Are Turkey’s Air Defence Weapon Systems (HSS) Weak or Inadequate?

NATO membership is a defining element of Ankara’s geopolitical identity and its role within the international system. Since joining NATO in 1952, Turkey has hosted the Alliance’s most critical early-warning and radar bases, safeguarding its south-eastern flank. From the past to the present, this network has evolved from analogue systems tracking Soviet bomber aircraft to today’s space-based digital networks tracking ballistic missiles beyond the atmosphere.

Air Defence Radar Network

In accordance with NADGE (NATO Air Defence Ground Environment) – an integrated system that enables the real-time sharing of radar-generated air pictures to protect the airspace of NATO countries and facilitates the detection of all air platforms – a large number of AN/FPS-400 fixed radars (surveillance, high-altitude detection, early warning and alert) were deployed on Turkish soil in the 1950s. In the 1960s, these radars were replaced by radome-equipped AN/FPS-88 radars. This radar network formed an uninterrupted chain stretching from Norway to the east of Turkey.

In the 1990s, the radars in Turkey were modernised and upgraded using funds from the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). They were replaced by modern three-dimensional radars (AN/FPS-117 and TRS-22XX) capable of simultaneously measuring a target’s direction, range and altitude with millimetre-level precision.

Mobile Radar Project requirements led to the domestic production of 14 radar systems by a joint venture company established in Ankara between Thomson and Tekfen. The joint venture company later joined HAVELSAN, transforming into HAVELSAN Technology Radar. In 2016, the fully national Early Warning Radar System Project was launched.

Meanwhile, in line with the 1991 SSİK decision, ASELSAN focused on meeting the Turkish Armed Forces’ radar requirements with advanced technology radar systems. It has effectively taken on the role of Turkey’s Radar Technology Centre. ASELSAN has implemented, and continues to implement, a concept for developing a family of multi-functional radars, ranging from tactical air defence to long-range early warning and guided missile fire control. For example, the KALKAN Air Defence Early Warning Radar, the Low-Altitude Air Defence Weapon System Mobile Search Radar, the Low-Altitude Air Defence Weapon System Fire Control Radar, Long-Range Early Warning Air Defence Radars, and the Alp series AESA radars are all ASELSAN products. The Alp series radars are a modular, mobile and high-performance (S-Band) radar family, forming the backbone of the Turkish Armed Forces’ Steel Dome air defence system. Utilising next-generation AESA technology and digital beamforming architecture, they are capable of detecting low-observable (stealth) targets and ballistic missiles from long ranges.

ALP 100-G (Low-Altitude Radar): A Gap Filler and mobile air defence radar mounted on an 8x8 tactical vehicle, with a range exceeding 100 nautical miles (>100 NM).

ALP 300-G (Portable Early Warning Radar – TEİRS): A highly manoeuvrable mobile radar capable of detecting airborne targets, ballistic missiles and low-RCS (stealth) targets at long range.

ALP 500-G (Fixed/Long-Range Radar): The series’ longest-range fixed-site search radar, combining wide-area surveillance and detailed tracking on a single platform.

ALP 400 UHF (Anti-Stealth Radar): A UHF radar system currently under development to detect low-observable targets, specialising particularly in countering stealth threats.

Air Defence Weapons and Systems (HSS)

Nike Hercules

The only high-altitude air defence missile in the Turkish Armed Forces’ inventory is the US-made ‘Nike Hercules’ system, dating from 1959. The missiles were intended to protect Istanbul and the straits with the support of Hughes HR-3000, AN/FPS-71 and AN/FPS-75 radars. Following the Cold War, the maintenance and sustainment of the Nike-Hercules systems became increasingly difficult, and their numbers dwindled. The last air defence systems around Istanbul were decommissioned in 2007. Only two fixed Nike sites remain along the Aegean coast. These are operated by the 1st Nike Squadron Command (Datça) and the 6th Nike Squadron Command (Ayvacık), both under the 15th Air and Missile Defence Base Command (Alemdağ – Istanbul), as part of the domestically produced SİPER system.

MIM-23 HAWK

A mobile, medium-altitude air defence system with a range of 40 km. It is typically deployed to protect strategic locations. It carries three missiles in its launcher. In 2001, the HAWK system (8 firing units, 24 missile batteries, 175 MIM-23B Hawk missiles, 8 MPQ-64 Sentinel 3D air defence radars) was procured and, following modernisation by 2005, was introduced into service with the Turkish Air Force under the name TURK HAWK XXI. The 1st HAWK Squadron Command (Alemdağ) and the 2nd HAWK Squadron Command (Fenertepe), attached to the 15th Air and Missile Defence Base Command (Alemdağ – Istanbul), are currently operational. Batteries are stationed in Libya, Datça, Hatay and Gaziantep. The domestic equivalent is HİSAR.

