Airbus A400M Atlas, Military Cargo Aircraft of Turkish Air Force (Part 9)
A400M military transport aircraft serial number MSN 023 crashed during a test flight in Seville, Spain. Two test pilots and two flight test engineers were killed among the six-member Spanish crew on board the aircraft, which made its first flight after leaving the factory assembly line.
On 9 May 2015, during a test flight in Seville, Spain, the A400M military transport aircraft serial number MSN 023 crashed. Two test pilots (Pilot Jaime de Gandarillas and Co-Pilot Manuel Regueiro) and two flight test engineers (Gabriel García Prieto and Jesualdo Martínez) were among the six Spanish crew members on board the aircraft, which made its first flight after leaving the factory assembly line. Of the crew seriously injured in the accident, flight test engineer José Luis de Augusto and technician Joaquín Muñoz Anaya survived.
The cover photo shows the Airbus A400M aircraft, serial number MSN 023, which was manufactured to join the Turkish Air Force inventory on 9 May 2015, but whose testing processes had not yet been completed, about to crash into a field during an emergency situation after a problem with its engines at the beginning of a test flight in Spain. At the time of the crash, the aircraft was travelling at a left bank angle of approximately 30 degrees, which caused the left wing to first contact the ground, causing a strong explosion followed by a large-scale fire. This image was captured at the last moment before the tail of the A400M hit the power lines and crashed into the ground of the field. It can be seen that the pilots did not deploy the landing gear in order not to further reduce the aircraft's speed. Image Source Europa Press.
Test Pilot Jaime de Gandarillas graduated as a military pilot from the Academia General del Aire y del Espacio in Spain in 1993. He completed his fighter pilot training with distinction at Columbus Air Force Base, USA, and is fluent in English. Between 1993 and 2000, he served as an F-18 fighter pilot in the ALA-12 unit of the Spanish Air Force. Between 2001 and 2011, he worked as an experimental test pilot at the Armament and Experimental Logistics Centre in Ardoz, Torrejón. Since 2011, he has worked at Airbus Defence and Space, piloting experimental tests on various aircraft models such as the C-212, A-330 MRTT, EF-2000 (Typhoon) and A-400M. He also holds a master's degree in flight testing from the Polytechnic University of Madrid.
Manu Regueiro (Manuel Valentín Regueiro Muñoz ) graduated from the Spanish General Air and Space Academy in 1997 and became a military pilot. He served in the ALA-35 squadron at Getafe Air Base, flying CN-235 and C-295 aircraft, before serving as Air Coordinator of the Military Emergency Unit from 2008 to 2009. He also served as Commander of the 353rd Squadron based in Getafe.
In 2003, he was also honoured with the Aviation Cross of Merit. He served in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2011. He was awarded the NATO Medal in 2006 for his services in Afghanistan.
In 2011, Regueiro started to work as an A-320 instructor at Airbus Military, and later became involved in the A-400M project. In 2012, after being assigned to Seville, he tragically lost his life on 9 May 2015 during a test flight of the A-400M aircraft.
Jesualdo Martínez Ródenas worked as a flight engineer at Airbus. Although he was of military origin, was he a pilot in his professional life? Information such as when he graduated from the Academy is not available in open sources. The only information I can find about him is an article in the ‘Revista de aeronáutica y astronautica’, which states that he was a soldier who served at the Morón airbase, and that he was a captain at least in 1999. (By captain, do you mean a captain pilot or a soldier with the rank of captain? unfortunately, I could not find out) .
Despite a detailed search of open sources for information on the pre-accident lives of Gabriel García Prieto, José Luis de Augusto and Joaquín Muñoz Anaya, I was unable to find clear and precise information.
