How Mini Drones Achieve Military Successes Greater Than Their Sizes

Drones and asymmetric warfare in Ukraine and Israel

Armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and/or attack drones are transforming the modern battlefield and the face of operations. Just observing the conflicts in Ukraine and now in Israel, I believe that today's conflicts serve as a laboratory for innovative projects and applications in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles.

In the rapidly developing military technology environment, UAVs have become the most prominent element of the list of new technologies in recent years and have become indispensable in conflicts. UAVs have changed the face of modern battlefield operations. Today, UAVs serve not only for advanced intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, but also as a tactical offensive weapon. The offensive capabilities that UAVs bring to the battlefield are almost on a par with fighter aircraft.

In Ukraine, the first hints of weaponised commercial drone technologies were observed with primitive camera drones used to drop grenades. Since then, commercial drones used for military offensive purposes have rapidly increased their contribution to the conflict. Ukrainian forces now use mini-drones to conduct tactical surveillance and reconnaissance, obtain critical intelligence on enemy movements and positions, and attack targets directly. The ability to deploy these devices in contested areas while minimising risks to human life significantly improves both tactical and strategic decision-making.

Use of Mini Drones

Among the myriad types of UAVs available, mini-UAVs or mini-drones, operated by a single soldier, carried almost on his or her back to engage targets within the soldier's line of sight, offer operators and the small-scale units in which they operate real-time situational awareness and the ability to precisely destroy targets of opportunity. Today, these mini-drones fulfil the role of forward observers in their units. In addition to the surveillance of the enemy's approach lines, the reconnaissance needs for the decision to engage the enemy are also met by using such mini UAVs, and the final decision is made. Even in mortar firing, these mini drones make a great contribution to both increasing situational awareness and the success of defence and/or offensive operations as the eyes looking from above for troops and soldiers. As much as a mobile phone occupies a place in the daily life of a normal person, there are now mini drones in the lives of military units. These very useful devices are present in every operation, small and large. Mini drones are becoming the hands and feet of military units in contact with the enemy.

Moreover, mini UAVs can be procured from the market at a much lower cost and more easily than conventional modern ammunition. Moreover, such UAVs can also be used as weapons when necessary, as seen in the examples of kamikaze UAVs, and they can function as effective and precise ammunition that can replace modern ammunition. When used effectively, mini UAVs function as mini cruise missiles in a soldier's rucksack.

It is noteworthy that the military versions of this technology, which makes civilian, commercial off-the-shelf products (COTS-commercial-off-the-shelf) available to the market, have been reconfigured and widely used. Drones, which have an increasing impact on battlefield operations, especially in Ukraine and Israel/Gaza, blur the line between who is technically superior to whom, keeping even an enemy that is technically superior to the weaker side in every way. Mini drones operating under the control and in the field of vision of a single soldier can cause an asymmetrical imbalance in the conflict zone. The tactical superiority of the side that owns them is immediately apparent. Mini UAVs, which cost quite cheaply and are assembled amateurishly, can easily stop expensive, highly technical, but in some ways outdated systems in the field. When used correctly in this respect, attack drones can achieve surprising successes.

How do mini drones work?

Mini drones provide operators with a live video feed, turning the user soldier into a standing pilot. It allows soldiers using the device to physically navigate and control the battlefield as if they were inside the drone. The mini-drones, which are handed to these soldiers in the field, many of whom are game console kids, offer an exciting, immersive experience to the soldier's control console, while turning war into a kind of game for these young people. In reality, the mini-drone increases the operator's situational awareness and ability to react to an approaching enemy at the right time and with the appropriate weapon, making mini-drones invaluable for small military units.

The technology of mini-drones can trace its roots back to the early days of radio-controlled model aeroplanes. For young people or enthusiasts with model aircraft experience, mini drones are not difficult to use and adapt to. Their flight mechanics and dynamics are very similar. However, the main factor that has brought these drones to the agenda in military conflicts today is the integration of compact cameras and real-time video transmission capabilities. A situation similar to the integration of the technology of giant cameras into mobile phones has been and is being experienced in the field of mini drones. As technology has developed, mini drones used for hobby purposes have turned into sophisticated vehicles with military-grade applications.

What are the main features of mini drones?

• Real-time video transmission allowing operators to make instant decisions, 
• It has an immersive control box for more precise and responsive manoeuvres,
• Very small, highly manoeuvrable and suitable for multi-purpose use.

These qualities of mini drones have found their counterpart in the military context. In a short time, these commercial vehicles were easily adapted to the battlefield to serve military purposes.  

