The Technical Evolution, Global Inventories and Logistical Anatomy of the F-104 Starfighter (Part 2)
This was a global corruption scandal that erupted during the purchase of Lockheed F-104 Starfighter aircraft from the US for the Turkish Air Force in the 1970s. ‘The Lockheed Bribery Scandal’, as this case is known, involved allegations that the company had distributed bribes to military and political officials in Turkey in exchange for the sale of aircraft, and the Commander of the Air Force at the time was tried in a military court.
The F-104 Starfighter has taken its place in aviation history as an iconic ‘manned missile’, pushing the boundaries of engineering through the radical aerodynamic decisions that shaped its design and the revolution brought about by the J79 propulsion system. However, the aircraft’s technical evolution and the immense performance it delivered are merely the beginning of its story. During the height of the Cold War, this aircraft built an unprecedented logistical architecture within the global defence ecosystem, involving cross-border multinational consortia, licensed production processes and vast second-hand transfer networks between allies. In the second part of our series, we will focus on Global Marketing, NATO Production and Political Scandals.
PART 4: Global Marketing, NATO Production and Political Scandals
In the late 1950s, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) embarked on an extensive search for a tactical fighter aircraft with the aim of strengthening its defence line against the Warsaw Pact and reviving its aviation industry, which had been largely destroyed following the Second World War. The Luftwaffe was seeking not merely a simple interceptor, but also a fighter-bomber and tactical reconnaissance aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. This major procurement programme launched a global competitive process that became the largest defence tender in the history of military aviation, known as the ‘Sale of the Century’. The Lockheed F-104 faced a very broad and high-calibre list of competitors during this process. The other platforms vying for the contract were as follows:
-Grumman F-11F-1F Super Tiger
-Dassault Mirage III
-Saab J35 Draken
-English Electric Lightning
- Convair F-102 Delta Dagger and F-106 Delta Dart
- Republic F-105 Thunderchief
- Vought F-8U Crusader
- Saunders-Roe SR.177 and Sud-Aviation SO.9050 Trident III
In the photograph above, Lockheed F-104 Starfighter aircraft are shown on the production line at the Burbank factory in California in 1957.
Among these competitors, the experimental prototype F-11F-1F Super Tiger—powered by Grumman’s J79-GE-3A engine—in particular had won the high praise of the technical evaluation panels. The Super Tiger had reached a speed of Mach 2.04, broken the altitude record at 76,828 feet and, most importantly, offered high manoeuvrability at low speeds and safe glide capabilities following engine failure, thanks to its much larger wing area compared to the F-104. Despite demonstrating a much safer flight profile from a technical standpoint, the Super Tiger was eliminated as a result of Lockheed’s aggressive behind-the-scenes marketing and lobbying efforts; West Germany opted for the F-104, signing a licensed production agreement on 18 March 1959. This signing completely altered the global fate of the F-104. Originally designed as a daytime interceptor, the Starfighter underwent extensive structural and avionics modifications in line with West Germany’s requirements, resulting in the F-104G (G: Germany) ‘Super Starfighter’ variant.
Lockheed added 96 new forged steel components to reinforce the fuselage, revised the landing gear with larger wheels and disc brakes, stiffened the wing structure, and integrated an extended tail fin (taken from the F-104B/D two-seater variants) into the aircraft. To ensure the aircraft’s all-weather capability, an Autonetics NASARR F15A-41B multi-mode fire control radar (capable of air-to-air interception, terrain mapping, contour mapping and obstacle avoidance) was installed in the nose. The Litton LN-3 Inertial Navigation System (INS), which operates in conjunction with this radar system, went down in military aviation history as the first INS system to be fitted to a production aircraft. The Litton LN-3 was capable of calculating the aircraft’s course with millimetre precision, completely isolated from the outside world and without the need for radio signals, using gyroscopes and accelerometers mounted on a four-gimbal stabilised platform. This avionics revolution enabled the aircraft to reach its target at low altitude without being detected by enemy radar, in line with the Cold War’s ‘nuclear penetration’ doctrine.
Under the Military Assistance Programme (MDAP), the US carried out Starfighter transfers at that time to bolster allies it considered geopolitically significant. These deliveries to countries such as Taiwan, Pakistan and Jordan were intended to create a deterrent supersonic shield against the Soviet Union and its regional allies.
Industrial Cooperation and European Production Groups
As the aircraft’s designer, Lockheed both operated the main production centres and provided parts and technical support for licensed production in other countries. This included the XF-104 prototypes, the YF-104A pre-production series, the F-104A, B, C and D models, and the majority of the TF-104G two-seater trainer aircraft. The Burbank and Palmdale (California) facilities, in particular, were the main production centres.
With the approval of the F-104G programme, NATO established the most extensive multinational industrial production consortium in its history. With the aim of revitalising the European aerospace industry, four main production groups were established across the continent, and an intensive flow of parts, components and assembly work was organised between these groups.
