One Nation, Two States, One Air Force: Joint Use of the Azerbaijani and Turkish Air Forces
Turkey's pursuit of autonomy in the defence sector and the scenario of indirectly adding JF-17 Block 3 aircraft to its inventory via Azerbaijan could offer Turkey an opportunity to expand its geopolitical playing field in the airspace, while also presenting potential for meeting its current fighter jet requirements. However, for this potential to materialise, Turkey and Azerbaijan must jointly demonstrate the ability to navigate with extreme caution on a very thin ice sheet in their dealings with the Western world.
The Turkish Air Force's need for modernisation and the vacuum created by the F-35 crisis with the US continue to push Ankara to seek alternatives. Until the National Combat Aircraft KAAN enters service, the need for a cost-effective combat aircraft to support the F-16 fleet and maintain deterrence is one of the most important issues on the defence agenda. At this point, the Eurofighters, which are frequently mentioned and have reached the solution stage, seem to provide short-term relief for the Turkish Armed Forces, but all authorities agree that this solution is only a temporary interim solution.
Turkey's membership in NATO, its role as a pillar of the alliance alongside the United States, and the shadow of past tensions may be seen as a layer of tar clouding our minds when it comes to finding solutions independent of the West.
Of course, being part of NATO provides Turkey with an invaluable strategic advantage. However, some power centres may not want the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to become too powerful (in their view) in order to maintain the balance of power in the region. For this reason, Turkey, which has faced various arms and spare parts embargoes over the past decade, has begun to cut its own umbilical cord in search of solutions. In addition to the general-purpose and guided air-to-ground munitions produced over the past decade, Turkey has recently developed active radar-guided BVR munitions, IR-guided advanced manoeuvrable and tracking short-range air-to-air munitions, cruise missiles, and air defence systems, which require much more advanced technology.
In this complex equation, a highly creative yet equally risky model could begin to be discussed:
The deployment of JF-17s in Turkey, registered on paper in the inventory of the Azerbaijani Air Force, to avoid direct tension with NATO and the United States.
‘One Nation, Two States, Joint Fleet’: How Does the Model Work?
The basic functioning of this hypothetical scenario is based on the principles of ‘covert procurement’ and ‘strategic partnership.’ The model I envision could be structured as follows:
* Official Buyer: Azerbaijan: Azerbaijan, which is known to have recently procured JF-17 Block 3 aircraft from Pakistan, places an order for an additional fleet. The ownership and official inventory registration of these aircraft would belong to Baku.
* Strategic Deployment Agreement: Under the ‘Strategic Partnership and Joint Airspace Defence Agreement’ to be signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan, it is decided that these aircraft will be deployed at specific bases in Turkey.
* Joint Training and Operations: Although the aircraft will fly with Azerbaijani Air Force tail numbers, markings and insignia, piloting and maintenance activities will be carried out largely by Turkish Air Force personnel. This is justified as ‘enhancing the joint training and interoperability capabilities of pilots from brotherly countries.’
* Actual Integration: The aircraft are integrated into the Turkish air defence network and perform tasks in accordance with Turkey's operational needs.
Potential Advantages of the Model
This indirect procurement model has many potential advantages for Ankara:
* Bypassing NATO and US Sanctions: Since Turkey is not the official owner of the aircraft, it can avoid being directly subject to sanctions such as CAATSA (the US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). Ankara can argue that ‘These are not our aircraft; they belong to our strategic partner Azerbaijan. We are only conducting joint defence and training activities.’ If necessary, the fleet can even return to Azerbaijani territory for certain periods and conduct temporary transfers.
* Rapid and Cost-Effective Modernisation: Given the lack of alternatives to the F-35 and the high cost and political obstacles associated with Western 4.5-generation aircraft such as the Eurofighter, the JF-17 Block 3, with its AESA radar and modern avionics, provides a rapid capability upgrade.
* Opens the door to more modern options: This strategy marks a step toward procuring more advanced Chinese-made 5th generation fighter jets.
* Signal of Strategic Autonomy: This move sends a strong message that Turkey is not dependent on the West to meet its defence needs and can produce ‘out-of-the-box’ solutions when necessary.
* Deepening Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations: The motto ‘One Nation, Two States’ is being taken to an unprecedented concrete level in the military sphere, further solidifying the strategic partnership.
Risks and Challenges: Walking on Thin Ice
To be impartial, this model, however clever it may appear on paper, harbours serious risks and technical challenges:
* Credibility Issue: Western intelligence services and military analysts will easily decipher this ‘Azerbaijani camouflage.’ This could be perceived as a move aimed at deception rather than honest dialogue. However, the reverse evolution of strategic and military policy ethics in the world over the past 50 years is as follows: "Power-centric countries disregard all rules for their own benefit but demand that their enemies adhere to all international and moral rules. Above all, they are well aware that everyone else is also fully aware of this hypocritical policy. In this shameless world order, to remain standing and strong, one must either rise up or make strategic moves. Both options carry their own risks.
* Potential Crisis Within NATO: The greatest technical challenge is interoperability with NATO air defence systems. Integrating an aircraft equipped with Pakistan/China data links and IFF (Friend or Foe Identification) systems into NATO's Link-16 network is nearly impossible. This situation creates serious coordination and security vulnerabilities in a joint NATO operation. However, these fleets, which will belong to the Azerbaijani Air Force, are not required to be used in NATO exercises or operations. Moreover, it is known that restrictions are currently imposed on the Turkish Armed Forces regarding the use of Link-16.
* Logistics and Maintenance Chain: Although Turkish technicians are skilled and qualified, establishing a logistics, spare parts, and maintenance infrastructure from scratch for the JF-17 will entail additional costs and complexity. This obstacle can be overcome temporarily by signing an additional protocol with Azerbaijan, which already has a JF-17 fleet in its inventory, for maintenance and repair activities.
* Pressure on Azerbaijan: This scenario could put Azerbaijan in a difficult position as it navigates a delicate balance between Russia and the West. For Turkey's strategic objectives, Bakü taking such a significant political risk could lead to unexpected tensions in relations.
Conclusion: A High-Risk Strategic Gamble
Turkey's scenario of indirectly incorporating JF-17 Block 3 aircraft into its inventory via Azerbaijan would constitute a bold and creative move in the geopolitical arena. This strategy could address Ankara's urgent military needs while offering the potential to avoid direct conflict with the United States and NATO. However, this potential is akin to walking on thin ice.
The success of this model depends on how much the West is willing to ‘turn a blind eye’ to this situation, how NATO interoperability issues can be overcome, and whether the political costs of this move outweigh the military gains it would bring. Ultimately, this scenario remains a possibility that must be carefully considered, as it demonstrates how far Turkey is willing to go in its quest for strategic autonomy and the significant risks it is willing to take along the way.
