and excluding graduates from these schools from the newly established structures.

-To move military units out of the capital and critical cities, to change their deployment locations, and to ensure control by preventing their dispersal throughout the country, to isolate the military from society. Attempting to destroy the ancient military culture by "civilianizing" military buildings of historical value.

-Creating several organizations that will control each other instead of a single intelligence organization.

-To glorify nationalist sentiments at home by involving the army in conflicts with external enemies, and to keep the army busy with its primary duties.

A final point that can be added to these is the change of the military service system. According to one view, the risk of coup d'état is higher in semi-democratic countries with a compulsory military service system. This is because society has a stronger bond with the armed forces in which every individual serves. It is argued that such a system may create a more favorable environment for some groups and currents of thought to organize a collective activity within the armed forces (3). On the other hand, it is also pointed out that such armies are more willing to transition to democracy after coups than professional armies. Nevertheless, it is noted that a transition to a professional army may be useful as part of coup prevention measures. In this way, it is believed that the loyalty of professionals will be gained by selectively recruiting individuals through a recruitment system. 

Negative repercussions of the measures 

The most prominent negative impact of the measures listed above is the risk of weakening military power and creating security weaknesses. Some of these are mentioned in the same sources as follows. 

Institutions established in search of balance require similar capabilities, such as weapons and equipment, to be kept in more than one institution, thus wasting resources.

Dual-headedness prevents specialization, which weakens coordination between elements that need to be used together on the battlefield.

Distributing the control of existing forces to different units reduces the ability to create synergy by using different classes and branches together in combat. Reducing joint training and exercises due to the fear of coup d'état and limiting communication between forces adversely affects training and combat preparations.

Armies that are unable to exercise initiative and whose decision-making authority is overly centralized have difficulty in adapting to the changing conditions of today's battles. 

Overly politicized rules for recruitment and training of personnel lead to the undeserved promotion of professionally incompetent leaders, who in turn fail to lead and manage. 

Leaders who maintain their power by allying with certain groups in domestic politics will have to take into account the wishes of these groups in high-level promotions and appointments, leading to a deterioration in the army's understanding of solidarity, obedience, competence and discipline. There is a danger of the army becoming overly politicized, as personnel with future expectations will try to be close to political leaders and establish relationships with them. 

Historical experience has shown that all measures taken and implemented with a reactive approach are not always successful in preventing coups. 

Measures to eliminate weaknesses 

It has already been mentioned that if the measures taken to prevent coups turn into excessive practices, there is a high risk of reducing the effectiveness of the armed forces and creating weaknesses, especially in the fight against external enemies.  Looking at past examples, there are two main methods that countries and some leaders have used to address this risk.

Two Methods

-To acquire weapons of mass destruction to compensate for the inadequacies of the armed forces. These could be mostly chemical and nuclear weapons. This is because these weapons provide a deterrent against external enemies, while at the same time their control can be given to a small group loyal to the leader, reducing the risk of a coup.

-The second method is to seek reassurance in foreign policy by forming new alliances or becoming a member of a new alliance.

Post-July 15 civil-military relations and the changes and transformations in the Turkish Armed Forces 

This section discusses the changes made in the institutional structure of the TAF in the aftermath of the coup attempt. The strategies and measures described above are based on the practices of countries with no experience of democracy, which are mostly based on leader dominance. Turkey's democratic experience, administrative and social structure are different from these. However, there are some similarities in the changes introduced. After the July 15 coup attempt, a large-scale change and transformation in the structure of the Turkish Armed Forces was inevitable and the political will implemented these changes on the grounds of eliminating tutelage and preventing coups without any political and social opposition. Unfortunately, the changes in question were made through decree laws issued in reaction to the incident, including radical changes and transformations (4). These changes are not limited to the ones mentioned below, but the important ones are emphasized here. 

What are the Changes in the Command and Organizational Structure of the TAF?

The Chief of General Staff has been defined as the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces in wartime, as in the past, but in peace, the Land, Naval and Air Forces have been directly subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense. With this practice, the authority and authority of the Chief of General Staff over the Turkish Armed Forces has been limited. Since responsibilities such as personnel, logistics and strategy development have also been assigned to the Ministry of National Defense, the Chief of General Staff has been transformed into a military advisor.

In the hierarchical structure, orders given by civilians will be implemented as if they were given by military commands.

The Gendarmerie General Command and Coast Guard Command have been disassociated from the Turkish Armed Forces and attached to the Ministry of Interior.

The headquarters of the Ministry of National Defense was strengthened and civilians appointed to certain positions were given titles equivalent to military ranks.

The Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy was established to train the Gendarmerie's own personnel, thus severing the connection between the Gendarmerie personnel and the personnel studying at other military schools.

Military courts were abolished and civilian courts were authorized to try soldiers.

TAF Health Command was abolished and Military Hospitals were transferred to the Ministry of Health.

Changes introduced in the personnel system

The military service law was amended to reduce and diversify the duration of compulsory military service and accelerate the transition to professional military service. Combat units were formed with more specialized personnel and operational missions were assigned to units composed of these soldiers.

The weight of interviews and the number of civilian members on commissions were increased in examinations for recruitment of military students and all kinds of personnel.

Most of the staff officers who had graduated in previous periods were removed from the system, and general/admiral promotions from class officers were preferred.

The structure of the Supreme Military Council was changed, the number of civilian members was increased, and the authority of political authorities in general admiral and senior level promotions was strengthened.

The criteria for the selection and appointment of the Chief of General Staff and Force Commanders were changed and the President was authorized to appoint one of the current admirals and generals. Generals were given the opportunity to be promoted or retired before the end of their rank waiting period.

Changes made in the education system

Military high schools and non-commissioned officer preparation schools were closed. Except for the Class Schools belonging to the Force Commands, other schools and educational institutions were incorporated into the National Defense University operating directly under the Ministry of National Defense.

Civilian administrators were appointed as rectors and deans of the War Schools, and teaching subjects were reorganized. In order to replace those who were dismissed after the coup attempt, personnel were recruited through accelerated training programs.

Changes in the defense industry

The defense industry has made great progress in recent years and the capabilities gained have become a new force multiplier for the changing operational needs of the Armed Forces. The defense industry has assumed important roles in terms of national security and survival by eliminating the weaknesses caused by foreign dependency and meeting the needs rapidly by accelerating the procurement period. These developments contribute not only to security but also to domestic politics in terms of political success.

In the use of resources allocated to the defense industry, political preferences play a role in the selection of the location and contractor of the facilities to be established as well as the priorities of military needs. In addition to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff, the membership of the Defense Industry Executive Committee-SSIK, the highest decision-making body for resource utilization and project approvals, has increased the weight of political authority by including the Deputy CB, the Ministers of Interior, Industry and Technology, and the Minister of Treasury and Finance.

The Undersecretariat, which was part of the MoD, was transformed into the Presidency of Defense Industry with the rationale of being able to do business faster and was directly affiliated to the President. It was also exempted from the provisions of the state procurement law in the use of resources. Managers appointed by the SSM and the government have assumed important roles in the management of the Foundation Affiliated Partnership Companies (ASELSAN, TAI, HAVELSAN, ROKETSAN, etc.), which are the most important companies in the sector, and the TSK Empowerment Foundation. Thus, unlike in the past, the visibility of the military in these institutions has been reduced.

The defense industry has gained a function of increasing the power of the army by providing new capabilities.  In the development of military power in this sector, the demands of the industry, which uses the resources, have started to guide the development of military power as much as the demands of the soldiers, who are the main experts and users of the capabilities. At this point, instead of focusing only on achievements, the parliament's oversight and supervision responsibility gains importance to ensure that resources are spent appropriately, efficiently and in a way that prioritizes national security.

Reflections of Change on the Turkish Armed Forces 

It is clear that the direct subordination of the Force Commands to the Minister is aimed at preventing the concentration of power in one center by limiting the powers and responsibilities of the Chief of General Staff.

However, this restructuring is likely to have negative effects on the management of joint operations, training and combat readiness activities, which are more necessary than ever in today's wars. In wartime, the Chief of Staff will serve as the commander of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the CB. However, it should be emphasized that powers that are limited in peacetime and procedures that have not been developed through training and exercises will be rapidly put into use in war. While the role of the Chief of General Staff has been reduced in the current system, the lack of commands established for the management of joint operations is another need.

The Gendarmerie, Security Forces and National Intelligence Organization (MİT) have been considerably strengthened in terms of their authority, organization and capabilities compared to the previous period.

Spending on acquiring similar capabilities also leads to a waste of resources. Considering the practices in the intervening period, it would be more accurate to say that the main purpose of strengthening these institutions was to ensure security, public order and public safety, and to increase internal control in all areas, rather than a counterbalance against the armed forces. Especially after the Gendarmerie was severed from the Turkish Armed Forces, its development under the organization of the Ministry of Interior was accelerated with a new institutional identity and culture. The political power's influence and control over the Gendarmerie organization has increased with its special training institutions, personnel recruitment, promotion and training system. Personnel selection, training and appointments have become more sensitive to political preferences and demands. Although military ranks are still used, the Gendarmerie's similarities with the Turkish Armed Forces are gradually diminishing. The promotion system is carried out by boards established within the ministry. 

