Is the ammunition more important, the platform to throw the ammunition?

The Magnitude of Engineering Effort of Complex Systems:

One of the basic principles of engineering is this: The more parts, the higher the probability of failure. In fact, the scope and depth of meaning of this principle, which has been proven (repeatedly) true, is much deeper. We can also consider this in terms of the complexity of a system. Not just in terms of failure rates. So complex systems:

Longer thinking and concept development processes.

· R&D processes are also more problematic and time-consuming.

· It will spread to more multidisciplinary fields of study.

· Testing, evaluation and qualification processes will increase progressively.

· The organization of production and subsystem / supplier will become more complex.

It can be said that it will take time for spare parts, maintenance and maintenance processes to settle.

In the light of this information, I would like to bring the following question to your attention: Does it take a long time to develop and produce an aircraft of F-35 tuning? Or an air-to-air missile with AMRAAM caliber? The answer, of course, is the latter. Because the first one is a full-fledged, wide and complex platform that has taken its share from all disciplines of human technological knowledge. The other is a high-tech ammunition designed with a narrow purpose, requiring far fewer factors to be considered.

In fact, it is because of this simple fact that the progress in ammunition technologies is well ahead of platform technologies. We see that the same approach applies in the air, on land, in the sea, in space and in cyberspace. For example, the development of anti-tank missiles is much more diverse and faster than the development of tanks.

Network-Centered Operations and Ammunition Relationship:

One of the most popular and obviously the most important issues today is "network-centered warfare". In fact, this concept is a concept that our readers with a civic point of view find it difficult to understand its value and nature. This network, which is a part of not only platforms but also ammunition, has a structure that increases combat effectiveness exponentially. Let's explain this with examples:

Have an air force consisting of F-16s that can detect a square meter radar reflection area at a distance of 80-90 NM and F-15 aircraft that can detect it from a distance of 130-140 NM. These are 120 km. Engage their targets with maximum range BVR missiles. Based on these basic data you can plan an air defense. How many planes will you keep in the air, how many in scramble, and how many in maintenance at the same time? How will you plan it for times of peace, crisis and war? Now, let's add satellites, early warning aircraft, intelligence systems, and set up a network-centered structure.

Suppose you set up a network of sensors naturally within all your boundaries and beyond the distance covering 800-900 NM. Thanks to this network, you can detect, diagnose and track a target of the same diameter without the need for radars of F-15s and F-16s. Now you can change all your plans for your planes to avoid your enemy. Your work becomes much easier and clearer. Your missiles also hit their targets with much more accuracy and confidence. So, is this the benefit of the concept of network-centered warfare?

No, sir. Because now you have changed air warfare by adding a new and larger dimension. This naturally raises a lot of logical questions about the future of your air defense. For example: If I have such a talent and I believe that I can maintain it in battle. Wouldn't a Hürkuş, Hürjet, Akıncı and Kızıl Elma component that will carry the same missile do the same job? In other words, is it worth spending all that money on F-15s and F-16s, building infrastructure and training people?

When we pass through this opened door, we are confronted with a large number of questions whose meaning and importance are at least of this value. We also see that there can be many ways of thinking and alternatives that follow the questions. However, in this article, we will keep the scope narrow in order not to distract the subject. The issue is "ammunition or more important platform?" We will frame it.

Turkey is a country that gives priority to ammunition production:

To tell the truth, this is a fact that is very much identified with the situation of our country. Because our country started from the right place and started its work in the name of establishing a "domestic and national" defense industry, prioritizing the localization of all ammunition that can be used in the air forces. Of course, this should be followed by developments in the platform area. We see that many manned and unmanned projects are being carried out in this area. Hürjet, which we hope to make its first flight in 2023, MMU, which we hope to celebrate its rollout, and Hürkuş, with its composite-weighted new structure and changing interior design, can be counted within the scope of manned platforms.

In addition, the issue of ammunition has another important dimension, which we realized thanks to the Ukraine-Russian war. These are spent like roasted chickpeas, and their expensive and limited stocks are quickly consumed. In addition, these smart munitions must have special storage conditions, and regular maintenance and modernization must be carried out. In the NATO concept, there are two missile firing standards against one aircraft. In the Soviet / Russian concept, this figure is three missiles. Therefore, ammunition can be described as an object that is carefully produced, stored and destroyed when thrown. An airplane without ammunition will turn into a creature doomed to starve, like a bird of prey with its talons and beak ripped out.

It is also important to emphasize that the people of our country, who have been engaged in asymmetrical warfare for forty years, who have long-lasting civil wars around them, and who only watch air power on the news with bombardments, do not fully understand air warfare. Air force has a very fast and agile nature with every element. It is a force that is very, very expensive to maintain. (If you have a western school army) An air war cannot be fought with just daily dogfights and isolated bombings. When the planes of the two countries take off to face each other, it will be an all-out and fully loaded battle. Air superiority will be aimed first and then air dominance in the fastest way possible.