F-104 Industrial Cooperation and European Production Groups
Production Group Participating Countries and Companies Production Responsibilities and Technical Allocation Final Assembly and Distribution Details
Southern Group (Arge-Süd) West Germany: Dornier (Munich), Heinkel (Speyer), Messerschmitt (Augsburg), Siebel (Donauwörth) Manufacture of the centre and forward fuselage sections; final assembly and flight tests at the Manching facility. J79 engines were produced by BMW/MAN-Turbo. 210 F-104G aircraft (all delivered to the Luftwaffe; 7000 series construction numbers).
North Group (Netherlands and Germany): Fokker (Schiphol/Dordrecht), Aviolanda, Focke-Wulf, Hamburger Flugzeugbau, Weserflugzeugbau – integrated assembly lines led by Fokker; assembly of fuselage sections and subsystems. 231 F-104G/RF-104G aircraft (for the Royal Netherlands Air Force – RNLAF and the Luftwaffe).
Western Group (West Group) Belgium: SABCA and Avions Fairey (joint facility at Gosselies); Fabrique Nationale (FN – Brussels) final assembly lines at Gosselies; licensed production of J79-GE-11A engines at the FN Brussels facility. 188 F-104G aircraft (for the Belgian Air Force – BAF and the Luftwaffe).
Italian Group (Italian Group) Italy: Fiat (Turin – prime contractor), Aerfer-Macchi, Piaggio, SACA, SIAI-Marchetti, Alfa Romeo Avio; full participation of the Italian aircraft industry under Fiat’s leadership; joint production of J79 engines by Alfa Romeo and Fiat. 169–199 F-104G aircraft (for the Italian Air Force – AMI, the Luftwaffe and the RNLAF).
Canadian Partnership (Canadair) Canada: Canadair (Montreal), licensed production of the CF-104 by Orenda Engines; additionally, manufacture of 121 sets of wings, rear fuselage and tail assemblies for European consortia. 200 CF-104s (RCAF); plus 140 F-104Gs supplied to allies under the Military Assistance Programme (MAP).
Until the aircraft’s licensed assembly lines in Europe became operational, Lockheed delivered the first 66 F-104G aircraft—produced directly at its own facilities—to the Luftwaffe to ensure that training programmes were not disrupted. The maiden flight dates of the first European-built Starfighters produced under the consortium demonstrate the pace of integration amongst the allies: West Germany on 5 October 1960, Belgium on 3 August 1961, the Netherlands on 11 November 1961 and Italy on 9 June 1962. West Germany, through a combination of different aircraft from these production lines, operated a total of 915/916 Starfighters (30 F-104F, 96 Lockheed-built F-104Gs, 136 TF-104Gs, 255 from the Northern Group, 210 from the Southern Group, 88 from the Western Group, 50 from the Italian Group and 50 replacement F-104Gs produced by MBB to make up for losses), becoming the aircraft’s largest operator worldwide. In Japan, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) produced the F-104J and F-104DJ models (approximately 210 aircraft) – interceptor variants specifically designed for the Japan Air Self-Defence Force – at its Komaki plant in Nagoya. The J79-IHI-11A engines were manufactured in Japan by Ishikawajima-Harima.
The photograph above shows the cockpit of a Canadian-built CF-104.
F-104 Starfighter Programme: Licensed Manufacturer Consortia and Variant Distribution
Licensed Manufacturer Consortium Country of Origin Variant Produced Total Number Produced
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. USA Prototype, F-104A/B/C/D/G, TF-104G 789
SABCA Belgium F-104G 188
Canadair Ltd. Canada CF-104, F-104G 340
Fiat / Aeritalia Italy F-104G, RF-104G, F-104S 445
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Japan F-104J 207
Fokker (Arge Nord) Netherlands F-104G, RF-104G 350
Messerschmitt (Arge Süd) Germany F-104G 260
Production of Critical Components
Not only the aircraft’s fuselage but also its complex systems were manufactured under licence worldwide:
-Engine (J79): Manufactured by the USA (General Electric), West Germany (BMW), Belgium (FN), Italy (Fiat and Alfa Romeo), Canada (Orenda) and Japan (IHI).
-Radar (NASARR): The radar system, designed by the US firm Autonetics, was manufactured by Telefunken in Germany, Philips in the Netherlands and MBLE in Belgium.
-Fire Control and Avionics: Inertial navigation systems designed by Litton were produced at facilities in Germany and Belgium.
‘The Deal of the Century’ and the Lockheed Bribery Scandals
However, this massive military procurement process has been overshadowed, historically speaking, by major political and economic scandals.
