F-16 OZGUR complements MMU KAAN

Do We Need to Produce Low Visibility Fighter Aircraft?

In the military aircraft industry, the trend of designing, developing and eventually producing low-visibility (stealth) fighter aircraft, regardless of whether they are fighters or bombers, manned or unmanned platforms, has been going on for the last 30-40 years. This ‘compulsory direction’, this trajectory is accepted by the armed forces of almost every country, from fighter pilots to aircraft engineers, from procurement authorities to the four-star generals/admirals occupying the highest levels of command. No one questions it, or perhaps does not want to question it.

In fact, almost all the world's armies are satisfied with the fighter aircraft designs that emerged in the 1970s. Although half a century has passed since the days when these aircraft began to fly, they are not uncomfortable with the use of these 1970s designs such as the F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, MiG-29, Su-27, Su-35. However, under the captivity of a questionable reality, as if the perception that the rules of air warfare will change in the field of air operations with the introduction of low-visibility military aircraft such as the F-117, SR-71, B-2, F-22 and F-35 by the USA has been accepted like a ‘creed’, countries are endeavouring to either purchase these aircraft or to produce similar ones. In a way, without questioning it too much, the majority of my peers in blue uniforms, including myself, have made this imposition the touchstone of our thoughts about the future, and we have endeavoured to make our inputs into the operational concepts we have tried to write by imagining the future as a prisoner of this ‘tunnel vision’. We have tried to draw a future scenario based on the fifth generation aircraft, the basis of which is invisibility, which is not very clear in reality. To what extent is invisibility really possible? What capabilities do we have to give up in order to build/purchase invisible aircraft? 

In the meantime, I recently read an article in which I realised that the same questions I had in my mind were shared by others. For some reason, everyone is pleased that there are people who think like us or who have similar thoughts to us, which is called ‘like-minded’ in English. When I read this article, I felt that I was not alone, and I was pleased. 

An American pilot admits that the F-35 is the aircraft of the future despite its current problems, but underlines that other fighter jets will be needed with this aircraft. He states that F-15s are at the forefront of these aircraft. In a sense, he points to a mixed force structure of fourth and fifth generation aircraft. Undoubtedly, while the sixth generation air dominance aircraft (NGAD-Next Generation Air Dominance) of the USA continues, the emphasis on the F-15, which means reversing the gear of the car, is a bit strange, but the American Pilot says that the reality on the ground for the US Air Force (USAF-United States Air Forces) requires this. If this reality is in question for the USA, I think it is much more in question for the Turkish Air Force. 

New Make-Up Aircrafts Shaking the Throne of the F-35: F-15EX, F-16 Viper, F/A-18 Super Hornet...

As you know, initially, the F-22s, another low-visibility aircraft, were to be kept in inventory by the USAF along with the F-35s. They were to operate together in the battlefield. As a reflection of the Obama-era decision to limit the production of F-22s to 187 units, the problem of the approaching retirement of F-22s is occupying the agenda of USAF force planners in search of a solution. Initially, the USAF advocated the production of up to 750 F-22 Raptors. In the coming years, the need for 750 aircraft must somehow be replaced and supplemented by other air platforms. 

The expensive F-22s are not even being considered for modernisation with the more modern sensors, hardware and software of the F-35s. Because for some, this means a modernisation equivalent to building a new F-35. In this case, when the F-22s, whose fate is understood to be similar to the legendary F-14 Tomcats of the US Navy, are deactivated, the USAF command inevitably focused on how long to keep the two existing main players, the F-15s and F-16s, on the playing field. Thus, new versions of these two fighters, which are more than 50 years old, were produced as new aircraft. The F-15EX and F-16Blok70 Viper versions started to appear on the production lines as brand new aircraft. For the Navy, the Super Hornets and F-18E/Fs have also become fighter aircraft within this scope.

What will replace the F-22 Raptor when it is retired?

Nowadays, the USAF management is openly talking about a ‘future without the F-22’ and, unlike what was previously envisaged, a cut in the total F-35 procurement and the inclusion of fewer F-35s in the inventory. 

In this respect, the F-15EX has been emphasised again. With its enormous operational radius, the F-15 was also designed as a monster that could strike enemy targets 3,000 miles away without refuelling from the air. This incredible operating radius, combined with the aircraft's ability to cruise at Mach 0.9 without afterburner (no AB), makes the F-15 an unrivalled aircraft in many respects, even today. The F-15 has an operational radius that the F-22 and F-35 do not have, a robust airframe that can accommodate the most powerful radar, and the ability to carry up to 22 air-to-air missiles. The only drawback is the low visibility factor called stealth. On the other hand, while there is talk of new radars that can eliminate low visibility and make the F-22 and F-35 visible, I wonder what kind of scenario will await the US Air Force when the low visibility that justifies the superiority of these two aircraft over their competitors is eliminated? In my opinion, this is the case for any country that dedicates its entire investment to the production of fifth-generation aircraft, or that chooses to purchase these aircraft and ‘trashes’ the fourth-generation aircraft it has. 

