S-400 Triumf Air Defence System (Part 2)

The modern battlefield is characterised by a multidimensional threat spectrum ranging from fifth-generation low-observable (stealth) aircraft to hypersonic cruise missiles, and from swarm UAV technologies to tactical ballistic missiles. Neutralising these threats requires not only high-performance missiles but also sophisticated radar networks and command-and-control architectures to orchestrate them. The two main pillars competing in this field on a global scale are the S-400 Triumf (NATO code: SA-21 Growler), developed by the Russian Federation, and the US-origin MIM-104 Patriot system.¹ Both systems have evolved as reflections of their respective military doctrines and strategic priorities. The S-400 aims to establish air superiority across a wide geographical area by combining the concepts of ‘area defence’ and ‘depth of defence’—inherited from the Soviet era—with modern technology; the Patriot has specialised in point defence, network-centred warfare and ballistic missile defence (BMD), particularly drawing on experience gained since the Gulf War. ⁴ This article will present an impartial strategic synthesis by subjecting the architecture, sensor capabilities, effector portfolio, operational impact and interoperability parameters of both systems to a detailed technical analysis.

System Architecture and Component Integration

The architectural structure of the S-400 Triumf system is designed to form a comprehensive regional air defence network, extending beyond the scale of a single battery or battalion. At the heart of the system lies the 30K6E command and control system, which functions as the operational command centre.² This system is capable of coordinating up to eight anti-aircraft missile battalions from a single command post. Each battalion houses its own 98Zh6E firing unit. This hierarchical structure demonstrates that the S-400 is not merely a weapons system, but also an integration hub bringing together various sensor and weapon platforms.²

The 55K6E command and control centre, regarded as the heart of the S-400, is built upon the Ural-532301 mobile chassis and stands out for its digital data processing capabilities. The Elbrus-90 microprocessor infrastructure used in this centre processes the massive amounts of radar data received from the field in real time, carrying out tasks such as classifying and prioritising targets and assigning them to the most suitable effector (missile). ⁷ The 30K6E system is capable of managing not only S-400 units but also older-generation systems such as the S-300PMU1 and PMU2, Tor-M1 short-range missile systems, and Pantsir-S1 air defence systems via its own command network connection. ² This ‘plug-and-play’ architecture is the most critical element technically supporting the multi-layered structure of Russian air defence doctrine.

Table 1: S-400 Triumf System Architectural Components and Functional Analysis

Component Code Function Carrier Platform Key Technical Capabilities

30K6E Strategic Management System N/A Coordination of up to 8 battalions, data fusion²

55K6E Command Post (CP) Ural-532301 (8x8) Elbrus-90 processor, real-time data processing⁷

91N6E Panoramic Search Radar MZKT-7930 (8x8) 600 km detection range, 300 target tracking¹

92N6E Fire Control Radar MZKT-7930 (8x8) 360–400 km range, 20–36 target engagement²

5P85TE2/SE2 Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) BAZ-64022 or MZKT-7930 with a capacity to launch 4 container-type missiles²

The system’s flexible missile management is ensured by the transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) being able to carry different missile types simultaneously. In an S-400 battery, strategic-range 40N6 missiles, medium-range 48N6 series missiles and short-to-medium-range 9M96E/E2 missiles can be deployed simultaneously.¹ This is made possible by the ‘target-missile matching’ algorithm of the 30K6E software. For example, whilst 40N6 missiles are assigned to a high-altitude AWACS aircraft detected on the radar screen, 9M96E2 missiles can be deployed simultaneously against a cruise missile with a low radar cross-section approaching the battery. ¹ The data link architecture ensures high strike accuracy in the terminal phase by updating the missile’s coordinates dozens of times per second during flight.¹

Advanced Sensor Architectures: Tracking and Identification Performance of Low-Visibility Targets

Radar technology is the eyes and ears of modern air defence. The S-400’s primary sensor, the 91N6E (NATO code: Big Bird), is a radar operating in the S-band frequencies, featuring a dual-side passive electronically scanned array (PESA) architecture. ¹⁶ The system’s most notable feature is its 360-degree panoramic coverage area, achieved through the continuous rotation of the antenna array.¹ This represents a significant doctrinal difference compared to its Western counterpart, the Patriot AN/MPQ-65 radar, which traditionally focuses on a 120-degree sector. Whilst the Patriot’s sectoral scanning method provides very high accuracy by focusing on the direction from which a threat is expected, it carries the risk of creating ‘blind spots’ against multi-directional (omni-directional) attacks.³

