Tahsin Şahinkaya, the Mighty Pasha of September 12, explains: How did we make the decision to produce F-16 in Turkiye?

Turkish Defence Industry Comes to the Point of Extinction in Post-World War II Conditions

Under the 1947 Truman Doctrine and the 1948 Marshall Plan, the military aid provided by the United States aimed to increase Turkey's defence power by equipping the Turkish army with modern weapons on the one hand, and to reduce the negative impact of military expenditures on the economy on the other. In this context, the aid received contributed significantly to increasing the deterrent power of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) against the Soviet threat. However, despite the fact that no price was paid for the materials sent from the US, the need for large resources allocated from the budget every year for the maintenance of these materials, contrary to what was initially targeted, played a role in further increasing the negative impact of defence expenditures on the Turkish economy.

In the 1950s, foreign aid and foreign procurement policies were predominantly applied in the defence industry in Turkey. In 1952, when Turkey became a member of NATO, allied countries donated surplus defence equipment to new member countries such as Turkey, and the fact that these 'old' products were both free of charge and, under the conditions of the time, were in much better condition than the war weapons, tools and equipment in the possession of the Turkish Armed Forces caused the political and military bureaucracy of the period to take the easy way out and not to give the necessary support to the domestic production of defence products. Thus, efforts to develop the defence industry tended to slow down due to the increasing military aid. As a result of the decline in the domestic orders of the Turkish Armed Forces, military factories have lost their efficiency and have become a burden on the national budget. On the other hand, although efforts to develop the weapons, vehicles and equipment needed by the TAF were kept on the agenda with the establishment of the R&D Department within the Ministry of National Defence (MND) in 1954, it was not even possible to maintain the current situation. Within the scope of restructuring efforts, military factories were taken under the newly established General Directorate of Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKEK), but many of them had to be closed down in time. 

1964 Johnson Letter: You cannot use the Weapons, Vehicles and Equipment of War that came with US Military Aid in Cyprus!

The provision in the agreement signed with the USA within the scope of the Truman Doctrine, stating that the materials provided within the scope of military aid could not be used for purposes other than their intended purpose, emerged as a major obstacle for Turkey 17 years later during the Cyprus crisis.

During the 1964 Cyprus crisis, the Turkish government had to accept this unpleasant and humiliating Johnson letter, even though it was said that "a new world will be established and Turkey will be a part of it!". The fact that some allied countries, including the USA, put obstacles in the way of the use of the defence equipment purchased from them in line with Turkey's national interests, in short, the Johnson letter, helped the Turkish political and military elite to put their feet on the ground in general terms. This letter demonstrated beyond doubt the drawbacks of becoming dependent on other countries, even if they were allies, in meeting defence requirements and the importance of meeting defence requirements with domestic capabilities, and formed the basis of policies towards the establishment of a self-sufficient defence industry infrastructure.

"Produce Your Own Aircraft, Tank and Ship" Moves of the Force Commands

In 1964, the Turkish Navy, which did not even have enough landing ships to land in Cyprus, launched the "Build Your Own Ship" campaign in 1965 with the foundation established under the name of "Turkish Navy Society" and started to lead the way in the construction of landing ships. Similarly, the "Turkish Air Force Foundation" was established in 1970 with the slogan "build your own aircraft" in order to develop our national aviation industry, and undertook the task of guiding the revitalisation of our military aircraft industry.

In this period, the political power also showed that it realised the gravity of the situation with the statements in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1968-1972). Among other expenditures, the rapidly increasing nature of national defence expenditures was emphasised and national defence infrastructure investments were brought to the agenda for the first time. Within this framework, with the establishment of the Technical Services Department of the Ministry of National Defence in 1970, efforts to develop the defence industry started to gain momentum in Turkey. In the Third Five-Year Development Plan (1973-1977), the importance of the industrialisation needed in the field of national defence was emphasised in line with the objective of establishing a systematic link between the provision of adequate equipment and tools required for national defence services and national industrialisation efforts.

