Are American Users Satisfied with the F-35 Aircraft?

USA; F-35A user Air Force, F-35C user Naval Air Force and F-35B user Marine Corps Air Force; They are not satisfied with the performance of the F-35 aircraft! Moreover, they are in search of a new "Intermediate Aircraft"! F-36A Kingsnake is pronounced.

As you know, we were one of the production partners of the F-35 aircraft. Due to our purchase of the Russian S-400 Air Defence Missile System; The US Congress prevented our partnership and the delivery of our aircraft within the scope of CAATSA sanctions. In return for the money we invested, we will receive some F-16 Block 70 Viper new aircraft and modernisation kits that will upgrade some of our existing aircraft to Viper level. That project has also been dragged out for a while and they have delayed us, but it seems that it will happen sooner or later.

Let me tell you from the beginning, it seemed to me a fabricated justification that we were subject to CAATSA sanctions because the stealth capability of the F-35 was eliminated or limited by the S-400s. In other words, I thought that if not this excuse, they would remove us from the F-35 programme with another excuse, but now, according to information obtained from some influential and reliable open sources, Uncle Sam's technical concerns about the S-400s are becoming more likely to be correct. In other words, the S-400s seem to know the "soft underbelly" of the F-35s!

Last year, US Air Force Chief of Staff (USAF Commander) General Charles Brown Jr, announced that they need to put a new generation aircraft between the F-22 and F-35 in the USAF inventory and that they want this need to be met in a very short time, and that the result will be a "high-low" mix of expensive "fifth generation" F-22s and F-35s and cheap "minus fifth generation" (we can also say -5th Generation or 4+++ Generation) jets. (See Ref.-1 for Jet Aircraft Generations / Generation)

According to the Commander of the USAF and some of the leading US military aviation authorities and experts, the capabilities and, in fact, the main justifications for the procurement of a new aircraft requirement are: a very fast and efficient design and development process (even a record time demand for the jet aircraft era, no longer than one year...), affordability (low cost) and the ability to incorporate new technology at a later date, i.e. the new aircraft must be flexible and adaptable to upgrades over time, as needed. According to aviation experts, "the F-35 is a Ferrari, the F-22 is a Bugatti Chiron, but the US Air Force is in urgent need of a Nissan 300ZX"!

The F-35 would in fact be a Nissan 300X; it would serve as a joint strike aircraft, meaning that with very few configuration changes, this aircraft could be used by both the Air Force, the Naval Air Force and the Marine Corps Air Force. Eighty per cent of the aircraft systems of these three variants would be identical, which would provide a highly effective, efficient and economical logistic support during the maintenance and overhaul phase. In fact, this entire logistics support network would be run and managed from Lockheed Martin's facilities in Forth Worth, Texas. The biggest risk for non-US users was that the US would hold the key to the aircraft's logistical support.

An affordable, low-cost but fast maintenance would provide ease of operation. 

It would be a Low Maintenance Concept aircraft.

In the early 1990s, the US government and LM Aero Company (then General Dynamics) were presenting concepts and solutions for the F-35 that were very pink and flattering to partners and customers.

The aim of the USA was to achieve with the F-35 the enormous export success they had achieved with the F-16.

However, during the 20-year design and development process, with the input of the US Air, Naval and Marine Corps Air Forces, as well as other partners and the designer Lockheed Martin Company, the result was a Ferrari 812 GTS instead of a Nissan 300X. 

According to the US air power authorities; "You cannot commute to work every day with your Ferrari, you cannot use this vehicle for your daily needs. You can only use your Ferrari on Sundays to satisfy your driving pleasure or when you need a very important driving ability and capacity. This means that we cannot use all of our "high-level combat aircraft for low-level air missions." 