The Lockheed F-104 Starfighter project, beyond its technical merits, lies at the heart of the Cold War defence industry’s greatest scandal involving ethical and financial corruption. Historic investigations conducted in 1975–1976 by a sub-committee led by US Senator Frank Church revealed that Lockheed Corporation had distributed bribes totalling over 22 million dollars to high-ranking officials of allied governments, royal families and defence ministers in order to secure aircraft sales and eliminate competitors. This bribery network proved that military procurement decisions were shaped by political influence and financial irregularities rather than technical and financial rationality. At the centre of the scandal in the Kingdom of the Netherlands was Prince Bernhard, husband of Queen Juliana and Inspector General of the Dutch Armed Forces. It was confirmed that Prince Bernhard had accepted a bribe worth 1.1 million dollars from Lockheed executives in order to ensure the selection of the Lockheed F-104G over the French-made Dassault Mirage III aircraft.
Following the reports by the commission of inquiry, Prince Bernhard was forced to step down, relinquishing all his military titles, official posts and the right to wear a uniform. In Germany, meanwhile, allegations that Lockheed had bribed decision-makers across Europe – particularly figures such as the German Federal Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Strauss – caused a major public outcry. Colonel Erich Hartmann, the legendary ace pilot of the time, who opposed this situation and argued that the use of the aircraft in a nuclear strike role would lead to disaster on German soil, was sidelined by military decision-makers and forced into early retirement.
On the German side, the figure at the centre of the scandal was Federal Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss, the chief architect of the aircraft’s inclusion in the Luftwaffe’s inventory. Ernest Hauser, a former Lockheed lobbyist, claimed in his sworn testimony to US Senate investigators that Strauss and his party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), had accepted a bribe of at least 10 million dollars (according to some documents, 12 million dollars for 700 aircraft) in return for the 1961 agreement to purchase 900 F-104G aircraft.
The relationship between Hauser and Strauss dated back to the period after the Second World War, when Hauser served in US intelligence and Strauss acted as his interpreter in Schongau, Bavaria. According to the allegations, agents of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) had hastily removed a German auditor working at Lockheed’s factory in Burbank in 1962 in order to prevent evidence of the bribery from coming to light. Strauss denied the allegations and brought a defamation case against Hauser; although he was cleared of any wrongdoing during the parliamentary inquiries in 1977 due to a lack of concrete evidence, the fact that almost all official documents and records relating to the Starfighter procurement within the Federal Ministry of Defence had been destroyed as early as 1962 has cast a lasting shadow of doubt over this acquittal.
Minister Strauss’s name is linked not only to allegations of corruption in military procurement but also to the 1962 ‘Spiegel Scandal’ (Spiegel-Affäre), one of the greatest constitutional crises in German democratic history. In its issue dated 10 October 1962, *Der Spiegel* magazine published a cover story entitled ‘Bedingt abwehrbereit’ (Conditionally Ready for Defence), based on classified reports from NATO’s “Fallex 62” exercise, revealed that the Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe’s ability to defend the country against a potential Soviet invasion was extremely weak, and that the procurement of F-104G aircraft and tactical planning constituted a military fiasco. Defence Minister Strauss, who characterised these criticisms as a disclosure of state secrets and an act of treason (Landesverrat), overstepped his constitutional powers and completely sidelined Justice Minister Wolfgang Stammberger by raiding the magazine’s headquarters in Hamburg and having the publisher Rudolf Augstein and the writer Conrad Ahlers—who was on holiday—illegally detained in Spain.
This unlawful crackdown and attempt at censorship, which caused a huge public outcry, resulted in the resignation of ministers from the liberal coalition partner, the FDP, following weeks of protests, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was forced to expel Strauss from the cabinet. Although the Spiegel Scandal permanently dashed Strauss’s hopes of becoming Chancellor, it is regarded as one of the most significant milestones in the transition from an authoritarian state structure to a modern, liberal democracy within German political culture.
This was a global corruption scandal that erupted during the purchase of Lockheed F-104 Starfighter aircraft from the US for the Turkish Air Force in the 1970s. ‘The Lockheed Bribery Scandal’: in this case, it was alleged that the company had distributed bribes to military and political officials in Turkey in exchange for the sale of aircraft, and the Commander of the Air Force at the time was tried in a military court. It was A. Carl Kotchian, then Vice-President and President of Lockheed, who admitted to the bribes in question before the US Senate (the Church Committee). In his testimony in 1976, Kotchian admitted that they had distributed millions of dollars in bribes to win aircraft tenders in countries such as Japan, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey.
In connection with these F-104 purchases, which took place in the period following the Cyprus Peace Operation, it was alleged that the then Commander of the Air Force, General Emin Alpkaya, had accepted bribes. Alpkaya resigned from his post and was tried by a military court; he was acquitted at the conclusion of the trial. Parliamentary inquiries launched in Turkey, however, produced reports suggesting that the matter had been covered up at a political level.
Whatever the justification may be, as long as such corruption is not tackled with determination and those responsible do not face deterrent sanctions, it is inevitable that practices of corruption and abuse of office will become institutionalised and increase.