One of the most noteworthy changes in the Gendarmerie General Command is the significant increase in the number of generals. After the closure of regional commands, the number of gendarmerie commanders in 61 provinces has recently been increased to general level. Considering the issues explained earlier, this development can be interpreted as a kind of reward and an attempt to bring more loyal personnel to command positions. Not only the personnel system, but also the Gendarmerie, Police and MIT have been strengthened with armed and unarmed helicopters, UAVs, UCAVs and many armored vehicles. On the other hand, these elements can take part alongside the armed forces in domestic and cross-border operations. In the event of a war, their cooperation with the armed forces will increase even more. Ensuring unity of command and coordination in such missions is very important. Ensuring the interoperability of personnel with different organizational cultures and levels of training is always difficult and requires good training and exercises. 

It has been mentioned above that increasing the degree of civilian control may negatively affect the leadership abilities of soldiers and their ability to exercise initiative during missions. It is natural that the Land Forces will be the most affected. Because they have the most manpower, their visibility in coups is also higher. Therefore, the control of land forces becomes even more important. The cost of excessive measures to be taken with the justification of preventing coups and uprisings emerges as a decrease in the combat effectiveness of the troops. 

For example, at the beginning of the conflicts in Ukraine, it was determined that the small unit commanders of the Russian army, which had a centralized management approach, could not use initiative and this increased casualties. As another example, when I was serving in Afghanistan, I witnessed that the troops allocated by Germany to the ISAF command were frequently visited by a large number of parliamentary and ministerial delegations. The many constraints that German soldiers in the field had to comply with in carrying out their assigned tasks and the difficulties they had in exercising initiative made it difficult for NATO operational planners. This situation attracted the attention of the senior US general in charge of the region, who criticized the situation in a conversation by saying "I wonder if these are the German soldiers who fought two world wars". It should also be noted that the regulations introduced after the war for civilian control of the German armed forces also played a role in this incident. Therefore, while increased civilian control is a safeguard against coups, it has a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the troops.

In determining the way in which military power is fought and used, the lessons learned from wars in other regions are taken into account as well as the experience of the countries themselves. The Ukraine - Russia war and the recent Israel - Hamas conflict are being closely analyzed by the armies of the world. These conflicts, in which heavy weapons and joint operations have been used to their full extent since the Second Gulf War, will also shape the doctrines of future wars. I hope that these developments are being carefully followed by the Turkish Armed Forces and all institutions responsible for security as a whole. 

For example, the personnel problems experienced in the war in Ukraine necessitate a careful review of our current recruitment and training system. In protracted conflicts, it is difficult to find a source of personnel with the same level of expertise to cover the casualties suffered by professional troops in the campaign. Even in peacetime, the Turkish army is a highly operational force in terms of its current missions. Even the resting, retraining and rotation of existing personnel between these missions is a challenge for planners. Considering the recent experience of the February 6 earthquake, the importance of personnel issues is even greater. The effective use of human resources is an issue that should be carefully considered not only by military experts but also by lawmakers.  Modern and high-tech products produced by the defense industry gain meaning only with the presence of trained personnel. 

The selection, training and control of personnel is one of the most sensitive issues in the light of our experiences. The existence of a management system that ensures merit and fairness in promotions and assignments is the most important basis of the morale and power of the army, along with modern warfare weaponry. Due to the increase in the number of professional personnel, it is imperative to ensure continuous professional development and renewal, not only at the entry stage. Preventing the abuse of authority by personnel who are unable to display good behavior due to personal problems, regardless of their rank, and establishing a system that operates with impartiality is also the guarantee of keeping the military out of the sphere of political influence. Personnel who face such problems in their working life but cannot find fair solutions are likely to be attracted to groups and movements that make promises to them. Likewise, political rewarding and favoritism of certain behaviors may also harm the spirit of solidarity in the army, as it may lead to the promotion of other merits instead of merit. The post-July 15th amendments allow politics to exert too much influence on the professional practices and working systems of soldiers. In order for the Turkish Army to remain the army of the nation, the divisive discourses and behaviors in domestic politics should not be allowed to reflect on the culture of the armed forces.  