The Impact of Unmanned Platforms in the Near Future:

I would like to remind you of Clausewitz's quote that I like very much: You can never fight a little. This word takes on a completely different meaning in the heavens. In an instant, the two forces, which take off with all their elements, work "air-to-air" only to destroy the other. All air-ground-oriented efforts focus on destroying enemy aircraft and runways, and destroying the radar and air defense infrastructure that will serve it. Because the necessity of being able to operate properly at sea and on land passes through your air existence.

Let's tell the truth. Unmanned platforms are still far from being capable of performing a meaningful mission during these critical early hours. Even though its effects will gradually increase in the next 40-50 years, it can be predicted that the result will depend on manned warplanes at this first and most important stage. However, it is obvious that it can play a very important role both after a victorious air war and when both sides are worn out at equal levels and air warfare becomes asymmetrical.

In addition, a war does not only affect your planes and ammunition stocks. Network-centric operations and your ability to counter electronic warfare will also suffer. Unmanned platforms can offer the fastest and ideal solutions in terms of patching the holes to be drilled in your network-centered war setup and filling the gaps with striking force when necessary. Therefore, it would be a more correct approach not to get carried away with the name of SİHA/TİHA, which has risen in the international arena under the leadership of TB2, to plan our unmanned combat aircraft structure within the framework of this concept, and to include appropriate task loads and ammunition in the inventory for this purpose. (Of course, at the critical first stage, a limited amount of unmanned power will be sacrificed to important missions, never to return. This issue is beyond our scope.)

You have witnessed many criticisms and expressions of disappointment regarding the Russian Air Force operating over Ukraine on various television channels and social media environments, especially YouTube. At the beginning of these were the inability of the Russians to establish air superiority, their inability to perform important types of missions such as SEAD / DEAD, the continued existence of the Ukrainian air force and air defense elements despite all their superiorities. I would like to draw your attention to the words of an expert foreign commentator on this subject.

The Difference of Russian and NATO Schools and the Ukraine War:

For all NATO school countries, air superiority and air supremacy is a highly important concept that must be achieved first. But this is not so for the Russians. From the time of the Soviets to the present, the Russians have developed concepts and trained to fight in a war environment where the enemy is in the air, even superior, and where there are air defense elements on the ground, in a way that they can accept higher losses. It is natural that most Western commentators fall into the error of understanding and perceiving Russian air operations, like any human being who is unable to speak unfamiliar words. However, when we look at the point where the war has evolved today, it can be seen that the Russian air elements are still operational, deep and quite superior. In addition, it is obvious that all the advancing Russian infantry elements carry air defense systems with them. In terms of establishing a Russian, the necessity of losses and flight hours to be spent in order to establish air dominance, as the westerners say, can be questioned.

As a result of this article, we can emphasize the following: It can be said that we have started to do the right thing by prioritizing our domestic and national ammunition projects. Now, we must ensure that all ammunition, especially air-air, is rapidly transferred to the mass production process. We should keep our stock numbers much higher than our previous expectations.

We must continue the development of ammunition. At this stage, we have to restructure the maintenance attitude and modernization activities according to new needs and demands. If necessary, we should also include modular ammunition types on our roadmap, the majority of which will be assembled and loaded before use. We should study the possibility of expanding this modular structure not only in the air-air field, but also in the ground-to-air (SAM, HSS) field through the use of common components.

For some of our UAVs, especially HALE (High altitude long stay in the air), we should design payloads that will close the holes to be opened in the network-centered warfare setup, and loads that will provide additional radar / sensors. Just like we developed a flying base station against disaster situations. We should aim for a capability that can do this in the depths of our country and in the following processes, even if it is not on the front line and at the first moment. In order to close the gaps that will be opened in our air defense systems, we should definitely include a second intellectual factor in our plans.

In the development of projects that we can describe as "Jet Engine Unmanned Fighter Aircraft", we should set a structure that will conduct and maintain air warfare in these mobile, dynamic and relatively safe areas to be created as a priority target. It is unrealistic to consider unmanned systems as a force that will take charge of the first line and determine the fate of the battle. However, as we try to emphasize in this article, the experience and knowledge to be gained over time will contribute to our unmanned systems as frontline combatants in the future.

Conclusion:

Our interested readers will notice that the increasingly popular "missile truck" approach has been left out of the question. Especially the proliferation of stealth capable 5th generation warplanes makes the issue more remarkable due to the limitations of internal weapon stations. It is a conscious choice that the subject is not included in the article, and we plan to address this issue from a broader perspective in the future.

It is of vital importance to continue the development processes of our domestic and national aircraft with patience, enthusiasm and stability. In this context, great demands and changes can be expected in the near future, especially from the Hürjet project. Aforementioned Airplane engine can turn into the core of a dynamic platform in many respects. In this context, a derivative that will use the TF6000 TurboFan engine developed and introduced by TEI in dual configuration can also be expected. Advances in digital technologies and design tools can make such work much easier and faster than in the past. This subject is also broad and important enough to be the subject of a separate article.

Issues regarding the procurement of aircraft from an external source are beyond the scope of this article. We plan to evaluate it by spreading to more than one article in the future. Until we meet again, I wish you to stay healthy, well and safe.