The 91N6E radar has an operational range of up to 600 km and can track approximately 300 targets simultaneously within this range. ¹ The S-400 adopts a multi-band approach for detecting targets with a low radar cross-section (RCS), particularly VLO platforms such as the F-35 and F-22. The 91N6E’s S-band characteristic is suitable for wide-area scanning whilst minimising atmospheric losses. Theoretical calculations and field data indicate that a ballistic target with an RCS of 0.4 square metres can be detected at a distance of approximately 200–230 km.² However, for the detection of stealth aircraft, radars such as the Nebo-M (operating in the VHF band) or the Protivnik-GE (operating in the L-band) are typically integrated with this radar. Due to its physical characteristics, the VHF band is less sensitive to the geometric shaping of stealth aircraft and can enable their coarse detection from greater distances thanks to the aircraft’s ‘resonance effect’.²

Table 2: Comparative Characteristics of S-400 and Patriot Radar Systems

Parameter 91N6E (S-400) AN/MPQ-65 (Patriot) LTAMDS (New Patriot)

Frequency Band S-Band C/G/H-Band X/S-Band (AESA)¹⁶

Coverage Area 360° (Mechanical + Electronic) 120° (Fixed Sector) 360° (3-element array)¹

Detection Range 600 km 150–170+ km 200+ km¹

Tracking Capacity 300 targets 100 targets 100+ targets¹

Radar Architecture PESA (Reflective) PESA AESA (GaN technology)¹⁶

The Patriot system’s AN/MPQ-65 radar, however, is designed for precision tracking and engagement. Operating in the C-band, this radar combines long-range detection with precision targeting functions in a single unit.²⁰ The sector scanning limitation, considered the Patriot’s greatest weakness, is being overcome by the recently developed LTAMDS (Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor). The LTAMDS is equipped with a triple AESA antenna array—comprising one main and two auxiliary arrays—and responds to the S-400’s 360-degree coverage area with real-time electronic scanning. ¹⁸ The LTAMDS’s Gallium Nitride (GaN)-based modules generate twice the signal power compared to the AN/MPQ-65, significantly increasing the detection range against low-observable targets.¹⁸

The S-400’s 92N6E ‘Grave Stone’ fire control radar operates in the X-band and provides the high-resolution data required for missile guidance. The 92N6E can lock onto more than 20 targets simultaneously and guide up to 72 missiles. ¹ This radar’s low sidelobe structure and frequency-hopping capability provide high resistance against electronic countermeasures (ECM).¹ However, in terms of cyber security and data fusion, Russian radars exhibit fundamental incompatibilities when it comes to integration with Western network-centred warfare systems.

The image of the MAZ Series Vertical Launcher above was generated by Google Gemini.

Effector (Missile) Portfolio and Kinematic Performance

One of the key features marketed as a technical advantage of the S-400 is its ammunition diversity. The system utilises four main missile families with different kinematic profiles and engagement mechanisms: 40N6, 48N6, 9M96E2 and 9M96E.¹³ Each of these missiles is optimised for a specific set of targets and altitude layer.

40N6: Strategic Beyond-Horizon Capability

The 40N6 missile, with a range of 400 km, is one of the world’s longest-range air-to-air missiles. Its primary mission is to neutralise the nerve centres of enemy air operations, such as AWACS, tanker aircraft, J-STARS and stand-off jammer platforms.¹ The 40N6 typically follows a semi-ballistic flight profile; after launch, it climbs to an altitude of approximately 30–35 km and dives towards the target at a steep angle (‘pitch-down’).²² This dive profile enables the missile to convert its potential energy into kinetic energy during the terminal phase, reaching hypersonic speeds of Mach 9. Furthermore, this angle allows illumination of the upper surface—the weakest point of stealth aircraft.²³ Equipped with an active radar seeker, the 40N6 can independently engage targets even beyond the line of sight of ground-based radars.⁸