Today, most of the sensors on the F-35 or F-22 can also be installed on multi-role, multi-purpose fighters such as the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18. New products and capabilities can also be introduced to these aircraft. For example, AESA radar, a large number of modern air-ground and air-air ammunition, electronic warfare capabilities, advanced flight helmets, data networks in the context of situational awareness and network-centric operations, avionics, etc. can be adapted to these aircraft. They cannot only be ‘invisible’, but at least they can be less visible than their current state with paints and/or coatings that absorb RF transmissions. 

USAF Purchases 144 F-15EX

As a matter of fact, since 2015, the air forces of many countries have started to turn towards the new versions of these aircraft. F-15EX, F-16 Viper, F/A-18 Super Hornet have started to be seen as aircraft that mean a lot to some countries that cannot buy F-35s or whose budget is not enough to buy these aircraft. Turkey, which for obvious reasons could not add F-35s to its inventory, has now followed this trend and has rolled up its sleeves to buy 40 F-16 Vipers from the USA and at least 40 Eurofighter Typhoons from the European consortium led by the UK. 

Therefore, the demand for new versions of these old fighters has ceased to be a taboo all over the world, and even the USAF has had to seriously consider the procurement of F-15EX and F-16Viper. Indeed, the USAF got the Pentagon to agree to purchase 144 F-15EX Eagle II aircraft, an advanced version of the F-15QA being built for Qatar. The USAF's first two F-15EXs are currently being tested at Eglin Main Jet Base in Florida. The additional capability they will bring to the USAF in both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles is already expected to have a negative impact on the F-35 programme, with fewer aircraft budgeted and purchased each year. However, for Lockheed Martin, which has already surpassed the 1,000 aircraft production target in the F-35 programme and is guaranteed to produce as many more aircraft, the USAF's decision to move towards F-15EXs in addition to the F-35As is not seen as a very disturbing situation. Moreover, since the F-15EXs are being considered as a replacement for the F-22s that will be decommissioned, they are not perceived as a threat to the F-35 programme.

However, the biggest threat to the F-35 programme is the USAF's and potential buyer countries' decision to abandon the purchase of F-35s in favour of F-16 Vipers. This is because the F-35 fighter jets are intended to replace the F-16s in the future. For example, if Turkey were to voluntarily exit the programme and purchase 100 F-16 Vipers instead of 100 F-35s, this could be seen as a threat to the programme for Lockheed Martin, as it would be a break from the programme. For now, neither the USAF nor any other country has taken steps in this direction. 

On the other hand, it is known that there have been high-level discussions at USAF headquarters about purchasing new F-16s and limiting F-35 purchases to 1,050 against the 1,763 originally planned. This is not yet a finalised view. However, as assessments are being made these days, it is possible that the USAF may consider purchasing 569 F-16 Viper aircraft in the future, similar to the purchase of 144 F-15EXs. Following the replacement of F/A-18 Hornets with the new version Super Hornets, the Navy may also be expected to revise the number of F-35s it will purchase.

Conclusion

The Turkish Air Force, as a result of somewhat incalculable developments, has been unable to add the F-35 to its inventory, and has therefore been searching for an intermediate aircraft since 2019, until the National Combat Aircraft (NCA) KAAN becomes operational. As a quirk of history, this situation has brought the Turkish Air Force to the same point with the USAF. Using new version/modernised F-16s and, if possible, Eurofighter Typhoons with the MMU KAAN, and moving to a mixed force structure points to a self-optimised way out for the Turkish Air Force. 

On 21 February 2024, the MMU successfully performed its first flight, and is expected to have technical features such as 1.8 mach speed, 55. 000 ceiling altitude, multi-role (Air-Air & Air-Ground), super cruise capability (without afterburner), high manoeuvrability, extended operational radius, interoperability with other platforms, increased situational awareness, optimised pilot load with decision support, sensor fusion, next generation avionics, advanced radar, in-sight and beyond-sight weapons, precision strike capability, low visibility (stealth) and internal weapon/ammunition bay. Except for the last two, the new/modernised F-16s have or are about to have the capabilities required from the MMU KAAN, more or less in some cases.

In this context, we need to achieve President Erdoğan's target of ‘producing and delivering at least 20 MMU KAANs to the Air Force by 2028, which will have better features and capabilities than the F-16 aircraft’. Likewise, while parallel efforts are being carried out to make the F-16 Block 30/40s and, if an agreement cannot be reached with the Americans, all the remaining F-16s truly FREEDOM, we need to proceed by transferring every FREEDOM capability gain to the FREEDOMs in coordination.

MMU KAAN made its first flight on 21 February. After a long wait, the second flight was successfully performed on 6 May. I believe that we will proceed without such a long gap between the next KAAN test flights. In essence, although the second flight did not bring any innovation beyond reassuring the platform, a more stable aircraft image was shared. I believe that we will see more test aircraft in the skies at more frequent intervals from now on. However, we should also take into account that this year will be a year in which prototypes will be produced and prepared for flight tests, rather than flight tests of KAAN. Once the prototypes are ready, TAI will surely find a way to accelerate.