Turkiye Rolls Up Its Sleeves for 400 Manned, 400 Unmanned, a Total of 800 Combat Aircraft

The rational requirements of air operations, along with the inventories of the air forces of countries in our region, dictate that Turkey must have approximately 400 manned combat aircraft and approximately 400 unmanned combat aircraft capable of operating alongside them. At the heart of this 400-unit target is the National Combat Aircraft KAAN, which made its maiden flight (P0) on 21 February 2024. The P1 and P2 prototypes, currently on the production line, are scheduled to enter the flight test phase starting in April 2026. Looking at this schedule, I estimate that the KAAN Block 10s, which are expected to be produced with limited capabilities, may not join the Turkish Air Force inventory in 2028, but rather in 2030-32. We will only see genuine fifth-generation KAANs in our fighter jet fleet between 2035 and 2040. There is no need to get carried away with more optimistic procurement scenarios. Realism is good. On the other hand, even this schedule dictates that we must prioritise the KAAN development and production programme with intense effort.

That is why the need has arisen to initiate the procurement processes for Eurofighter and F-16 Viper fighter jets to meet our fighter jet requirements during the minimum 10-year interim period between 2025 and 2035. To say that we will ‘manage’ without purchasing fighter jets that can fill this ten-year gap would mean choosing to live in a Turkey disconnected from the reality of our world, which is hurtling towards a Third World War, a risk that I believe no sane person would take. Indeed, the political and military leadership governing our country acted sensibly and took the necessary steps to procure interim aircraft. It is worth noting that before being excluded from the F-35 programme in 2019, Turkey planned to procure around 96-116 F-35As (plus 16-24 F-35Bs for the Navy) in accordance with the Air Force Force Structure Plan. The non-delivery of the F-35 disrupted the procurement process being followed in accordance with the aforementioned force plan, throwing calculations into disarray. In the new situation, steps had to be taken to replace and complete the resulting fighter jet requirement as much as possible with the procurement of F-16 Vipers and Eurofighters (despite certain limitations of these aircraft). Had Turkey never joined the F-35 programme, it would likely have been possible to initiate the procurement process for an additional 80-120 F-16 Vipers in the early 2010s. Consequently, the need for a “transitional aircraft”, which is currently occupying much of our attention, would not be on our agenda today. Why am I making this statement? Some platforms are raising questions such as, ‘Why did the Turkish Air Force fail to see the need for fighter aircraft from the outset, and why did it not take the necessary action in time?’ I wanted to make this statement here as a footnote to provide a brief response to such seemingly justified but actually baseless accusations.

Eurofighter Procurement

Initially, Turkey launched the F-16V procurement process on 30 September 2021; in parallel with this process, it also activated the option to purchase Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets. In this regard, it managed a rather difficult schedule of discussions and negotiations with the UK. In fact, Turkey's interest in this aircraft was not new. The aircraft had been on Ankara's agenda in the early 1990s, when it was still in the development phase, before the first prototype had even flown. At that time, frequent discussions were held between Ankara and the Eurofighter consortium (the UK, Germany, Spain and Italy), but these discussions were unsuccessful due to the terms of the contract and, in particular, the purchase and maintenance costs. When the subject of purchasing the EF came up again in the early 2000s, Ankara had become a production partner in the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jet programme, so naturally, it shelved the procurement of the EF, a fourth-generation aircraft.

As a result of recent negative developments regarding the procurement of the F-35 from the US, Turkey has been forced to put the procurement of the Eurofighter back on its agenda. However, contrary to expectations, obtaining the approval of the European consortium countries that manufacture this aircraft was not easy. This is because the sale of the Eurofighter Typhoon to Turkey required the management of a complex mechanism that required the unanimous approval of the consortium countries. In fact, Madrid and Rome supported the sales process spearheaded by London, but the Berlin Government continued to stall Ankara on the grounds that “the rule of law was not respected” in Turkey. The knot tied by Germany was only untangled on 23 July 2025 with the active support of the other three countries in the consortium. According to some sources, resolving the deadlock was not so easy or unconditional. Allegedly, Turkey had given assurances that the aircraft would only be used for collective defence within the framework of NATO and would not be used against another NATO member (clearly referring to Greece). It is stated that this assurance shaped Germany's decision.

Subsequently, additional technical discussions between the parties lasted several more months, leading to a final agreement. Indeed, at the Erdoğan-Starmer meeting held in Ankara on 27 October 2025, an agreement guaranteeing the sale of 20 latest generation (Tranche 4) Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets was signed. According to this agreement, delivery of the T4s to the Turkish Air Force would be possible as early as 2030.