48N6DM and 9M96E2: Balanced and Agile Response

The 48N6DM (or 48N6E3) is the S-400’s primary munition. With a range of 250 km and a speed of Mach 8.2, this missile carries a large fragmentation warhead weighing 180 kg. ⁷ Effective against ballistic missiles in the terminal phase, this missile is capable of intercepting missiles with a range of 3,500 km. On the other hand, the 9M96E2 missile is based on a completely different design philosophy. Known as a ‘missile-in-missile’, this munition can be transported in sets of four within launch containers.¹³ With a range of 120 km, the 9M96E2, can manoeuvre up to 20G thanks to its active radar seeker and gas-dynamic control system.¹ This missile is optimised against high-manoeuvrability fighter aircraft and precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

Table 3: Technical and Kinematic Data of the S-400 Missile Family

Missile Model Range (km) Max. Altitude (km) Max. Speed (Mach) Warhead Type

40N6 400 185 7.0 - 9.0 Fragmentation (Frag)¹

48N6DM 250 30 8.2 Fragmentation (Frag)⁷

9M96E2 120 30 15.0 (Claimed) Frag / Hit-to-Kill (Precision)¹

9M96E 40 20 3.0 Fragmentation (Frag)¹³

Doctrinal Comparison: Fragmentation Warhead and Hit-to-Kill (Hit-to-Kill / Impact Destruction)

The engagement mechanism represents the most profound divergence between Russian and American air defence doctrines. S-400 missiles (with the exception of the 9M96) generally use large blast-fragmentation warheads. ⁷ These warheads detonate within 20–30 metres of the target, scattering thousands of high-velocity fragments over a wide area. This method causes the target to fall by destroying its aerodynamic control surfaces and compensates for minor errors in the system’s target tracking.²⁷

However, the Patriot PAC-3 MSE employs a direct impact technology known as ‘Hit-to-Kill’. The PAC-3 MSE has no warhead; instead, it strikes the target directly, vaporising it in mid-air with its immense kinetic energy.³ The advantage of the direct-impact technology is that it completely destroys the nuclear, chemical or biological warheads of ballistic missiles in mid-air. Whilst fragmentation warheads may divert a ballistic missile from its course, the warhead could still fall to the ground and detonate; impact destruction, however, reduces this risk to zero. ²⁷ However, impact destruction technology requires the missile to be controlled with incredible precision during the terminal phase; to this end, the PAC-3 MSE uses 180 small solid-propellant attitude control motors (attitude control motors) on its body to make course corrections within milliseconds.²⁷

A2/AD Strategy and Operational Impact

The S-400 Triumf is a key component of the ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial’ (A2/AD) strategy in modern military terminology. By deploying this system in strategic regions such as Crimea, Kaliningrad and Syria, Russia has created a ‘defence bubble’ that restricts the freedom of movement of NATO air assets.⁶ The system’s 400 km engagement radius creates a deterrent that not only provides defence but also causes enemy aircraft to feel threatened even within their own safe airspace.

The S-400’s A2/AD capability has fundamentally altered NATO’s traditional operational approach, which relies on air superiority. For example, the S-400 batteries in Kaliningrad have a range capable of completely controlling air traffic over Poland and the Baltic states. ¹² This situation directly threatens NATO’s ability to provide air reinforcements to its Baltic allies in the event of a crisis. The system’s survivability is supported by its ‘shoot-and-scoot’ capability. S-400 components can become fully operational within 5–10 minutes or relocate within the same timeframe to evade counter-attacks. ⁸ In contrast, the deployment and redeployment time for Patriot batteries is around 25–30 minutes.³³ This difference in mobility makes the S-400 a far more challenging and unpredictable target for units carrying out SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) missions.

However, it is important to understand that the A2/AD bubble is not established solely by the system’s presence. Russian doctrine employs the S-400 within a layered structure. The outer ring comprises the S-400, the middle ring the S-300 or Buk-M3, and the inner ring the Pantsir-S1 and Tor -M2.² This ‘matryoshka’-style defence structure ensures that if one layer is breached, another takes over. The S-400’s role in providing strategic depth is not merely to shoot down aircraft, but to wear down enemy air forces by forcing them to use more expensive stand-off munitions and adopt more complex mission profiles.³⁵

Interoperability and Data Fusion

Turkey’s procurement process for the S-400 air defence system from Russia reached a strategic turning point with the official agreement signed in 2017. Following this agreement, the delivery phase was completed in 2019 with the handover of the first batteries to Turkey, and the system’s operational capabilities were tested during live-fire exercises conducted in Sinop in 2020.