It may be a good solution for the military to focus on external threats by getting rid of tasks related to internal threats, except for tasks such as assisting civilian authorities in natural disasters and social events, and to do its job better and to distance itself from political debates. It would not be wrong to say that this situation is one of the driving forces of the breakthroughs in the defense industry. The strengthening of the Gendarmerie organization to take responsibility for internal security can be considered a useful change in this respect. However, the fact that border security belongs to the Armed Forces and that domestic and international operations cannot be clearly separated due to the nature of the fight against terrorism makes it difficult to share authority and responsibility. For this reason, there is still a need to share information and experience and to develop coordination procedures to ensure a healthy cooperation between these elements.

Conclusion

Intervening in political life through military coups is not acceptable in countries that have adopted and internalized democracy. In this respect, military-civilian relations should be based on an institutional functioning shaped by the values of the countries themselves for a healthy democracy to function. While the military should recognize the supremacy of the elected civilian will, civilians should not interfere too much in the military's areas of expertise. 

Unfortunately, Turkey has had bitter experiences in its democratic journey during the Republican era where politics was interrupted by military coups. The position of the military and their influence on social life have also been the source of discussions on tutelage. The recent failed coup attempt was not an act carried out by the TSK with its institutional identity, but by members of the FETÖ organization, which has been insidiously infiltrating and nesting in the army for many years. As a result, the TSK itself has suffered the most in terms of the reputation it has lost in the eyes of the public. 

This attempt gave the political will the opportunity to reorganize civil-military relations. Significant changes were made not only in the way institutions relate to each other and how they should function in democracies, but also in the transformation and transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces. Unfortunately, these changes have been largely reactive rather than rational ones that have gone through healthy, mutually discussed decision-making processes. It is clear that the aim of these changes was to put the military in a position where it would not be able to carry out coups again. For this purpose, it is believed that other practices in the world have been analyzed and utilized.   At the point reached today, there is no democratic civilian control of the military, but a military controlled by the government. Although some balance seems to have been achieved at the points where the military comes into contact with politics as a result of the appointment of military figures who have served as commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces as the Minister of National Defense in the last two periods, it would not be wrong to state that the weight of politics on the military will increase in every period by using the existing executive and control powers of the Ministry. This would mean moving away from the understanding of keeping the military out of politics.  

In recent years, the changing security needs of our country have necessitated the use of the TAF more in foreign missions. If the capabilities of the armed forces and the warfighting doctrine they have developed are not compatible with the foreign operations to be carried out in line with the assessments of the civilian authority, success will be at risk. It is the duty of the military to keep the doctrine they are responsible for developing up to date and to show the will, courage and resilience to harmonize the demands of civilians with the capabilities of the military force when necessary.  

The assessment of the seven years that have passed since the attempted coup should be made primarily by the Armed Forces themselves, as a matter of professionalism. The risks of ineffective measures and proposals to remedy them should be honestly reported to the political authorities, while maintaining good practices. The parliament should also provide an environment in which these issues can be heard, questioned and evaluated directly from the soldiers themselves, with a supra-political approach in the relevant commissions when necessary, and make on-site observations by visiting the troops.

References

(1) Doç. Dr. Oktay Bingöl ve Ali Bilgin Varlık tarafından hazırlanan ve Ağustos 2017’de Barış Kitap tarafından yayımlanan “15 Temmuz sonrası Türk Ordusu: Kriz ve Çıkış” kitabı daha detaylı bilgiler ihtiva etmektedir. 

(2) Notların hazırlanmasında yararlanılan ve Darbelere karşı çeşitli ülkeler tarafından getirilen uygulamalar için önerilen kaynaklar

- Cameron S. Brown, Christopher J. Fariss and R. Blake McMahor, Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution

- Dan Reiter, Avoiding the Coup-Proofing Dilemma: Consolidating Political Control While Maximizing Military power, Political Science, Foreign Policy Analysis, 1 June 2020

- Jonathan M Powell, Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: A Coup-Proofing Paradox, Armed Forces & Society, 4 December 2017, 

-Joseph Paul Vasquez, Jonathan M Powell, Institutional Arsenals for Democracy? The Post coup Effects of Conscript Militaries.  Armed Forces & Society, 9 October 2019

- Ulrich H. Pilster, Tobias Böhmet, Coup proofing and military effectiveness in interstate wars

-James T. Quinlivan, Coup Proofing, Its practice and consequences in Middle East

- Doç. Dr. Oktay Bingöl ve Ali Bilgin Varlık, 15 Temmuz sonrası Türk Ordusu: Kriz ve Çıkış, Barış Kitap, Ağustos 2017

(3) Ioannis Choulis, I want you…or not? The effect of conscription on coup risk in anocracies, International Politics, 11 November 2021

(4) 668, 669, 671, 674, 676, 677 ve 678 sayılı KHK’ler