After the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, Turkey faced an arms embargo imposed by the USA between 1975-78. In order to reduce the negative effects of the embargo, efforts to establish a modern national defence industry were accelerated. In the same year, the "Turkish Land Forces Strengthening Foundation" was established. The great enthusiasm of the public at the time led to significant donations from the public to the Land, Naval and Air Force Strengthening Foundations, and the approved laws paved the way for these foundations to generate special income to support their pioneering efforts in the defence industry in their respective fields.

"Produce Your Own Aircraft" Slogan is Being Implemented

At this point, let us listen to the late General Tahsin Şahinkaya (1), former Commander of the Air Force:

"Until now, we have made many moves and studies on aircraft construction or the establishment of an aircraft industry. But we could not ensure their sustainability. As a result, we were late, we were dependent. Looking backwards, if we can do it right, we have a lot of experiences and history to learn from. Provided that we take the right decisions, we can close this distance between us and the advanced states of the world.

Let's come to the reason for our delay. At the time of Muhsin Pasha (2), we set out with the slogan "Build Your Own Aircraft". Money was collected, balls were organised, everyone made a donation. The money is increasing, the amount in the interest-bearing banks is increasing. But when it comes to building an aeroplane, things are referred to the commission. Stalling. This was the case in every government period, whether it was the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel (3) or the parties under Necmettin Erbakan (4). 

For example, in the Air Force, there would be meetings. Members of the government would come, they would be briefed. They would say that they were right, that you were right, but they would also say that a commission should be formed to analyse the needs. The needs are obvious, the situation is clear, there are no aircraft, you will buy aircraft. The Air Force was supposed to do the work, not a commission. It was always referred to the commission, always referred to the commission. We couldn't do this. I was present as an observer at some of these events, so I know it well. This struggle was like this even before my arrival. We started in 1977-78, but it didn't yield any results. But after 12 September, we were stronger as the Armed Forces.

We wanted to get this done. We bring up the subject every time. We talked about it at the headquarters, and what we talked about at the headquarters we conveyed to the government. They said, "Don't build an aeroplane factory. This was Bülend Pasha's (5) statement. He said, "Just as we are overhauling ships at Taşkızak (6), you should overhaul aeroplanes. This does not solve anything, because we cannot make modifications. In other words, you take the aircraft for maintenance, check the oil and water, and put it back here like clockwork, but it is not possible to make any modifications to it. We can't. Therefore, we need technology, we need to establish an organisation that can do this. We talk about this on every occasion, all the time. At the same time, incidents have increased, accidents are also increasing. Aircraft breakdowns are increasing.

Of course, it got to such a point that the General Staff told us to start the work. We started to work. Of course, I personally favoured F-18s, because the reason why I favoured F-18s was that when I was serving as the Commander of the 6th Main Jet Base in Bandırma a few times, unfortunately, one of our engines stopped in the air and we had to land with a single engine. Our engine had stopped due to fragments bouncing off the ground during ground fire. I said that if one engine stops in a twin-engine aircraft, at least the pilot can land with one engine, instead of having a single engine and saying that the pilot should jump out of the aircraft and be saved. But these F-18s were a completely untested aircraft at that time. We realised this later.

The F-15 is a very expensive aircraft. It is not possible for us to buy it at all. Fortunately, the decision was made. Thanks to our efforts, both the General Staff and the government at the time facilitated this. And finally we decided on the F-16, so it was decided to build these aircraft.

This time, the issue of money arose. Now we were wondering how we would pay for this. At that time, the Empowerment Foundation probably had about 100 billion (225 million USD). We had already spent some of it. In the military council hall, members of the government, members of the council all sat together and decided. The Minister of National Defence was Haluk Bayülken (7), who later also served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

General Nurettin Ersin (8) was the Chief of General Staff, albeit for a short time. The decision was made together and the government was asked. Can you support this? The then Finance Minister Kafaoğlu (9) said, "I mean, 100 million dollars a year will be given, right, a state that cannot give 100 million dollars is not a state." Thereupon it was signed, as you know. Immediately, the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of National Defence became active, agreements were signed and the joint production of the F-16 aircraft was started.

