Drone Drone Combat: Is It Possible to Stop a UAV with a UAV?

One of the most important developments in the world defence industry in recent years has been the effective use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, in armed conflicts and their force multiplier effect that can change the outcome of battles. Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were frequently used in the fight against radical elements both in that country and in Pakistan. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have been using UAVs and UCAVs extensively in the fight against terrorism and border security since 2005-2010. During Azerbaijan's liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish UCAVs had an impact that will go down in the literature of warfare. In the war that started with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, roaming / mobile ammunition or kamikaze (suicide) UAVs and First Person View UAVs have been used extensively along with other UAVs / UCAVs. In the ongoing instability in the Middle East, UAVs are frequently used by proxy elements and states party to conflicts. It is known that Hamas effectively used suicide drones to neutralise Israel's surveillance and command and control systems during its attacks on 07 October 2023. Drones also played an important role in Iran's attack on Israel on the night of 13-14 April 2024.

The effects of the use of UAVs for reconnaissance and attack purposes on the battlefield have also increased the studies on defence systems developed against them. Before reviewing the developments in UAV defence systems, also known as Anti-UAV / Dronesavar, it is useful to briefly mention the classification of UAVs. According to the classification made by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (2020, p. 3) according to their weight;

- UAV0, UAVs with a maximum take-off weight between 500 g (inclusive) - 4kg,

- UAV1, UAVs with a maximum take-off weight between 4 kg (inclusive) - 25 kg,

- UAV2, UAVs with a maximum take-off weight between 25 kg (inclusive) - 150 kg,

- UAV3 is a UAV with a maximum take-off weight of 150 kg (inclusive) or more.

According to another classification that takes into account factors such as weight, range, flight altitude and endurance, UAVs are classified as very small, small, short-range, short-range, medium-range, medium endurance, low altitude long endurance, medium altitude long endurance, unmanned aerial combat vehicle, high altitude and high endurance (Karataş, 2020, p. 57). According to a similar classification also used by NATO, Class I is used for very small, small UAVs; Class II for medium-sized UAVs; and Class III for UAVs with medium and high altitude and long endurance (Çağlar & Gülmez, 2023, p. 29). This study will be based on the NATO classification for ease of expression.

Defence systems against UAVs include detection, identification, tracking and neutralisation components of UAVs. Radar, radio frequency (RF) scanner systems, electro-optical cameras and thermal cameras are generally used for the detection, identification and tracking of UAVs. Radars are devices that emit radio frequency signals to detect aircraft through radar cross-sections. Radars used for military purposes are ineffective against UAVs since they are developed to detect higher flying, bulkier and faster aircraft. On the other hand, the use of styrofoam, plastic and wood instead of metal in some UAV models reduces the radar cross-sectional area, making them difficult to detect. Especially Class I UAVs can fly at low altitudes, which causes radar signals to lose their effectiveness due to terrain disturbances. Radio frequency scanner systems are devices that scan the radio frequencies operated by UAVs and detect UAVs that may pose a threat. These systems are not effective against UAVs with autonomous flight capability (Genç & Erciyes, 2020, p. 38).

Electro-optical cameras detect and identify objects according to image sections, while thermal cameras (IR) detect and identify objects according to infrared ray (heat) sections. Acoustic systems perform the identification process by comparing the sounds they detect from UAVs with the UAV sounds in their libraries. In order to establish an effective UAV defence system, detection, identification and tracking systems should be used in a complementary manner. While the location of UAVs is mainly determined by radar, electro-optical and acoustic systems are used for identification, and radar and electro-optical systems are used for tracking.

UAV neutralisation systems are also developing and diversifying in parallel with technological developments. For this purpose, RF jamming, global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) jamming, spoofing, laser, blinding, high-power microwave, network, ammunition (bullets, missiles, rockets, etc.), UAVs are used. Jamming systems are based on the principle of interrupting the signal / data connection between the UAV and the user or satellite. The deception signal is applied by sending a misleading signal to the UAV to take control of it and take it off its route or land it in the desired area.

In laser neutralisation, important parts of the UAV are burnt. In blinding, the UAV's cameras are blinded by laser or high-intensity beam. In high-power microwave neutralisation, the UAV's electronic systems are rendered unusable by directed energy waves. In the network system, the UAV is taken under control with a network launched by a launcher. UAV destruction with ammunition offers a wider range of options compared to other methods. These include ammunition fired from conventional weapons such as shotguns, machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, rocket launchers, as well as modern ammunition such as guided missiles or smart munitions. Different methods can be used to neutralise UAVs, such as detonating the munitions on the UAV, crashing the UAV into another UAV, or using energy guidance systems such as lasers on the UAV.

Among Class I UAVs, it is possible to neutralise very small UAVs by using one or more of the existing UAV defence methods. Naturally, it will be cost-effective to use small-calibre conventional ammunition and UAVs of their own class and diameter against them. Especially with the developments in swarm UAV technology, it will be possible to respond to the swarm UAV threat with swarm UAVs. In the battlefield, it will be possible to see autonomous swarm UAVs clashing with each other in addition to isolating certain areas, providing fire support, and being used as ammunition in addition to classical reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Class III UAVs, which are used in strategic and operational operations, can be neutralised by missiles fired from other UAVs of their class, ground-to-air missiles or missiles fired from fighter aircraft. Although the low radar cross-section of these UAVs provides an advantage, their low speed and IR signatures create sensitivity to ground-air and air-air missiles. Indeed, all 170 Shahid 131 and 136 suicide drones used by Iran in its attacks against Israel on the night of 13-14 April were destroyed by fighter jets and air defence missiles.

It is considered that small tactical UAVs in the scope of Class I and Class II, which are mainly used at the tactical level in efforts to neutralise UAVs with another UAV, can also be used against UAVs in this scope. This is because, as mentioned above, it is possible to destroy UAVs used at strategic distances when they enter the airspace or operational area with long-range air defence systems. On the other hand, in order for the UAV to be able to detect, identify, track and then shoot down the threatening UAV by ramming or other means, it must be faster than it, and the ammunition it carries or the kinetic effect it creates must be of sufficient intensity. UAVs with lower radar cross-sections, which can fly at low altitudes and are difficult to detect by radar due to their manufacturing materials, can be destroyed by another UAV of the same class if electronic attack measures are not effective when they exceed other air defence measures.

In fact, within the scope of the principle of eliminating the threat from a distance, it may also be considered to use the UAV directly when the range of electronic jamming or laser blinding methods is short. The best course of action in this regard should be determined through doctrinal studies. In terms of cost, it would be more economical to destroy a UAV costing $20,000-50,000 at current prices with a UAV of similar cost rather than a higher cost air defence missile. In October 2022, the US Army implemented the Low Altitude, Slow, Small, Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System, known as LIDS (The Low, Slow, Small, Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System) against small tactical UAVs within the scope of Class I and Class II. The two most important components of this system are the Ku-band RF System (KuRFS), which detects and tracks even micro UAVs, and the interceptor/interceptor UAV called Coyote. In Turkey, Gürbağ Defence and Technology has been working in this field.

Efforts to develop an effective defence system against UAVs, which have become an important element of today's wars with the expansion of conflict areas, are increasing all over the world. As a UAV defence method, there are countries that have taken products that use UAVs against UAVs into their inventories and use them in the battlefield. In this context, it is considered that the UAV versus UAV concept can be an important component of the layered air defence architecture with the doctrine studies to be carried out in the light of the experiences gained in the battlefield.

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