Use of Mini Drones on the Russian-Ukrainian and Israeli-Hamas Fronts 

When we look at the Russian and Ukrainian front, we see that both sides attach importance to the use of mini drones. However, the Ukrainian side has a marginal superiority in the development and deployment of mini drones. Against the superior Russian Army, Ukrainian troops are able to carry out spectacular attacks with mini drones. 

Meanwhile, it is assessed that Russia's efforts in the field of mini drones are reflected in the field, and that Russian technology may soon be involved in the production of a large-scale military drone. In this case, it can be said that the Russian defence industry, which is very good at mass production, can put an end to Ukraine's mini drone advantage in the field in a short time. However, it should be noted that Ukraine also plans to produce almost one million mini drones this year through some 200 companies. The possibility of the Russian forces overtaking the Ukrainians in the production and deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles may therefore be somewhat difficult. 

On the Israeli front, we observe that the Israeli Army is superior in the use of mini-drones, while Hamas remains weak in this area. During the 7 October attack, Hamas used a limited number of mini-drones, but could not follow it up. However, if Hamas had been able to use mini-drones against Israel, it could have had an effective and sound power to harass the civilian population even on Israeli territory and to organise tactical attacks on Israeli army units. On the other hand, Hamas may find it most efficient in the coming days to allocate more of its dwindling resources to drones as one of the only viable ways to make progress. Taking a lesson from Ukraine, it could turn to commercially available mini-drones to launch asymmetric attacks on Israel. While Hamas has not yet fully embraced these mini-drone technologies, the benefits of using mini-drones against a large and mechanised enemy such as the Israeli Army are too great to ignore. Nevertheless, Hamas does not neglect to use jammers and GPS jammers against Israeli mini-drones. 

What Measures Are Taken Against Mini Drone Attacks? 

However, the protection of troops, tanks and armoured vehicles against mini-drones is also a necessity. Although mini-drones are here to stay, it is unlikely that these weapons will continue to dominate battlefield operations, as countermeasures will eventually catch up with their asymmetric advantage.

The most common countermeasures against mini-drones in the context of the lessons of the Russian-Ukrainian War include the use of jammer units (called "domes") mounted on armoured vehicles and omnidirectional jammers carried in backpacks for infantry. The main limitation of these jammers is that they require sufficient power in a specific frequency sector. This requires the introduction of new technologies that can suppress the frequencies used by the control mechanism of mini drones from greater distances and for longer periods of time.

In the meantime, a countermeasure to such a development could be to increase the number of frequency ranges used by mini-drone manufacturers to maximise their commercial gains, and to make new control frequencies available to the user that are not yet covered by jammers or GPS jammers. Competition in this area could lead to the suppression of all frequencies, from kilohertz to satellite communications, harming not only mini-drones but also all UAV users, from satellite-controlled military UAVs to UAVs. Cyber warfare capabilities can be activated in the mini-drone field.

Also in the near term, as a measure against jamming, it is possible to increase the autonomous capabilities of mini-drones. For example, if the mini drone, which will remain under the control of the operator until the jamming occurs, does not receive control signals from the operator after the jamming, it can be considered to return to the base return mode (if the conditions are appropriate) or to spontaneously engage the first target in the threat library directly in its region. In this way, even if the mini drones are scrambled, their mission cannot be completely terminated. In order to counter such alternative drone attack methods and to completely disable mini-drones, power sources enabling electromagnetic defence should be placed at the disposal of military units.

Conclusion

Having learnt from the conflicts of recent years, many countries prefer to invest in mini drone production technology. However, mini-drones are not expected to cause seismic changes in military capabilities or create an earthquake effect, and I find such assessments too exaggerated. 

Ukraine's attacks on distant targets, such as the attack on Russia's TU-22 bombers at the Soltsy-2 airbase last August or the multiple attacks on the Kerch Bridge in Crimea, can be considered a success in the face of impossibilities. Again, the attacks on fuel and ammunition depots in Luhansk resulted in the Russian Army concentrating on defence. In this respect, it became necessary for the Russian operational ecosystem to be vigilant against Ukrainian attacks and to apply dispersal measures during drone attacks. However, all military authorities agree that these attacks, even the striking of the rear of the Russian front with HIMARS-like tactical missile systems, cannot ensure a decisive victory for Ukraine. 

In the final analysis, mini drones are achieving game-changing successes in today's conflicts. They are doing more than their size. They pave the way for the side with a mini drone to establish an asymmetric superiority over the other. However, it is necessary to see mini drones as aerial vehicles that distract the enemy, disrupt even the psychology of enemy soldiers, and force the enemy to take absolute measures against them (using frequency jammers and GPS jammers, building domes on armoured vehicles, etc.), but it is also necessary to know that the war cannot be won with them.