Simple but Effective Fighter Aircraft Production

Life Cycle of Airplanes:

 Whenthe Air Force launched its F-16 combat network program in the second half of the '80s, it made the right choice for that period and  added a modern warfare networkto its inventory. We can examine this program from a lot of angles. However, the point I want to emphasize is this: The F-16 fighter jet,  which was one of the products of the American defense industry in those years, was a fighter jet in total. 8.000 hours life cycle, the engine is every 1.  It emerged as a factory-level maintenance (FASBAT) of 1.500 hours, offering many years of use and ultimately cost-effective. The combat aircraft that was  widely used by Soviet (Russian) aviation at this time was the MIG-29s. If we characterize the F-16 aircraft as the counterpart of the MIG-29 aircraft, we would not be grossly mistaken.   

The MIG-29s, on the other hand, had a power of approximately 2000-2500 hours in accordance with the Russian fighter jet production doctrine. The  need  for  maintenance at the factory level, especially jet engines, was around 150-200 hours. Over time, the Russians were able to relocate MIG-29 aircraft  to the  4th Infantry Division.  They increased the engine’s life cycle hours and started to make the FASBAT of the engines every 400-500 hours.   

The fuselage life and FASBAT watches for the Sukhoi series  fighter jets, which were the product of another Soviet fighter jet manufacturing company,  were at a better level.  However, according to the experience of other countries that used these warplanes, they performed  well below the performance  claimed by the Soviets.  India, Malaysia vb.  The users of Soviet warplanes  agreed that these war-fighting operations were inefficient  and somewhat problematic  in terms of maintenance,  maintenance and preparation for war, as well as their western counterparts.

Russian aviationhas not been able to make a meaningful breakthrough in this area. But the American F-16V is in the 12.000 hours (after structural improvement), while the F-15EX had reached the long standard  expectation of being like 20.000 hours. Of course, the  time between Depot Level Maintenance and F ASBAT was also prolonged, with  the  Line Maintenance processes developing further and gaining experience, thecombat readiness rates of all these systems were very high. With future modernisation programmes, it was expected that all systems coulddouble the existing standards, not only in terms of capability, but  also in terms of service and  maintenance attitudes.  Indeed,  when we look at our current F-16 modernization program, we  see that this is a very rewarding expectation.

The Impact of the Regression in Russian Aviation on Users:

Over time, we see that Russian aviation is beginning to lag far behindthe West, in another way.  For example, in the transition to digital technologies, they had serious difficulties in the business phase. This makes Electronic Warfare (EH) and otherdefense systems, especially theabilityof all the forces and other intelligences, to be a challenge. The air-air they have, especially if it  is a smart and thermal portfolio,  is a composition that is far from meeting the requirements of the network. AESA radars, especially if there are problems in manycritical areas, increase the gravity of the situation.

We can say that the situations that will develop after the Ukrainian war will ensure  that the gap between the two sides  is resolved as far as it is reflected in us in this regard. In other words, the time, effort and resource requirements that the Russian aviation industry has to spend in order to catch up with its western counterparts  are increasing day by day.  Whether it has the potential to close  the scissors  is also a humid question. This adds the fact that the user countries in the 'customer' position;  What invites the rise to western aviation platforms, which we will still see as a trend that is increasing with momentum in the near future.

 If we  proceed from the points we have just mentioned, it may be possible that countries with defensive concernsand long term  will fall into western wars in proportion to the amount they can deserve. Of course, some politically motivated countries may not be willing to work with the western world.  Apart from ideological distinctions, it  should be accepted as a fact that the world in general will be more demanding to use the products of the western arms industry than before.

Efforts to Create Your Own Aircraft and Usage Model:

Let'sdo a gymnastics of ideas together. If your expectation from the air force is not high, if your threat perception is low, and  if the most important thing is that defense  technology is becoming more and more complex and more difficult, If they are not afraid, would you still prefer western-made platforms? Let's even  expand  the question  a little more with the approach of weapon selects the alliances.  How sympathetic would you be to the purchase of an advanced weapon system, which would bring with it a lot of political and economic handicap, which  would become invincible  in direct proportion to the technology it has, and which would lead to the presence of a number of military/intelligence personnel with high morale and motivation in your country?

