An Alternative Model for Outsourcing Fighter Aircraft Procurement

As you know, the backbone of the Turkish Air Force is the F-16 fighter aircraft of American origin. With the retirement of the F-4E 2020 aircraft soon, this situation will evolve into a combat aircraft wing consisting entirely of a single source and a single type. Our exclusion from the F-35 JSF project has long brought the issue of outsourcing aircraft procurement to our agenda, either as a gap filler or as a second main type.

Yes, our domestic and national combat aircraft projects such as Hürjet and Kaan continue. We are also planning to modernise our F-16s and carry them into the future by evolving them into two different types, either the latest configuration Block 70 Viper or the indigenous Free. However, not all projects and intentions fully cover today's urgent needs. For this reason, while efforts to procure fighter jets from external sources continue, it is necessary to approach the issue from a perspective that embraces alternative models. This article has the potential to broaden your horizons regarding these alternative models.

Genetic Codes of US Combat Aviation

Surrounded by oceans on both sides and with a relatively secure mainland, the United States has placed air power at the centre of its global power projection. A naval aviation that enables it to dominate all oceans, an air force that enables it to establish air superiority and air dominance in the battlefields, and force multiplier elements that include a bombardment, logistics and support forces that will strategically strengthen this situation... These forces, structured in a purely offensive manner, have continuously strengthened their importance and position in the American hegemony in parallel with the development of technology and the transition to the information age.

The unipolar world order of the last thirty years has reduced the flexibility of the industrial wing that feeds these forces and caused it to lose its foresight. Because; it was enough to continue doing what they already did well and did not face any competition. For this reason, all innovations, especially the JSF project, have become extremely costly, time-consuming, more complex, more expensive, difficult to maintain and industrially troublesome. In this process, it is of particular importance to understand the genetic codes of the US air power and the defence and aerospace industry that feeds it. Let us try to summarise this in bullet points:

• The US considers it a priority, even a necessity, to achieve air superiority and even dominance in all battlefield dimensions such as land, sea, etc.
• US air forces have a predominantly offensive structure.
• It is becoming more and more network-centred and even dependent on a sustainable network structure.
• It preferred to solve the process of transition to the information age by making every feature it added a part of the industrial ecosystem and expanding its sub-ecosystem with an industrial age approach. For this reason, the production lines of half-century-old aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16 are still open and receiving new demands.
• The emerging powers (including Turkey), on the other hand, are not as wedded to certain habits as the US military-industrial complex. For this reason, it seems closer to establishing a more modern and future-friendly industrial infrastructure.
• Unmanned / Robotic air elements play a catalysing role in this process.
• The US air forces, on the other hand, tend to see unmanned systems as a contribution to industrial transformation and the first testing ground.
• Modularity is a concept that can vary considerably depending on who understands it. While we have witnessed some correct applications of modularity, its negative and cost-increasing effects are also observed in many projects.
• The lack of skilled, meritorious and polymath senior managers seems to have become a major weakness of the military-industrial system in the decision-making phase.
• As the expectations from fighter jets increase and new features are added, costs are increasing much more than before (again due to the existing industrial infrastructure and old generation management approaches).
• This cost increase inevitably leads to the need for a trade-off. (A kind of scientific trade, aiming for an ideal balance of advantages and disadvantages). The United States is much more inept, slow and reluctant to achieve this trade-off.
• The US air force and the infrastructure that supports it are a crucial part of the country's social life and productive power. For this reason, it is difficult to give up and conservative against change. (Too big to fail, too big to change...)
• The USA, with its political influence, marketing power, technological and psychological superiority and propaganda capability, continues to dictate its air power understanding to other countries. It is not known how sustainable this is.
• While the industrial age was marked by technologies that left the military field and adapted to civilian life, in the transition to the information age, it is observed that technologies that leave civilian life and find use in the military field are increasing. While this situation can penetrate the American system at the lower ends, it cannot create the necessary space for itself in the superstructure.
• As is the case in all developed countries, the USA also has difficulty in attracting sufficient ‘qualified manpower’ to the military field and industry.

‘Choosing a Fighter Jet is Choosing a Pact’

Military aviation is constantly evolving in parallel with technologies, is very expensive, technically complex and requires political support for its maintenance as well as its procurement. A country can purchase weapons from any external source it wishes. However, when it comes to combat aircraft, the understanding that ‘choosing an aircraft is choosing a pact’ has been accepted since the Cold War years. Will this understanding change? If it will change, how will this change take place?...

In fact, when we look at the basis of the industries related to military aviation, we see that each country carries out this business within the framework of its own philosophy, understanding and technical standards. The only exception to this is the USA, which, thanks to its political, economic and military power, has been able to turn its own standards into NATO alliance standards. This situation led to the further increase and development of these standards, thanks to the participation of European manufacturers. In time, the duopoly of US Boeing and European Airbus in civil aviation also made it possible to establish civil aviation standards similar to NATO's. (It is not well known, but Chinese J-10 and JF-17 aircraft are manufactured to use civil aviation standard products and protocols in the use of all infrastructure such as cabling, connectors, data communication, etc.).