The infographic above shows the route of the A400M after take-off from the runway. According to flight data records, the A400M is seen at 1700 feet (600 metres) above the ground in its final turning manoeuvre before the accident. The A400M was in the air for approximately three minutes at a cruising speed of 309 kilometres per hour. The aircraft performed a turning manoeuvre, gradually losing altitude and speed, and crashed into a field near the airport. The dense column of smoke was visible to the naked eye from the Aljarafe area. The aircraft had to stay in the air for another 30 seconds to reach its runway, which was about a mile away.
Image source abc.es.
Analysis of the A400M aircraft crash in Seville on 9 May 2015
On 9 May 2015, an A400M built for the Turkish Air Force, but with incomplete testing activities, suffered a fatal accident during a test flight in Spain. The incident was attributed to an engine failure caused by a software-related malfunction. Airbus Defence and Space had published its preliminary report on the A400M military transport aircraft accident that occurred in Spain on 9 May 2015. The Airbus A400M type aircraft took off from Seville Airport (SVQ) runway 09 at 12:54. The flight was a routine test flight before the delivery of the new A400M for the Turkish Air Force. The A400M had completed the factory assembly phase and was to take off for its first flight.
There was a crew of six people in the cockpit: two pilots, one technician and three engineers. Shortly after take-off, three of the four engines (engines 1,2,3) were stuck at high power. The crew followed standard procedures to restore engine power to normal levels, but without success. They then attempted to reduce the power by moving the engine thrust levers to the idle position. The pilots were then able to reduce power after moving the thrust levers to idle. The engines (engines 1,2,3) were then stuck at idle. As the A400M attempted to return to the airport, first the left wing hit the ground at a 30-degree angle, then the tail of the aircraft hit power lines, crashed into a field and caught fire. According to the company, the root cause of this power loss was a software error in the aircraft's electronic control system.
The TP400-D6 engines used on the A400M are controlled by FADEC. FADEC is a frequently used abbreviation in aviation and consists of the initials of Full Authority Digital Engine Control. Although it does not have an exact Turkish equivalent, it can be translated as Full Authority Digital Engine Control System. The inability of the pilots to take the aircraft under control as a result of their inability to correct this situation despite all the interventions they made to eliminate the loss of power in the engines coincides with a similar software problem detected previously. Following the preliminary report released by Airbus D&S, the more detailed report prepared by the institutions authorised for the accident investigation emphasises that especially the 1st, 2nd and 3rd engines lost power after take-off and did not respond to the pilots' interventions. In the accident, four members of the A400M test crew lost their lives and two test crew members were seriously injured. Unfortunately, the reason for the software failure was very simple. Weeks after the disaster, the Reuters news agency reported, citing several sources familiar with the matter, that Airbus employees had inadvertently deleted the data needed to start the engines during the installation of more up-to-date software on the A400M's flight computer while the aircraft was on the ground (when the software installation initially failed, the data for three engines was deleted due to a software error during the update, and these files were never restored during the subsequent installation process). It is believed that the deletion of critical data was not noticed by the technical team performing the software installation, and therefore, the pilots realised too late that there was a malfunction or a problem with the engines, and that there was not much that could be done. According to the results of the investigation, due to the lack of data in the engine control systems, the engines were fixed at maximum thrust. This caused the aircraft to accelerate unexpectedly and gain altitude. Air traffic control instructed the A400M pilots to cruise at an altitude of 1500 feet. According to sources, the pilots reduced engine thrust while trying to comply with this instruction, but were not aware of the fact that the failed engines could either operate at full power or remain completely idle.
As a result, engines 1, 2 and 3 remained idle and the aircraft controls did not respond positively to the locked pilots‘ attempts to increase engine power, leaving only one engine running and the only remaining engine responsive to the pilots’ controls. While trying to return to the airport, the A400M could not hold on in the air any longer, and while rapidly losing altitude in a left bank of about 30 degrees, first the left wing hit the ground; immediately afterwards, the tail section hit the power lines, fell into a field and burned. During the emergency situation, captain pilot Jaime de Gandarillas had set the A400M's course to minimise the risk, finding it too risky to fly over a shopping mall, the Coca Cola factory in Seville and the Aerópolis facilities, instead of taking the shortest route to the runway. The last words of the captain pilot Jaime de Gandarillas heard on the radio were ‘We did not reach the runway’.