To be honest, these questions carry their direct answers in the first place. Because if you have a  sustainable  and sustainable alternative, an alternative path is taking shape that can be used for many countries. A number of countries that  are in the process of making a breakthrough in the field of military aviation areactually aware of this reality.  China, India, South Korea, Turkey, Brazil etc.  Countries like Italy are getting used to closing such markets by adopting a unique school of jet training aircraft. From this point of view, it can be seen that the H ü rkuş and Hürjet projects  will become meaningful in the future. In fact, in parallel with our development in unmanned systems, it  is logical  and logical for us to create packages for ourselves. However, I want to continue our gymnastics of ideas and offer you different alternatives. Let's take a new curtain starting from the civilian sphere and extending to the military sphere.

Thanks to the technology world, we have also met many new concepts.  For example,  "planned obsolescence" that causes a product to decrease after a certain period of time and therefore  the  degree of satisfaction that the user receives from that product over time   . Or  a "fault" that will cause a fault and disengage after a certain period of time, for example at times following the expiry of the warranty. These are concepts that capitalism has introduced into our lives in order to encourage us to make newer, more modern purchases.

But in the military field, we have been using these and similar approaches for more than half a century.  For example, a vehicle sold or donated to you may be denied access to certain conditions. He only deals with  the country of refusal. After a certain number of times, the faulty is delivered to you in a closed manner and the new one to be installed in its place is delivered to you in a closed place. We can say thatwe are not strangers to similar approaches in air, land or sea, all military systems. In the JSF (F-35) program that we have removed, it can be said that such "things" have reached the ceiling and opened a new horizon not only in terms of hardware but also with software dimensions. Let's take a more complete alternative approach to this.

How the Production Concept of a New Aircraft Could Be:

Developing knowledge of materials and materials. As well as providing the standard ö mü r expectation of reaching 2.000 hours.  It may also offer an expectation limited to 20.000 hours. It can provide modern, lightweight and durable composite components, as well as classic metal yielding or  3D Print components with limited size. Concepts such as modularity, together with not only classical but also unconventional approaches, can develop  a platform in unexpected ways. All ofthese can  be the basis for creating different and commercial / end-end programs.

First of all, let's start with the subject of the engine, which is one of the hottest topics of our country.  Let's imagine a cost-effective turbojet or turbofan jet engine that does not aim  for technology and the highest  quality  .  Although it requires FASBAT every 400 hours, 2. 000 hours can offer a total expectation of life. It can be FADEC controls, hydraulic + analog controllers. But it should not be difficult to understand or repair. Let  it be handled with a simple, familiar and flexible approach.

The metal alloy is a dense structure and the skeletal structure is not good. Have a maneuverability limited to +7/-2 G in a completely clean U. Of course, these limits can also be met along with external tasks. Again 2. The standard expectation of 000 hours is sufficient. Not electronic, but hydraulic controllers to be emphasized by the aircraft, aerodynamically and have a balanced design. This can be separated from all sorts of unstable platforms. You can take off from conventional runways and get put on them again. STOVL or a similar alternative should not beused even during the design phase. However, we may also want it to offer the possibility of operating from semi-ready-made or partially dirty runways, such as the engine grille, alternating air intake, landing gear with increased durability, the use of low-strength equipment in places where ground contact is available. Provided, of course, that thisdoes not add to a serious cost of costs. Also, bubble canopy should be preferred, but a more classical approach.