Rapier

A BAE Systems product, a short-range (altitude 5 km, range 8 km) autonomous, radar-guided (Alenia Marconi Systems) electro-optically guided low-altitude air defence system. Turkey procured a total of 86 launchers and 983 missiles, comprising 72 purchased in the 1980s and 14 donated by the US in 1995. Subsequently, 78 of these were modernised to the B1X standard under the leadership of Roketsan. Each launcher can carry 8 missiles. The domestic equivalent is Hisar-A.

Stinger

A US General Dynamics-manufactured, IR-guided ‘fire-and-forget’ type air defence missile system. It is a system with an effective range of 8 km, used for ground forces’ air defence either as a MANPADS (shoulder-fired) or vehicle-mounted system. The domestic equivalent is SUNGUR.

Bofors L70 Anti-Aircraft System

The radar-equipped L70 is a low-altitude air defence system featuring a 40 mm calibre, single-barrelled gun with a range of 12.5 km, capable of manual, semi-automatic and fully automatic operation. It is used for low-altitude air defence at air bases. Each battery comprises 4 emplacements, each housing 3 L70 guns.

(Switzerland) Oerlikon GDF-003 Anti-Aircraft System

An automatic low-altitude air defence system with a firing rate of 550 rounds per minute and a capacity of 1,100 rounds. It is used for the defence of fixed targets (e.g. bridges in the strait). The radar has a range of 40 km, with an engagement range of 12 km. It is a highly effective system capable of rotating its barrel 360 degrees around its own axis and positioning it vertically at 90 degrees. The domestic equivalent is Korkut.

Air and Missile Defence Command – Eskişehir (5 August 2014) Established

In 2002, the Turkish Armed Forces Air Concept was replaced by the Air and Missile Defence Concept, and the Air Force was tasked with the command and control of missile defence. Secondly, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries launched the Long-Range Regional Air and Missile Defence System Project. Furthermore, in August 2014, the Combat Air and Missile Defence Command was established within the Air Force Command; the ‘Air Defence Command’, which would manage Turkish air and missile defence from a single centre and exercise engagement authority through land and sea coordination units within this command, was established in Eskişehir. Turkish air and missile defence assets have been made capable of being directed and controlled from a single centre, and full command and control unity has been established at the HSS level.

As is well known, Turkey’s ‘Common Air Picture’ is generated at the air operations centre in Eskişehir. At the image generation centre in Eskişehir, separate air pictures are generated for national and NATO purposes. The national-level picture is transmitted to the General Staff and Service Operations Centres; the air picture of Turkish airspace generated within the NATO framework is transmitted continuously 24/7 via high-speed fibre and satellite links to the NATO Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Torrejón, Spain. Similarly, the air picture of NATO countries is shared with users via the NATO network in Turkey. In this way, NATO and Turkey are not only able to detect an impending threat immediately but can also jointly activate common defence mechanisms through a system operating in accordance with NATO guidelines. This cooperation played a critical role in intercepting ballistic missiles launched from Iran and targeting Turkish territory, making it possible for NATO assets to destroy the missiles in flight.

Kürecik AN/TPY-2 Radar:

Following a decision taken in September 2011, the Kürecik (Malatya) missile defence radar—owned by the US but under NATO command—was deployed as part of NATO’s ballistic missile defence architecture (EPAA). Similar radars have also been deployed in Romania and Poland. It operates within the framework of the SHAPE Shared Early Warning (SEW Plus) system. In Turkey, the SEW Plus centres are the air operations centres located in Eskişehir and Diyarbakır.

How the System Works:

The Kürecik radar detects a ballistic missile launched from the Middle East (for example, from Iran) towards Europe the moment it is launched. It calculates the missile’s trajectory, speed and impact location within milliseconds and transmits this data to Ramstein Air Base in Germany (the NATO air command centre). From there, interceptor missiles (SM-3) on US (NATO-affiliated) air defence destroyers in Romania or the Mediterranean are fired, destroying the enemy missile at the edge of space.

Long-Range Air Defence System (HSS) (PAC-3, HQ-9, SAMP-T, Antey-2500) Project

Following a 2006 SSİK decision to replace Turkey’s NIKE systems, a decision was made to procure four HSS batteries, and a ‘Request for Proposal’ was published in 2010. Seventy per cent of the targets are ‘air-breathing vehicles’; these are primarily air vehicles such as cruise missiles, UAVs, combat helicopters and fighter aircraft. The remaining 30 per cent of the target group consists of ballistic missiles. Turkey aimed to acquire ownership rights (design/production technology) for the HSS it would procure, alongside joint production. Proposals received:

USA, Patriot PAC-3:

4.5 billion USD. Technology transfer and even the use of a national IFF system are not permitted. The domestic contribution rate is limited to 10–12 per cent.

Russian Antey-2500:

5.2 billion USD. More advanced than the PAC-3. Technology transfer is not entirely clear. Issue with connecting to NATO networks.

China; FD-2000 HQ-9 (PAC-3 equivalent):

3.44 billion USD. Open to technology transfer. Issue with connecting to NATO networks. Turkey had viewed the Chinese offer favourably, but NATO and the US have drawn Turkey’s attention to the fact that this system should not be procured.