Although the content of the sales agreement was not fully disclosed by the parties, BAE Systems, the main contractor for the project, announced that it had signed a £5.4 billion (approximately $7 billion) agreement package that included the sale of 20 EFs, along with Meteor air-to-air missiles and Brimstone air-to-surface missiles. The Turkish Ministry of National Defence also sought to clarify the agreement with a similar statement. Starmer, however, stated that the value of the contract was £8 billion (approximately $10.7 billion). It is understood that the British Prime Minister may have included in this figure the economic benefits that the agreement will bring to the British defence industry ecosystem, as well as some options whose details are not yet known (such as the cost of providing direct logistical support for the aircraft by the UK for three years, etc.).

Meanwhile, it is not known whether there has been any development regarding the 24-36 aircraft (12 from each country or 24 directly from Qatar and 12 from Oman) that Turkey is said to be purchasing from Qatar and Oman. The only thing being discussed is that negotiations are ongoing with these two countries and, in a technical context, with the other countries in the consortium led by the UK (Germany, Italy and Spain) to purchase a total of 24-36 Eurofighters. With this purchase, the number of EFs that could enter the Turkish Air Force inventory would be a minimum of 44 and a maximum of 56. According to some sources, if the procurement process from Qatar and Oman does not shape up according to Turkey's expectations, this option may be abandoned, and an additional 20 T4 or T5 aircraft may be purchased instead.

F-16V Procurement: A Never-Ending Story

Along with the Eurofighter procurement, the procurement of 40 F-16 Block 70 Viper aircraft is also on Turkey's agenda. As a result of the effective manipulation of the American Jewish lobby, which looks to Tel Aviv, Washington, hiding behind excuses such as the S-400 procurement from Russia and the Pastor Andrew Brunson case, removed Ankara from the F-35 programme as of 23 September 2021. Despite this, Ankara deemed it necessary to knock on the US door again on 30 September 2021 to partially replace its fighter jet needs. The Ankara-Washington talks, conducted through the Ministry of National Defence, only bore fruit on 26 January 2024: the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) submitted the relevant document to Congress regarding this potential sale. Shortly thereafter, the US State Department also announced that it had approved the sale of 40 new F-16Vs and 79 modernisation kits to Turkey through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channel, at an estimated cost of $23 billion (approximately 1 trillion Turkish lira).

Whatever happened afterwards, National Defence Minister Yaşar Güler declared during a parliamentary session around this time last year that Turkey had revised its F-16 procurement package, that the 79 modernisation kits would not be purchased, and that only 40 F-16 Block-70s would be acquired. He emphasised that the approximate sale price of the F-16s to be produced by Lockheed Martin (to be delivered in the early 2030s) would be 7 billion dollars (approximately 3 billion TL), and that the 1.4 billion dollars paid under the F-35 programme was a prepayment for the F-16 sale.

So why did Turkey suddenly decide not to purchase 79 kits? According to Minister Güler, ‘The reason we decided not to proceed is this: our Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) facilities have the capacity to carry out this modernisation on their own, so we left it to them (TAI).’

Faced with a bill of probably 1 trillion lira, Ankara probably decided to be more economical in the F-16 procurement process and tasked the Defence Industry Presidency with ‘modernising the aircraft domestically’. It appears that this decision was taken, encouraged by the ÖZGÜR modernisation process of the F-16 Block 30 aircraft led by TUSAŞ, or that domestic defence industry circles played a “dominant” role in this decision.

Given the expectation that certain critical capabilities listed in the DSCA document (e.g., 168 Integrated Viper Electronic Warfare Systems (IVEWS) or equivalent, sufficient numbers of advanced HARM, AMRAAM, and AIM-9X missiles, etc.) I can say that I find this decision appropriate and correct, with the expectation that these capabilities will also be preserved in the revised purchase package for 40 F-16 Block 70 aircraft. However, I must also state that without US support, it is highly unlikely that the ÖZGÜR II modernisation, which is expected to be applied to all F-16s in the Turkish Air Force inventory (approximately 235 aircraft), will fully meet our air operations needs/requirements. On the other hand, the ÖZGÜR II modernisation includes will significantly enhance the capabilities of existing aircraft with a new cockpit design, a unique mission computer, new sensors including the Murad AESA radar and Toygun EOTS targeting sight, and the integration of advanced national air-to-air (Bozdoğan and Gökdoğan) and national air-to-ground (SOM, HGK, KGK, smart munitions family, etc.) munitions. Undoubtedly, compared to modernisation processes carried out with off-the-shelf systems purchased from Lockheed Martin, the ÖZGÜR II modernisation will require a longer timeline, but I believe that this delay can be managed with strategic patience, as the resulting new F-16 will be more ‘ours’.

Will there be a return to the F-35 programme?