Analysing the A400M accident, some experts questioned the pilots' reaction to the incident despite the technical difficulties. It is argued that in the event of an engine failure, pilots should have ignored the engine control elements and firstly ascended to a safe altitude and then adjusted the power settings. Research has shown that pilots are not prepared for such emergency scenarios and that the A400M's troubleshooting system is inadequate. Airbus, on the other hand, maintains that the pilots are highly trained and experienced.
According to a Spanish military investigative report leaked in the summer of 2017, Airbus and EPI do not agree on who installed the engine software, Reuters reported. The report stated that the software was installed by Airbus employees using the aircraft manufacturer's systems, but EPI had to be installed by its own personnel and using EPI systems. The report stated that EPI claimed that it had authority over the software installation under civilian rules, but emphasised that there was confusion in the regulations regarding civilian and military authority over the aircraft at the time of the accident.
Airbus argues that the installation of the software was correct on the grounds that it was authorised to act in accordance with military standards. Airbus admits that the software did not comply with the terms of the contract. According to three people familiar with the investigation, EPI, the company that developed the software, denies this claim. The Spanish authorities, on the other hand, support Airbus' position on the grounds that the assembly line is considered a defence industrial facility and therefore not subject to civilian regulations.
Some safety experts argue that the accident is an indication that multiple system failures in today's increasingly complex aviation systems can combine to cause unexpected consequences. According to these experts, seemingly insignificant minor malfunctions or structural weaknesses, if inappropriately combined, can lead to serious accidents.
In the summer of 2017, a leaked report by Spanish military investigators revealed that Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) had been informed of a vulnerability similar to the software bug found on the A400M military aircraft in late 2014, which was identified as the cause of a fatal crash seven months later.
According to information from the report seen by Reuters and three people close to the investigation, the findings confirmed that the engines were compromised due to the deletion of data.
The report also said that engine manufacturers warned Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in October 2014 that software installation errors could lead to the loss of engine data and that technicians may not receive any warning that a problem had occurred before take-off.
The A400M accident is proof that disruptions, poor coordination and poor decision-making in Europe's largest military project can lead to serious consequences.
According to the news published in Aviaciondigital on 8 April 2018, due to the lack of coordination between Airbus D&S and EPI, a critical software failure occurred as a result of the unintentional deletion of calibration parameters during the software installation process. In the report prepared by CITAAM (Comisión para la Investigación Técnica de Accidentes de Aeronaves Militares) (Commission for the Technical Investigation of Military Aircraft Accidents), it was stated that this error was not detected by any warning system and that the relevant personnel did not exercise due diligence. The prosecution authorities, on the other hand, emphasised that the accident was preventable and stated that the criminal investigation should continue. As Allianz is the insurance provider of the Airbus Group, it is necessary to initiate legal proceedings to recover the material and moral damages suffered.
In a judgment dated 3 March 2021, compiled by Europa Press, the Seventh Chamber of the Seventh Instance of the Seville Court upheld the previous decision of the Court of Instruction No. 13 to institute proceedings for a second time in relation to the crash of the A400M military transport aircraft on 9 May 2015 near Seville airport, which resulted in four deaths and two injuries, the district court stated that the ‘proposition’ or assumption that led to the accident was ‘highly improbable and practically non-existent at the time’.
The Spanish court found that this error in the design of the aircraft caused the accident, but denied that the training of the crew or other factors were instrumental in the accident. The court stated that the aircraft manufacturer was liable for the design defect, but ruled that those affected by the accident should seek civil remedies for financial compensation.