Italian (MBDA)/French (Thales) Eurosam (SAMP/T Aster-30 Block-1):

4.4 billion USD. Closed to joint production and technology transfer. Domestic content ratio: 10–12%.

Consequently, on 9 February 2015, the Ankara Government decided to opt for domestic production for the HSS procurement, as technology transfer-based negotiations had not yielded the desired results.

Russian S-400 HSS System:

Procured in 2019. No technology transfer. The S-400 HSS is a high-altitude air defence system. Each system comprises four batteries. Each battery (each containing 8 or 9 launchers) includes radars, a command and control system, and missile launchers (each with 4 tubes). The batteries can be deployed at four separate locations in Turkey. There are 32–36 ready-to-fire missiles per launcher, totalling 128–144 ready-to-fire missiles. An additional 48 spare missiles have been purchased. The system can operate independently without being connected to the NATO radar/defence network. It is also expected that Turkey will acquire the European-produced SAMP-T HSS alongside the S-400 system; negotiations are ongoing.

Iron Dome Project

The Iron Dome project was launched by a decision of the Supreme Military Council (SSİK) on 6 August 2024. This project aims to develop a system of systems—entirely indigenous and national—that ensures the integrated operation of all sensors and weapons under a network architecture, the creation of a common air picture, its real-time transmission to operations centres, and its presentation to decision-makers supported by artificial intelligence.

Components of the Steel Dome

The weapon systems forming the backbone of the Steel Dome consist of national technology products diversified according to different altitude and range classes. At the lowest tier of this structure are the İhtar and Gökberk systems, developed specifically against drones. These are followed by the Korkut self-propelled artillery system and the 35-millimetre anti-aircraft gun. Alongside the Korkut 110/35S and Korkut 100/25 SB, developed for the close-range air defence of bases, units and facilities, the entire anti-aircraft artillery family can further enhance its effectiveness with ASELSAN’s ATOM smart fragmentation munitions.

In the Hisar air defence missile system, developed in partnership between ASELSAN and ROKETSAN, the Hisar-A+ (low-altitude) and Hisar-O+ (medium-altitude) systems began entering service as of 2021. The Hisar-A+ consists of radar and electro-optical sensors mounted on the ACV-30 tracked armoured vehicle chassis produced by FNSS, along with four vertical launchers firing 15-kilometre range infrared-guided missiles. Hisar-A+ provides defence against low-altitude drones, cruise missiles and helicopters. Hisar-O+, meanwhile, contributes as a medium-altitude defence system with a range of 25 kilometres, mounted on a tactical wheeled vehicle. The National Vertical Launch System (MİDLAS), developed for combat ships and integrated with the Hisar-D RF, is expected to take the air defence capabilities of national warships, starting with the İstif class, a step further.

For the air defence of strategic infrastructure, bases and facilities, Siper; a joint product of ASELSAN, ROKETSAN and TÜBİTAK SAGE, forms the backbone of Turkey’s strategic air defence with its active radar-guided missiles, advanced command-and-control infrastructure and radar capable of detecting, identifying and tracking targets from long range. The 100 km-range ‘Siper Product 1’ missile is currently in service. Development and testing activities are ongoing for the 150 km-range Siper Product 2 and the 180 km-range Siper Product 3, which are scheduled to enter service. It is anticipated that space-based variants of Siper will subsequently be considered.

The HSSs in question receive airspace and target data from the Alp series early warning and Kalkan series air defence radars. The backbone of this entire network structure is formed by the Hakim Air Command and Control System (C4I), another ASELSAN product, which was launched in March 2020. Hakim is capable of creating a ‘common picture’ by utilising land and sea sensor data as well. With its infrastructure compatible with the NATO ACCS (Air Command & Control System) architecture, it can also contribute to the creation of the NATO air picture. Thanks to Hakim, operations centres can now detect, identify, track and prevent threats entering the air operations area, and destroy them when necessary, with significantly higher success rates.

Conclusion

Meeting Turkey’s HSS requirement is not a problem of the last few years. It points to processes that Turkish political and military authorities have been aware of since the early 1990s, during which procurement mechanisms were put in place but purchases could not be finalised for various reasons (with the exception of the S-400). Furthermore, prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion, allies provided support to Turkey by deploying Patriot batteries; as seen in the three ballistic missile attacks that have occurred to date between the US/Israel and Iran—which were neutralised by allied forces on the ground— the fact that this dynamic process is occasionally operated within the framework of the consultation mechanism under NATO Article 4, in line with Turkey’s request, serves to meet Turkey’s HSS needs to some extent. In this context, when considered alongside the systems in Turkey’s inventory, there is currently no major vulnerability in Turkey’s air defence.

However, in the long term, Turkey has taken a very wise step by launching the Steel Dome project in 2024 to establish its own unique air defence system. I anticipate that the Turkish Steel Dome will be largely operational by 2030; with its layered and comprehensive indigenous air defence capabilities—comprising weapon system components, a command and control centre, and the Alp series of AESA radars—it will serve as a complete protective shield over Turkish airspace, working in conjunction with air defence aircraft.