This signals that orders for the F-35 will be reduced, just as they did for the F-22, but they are trying not to say this out loud so as not to disturb other customers and potential customers. But if even the Commander of the US Air Force expresses dissatisfaction with the F-35, at what level should we expect it to be expressed at a higher level? Ha...The previous US President openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the F-35 Project...Moreover, after this extreme dissatisfaction of the former US President, especially regarding price increases; the project was accelerated, costs were reduced and customer satisfaction was increased. The former president also insisted that all components for this aircraft be manufactured within the United States, meaning that he was extremely uncomfortable with the fact that other partners, including us, were and would be manufacturing many components outside the United States as part of their share of the project.

Serious publications such as Forbes and Populer Mechanics mention an interim aircraft solution project called F-36A Kingsnake, but such a project is not mentioned in US government open sources. In other words, there is no official project or request for such a new aircraft (more precisely, an intermediate solution aircraft).

For me, there are two studies that are more serious, valuable and important than the USAF Commander's statement of dissatisfaction, which emphasise the dissatisfaction with the F-35 and were presented in the form of a report in 2021. The reports resulting from both studies were not publicly available at first, and then (some time later, in 2022) they were sanitised, that is, some parts were removed and published in the Public Accessible Version. However, it is clear from the previous public reports that the GAO has been seriously auditing the F-35 programme since 2016 and reporting to the US Congress. 

The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) provides the US Congress, the heads of executive agencies, and the public with timely, factual, impartial information that can be used to improve government and save taxpayers billions of dollars. It conducts financial audits of every government project it deems necessary. It is a 100+ year old congressional financial audit department.

DOT&E (The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation) has also publicly released part of its report on the F-35 Programme.

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is a department within the US Department of Defence (DoD) that specialises in operational test and evaluation (OT&E).  It provides independent oversight and evaluations to SecDef, the Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) and Congress. It audits major DoD acquisition programmes to ensure that they are sufficient to verify the operational effectiveness and suitability of defence systems in combat use.

We also reviewed the F-35 report of the Joint Meeting of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the US House Armed Services Committee, which found that all three oversight and evaluation bodies pointed to the same fundamental problems and informed the US Congress and the Department of Defence of both public and confidential findings of serious flaws in the programme. The most important of the common findings of the three US government agencies are summarised in this article.

Identified F-35 project and programme deficiencies:

1. Unsatisfactory, even abysmal, F-35 Fleet Performance.

a. While the F-35 programme has experienced a few marginal improvements in some reliability categories, the overall trend shows that the fleet's performance remains below DoD standards and has even worsened in some categories.

b. According to the non-public version of the test report, the F-35's availability rates "plateaued" in 2021 and then began to decline from June. The three US Air Forces (USAF and NAVAIR Air Forces) have set an availability rate (activity rate) target of 65%. For a fleet of aircraft, 65 per cent availability is a low bar, as 75 per cent to 80 per cent availability is the accepted standard for other jet fighters. The average fleet-wide availability/full mission readiness activity rate for the F-35A, F-35B, F-35C in 2021 is 26.16%. This was a very low activity percentage for the US Air Force, US Naval Air Force and US Marine Corps Air Forces. 

For example, the US Air Force had retired (taken out of service) the F-4 aircraft due to its 65 per cent activity rate, which they considered low. However, they could have used the F-4 for approximately 20 more years from the date of decommissioning.

When the F-35 activity tables are analysed; in addition to the "Full Mission Capable" (FMC-Full Mission Capable) performance data, which indicates that the F-35 can perform all the missions that will be entrusted to it, the "Mission Capable" (MC-Mission Capable) metric has also been added, this performance metric indicates that the aircraft can fly safely and perform at least one of the missions assigned to it.

According to 2021 data; FMC values are 50 per cent for the F-35A, 19.5 per cent for the F-35B and 9 per cent for the F-35C. While the F-35A is able to achieve an activity rate of 50 per cent, the F-35B and F-35C are in seriously poor condition. It is almost as if these aircraft will not be able to perform 90 per cent of the operational missions that will be assigned to them.