This was already decided. We retired ourselves then..."

Conclusion

As a result of the pioneering efforts of the empowerment foundations established by the Forces in order to reduce Turkey's foreign dependence in the defence industry, many factories and facilities, which are today the engines of our defence industry, have been established and put into production. The Turkish Aircraft Industry Corporation (TAI) was established in 1973 under the Ministry of Industry and Technology, and in a short period of time, companies such as ASELSAN (1975), İŞBİR (1978), ASPİLSAN (1981), HAVELSAN (1982) and ROKETSAN (1988) were established by these foundations and investments were made in the defence industry.

In 1979, TAI received a letter from the General Staff for aircraft production. At that time, important generals from the Air Force and the General Staff were serving on the board of directors of TAI. Especially after 12 September, the structure became even stronger.

In this letter, it was requested that the tender, studies and selection of the new generation fighter aircraft to be selected based on the needs of the Air Force be carried out. Detailed studies are initiated based on this letter. In addition to the Americans, the French and the British are also being contacted. A process is initiated in which TAI and the Turkish Air Force are the main players. Crowded meetings are held. Within four years, at a time when telephones and faxes were limited, the expropriation of an area of 5 million square metres in the Mürted region was carried out. This land was created by merging the lands of Fethiye-Saray-Kışla villagers in the Mürted plain, and by bringing together 80-100 deeds. 

A model like MKE is being considered. TAI will be like a holding company. There is talk of a fuselage factory, an engine factory and even a radar factory. (Later, the decision is taken to produce the engine in Eskişehir. No step is taken on radar). In the decision briefing on the aircraft to be selected, there were evaluations that it should be a twin-engine aircraft and, if possible, an F-15 aircraft, but as General Şahinkaya points out in his memoirs, in the final analysis, the decision was made on the F-16. In fact, given the flow of the briefing and its technical performance, it was thought that it would be like the F-15 or the F-18, but it turned out to be a single-engine aircraft, and General Dynamics' F-16 was chosen. Thus, the button was pressed for Turkey's production of 160 F-16 aircraft for USD 4 billion 200 million, including the factory. 

I commemorate with mercy and gratitude all our elders who contributed to this project. It is a good thing that they brought such a gigantic business and aircraft production capability to Turkey. Today, I believe that everything that flies in the air, including the national combat aircraft KAAN, the flagship of the Turkish defence industry, has come to life as a result of this determined struggle in the past. I believe that the Turkish aerospace industry has been able to rise on the foundations laid by the previous generations, and that the efforts of our engineers today, with the strength derived from these foundations, have made it possible to produce modern air platforms that will be used in the defence of our country tomorrow. 

In short, the past, present and future are a whole. Works are the source of pride of this whole.

Footnotes

(1) Hv. Org. Tahsin Şahinkaya (1925-2015), Last duty: 15th Commander of the Air Forces, Retired: 1983. (He was appointed as the Commander of the Air Forces on 21 August 1978. After the 12 September 1980 coup, he also served as a member of the National Security Council. On 6 December 1983, he retired of his own accord).

(2) Air Force Org. Muhsin Batur (1920-1999), Last duty: 12th Commander of the Air Forces, Retired: 1973.

(3) 100 Süleyman Demirel (1924-2015), 9th President of the Republic of Turkey.

(4) 101 Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), 23rd Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey (1996-1997).

(5) Bülend Ulusu (1923-2015), 9th Chief of Naval Forces and 18th Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey. K. K. and 18th Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey (1980-1983).

(6) Taşkızak: Naval shipyard, Haliç/Istanbul.

(7) Ümit Haluk Bayülken (1921-2007), Turkish politician, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence.

(8) Org. Nurettin Ersin (1918-2005), Last position: 18th Chief of General Staff, Retired: 1983.

(9) İlhami Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu (1926-2002), Minister of Finance.

Bibliography

H.İbrahim Fırtına (2020). Alçalalmadan Yükselenler, Komutanlar Anlatıyor. Kırmızı Kedi Publications 3rd Edition, Istanbul. pp.92-95.