However, this process has also triggered serious diplomatic crises on the international stage. As a result of tensions that intensified particularly in 2021 and 2022, the US imposed CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) against Turkey, leading to an extensive debate that culminated in Turkey’s formal exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet programme in 2021.^47,48,49,50

The effectiveness of an air defence system is measured not only by its own missiles but also by how well it integrates with the network it operates within. The procurement of the S-400 system by a NATO ally (such as Turkey) has raised technical and strategic ‘interoperability’ issues. Link-16, NATO’s tactical data link standard, enables allied aircraft, ships and land-based radars to share data with one another in real time.³⁸ However, the S-400 cannot be structurally integrated into the Link-16 network. This situation stems from both technical limitations and cyber security risks.

“Sovereign System” and Cyber Security Risks

The S-400 has been designed by Russia as a “Sovereign System”. This means that the system’s source code, radar algorithms and command-and-control software are under Russia’s exclusive control. If a NATO country attempts to connect the S-400 to the Link-16 network, there is a risk that the network’s most sensitive data (the positions of friendly aircraft, flight profiles, mission plans, radar signatures) by Russian software or being leaked to Russia.⁴¹ This is precisely the rationale behind the US decision to exclude Turkey from the F-35 programme: the possibility that S-400 radars could continuously analyse the stealth characteristics of F-35 aircraft and provide data to Russian intelligence.⁴¹

Turkey’s decision to procure the S-400 Long-Range Air Defence System from the Russian Federation has triggered a deep strategic crisis in the eyes of the United States (US) and other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. The US Department of Defence’s primary concern is the possibility that operational data obtained through the deployment of the S-400 system on Turkish territory could provide Russia with a critical intelligence advantage regarding the radar cross-section (RCS) and mission profile of the fifth-generation F-35 joint strike fighter. This situation has been assessed as a strategic threat in terms of the F-35 platform’s stealth capability and its survivability within the combat network. Although Turkish authorities have committed to retaining the removable Lüneburg lenses (radar reflectors) (RCS) values, which artificially increase the platform’s radar cross-section; however, the US side has continued to view the risk of low-observability technology being deciphered via signals intelligence (ELINT) as a strategic threat.

In light of these concerns, the US unilaterally removed Turkey from the F-35 programme and cancelled deliveries. Subsequently, the US took a precedent-setting decision by imposing sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) against a NATO member state for the first time.

This situation has provided a useful reference point for NATO member states to impose defence industry restrictions and embargoes on Turkey. Relations between Turkey, the US and NATO countries have become strained, and the NATO alliance has consequently suffered a deep wound that is difficult to heal⁴⁶

As of March 2026, recent statements by the Ministry of National Defence (MSB) and government officials indicate that the S-400s are part of the Turkish Air Force’s inventory and are kept on standby to be activated when required. However, there is no information to suggest that the system’s radars are constantly active or that it is maintaining an active airspace defence watch.⁵¹

IFF Protocols and Operational Risks

Incompatibility in Friend-or-Foe Identification (IFF) protocols maximises the risk of ‘friendly fire’ on the battlefield. Whilst NATO countries use Mk-XII and Mode 5 IFF standards, the S-400 employs Russia’s own IFF system. ⁴¹ Although it is claimed that Russia has added an IFF interrogator compliant with the NATO standard STANAG 4193 to the systems it sold to Turkey, it is doubtful whether this system can operate securely on Russian equipment using the complex cryptographic keys (Mode 4/5) on Russian hardware.⁴¹ If the system operates ‘stand-alone’ outside the NATO network, it may tend to automatically classify allied aircraft detected by its own radars as ‘unknown’ or ‘enemy’. This creates a serious operational constraint for allied air assets.⁴¹

Comparative Synthesis and Final Assessment

In air defence doctrine, the most critical constraints determining radar performance are the curvature of the Earth (geometric horizon) and topographical obstacles. This phenomenon, referred to in the literature as the ‘Radar Horizon’, results in blind spots due to geographical elevations and the Earth’s spherical shape, particularly when detecting threats approaching from low altitudes. This is a physical necessity that directly limits the effective coverage area of the systems.

When comparing the S-400 Triumf and MIM-104 Patriot systems, it is evident that both possess distinct ‘areas of superiority’. On paper, the S-400 is the world’s most impressive ‘wide-area defence’ system on paper.¹ In particular, its ability to integrate different missile types into a single battery makes it extremely flexible against hybrid threats. From a cost perspective, the battery price of approximately 500–600 million dollars is more competitive compared to the Patriot’s cost exceeding 1 billion dollars.²

However, the Patriot system’s “combat-proven” track record and success in “Ballistic Missile Defence” (BMD), particularly with the PAC-3 MSE variant, cannot be overlooked. During the Ukraine War between 2023 and 2026, the Patriot system demonstrated its technological maturity by successfully intercepting Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and Zircon missiles, which Russia had claimed were ‘unstoppable’. ³ The S-400, however, was struck by ATACMS missiles in the Crimea and surrounding areas of Ukraine and, in some instances, demonstrated vulnerabilities against threats within its own range.¹¹ This situation demonstrates that data on paper does not always translate into reality under jamming attacks in a modern electronic warfare (EW) environment.

Table 4: Strategic Comparison Matrix

Criterion S-400 Triumf ⁵ MIM-104 Patriot PAC-3 MSE ³

Operational Philosophy Area Air Defence (A2/AD) Ballistic Missile and Point Defence

Technological Capabilities Multi-band radar, wide range of munitions Hit-to-Kill precision, AESA/GaN radar

Weaknesses No NATO integration, cyber risks High unit cost, limited range

Logistics Full dependence on Russia Widespread spare parts and allied network

Expected Lifespan 15–20-year service life Continuous modernisation for 2040 and beyond

In terms of logistical sustainability, the Patriot is part of a global ecosystem used by dozens of countries worldwide, with shared production and maintenance facilities. The S-400, however, not only makes the purchasing country dependent solely on Russia, but can also put the entire defence industry at risk through sanctions such as CAATSA.⁴¹ In the modern electronic warfare environment, the Patriot’s network-centric architecture and data fusion fed by other allied sensors (AWACS, F-35, satellites) compensates for the weaknesses of a single battery. However, no matter how powerful the S-400 may be, as long as it remains outside the NATO network, it is forced to operate like an ‘isolated island’.

Consequently, the S-400 Triumf is a critical force multiplier for nations implementing an A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) strategy across vast geographical areas and aiming for a fully independent defence architecture. The system’s operational effectiveness reaches its maximum level when integrated into a Network-Centric Layered Air Defence structure, supported by point defence and medium-altitude components such as the Pantsir-S1/S2, Tor-M2 and Buk-M3, as well as airborne early warning and control (AWACS) platforms like the Beriev A-50U. This comprehensive ecosystem, which is expected to include the S-350 Vityaz and, in the future, the S-500 Prometey, promises an impenetrable defence umbrella against modern asymmetric and conventional air threats, despite entailing high procurement and sustainment costs.

Deploying the S-400 Triumf air defence system as a standalone (standalone) deployment exposes the system’s operational limitations and potential vulnerabilities to exploitation by enemy forces. In contrast, operating the S-400 within a fully integrated, ‘like-minded’ Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) architecture maximises the system’s situational awareness, operational survivability and potential to neutralise the enemy’s air attack capability.

The Patriot, meanwhile, offers a proven, precise and network-centred defence line, particularly for alliances (such as NATO) facing high-tech and ballistic missile threats. Ultimate success on the battlefield will be determined not so much by the system’s range, but by its resilience against electronic warfare and its ability to operate in sync with allied assets and nations. Whilst the S-400’s specifications on paper promise a strategic advantage, the Patriot’s operational reliability and system approach—which allows for integration with allied assets—enhances the effectiveness of the defence line by enabling real-time fusion of data from F-35 and AWACS platforms.

For those who have not read the first part or wish to refresh their memory, the relevant link is provided below.

S-400 Triumf Air Defence System (Part 1)

https://strasam.org/savunma/havacilik-ve-uzay-sanayii/s-400-triumf-hava-savunma-sistemi-bolum-1-4079

You can access my other five analyses, which I have prepared on air defence doctrines and system technologies and are directly related to this topic, via the links below.

1) Technological Integration in Layered Air Defence Systems and Sustainable Defence Economics

https://strasam.org/savunma/havacilik-ve-uzay-sanayii/katmanli-hava-savunma-sistemlerinde-teknolojik-entegrasyon-ve-surdurulebilir-savunma-ekonomisi-4028

2) MIM-104 Patriot: From PAC-2 to PAC-3 MSE: Guidance and Radar Technologies in the Patriot Family

https://strasam.org/analiz-ve-raporlar/analiz/mim-104-patriot-pac-2den-pac-3-mseye-patriot-ailesinde-gudum-ve-radar-teknolojileri-4048

3) From Beyond the Horizon to Space: Multi-Layered Air Defence Strategies with Aegis IAMD

https://strasam.org/savunma/havacilik-ve-uzay-sanayii/ufuk-otesinden-uzaya-aegis-iamd-ile-cok-katmanli-hava-savunma-stratejileri-4052

4) THAAD System: Integrated Radar Architecture and Precision Guidance Technologies

https://strasam.org/savunma/havacilik-ve-uzay-sanayii/thaad-sistemi-entegre-radar-mimarisi-ve-hassas-gudum-teknolojileri-4068

5) SAMP/T (MAMBA) and SAMP/T NG Long-Range Air Defence System

https://strasam.org/savunma/havacilik-ve-uzay-sanayii/samp-t-mamba-ve-samp-t-ng-uzun-menzilli-hava-savunma-sistemi-4072

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36. Russia's Anti-Access Area Denial - Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/russia/russia-anti-access-area-denial/

37. To what extent are Russian ‘anti-access’ and ‘area-denial’ systems defensive or offensive in character?, https://wsb.edu.pl/files/pages/634/security_forum_02_2017_9.pdf

38. Saab GRIPEN E Canada – Fighter Jet - Canadian Defence Review, https://canadiandefencereview.com/saab-gripen-e-fighter-jet-canada/

39. NATO allies synchronise communication via Link 16 - U.S. Air Forces in Europe, https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/253616/nato-allies-synch-communication-through-link-16/

40. Interoperability at the Edge: The Strategic Imperative for NATO in an Era of Complex Threats, https://hadean.com/blog/interoperability-at-the-edge-the-strategic-imperative-for-nato-in-an-era-of-complex-threats/

41. Russia Built a NATO-Specification Identification Friend or Foe System for ..., https://www.twz.com/31350/russia-built-a-nato-spec-identification-friend-or-foe-system-for-turkeys-s-400-batteries

42. Turkey’s perennial strategic importance and the S-400 saga, https://www.aies.at/download/2019/AIES-Fokus-2019-10.pdf

43. US Patriot vs Russia's S-400 - which is better? - YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aqOsedSRD44

44. Why Ukraine Can't Seriously Deplete Russia's S-400 Air Defence Arsenal: Massive Production Scale Allows For Rapid Replenishment, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/why-ukraine-cant-seriously-deplete-russia-s400

45. Russia's S-400 Air Defence System Alarms NATO, https://voennoedelo.com/en/posts/id13630-russia-s-s-400-air-defense-system-alarms-nato

46. https://strasam.org/strateji/istihbarat/rusya-federasyonunun-turkiyedeki-stratejik-etki-mimarisi-propaganda-dezenformasyon-ve-hibrit-nufuz-operasyonlari-uzerine-dusunceler-3959

47. https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/turkiye-ve-rusya-arasinda-s-400-anlasmasi-imzalandi-531880

48. https://t24.com.tr/dunya/milli-savunma-bakanligi-s-400-teslimati-basladi,830264

49. https://www.internethaber.com/s-400ler-sinopta-test-atislarini-basari-ile-tamamlayip-ankaraya-donuse-gecti-foto-galerisi-2134453.htm

50. https://setadc.org/turkiye-f -35-officially-removed-from-the-programme/

51. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/turkiye/msb-acikladi-iran-dan-ateslenen-balistik-fuzeler-icin-s-400-ler-neden-kullanilmadi-2486139