2. Very long troubleshooting times.

The non-public version of the report presented the reliability data in six separate sections, one of the most notable being that not only did the US Air Force's F-35A fleet miss the standard 20-hour target for Average Flying Hours Between Critical Failures, but the performance was only 11.2 hours. In other words, the aircraft, which is expected to fly at least 20 hours between two critical failures, can fly 11.2 hours. In fact, even an average of 20 hours of flying between two critical failures is too few. The availability values of the aircraft are really not encouraging.

3. Cyber Threats and a Scrapped Logistics and Maintenance Network, ALIS.

"Cyber Threat" for the F-35. F-35 supporters and enthusiasts like to tell people that the programme is more than just a fighter jet. "A computer that can fly by accident", "The Most Advanced Port in 21st Century Warfare", and "The Most Lethal, Survivable, and Connected Fighter Aircraft Ever Built", etc., are just a few of the overblown marketing slogans used to sell and protect the F-35. While these slogans may look good in a brochure or splashed across the pages of trade publications, the interconnected nature of the F-35 aircraft and its support networks on the ground may ultimately be the programme's biggest conceptual flaw. The entire F-35 logistics operating system is dangerously vulnerable to cyber attacks, despite years of warnings.

The problems with ALIS have become so severe that Pentagon leaders decided in 2020 to shelve the entire project and replace it with a new cloud-based system called the Operational Data Integrated Network, or ODIN.

4. The Operational Data Integrated Network ODIN Logistics Information and Support System, which replaced ALIS, was also exposed to cyber attacks.

DOT&E reports that despite the recognised need for all new information systems to be developed with cyber security as a fundamental design feature, questions remain about the ability of ODIN to withstand cyber attacks.

ALIS could not be protected against cyber attacks, and the newly developed ODIN cannot be protected against cyber attacks.

5. Unfinished Test Simulator.

The biggest reason why the F-35 programme remains stagnant in 2021 is the inability to complete the work of designers and programmers of an important simulation facility. The programme office needs a dedicated simulation facility to fully test the F-35's ability to fight and survive in heavily protected airspace created by a sophisticated adversary such as Russia or China. Over the past seven years, a Navy-led team has worked to build the facility, called the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE), at Maryland's Naval Air Station Patuxent River. DOT&E reported that the facility is now more than six years behind schedule and that "significant" work has been delayed so that F-35 testing can be completed.

6. Incomplete Enhancements Disguised as Modernisation.

Since the Joint Programme Office and Lockheed Martin were unable to meet all the requirements for a fully functional aircraft within the time and budget of the first, second or third programme baselines, officials simply decided to rename and perform the incomplete work as "modernisation". The ongoing "modernisation" effort is, in reality, a redo of the initial development of an F-35.

In other words, since a process that the customers have paid for cannot be completed, they will pay for the same process again under the name of modernisation!?!...This is not a big problem for the US government in terms of macro-economics, the US government will make double payments to the LM company for the unfinished works from the project financial resource created with the taxes of the people of the US state, but the money of the US will remain in the US. What is the situation for other user countries?

7. Engine Modernisation Requirement.

One of the most serious system performance and logistic sustainment problems is considered to be the F-35's engine. While the aircraft are still far from adequate levels of combat readiness, their engines need to be modernised. In 20 years, although the engine has not flown properly, it needs to be modernised.

8. Increased Procurement and Sustainment Costs.

Since 2012, auditors have reported that estimated sustainment costs over the 66-year life cycle of the F-35 have steadily increased from $1.11 trillion to $1.27 trillion, despite efforts to reduce costs.  Collectively, the US User Air forces (USAF, NAVAIR) will face tens of billions of dollars in sustainment costs that they projected as unaffordable during the programme. 

However, these costs were projected to decrease, not increase.

9. Inadequate levels of material resupply support.

Also due to the inadequacy of ALIS, dissatisfaction with the flow of spare parts is widespread. The number of aircraft in Parts Waiting status is constantly at high levels.