This photograph, taken in March 2019, is a powerful testament to human perseverance and love of life. José Luis de Augusto, a flight test engineer and pilot who suffered serious damage to his spine in the A400M crash on 9 May 2015, continues to fly thanks to a special system (kit) after a difficult rehabilitation process. Despite being paralysed from the waist down, Augusto, who continues his passion for aviation by controlling the aircraft with his hands, wants to establish a flight school to inspire other pilots in the same situation, and this is his goal. Augusto, who obtained his health certificate with the support of his colleagues in the industry, plays a pioneering role in this field by participating in flights organised for disabled pilots around the world. Although there is no current information about Augusto's status and whether he opened a flight school after 2019, his perseverance and determination can be shown as one of the best examples of overcoming obstacles. Visual source abc.es.
In my personal opinion, the most unfortunate incident for the pilots was the simultaneous critical failure of three engines immediately after take-off and the instruction given by air traffic control to remain at an altitude of 1500 feet. Multiple engine failure Immediately after the A400M took off from the runway, the same type of failure occurred in three engines at the same time, which affected the thrust of the aircraft and limited the manoeuvrability of the pilots. This situation played an important role in the accident by making it difficult to control the A400M in a limited time period. The instruction given by the air traffic control to stay at an altitude of 1500 feet made it even more difficult for the aircraft, which was already in a critical situation, to hold in the air. This is because it is very difficult to control a heavy aircraft like the A400M with almost one engine at low altitude and with reduced thrust. The reasons for giving this instruction and the evaluation of alternative scenarios can be revealed by experts through a detailed examination of the accident. The flight experience, expertise and competence of the pilots are vital in such critical situations. The fact that the route chosen for the A400M to reach the runway as soon as possible in case of an emergency landing, passing over an area with a high population density, was quickly assessed by the pilots as a major risk factor that could increase the loss of life and material damages in a possible accident. The pilots determined a safer approach and landing route. The primary objective of the pilots was to land the aircraft safely and to minimise civilian casualties in the event of an accident. However, in an unexpected and rapidly developing situation such as a multiple engine failure, it may not always be possible for pilots to take all precautions. It can be assessed that the pilots did their best to land the aircraft safely, following all procedures, within the existing conditions and constraints.
Conclusion
On 9 May 2015, an A400M military transport aircraft accident occurred in Seville, resulting in the death of four crew members and serious injuries to two others. Following a thorough investigation, the main cause of the accident was identified as a lack of data in the engine control systems.
The investigation emphasised that the lack of coordination between Airbus D&S and the engine manufacturer, Europrop International (EPI), led to this data deficiency and thus played an important role in the accident. Such data deficiencies in engine control systems pose serious risks for flight safety. With the lessons learnt from the accident, I believe that safety standards in the aviation industry have been raised and important steps have been taken to prevent similar accidents.
The A400M project can be considered one of the most complex and comprehensive projects in aeronautical engineering. Due to the importance of the design, production, testing and certification processes in this project, which requires a multi-disciplinary approach, in my previous article, I outlined the design, production and certification phases of the project and tried to provide information. I leave the relevant link below for those who want to read it.
Airbus A400M Atlas, Military Cargo Aircraft of Turkish Air Force (Part 8)
https://strasam.org/savunma/havacilik-ve-uzay-sanayii/turk-hava-kuvvetlerinin-askeri-kargo-ucaklarindan-airbus-a400m-atlas-bolum-8-3521
We will continue our article series with the A400M. See you in the next chapter.
Bibliography
https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/05/09/album/1431179061_911910.html
https://www.abc.es/sevilla/ciudad/20150510/sevi-cronica-vuelo-a400m-201505092143.html
https://www.elmundo.es/andalucia/2015/05/09/554e7a35ca4741d1098b456e.html
https://www.elmundo.es/andalucia/sevilla/2018/09/07/5b925e01e2704e98448b4602.html
https://aviaciondigital.com/archivo-de-la-causa-penal-del-accidente-del-a400m-en-sevilla/