Let theaircraft  be planned in a structure of all ift from the beginning. But let the second pilot and, of course, his cockpit, be presented only as an alternative to whoever wants it. At this point, let a modal approach be adopted.  For example, an additional fuel tank can be placed in the area where the second pilot will be located. In fact, if desired, there may be a part of this area that has an alternative to the boom entry for refueling. Of course, this type of modewill also replace the glass part of the second pilot's cockpit. But there may be another mode that preserves the glass part,allowing the pilot to spend the IIR night by looking at it from a slightly smaller point here. Or in the rear cockpit, which is covered with radome instead of glass, SATCOM can be found. In this way, even remote command facilities can be provided to the system via satellite. The first thing that comes to mind  as a teacher and  a student pilot is the aft cockpit approach for civilians. For soldiers, approaches such as  "Weapon System / Radar Operator have been customary for a long time. Alternatively, a UAV operation  operation modular approach can be used. Or, with a second gatling gun and a small   number of patronage, there  may be air forces that want to make the aircraft more geared. In short, the personality will be able to give a different functionality  to the standard design with the use of alternative modular.

It does not have to be in a competitive structure with modern and  expensive warfare systems in terms ofg-to-three/weight ratio, maneuverability, weapon and so on. However, modern systems will have to be competitive in the use of equipment. In this regard, too, a modal approach can be taken to  examine the use of our domestic family of patronage. The fact that it has analog and hydraulic controls that completely dominate the pilot  will not exclude the world from having the blessings of the digital network. At this point, I imagine a digital computer structure with a separate and hardware mode of operation.

Can it find such a buyer who can be more easily understood by the country that will be  purchased, that basic line maintenance can even be done warehouse level maintenance if they decide to invest,   that is built on more valuable technologies? If you can afford aprice tag of 15-20 million USD against a network that costs 400-500 million dollars. If you are facing a total cost of about 50-60 million after 2.000 hours, why not? Of course, the existence of an additional program should be considered in the part of the supply and logistics of the system, which is indicated according to the needs of each user.

Implications of the Turkish-Greek Balance:

Let's continue by expanding  the whole house in our gymnastics of ideas a little more.  Let us consider our country  and  the crisis between us and Greece, which is already one of the hottest issues. Approximately equal to two subjectsof  air are  adversaries who have western schoolsand use similar platforms. So, from the outside, what  kind of factors can we see that can make one come tothe other?

1.    First of all, "the dominant is the one who attacks first”. That is, whichever country attacks first and manages to catch the opponent's air on the ground, itwill have a great advantage. It is believed that  it will pass very little of it in the air.  Take the 8,000  hours of  first batch F-16 that we have given as an example. after 40 years of use, we notice that these batteries pass only 8,000 of the total 350,400 hours in the air. In addition, at 72,000 hours of this world, it is  in a state of disrepair, modernization, etc. at various levels. This unavoidance is handled by planning the maintenance times of the fleets and not to lose military and operational efficiency. By adding one arrow to another, a certain rate of combat readiness for the aircraft is revealed. Of course, a force that decides to attack and prepares these but not only those precautions can maximize this rate of combat readiness. In fact, the provision of new systems  and the completion  of modernization programmes will provide cleaner, less maintenance-requiring tasks, so the air force also offers an obvious  amount of money.

2.     Secondly, the numerical equilibrium  showsthat the fact that it comesinto play.  The fire is also very humid. It is possible to have twice as much fire as you would have half the amountof fire. If we compare this best with the Egyptian and Israeli air forces,the situation is different in Turkey and Greece. Because Greece has completely started to purchase ready-made and mü ümmat with external boron degradation and has renewed its air force in parallel with modernizations. This situation  has led to the evaluations that it has gained an equivalence against Turkey in  the current 5-6 yearsof time. However, in the longer term, the Turkish State, which has turned to domestic weapons and platforms, will be able to start a renaissance in which Greece will not  be able to become equal again when theissue of 5-6 years is over.

3.    Third, the "quality and quantity of things to be lost" should be taken. Greece has little to lose. It has no meaningful income other than tourism and agriculture. Foreigners who visit defense industry organizations in order to reject the ship, to reject it, to do this and that, are missing without even looking back.   The future of the country in terms of industry and technology  is not very bright. However, Turkey has a very valuable industrial organization. In short, the 100th anniversary of the conversion to Greece. A 000 kg smart bomb can only cause $10 billion in damages. But the 100th anniversary of the Türkiye. The damage caused by a 000 kg smart bombwill be a minimum of 200 billion dollars. Because of this, there will be a difference between the psychological comfort and tension of the air force. For this reason, it is obvious that the Government, which is advancing in the course of military development, is closing the window of opportunity of its adversary.