10. Unnecessary Levels of Excessive Secrecy.

Federal law required the test office to write an annual report on weapons programmes on the watch list. The law stated that if the test office submits a classified report to Congress, it must also submit a version with no level of secrecy. DOT&E prepared three versions of the 2021 report: A declassified version, a non-declassified version released publicly, and a controlled declassified version. This last version also included information that had already been publicly released and had not been declassified in previous reports. While the public version of this year's report provides an overall assessment of the F-35 programme, the reporters removed many figures and details from the public report that give a complete picture of how the programme is performing in 2021.

Operational tests were not being conducted properly. If they had been done properly, design flaws such as poor engine reliability and the F-35A's cannon not working properly would have been found and reported, so they could have been corrected before an adversary could exploit them.

Of course, there was information that should have been classified, such as the F-35's radar cross-section, certain software deficiencies, and many other deficiencies that could have been exploited. But the details that DOT&E extracted from this year's publicly available version of its report were not of the kind that would give a potential competitor a technological advantage. Instead, while embarrassing for the Pentagon and its suppliers, it was the kind of information the public needed to know to force F-35 stakeholders to take steps to correct the problems. 

Members of Congress have expressed concern about the excessive secrecy of test results in numerous letters to Pentagon leaders. Congress should keep up the pressure to protect the independence of the testing office by ensuring that no future unclassified report is labelled with any definition of false information.

11. The US Congress rejects the US Department of Defence's request for additional F-35s.

Congress kept the fiscal year 2022 budget debate intact by refusing to authorise the procurement of additional new F-35s beyond the Pentagon's request. This was the first time since 2007, when low-rate initial production of the F-35 began, that Congress did not increase the annual purchase. It seems that official US patience with the slowly unfolding F-35 programme disaster is beginning to wane. Congress should maintain its resolve by limiting F-35 purchases until programme officials have completed a design that can be proven effective in operational testing and fit for service.

Conclusion:

At the end of more than two decades of development of the F-35, the aircraft delivered to the US Air Force is, in both practical and legal terms, "nothing more than a very expensive prototype". 

A combat-ready aircraft delivered to customer air forces is one thing; a prototype aircraft is another. The prototype is the aircraft that is manufactured at the end of the design phase, where the test and evaluation phase will be carried out, followed by mass production and deliveries to the customer in combat readiness. 

But the prototypes of the F-35 were tested and evaluated for more than 20 years. Errors were corrected, improvements were made, modifications were made. Subsequently, serial production began, and the completed serial production began to be delivered to the customer air forces. We are currently talking about the aircraft that have been delivered to the air forces and are considered combat-ready, and the GAO, the Financial Audit Unit of the US Congress, reports that these aircraft have not advanced beyond the level of prototype aircraft. The fact that the contractors and the F-35 programme office have been unable to deliver to the customer air forces an aircraft with full and proven effectiveness shows that the original "Joint Strike Fighter" concept is flawed and beyond any practical and technological reality. Moreover, the F-35 programme is likely to remain in its current stagnant state for the foreseeable future. 

In other words, 20 years later, the F-35 is no better than it was 20 years ago.

If the Commander of the US Air Force clearly states the need, the need for a new 5th generation fighter/bomber between the F-22 and the F-35, which can be rapidly designed and mass-produced, can also be formalised.

The F-35 was a good option both in terms of the capacities of the systems on it and structural design and integrity, but the aircraft cannot perform. Of course, the problems will be solved, but there have been serious time and cost losses in the project. 

There are many lessons to be learned from the biggest project in the history of US defence systems.

We will continue to follow the developments carefully and share them with our readers.

References

1. Jet Fighter Development/Jet Fighter Generations, STRASAM, Strategic Research Centre

https://strasam.org/savunma/havacilik-ve-uzay-sanayii/jet-savas-ucagi-gelisimi-jet-savas-ucagi-nesilleri-1197