It is certain that major changes and transformations will take place in the defence and aerospace industry. There is an irreparable need for this and many signs can already be seen. The USAF is considering whether we can shelve the NGAD project and replace it with many different aircraft with the ‘Digital Century Series’ approach. For unmanned companion combat aircraft (CCA), exponential manufacturers have been identified as the main contractor, while giant defence and aerospace companies have been identified as subcontractors. Established manufacturers such as Northrop-Grumman, on the other hand, are trying to increase their adaptation capabilities by establishing sub-companies such as Scaled Composites with exponential identity. For example, with the Vanguard project; with the idea of placing a pilot on an unmanned aircraft, it is trying to capture a cost advantage far beyond developing a pilotless version of a manned aircraft.

As someone who has been thinking about these issues for a long time, I can say that I have analysed many different models. Among these analyses, there are also business models that do not yet exist, have not been considered or have not been announced. Let's dive straight into the subject with an interesting idea storm and put one of the alternative models I mentioned on the table. (What If...?) What if Turkey buys naked J-10CN (Naked) aircraft from the People's Republic of China, which do not include radar, electronic warfare and self-defence systems, ammunition, mission computers, etc.? Would it still be considered as choosing a pact?..

Purchasing Bare Aircraft as an Alternative Procurement Method

You may have read many different names for the F-35 aircraft developed within the framework of the JSF project, such as ‘flying computer’, ‘flying software’, ‘supercomputer’ and so on. In fact, the process of transition to the information age requires us to divide aircraft into two separate subcomponents. Hardware and software. These two main components are sometimes integrated with each other and sometimes modular and discrete. For example, the flight control computer, which manages an aircraft's ability to fly, can be considered an integral part of the fuselage. However, the mission computer, which provides the aircraft with combat capabilities, can be considered as a separate module. In this context, let's construct a naked J-10CN aircraft.

Components:

1. The entire skeleton and fuselage of the aircraft
2. Landing gear
3. All hydraulic and/or electronic infrastructure
4. Motor (WS-10C with Single Cyristal Blade technology)
5. Flight control computer (preferably with source code)
6. Ejection seat and all other pilot cabin equipment
7. All actuator etc. subcomponents required for flight
8. Ready for all systems to be added, energy and data cabling
9. Drawing and data pack containing all details of the fuselage
10. Spare parts and maintenance infrastructure

These are the indigenous and national subsystems that need to be installed/integrated into the fuselage to be purchased:

1. Mission computer
2. AESA Radar
3. Integrated self-defence and electronic warfare equipment
4. IRST
5. Targeting, ELINT, Reconnaissance, etc. other pods suitable for the purpose
6. Air-to-Air Munitions
7. Air-to-Surface Munitions
8. Data link subsystem
9. IFF subsystem
10. All other subsystems and components deemed necessary

If we had not passed a certain stage in projects such as Hürkuş, Hürjet, Kaan and F-16 Özgür, I would not have expressed this opinion and would have kept it in my mind. However, the defence and aerospace industry of our country has exceeded a certain capability threshold. For this reason, an opportunity has arisen for the realisation of this procurement mechanism.

The production of the fuselage of an aircraft, apart from other subcomponents, can be considered as one of our national capabilities. Yes, we understand fuselage construction better than many other things. We have an eco-system that has proven itself in fuselage manufacturing. So, the following question may come to your mind: Why do we need to outsource a fuselage? It is not only the fuselage we will buy, but also the engine, which we have difficulty in producing, and a fighter aircraft infrastructure that has been in use for nearly twenty years. Logistic expectations, lifetime and maintenance period requirements, combat tactics suitable for the airframe... Most importantly, the value of the political message that we have the will and determination to do this without changing the pact, if it is delayed and delayed further...

In addition, this type of purchase will also have a backup advantage that cannot be foreseen by your adversaries. Because even if you prefer an empty aircraft, the country you procure it from will have all the matured subsystems and usage experience of the full version. Therefore, you can replace some of the subsystems that are expected to be domestic and national with mature products purchased from foreign sources. This possibility of procuring subsystems and ammunition from two sources, one domestic and the other foreign, will increase the ability of your air force to closely follow the technology and its logistical resistance against unforeseen embargoes.

In addition, the reason for the high cost of fighter aircraft is the technologies and subsystems used. Even if it requires detailed calculations since it will be the first of its kind, we can foresee that the cost of ownership of an empty aircraft will be less than half the cost. Your own subsystems and ammunition can also make this cost more expensive than the ready purchase. However, the advantages you will gain will be higher than these costs.