Anumberof other factorscan be added in this area. But there is a fundamentaltruth that "the leaven of victory is blood." That is, in any Greek war, even if the rate of loss could change in the light of such facts, it can be  assumed that both countries would make an attempt at the cost of losing more than half of the available air and sea conditions. If we look at Greece from the third temperature, 8.  A French Rafale, which was taken with  the expectation of 000 hours of m, would even gain 8-10 hours of the expectation of the additional  hours in the war  . Because this means that he has done more than one task and accomplished his job more than once.

Let's imagine the hypothetical "war" together. We have 2. Let  there be 150 imaginary aircraft for 000 hours  . The fact that this network is shaped by older technologies, that it is in a structure that evaluatesits pilot capability,  does not mean that it cannot be the par ace of a network-centric war. The fire that this country will have may increase the humidity  and may cause the wear and tear of Greece as the war continues, and the arithmetic may cause increased losses. In other words, it will reduce the likelihood of war and increase the concept of deterrence. In fact, this is: "If  I can get through this crisis in the next 3-5 years, I can spend the next 40-50 yearsin the future."

Then let's focus on the extremely humid "after a war" issue. I think that we have entered the war with Greece at the moment, that we have won, but that we have lost half of our air forcein this case. In fact, this means that we have lost more than half of our deterrence. In other words, the potential adversaries who  used to confront us militarily  will have the necessary and sufficient courage to confront us. Of course, if we want our existing programs, the country may try to close the gap with platforms such as Hürjet. But the commercial and economic troubles that will come with the war, and the deep troubles and embargoes that will prolong the production of more complex and technological platforms. So even if it has a more limited amount of time, it will be an imaginary aircraft, the Gap Filler (gap filler) mission, allowing us to repair our defensive capacity and deterrence.

Conclusion:

Atthe end  of it, military systems do not age easily. The fact thatthe F-4 Phantom batteries, which date back to the 1950s, are still in our inventory, albeit symbolically, and are still being used successfully is a great example. Technology develops, various modernization programs are implemented, and manysystems continue their path with new capabilities. Of course, manynew systems emerge and find a place for themselves on the battlefield. In this context, the humidity of modern digital technologies can never be taken for granted.

However, systems that aim to bring the existing roads and paths together with the future are almost non-existent.  Especially when it comes to military aviation, this shortcoming is worth noting. Yes, the modern battlefield is a wholething. No matter how much money you fill with ultra-modern systems and how much technology, it will not be satisfied. Yes, many more changes and changes are also pregnant. However, it should not be forgotten that there is a wide range of human resources that will benefit from conventional and easy technologies and use them with more satisfaction and efficiency. Can  not a more idealized, analogue or hybrid design be developed   with digital technologies?

 In the recent   Russia-Ukraine war, in terms of international trade  and thesupply of microprocessors, no country should feel safe.  Especially if it is placed on a target board, completely staged.  Itis obvious that unorhodox approaches will be required to break the norm. You may also  encounter many possibilities and capabilities that  have not yet been taken into account.  For example,  a damp microrope that you use can be delivered to you in a way that is sensitive to certain conditions. You can lose your critical platforms without realizing this weakness. Yes, electronic controls do not require wrist buttons such as hydraulics. It's easy, it's cheap, it's veryadvantages. But he  does the same job.

I am very happy that our defense industry offers creative solutions accompanied by modern technologies. In fact, it   is admirable that the blessings that come with the digital network are seen as an opportunity to close the gap,but this is the goal of raising a new generation. But we must not forget the past.  We must not abandon the techniques and methods of the past to history. At least one more time. Until we can design and develop our own microprocessors, sensors, other critical electronic components.