Meanwhile, in a statement to a news agency in December 2024, the Minister of National Defence stated that Turkey aims to rejoin the F-35 programme and purchase 40 new F-35 jet aircraft. Minister Güler said, "When the Americans saw that we could produce and fly the KAAN, they changed their minds a little about the F-35. Now they say they are willing to give us the F-35s. However, no progress has been made on this issue (so far). We insist on regaining our share of production and continue our request to purchase F-35s."

We can say that Minister Güler's statement is theoretically correct, but looking at the back-and-forth negotiations between the parties on this issue from the past to the present, we also know that this statement will not be reflected in practice. Despite Ankara's regular pressure on Washington to rejoin the F-35 programme, the optimism expressed by Turkish political officials to the public, and the (apparent) good relations between Trump and Erdoğan, relations between Turkey and the US are still far from stable. Moreover, the CAATSA sanctions have not yet been lifted. The sale of 30 T-129 Atak helicopters manufactured by TUSAŞ to Pakistan has not even been approved. The F-16V procurement journey is like a military march... Under these conditions, the F-35 procurement process will remain on the agenda only to the extent that it serves US interests.

Are KIZILELMA and ANKA III ready?

Today's modern air power doctrines are shaped around artificial intelligence, focusing on smart munitions, advanced sensors, autonomous systems, and especially unmanned combat aircraft. In this context, gaining air superiority over the enemy will depend on the success of the battle fought beyond visual range (beyond 18 km) in the air. With this understanding, within the framework of the Göktuğ programme launched in 2013, the Bozdoğan, a short-range heat-seeking air-to-air missile, and the Gökdoğan, a long-range radar-guided air-to-air missile, were developed and successfully test-fired from Turkish F-16 aircraft.

Meanwhile, while the Eurofighter and F-16 Viper procurement processes continued, the TUSAŞ ANKA III and Bayraktar KIZILELMA programmes for multi-role unmanned combat aircraft capable of performing the tasks of these aircraft were also launched.

The ANKA III, which took to the skies on 28 December 2023, successfully carried out TEBER and TOLUN munitions firing in subsequent sorties. With its flying wing configuration and a total payload capacity of 1,200 kilograms, it continues its flight tests as a successful platform poised to meet Turkey's needs in the field of unmanned combat aircraft. It is said that it is very close to the serial production stage.

Bayraktar KIZILELMA, which was activated in 2021, successfully performed many flight tests, including air-to-ground bomb firing, following its first flight on 14 December 2022. On 20 November 2025, KIZILELMA made history in the skies by locking onto a representative target F-16 located 30 miles (approximately 50 km) away, locked onto it using the Murad AESA radar developed by ASELSAN, and achieved a direct hit in a simulated firing test using the TÜBİTAK SAGE-produced radar-guided national air-to-air missile GÖKDOĞAN. Shortly thereafter, on 30 November, it hit the TUSAŞ-produced high-speed target aircraft ŞİMŞEK squarely with a live missile.

KIZILELMA, which is scheduled to enter serial production in 2026, achieved a first in world aviation history. For the first time in the world, an unmanned combat aircraft successfully hit a target beyond visual range with a radar-guided missile. In this sense, KIZILELMA, which managed to surpass the Australian-US joint venture MQ-28, which is preparing to conduct AMRAAM firing in December 2025, proved that it can also serve as a gap-filling combat platform for the Turkish Air Force. It made us all proud. It gave confidence to the Turkish nation.

Conclusion

Let us reiterate: The Turkish Air Force needs around 400 KAAN-based manned combat aircraft and an equal number of advanced versions of KIZILELMA and ANKA III, unmanned combat aircraft. We want the F-35, F-16 and Eurofighter combat aircraft to be added to the Turkish Air Force inventory as soon as possible. In particular, the addition of the Eurofighter T-3A variants, which are expected to be procured from Qatar and Oman, to the inventory by 2026 should be treated as a priority. Signatures for the F-16 Viper should be secured without further delay in 2026. The procurement processes for 20 Eurofighter T4s and 40 F-16 Vipers should be completed by 2030-32. Thus, we will witness a total of 314-331 manned combat aircraft, including 230-35 F-16 ÖZGÜR, 40 F-16 Viper, and 44-56 Eurofighter, ready for duty in GÖKVATAN defence.

In addition, the KIZILELMA multi-role and ANKA III unmanned combat platforms have begun to make their presence known in air-to-ground roles. I believe that the day is very near when KIZILELMA and ANKA III drones will begin patrolling the Aegean Sea or the Eastern Mediterranean alongside Turkish Air Force F-16s and Eurofighters, protecting Turkish airspace. Within a few years, we will transition to an era where at least 200 KIZILELMA and ANKA III drones, equipped with our own radar, targeting systems, modern sensors, and air-to-ground and air-to-air munitions, will take on missions to protect GÖKVATAN and contribute to our air defence. We will feel much safer than we do today. It won't be long now...