Let's Draw a Hypothetical Programme Framework

Let's consider the procurement of 160 J-10CN aircraft, including 80 definite and 80 options. For the maintenance and upkeep of these aircraft, let's establish a new (partner) company. Let's start with the simplest one among many different infrastructures such as line maintenance, depot level and factory level maintenance. Let's conclude a goodwill protocol for future production under licence through the new support company to be established.

Let's keep the number of spare engines as high as possible. In this way, we should prioritise keeping the aircraft at as high a level of combat readiness as possible.

Let's offer countries the opportunity to purchase aircraft of Turkish or Turkish-Chinese mixed standards by equipping them in Turkey. We should even offer these countries the flexibility to use their own ammunition and subsystems.

Let's provide the ability to communicate and conduct joint operations with Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles through an external pod or hybrid payload type (for example, a pod integrated with a fuel tank). Let's also offer this to foreign customers.

Let's also create an additional package centred on Hürkuş and Hürjet for a training system suitable for these combat aircraft. Within this package, let's provide the flexibility to perform operations together with unmanned systems with an external pod structure. In fact, for countries with limited budgets, let's offer a manned military aviation solution that will develop over time, starting with a training package.

Changes Reflected in Multinational Projects, Even Export Products

Most of the countries that purchase advanced weapon systems such as fighter jets add demands in line with their own requirements. For example, the United Arab Emirates added many unique requirements to its F-16 purchase, such as a more powerful engine, the AESA radar, which was first used with this aircraft, and the IRST system. The country, which also covered the R&D costs on the condition of partnership in IP rights, now has its own special aircraft, characterised as F-16E/F Block 60. The latest version of the F-15EX Eagle 2 aircraft, which the USAF has started to procure, was shaped based on the special requirements added to the F-15QA aircraft ordered by the Emirate of Qatar.

In fact, even in normal export and modernisation projects, we observe a significant increase in alternative subsystems. In the case of a fighter aircraft, you can buy the self-defence and electronic warfare system from any manufacturer you want. In fact, you have a wide range of options in this choice, from solutions integrated into the fuselage to POD or release format add-ons. The ability to choose from options such as these is beginning to change the identity of international projects. Even if they look the same on the outside, the era of fighter aircraft that differ from each other in subsystems and other details is beginning.

One of the graphics we often saw in defence and aerospace magazines of the recent past was a picture showing the division of labour in multinational fighter aircraft in different colours. In fact, the reason for this was that the projects were handled in this way. Just as TAI produces the front fuselage of the F-35, the physical parts such as the front fuselage, middle and rear fuselage, wings, tails, etc., as well as the subsystems such as radar, EW, etc., could be indicated with different colours representing the responsible countries. However, in projects such as GCAS, which aims to produce a 6th generation fighter aircraft and is being developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom, Japan and Italy, a change trend is observed. Even in major sub-components such as radar, the partner countries are developing and using separate products. Examples such as Turkey, which was unable to purchase the Eurofighter due to the objection of only one of the four co-developer countries, reinforce the trend towards the use of interchangeable modular sub-systems.

Although such changes are frequently observed in the international arms market, there has not yet been a transformation towards equipping an empty aircraft with the subsystems and ammunition of another country. However, the industrial ground that will make such alternative procurement methods possible seems to have matured not only for Turkey, but also for many other countries.

Creating Globally Produced Local Solutions from Global Supply Chains

Russia is working on the export-oriented and single-engine Su-75 Shah Mat aircraft. It plans to offer this aircraft to the market at a very low price of almost 30 million USD. Behind this price policy lies the fact that the aircraft will be sold almost empty and customised according to user demands. Of course, it is well known that the Russian military-industrial complex is experiencing difficulties in many aspects, especially in digital electronics. In this case, it seems logical to think that the Su-75 jet will also be equipped with subsystems of foreign origin.

As a matter of fact, the Russian Su-30/34/35 series jets are also equipped with many outsourced electronic systems, especially from France and Israel. In some major suppliers, such as India, we observe that the use of both outsourced and indigenous subsystems and ammunition has gone through the roof. For this reason, the modular approach open to outsourcing in the Su-75 aircraft does not come as a surprise. The Su-75 is an aircraft that is still in the design phase, and even the prototype has not taken off. Moreover, Russia is the subject of international embargoes and the centre of attention due to its war in Ukraine. China, on the other hand, as an indispensable country in global supply chains, seems to be far from a similar isolation (yet).

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the People's Republic of China should also be considered when it is deemed necessary to outsource the purchase of fighter jets. In my opinion, it would be much more appropriate to carry out this procurement through an alternative procurement method, which I have presented in this article. In this way, the developing Turkish defence and aerospace industry will be prevented from being damaged both financially and in terms of prestige. It would also prevent this procurement from being interpreted as a shift of axis. It will also be possible to convey a political message of the desired strength to many western countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom.