SAAB A Competitor or Potential for Cooperation

As you know, UCAVs, one of today's popular modern aviation platforms, are developing and diversifying in every dimension. As Turkey, we have raised our position in the UCAV concept, which consists of a reusable platform and the appropriate ammunition families. Undoubtedly, this has pushed back the field of loitering munitions and kamikaze drones to some extent and shaped the sector around itself. The next niche area of this trend will be unmanned combat vehicles, whose combat capability has been raised to the level of jet-powered fighter aircraft. As you can see in Baykar KIZILELMA and TAI ANKA-3, which we are currently developing. For this reason, it would be very useful to examine other studies carried out in the world in this field and our future competitors.
In this article, we will discuss the Swedish SAAB company, together with its future positioning in the defence and aerospace industry. The studies of the USA, EU countries, Russia, China and other countries of the world will be excluded. In this way, I believe that we will find a more qualified basis for thinking about our potential areas of cooperation or possible competition with the country / company in question.

Swedish Defence and Aerospace Industry

Even if it is a Nordic European country with a relatively low population, it would be a mistake to underestimate Sweden on the road from the industrial revolution to the information age. This society, which is well acquainted with information and technology, has had its share of all the wars and turmoil experienced by continental Europe. For this reason, the importance it attaches to defence and aerospace has become a habit.
During the Cold War years, Sweden, caught in the middle between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, was aware of the need to show asymmetric resistance in a major war, while developing its defence industry and integrating technology into this development. This awareness led Sweden to adopt a unique development path in the field of military aviation. In the airspace protected by its own products, Draken, Viggen and Gripen, as well as its own fighter aircraft, it had to be ready for war in order to eliminate numerically superior forces. For this reason, it created a different air force structure capable of taking off and landing even on land roads, using technology as a lever, and blending professionalism and patriotism in its personnel policy.
To put it bluntly, Gripen was a combat platform that adopted the ‘network-centric warfare’ doctrine before all other contemporary aircraft. We see the same prioritised approach in all subsystems in charge of information and communication, with an open architecture structure. In addition, we observe that the need to develop indigenous systems for their own requirements, unlike the multinational European consortiums, has led to their success in terms of both budget and management who know what they want.
However, it is clear that this success is not reflected in export figures. In addition to the attitude of the country, which does not accept sales to every potential customer due to its special sensitivities, the fact that uniquely tailored shirts will not look stylish on every body has also played a role in this. Moreover, from the point of view of other countries, it is well known that the purchase of a complex weapon system from a politically independent country raises many questions in terms of sustainability and maintenance. We can foresee that this situation will change in the near future in parallel with Sweden's NATO membership.

Next Generation Fighter Aircraft from Gripen

I would like to enter the subject from another geography. When the US Air Force went out to tender for a new generation jet trainer aircraft, my personal favourite was the T-7 RedHawk, developed from scratch in partnership with Boeing and SAAB. This was because Lockheed Martin had won the vast majority of military aircraft tenders and Northrop Grumman's future was assured in terms of the B-21 and unmanned vehicles. Logic dictated to feed the only hungry mouth with this tender and to utilise Sweden's industrial infrastructure in doing so. And so it was, and the tender was awarded to this consortium.
Following this development, I asked myself the following question: Could it be that the US was planning to transition to unmanned combat aviation platforms through the T-7? At that time, the CCA logic and the US vision on the subject had not fully matured, and this seemed to be a logical possibility. This was because the Gripen's information and communication infrastructure was highly suitable for unmanned aircraft. However, Boeing, the company that was awarded the contract, got into a great deal of trouble in terms of management, quality control and many other aspects, and this brought with it many financial burdens. This is partly the reason for the delay in the RedHawk programme.
Over time, Sweden's interest in the Tempest programme, led by the United Kingdom, emerged. My first thought in this regard was as follows: The important thing for SAAB will be the autonomous front, not the manned front. They will both want to play a role in making Tempest ‘optionally unmanned’ and prefer to make a profit by developing unmanned combat aircraft that will act together with it. Having left the consortium, the country was again directed to pursue an independent role. However, common sense prevailed, and I continued to expect serious activity from this country and SAAB in the field of unmanned combat and companion aircraft.
A few days ago, the company presented the first concept of its next-generation fighter aircraft, and this aircraft was completely unmanned. If you notice, they did not present it with a term such as companion combat aircraft, unmanned jet fighter, CCA, etc., but directly called it a new generation fighter aircraft. This word choice is very meaningful for the future defence and aerospace concept of the country, as well as for the future of SAAB.

Rival or Partner

Undoubtedly, there will be many groups and companies in European countries that will work on unmanned aerial vehicles and combat aircraft. Among them, there will be multinational aviation giants such as Airbus and new initiatives. However, SAAB is the most suitable company to turn this field into its own niche technology and trade. Of course, other aircraft can also find customers. It is natural that especially multinational consortium members will employ these vehicles in their armies. However, just as Estonia and Milrem Robotics have become the European technology centre in unmanned land vehicles, it can be predicted that Sweden and SAAB will take this role in unmanned combat and escort air vehicles.
What are the implications of this observation for Turkey, which is shaping its future in military air vehicles to cover the same niche area? Life has many different options to offer. However, all these options can be distinguished by their proximity to one of two situations. Fierce competition or partnership, i.e. co-operation.
Whichever of these two points we stand close to, we have to recognise some things. First of all, the exterior design and aerodynamic characteristics of all Swedish / SAAB aircraft will be different from Turkish products. This situation inspires that not only the design but also the production of the outer shell should be done in Europe. At the same time, this situation makes it possible to employ platforms of different design / kinematics with different requirements. This can be turned into an advantage.
A possible co-operation would prioritise the common use of subsystems. This would create the opportunity for both Turkey and Europe to have different features and wider mission coverage. Since each subsystem will come with its own software, the resistance of the resulting products against countermeasures can be significantly increased. Enriching sub-ecosystems can add value to sustainable defence production. Unlike Europe, Turkey, which can include different component manufacturers such as South Korea and China in its subsystems, can also act as a bridge thanks to the know-how it has created in this area. NATO's well-established standardisation infrastructure will facilitate the use of different subsystems and ammunition. Speaking of which, Turkey, which has embarked on the path of creating an indigenous defence and aerospace industry by prioritising munitions rather than platforms, has a very high bar for the benefits it can offer in this field.
Another fact is this: modern combat platforms must be manufactured in complementary wingmen, with a diversity of products. Sweden's isolation in this field will push other European countries to develop wingmen that will complement SAAB combat platforms. Steps to be taken in this direction will limit Turkey's political, economic and technological influence in the future of Europe.

Sweden's NATO Membership Approval Process could lead to a Rapprochement

In this regard, it is entirely in the domain of ‘political decision-makers’. Are we going to leave the shaping of this possible future entirely to fate or are we going to be a lemon in it? You may have noticed that I personally voted in favour of the second option. Therefore, I would like to draw your attention again to the importance of approaching our interlocutors with the right discourse and language. Because there is a window of opportunity of 4-6 years in this regard. If this window of opportunity is not utilised, the market for our indigenous and national platforms such as KIZILELMA and ANKA-3 will shrink considerably.
The Swedish defence and aerospace industry has a long-established history, and has a product and quality understanding that has increased in parallel with the developing technology. In these years, the European defence ecosystem is being restructured, and this will take some time. Sweden is now a NATO member, and in parallel with this membership, it will seek the place it believes it deserves in the world arms export market with greater fervour than before. The quality and sustainability problems of weapons to be procured from alternative sources such as Russian, Chinese, Indian, etc. will strengthen this search considerably. Obviously, if the country in question cannot be penetrated in this process, the Turkish defence and aerospace industry will have a strong and formidable competitor in many areas in the near future. This competitor will also have extensive external support.
A cooperation process can be realised by prioritising Baykar or TAI companies. However, the fact that Baykar is a private enterprise and KIZILELMA is a direct competitor of SAAB projects will reduce the chances of this company. TAI's ANKA-3, on the other hand, has the potential to complement this company's project. In addition to B2B, G2G meetings can also be organised in this way. All SMEs in the Baykar ecosystem can also share products and services through corporate intermediaries such as SAHA Istanbul. For this reason, institutions such as the Presidency of Defence Industries need to develop ideas and strategies in addition to concrete products and projects.