Was Being Removed from the F-35 Program a Loss or a Gain for Turkey? Part-9 (Final)

Short Answer: Lost Case

According to official records, the F-35 program began in 2001. In reality, the theoretical background of this program dates back to the late 1980s. So far, I have written eight articles on the F-35 in STRASAM. Before reading this last article, if you have time, I suggest you read my previous F-35 articles.

Which Aircraft is the F-35 Replacing?

Short Answer: F-16

In some ways, the F-35 has a similar development and use culture to the F-16, which made its first flight on January 20, 1974. As a fourth-generation, multi-role fighter, the F-16 is a flexible and globally deployed aircraft that can fulfill almost all expectations of such a platform. The F-16 Block 10 and the Block 70 Viper version, which is still in demand today, are the products of a process that proved to us how modern technology products can be easily adapted to the F-16 war machine over a period of half a century. I foresee that the F-16s, at least the Viper versions, will be able to fly until the 2050s. Likewise, I believe that the F-35, which made its first flight in 2006, will be used until 2080, during which time we will see new F-35 versions that will be equipped with new weapon technologies and transformed into a more powerful machine. 

If we take into account the orders for the F-16V, which took its first test flight on January 24, 2023, a total of nearly 5,000 F-16 aircraft will have been produced. Looking at the current orders, around 3,500 F-35 aircraft will be produced. With the orders to be received in the near future, I can say that there will be close to 5,000 F-35 production. The Pentagon has ensured that the fuselage of this aircraft is produced as an 'adaptive' aircraft, taking into account the new modernization needs that may arise over the next 50 years. As an extension of this approach, Block 70 versions of the F-35A will also be produced. Taking into account the production costs and life cycles of the aircraft, the total size of the defence program is currently estimated at USD 1.7 trillion, but could reach USD 2 trillion with the needs that will emerge in the coming years. With this size, the F-35 program stands out as the most expensive defense program in the world.

It is also possible that the F-35 will be produced in smaller numbers. Depending on the progress to be made in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles and the 6th generation fighter jet, the number of F-35s may naturally be reduced. In this case, I believe that the share of American production can be expected to be around 1,500 instead of 2,500. This is the normal trend when we look at the advances in aircraft technologies. 

What is the main difference between the F-35 and the F-22?

Short Answer: The F-35 is an international program, while the F-22 is a national program.

It is important to compare the F-35s and F-22s in terms of program size. The F-35 has a greater operational range than the F-22. The F-35, which incorporates more advanced sensors, provides pilots with a much better operational picture than the F-22. The US Army preferred the F-35 over the F-22. It deemed 187 F-22s sufficient, but wanted to meet the need for a total of nearly 2500 F-35s for the three services. Doesn't this orientation show the US military's expectation of which aircraft is better in terms of cost, capability and usability?

In my opinion, the F-22 shares a similar fate to the F-14 Tomcat. Although the F-14s entered the production line the same year as the F-16s, the life of the F-14s, with extensions, lasted only until 2006. Today, we believe that F-16s will be able to fly in the 2050s. The same situation will occur between the F-22 and the F-35. Instead of the twin-engine F-22, which costs 200 million dollars, the F-22 has no chance against the single-engine F-35, which can be produced for 68 million dollars (the price of the F-35A versions), taking into account the high maintenance and sustainment costs. What I am trying to say here is that the F-35 is a very important fighter jet project that will remain on the agenda today and tomorrow, and will be in the inventories of many countries around the world. It cannot be discarded.

Is the F-35 the World's Most Superior Fighter Jet?

Short Answer YES

Lockheed Martin, the aircraft's manufacturer, claims that the F-35 strengthens national security, enhances global partnerships and promotes economic growth. It is the world's most lethal aircraft with the highest survivability. It is equipped with low visibility and network-enabled operational capabilities, with the capability to conduct all types of air operations missions. 

Lockheed Martin has always maintained that the aircraft will be much better than existing fourth-generation aircraft. For example, it has claimed that the F-35 is "four times more effective" in air-to-air combat, "eight times more effective" in bombing missions, and "three times more effective" in suppressing/destroying enemy air defenses. Such claims may sound a bit exaggerated, at least I would like to say that I find them exaggerated. Nevertheless, the F-35 was not intended to compete with the F-22, which was originally built as an air dominance aircraft. However, it was intended to be "second only to the F-22 in establishing air superiority". In addition, the F-35 was envisioned to have a longer range than the F-22 and a lower logistical support requirement than the fourth-generation fighter jet. The Pentagon continues to describe the F-35 as "the most affordable, lethal, easily supportable and survivable fighter jet ever built." The Pentagon, and the US Air Force in particular, are highly confident in the F-35's stealth, network-enabled operations, survivability and electronic warfare capabilities. 

Is the F-35 really too expensive?

Short Answer: NO.

The sticker price of the F-35, of which about 900 have been produced to date, has always been kept on the agenda as expensive. However, once economies of scale requirements were met, the sticker price of the aircraft began to fall rapidly. Since the F-35 brand as a whole is considered here, the relatively high price of the F-35B (98.4 million dollars) has become more prominent. In my opinion, for countries like Turkey, it is the price of the F-35A that should be taken into account, which is only 68.1 million dollars. The F-35A can be purchased cheaper than most of the fourth generation aircraft. The prices of the $120 million Typhoon or the $110 million Rafale are not discussed for some reason. However, despite being a fifth-generation aircraft, I believe that the F-35A's relatively low price compared to fourth-generation aircraft should not be a negative factor in the debate about this aircraft.

Are those who call the F-35 a "good plane" pro-American? Non-National?

Short Answer NO

During the process of Turkey's exclusion from the F-35 program for various reasons, there was a lot of discussion about this aircraft in the Turkish public opinion. We are faced with a US state that completely excluded Turkey from the F-35 program as of September 23, 2021, and then had difficulty in responding positively to our request to purchase 40 F-16V aircraft, which we submitted on September 30, 2021, and put obstacles in our way. It does not matter whether the president is Trump or Biden. There are countless indications that the Pentagon is the architect of the anti-Turkey American politics. At the root of it is the Turkish Grand National Assembly's rejection of the March 1, 2003 Tezker. The majority of Western countries, especially the US, have activated a mechanism that excludes Turkey in the field of defense industry. At this stage, many of our people may find it more correct to think that Turkey should turn its direction towards the East, pursue a policy that is close to Eurasianism, and increase cooperation with the Russian and Chinese defense industries. There is nothing inherently wrong with this idea.

Leaving this political orientation aside, I believe that evaluating the F-35 only as an "airplane" will allow us to reach more technically correct conclusions. In this context, I find it strange that calling the F-35 a 'good airplane' has become almost equivalent to being pro-American. I do not find it right either. While it is possible for me to accept the F-35, which is seen as an extension of global capital, as an understandable argument at first glance, I cannot understand why we forget that the F-16 is also a product of global capital and is widely used in global armament! I do not see it meaningful to condemn the F-35 to such high rhetoric. 

Those who say that it would have been good if we had bought the F-35 are, in the eyes of some, relegated to the position of the mandate-seekers in the War of Independence who wanted American mandate. Moreover, those who advocate the F-35 are also seen as the mentality that wants to prevent the production of a national fighter jet. As a result, in today's climate of high anti-Americanism, calling the F-35 "bad" is a very high premium. The exaggerated 'national and domestic' rhetoric of the so-called experts of the subject on television channels has made badmouthing the F-35 one of the talking points of popular culture. I do not find this right either.

Reducing the issue to a "non-national-national" debate is undoubtedly wrong. Strategic and visionary goals such as "build your own airplane" and "being a free country under our own wings" are of great value for our national aviation. The direction shown by the Great Atatürk, who said "The future is in the skies", is to establish the national aviation and space industry in our country at all costs. Everyone wants a 'domestic and national' airplane. In this context, the National Combat Aircraft project is a project of much greater value for our country than the F-35.

Was Being in the F-35 Program an Obstacle for the National Combat Aircraft?

Short Answer: NO

We entered the F-35 program with our declaration of will in 1999, and with the memorandum of understanding we signed on January 25, 2007, we were involved with 100 F-35A aircraft (+16-20 F-35B aircraft were on the agenda, but were not realized). The MMU, on the other hand, is a project that has been on the agenda since 2010, with the idea that we could build a fifth-generation fighter similar to the F-35. The aircraft that the MMU is based on is none other than the F-35A. First there was the F-35, then the MMU emerged. The two were never seen as an obstacle to each other. In fact, it was envisioned that the more involvement in the F-35's development processes, the more technology could be transferred to the MMU.

In this respect, it is necessary to look at the F-35 development and production program from an independent perspective. I am one of those who see taking part in this program as a tipping point that can give the Turkish Air Force a leap forward. Being as involved as possible in a fifth-generation aircraft would naturally bring us into a process of learning the basic technical and tactical use of this aircraft. Those who have even flipped through the pages of the Basic Employment Manual (BEM), which can be described as the F-16's User Manual, will better understand what I mean. Therefore, I am not one of those who say "I am glad we were removed from the F-35". I am one of those who believe that we should somehow remain in the program. In short, I am a former F-16 fighter pilot who calls the F-35 a "Good Aircraft." I am as nationalist as anyone. I put my homeland first.

Did we lose any industrial value by being removed from the F-35 Program?

Short Answer: YES

Since the early years of the program, Turkey has been a 'Level III Participation Partner', joining Australia, Denmark, Norway, Canada and Norway in the consortium that produces the F-35 on the same terms, for 175 million USD. Thus, in return for the supply of 100 F-35As, it was granted certain production rights and access to the aircraft's technologies. This provided jobs for our engineers and technicians in the defense industry and made it possible to establish F-35 production facilities in Turkey within the structure of our various defense industry companies. However, the exclusion of Turkey from the program caused financial and industrial losses to our defense-oriented companies (TAI, Alp Aviation, AYESAŞ, Kale Aviation, etc.).

It should also be taken into account that such programs have the characteristics of a school. For example, Turkey's participation in the A-400M project taught TAI and related organizations how to 'design aircraft' in the transport aircraft sector, and added value to our industry as a project that served as a school. Our engineers working on this project believed that projects such as ANKA and Hürkuş could be realized in Turkey, and they continue to work and produce with this belief. 

By being removed from the F-35 program, Turkey was deprived of a school where it could learn fifth-generation fighter jet technologies. A 'guide' for the development and production phases of the MMU was lost. Our engineers and managers working in the MMU building know best the difficulty of moving forward without a guide, the extent to which these works can be accomplished with the British UAE, and the difficulties they are experiencing. Their job has now become even more difficult. 

When you look at the picture below, you can see the areas on the aircraft where the Turkish defense industry plays a role in the production of the F-35. An achievement that allows touching key parts of the fuselage, except the engine. The mystery of invisibility in the palm of your hand. This is what the F-35 program is all about for countries like Turkey. The US does not allow technology transfer, but it does not say no to sniffing and touching. For those in the know, this is a big thing.

Will the F-35 increase Turkey's dependence on the US? 

Short Answer: NO.

Any country that cannot make a weapon system or platform itself and has to buy it from abroad is dependent on foreign countries. From a historical perspective, Turkey is a country that chose voluntary dependence on the United States within the framework of the 'Lend-Lease Law' during World War II and the bilateral agreements it signed with the United States within the framework of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid. This dependence has nothing to do with the F-35. Just as Turkey was dependent on the US in the past when using American-made air platforms such as the P-47, F-84, F-86, F-104, F-4, F-16, etc., the same would be true for the F-35. 

With the Johnson letter of June 5, 1964, written to prevent Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, the Turkish nation painfully learned that its military could not "use" American-made weapons without permission. Thus, the Turkish political and military perspective based on unconditional allegiance to NATO and its leader, the United States, which it had joined in 1952, gave way to a multifaceted and multilateral foreign policy after 1964 (despite its zigzags). However, Turkey has never diversified or diversified its sources of fighter aircraft. I find this wrong. 

Turkey could have at least considered acquiring fighter jets from countries other than the United States (e.g. Britain, France, and perhaps the Russian Federation after the Cold War), as Greece did. However, it is possible that Turkish decision-makers may have been of the opinion that until we can get our own national aircraft industry on its feet, we can at least meet our requirements with American-made fighter jets. If it were not for the 'divergence' with the US over the last decade, this might have been true to a certain extent. However, since I am one of those who believe that strategy should be determined by taking into account the worst case scenario in the future, I would like to express that I do not find it right that we have not been able to diversify our sources.

Can the F-35 Fly Without US Authorization?

Short Answer: YES for normal flight missions, NO for operational missions

The performance-based global logistics support service for the F-35 is provided through the Lockheed Martin-controlled ALIS. 'ALIS, which has an algorithm similar to the Air Force Information System (AFIS), is the name of the system that makes F-35 user countries autonomously dependent on each other and the United States. Just as it is not possible to fly the F-16 without the HvBS, the F-35 cannot be flown in operational missions without the ALIS. F-35 pilots carry out all flight planning in squadron operations rooms with the help of Lockheed Martin personnel who support the national personnel in charge. By logging in to the ALIS network, all flight plans are made and DTC loading is performed. At the same time, each pilot/aircraft/mission is given a user name and password determined by the system. The password and username are given to both American and Japanese pilots by the same center with the same algorithm. The system is closed to any national input. When the pilot boards the aircraft, he/she has to use the username and password given by ALIS in order to use the mission computer of the aircraft. The activation of all avionics (DAS, EOTS, AESA Radar, etc.) connected to the mission computer is only possible with the user name and password.

It should be noted that without a user name and password, the F-35 can be flown, but not fought. There is nothing preventing you from flying the plane from Malatya to Eskişehir without anyone's permission. However, it is unlikely that you can take off from Malatya and drop a bomb somewhere without the knowledge of ALIS. However, one should not get too hung up on this restriction. In 1964, we could not drop bombs on Cyprus without Johnson's knowledge. Johnson's indiscretion did not prevent us from later establishing the F-16 factory in Turkey together with the US. This enabled us to have a modern Air Force for many years. 

ALIS should not prevent us from being in the same consortium with the US and producing the F-35 together. Because nothing has changed from the past to the present. ALIS, which is of symbolic importance, is not an obstacle to the process of building national military technology that will overcome Turkey's overall dependence on the United States. Whatever the dependency situation was with the F-16, it would be the same with the F-35. Turkish F-16s cannot be flown without HvBS. This is where technology and knowledge management have brought us. The same is true for ALIS. ALIS is not the bogeyman, it is HvBS. Although it does not have a password or username mechanism, the mechanism of tracking all flight information is very valid for civilian aircraft in all airlines. In a sense, the use of a cloud-based flight and logistics information management system is now a must for all user countries that have modern aircraft in their inventory.

Can National Systems and Aircraft Parts be Installed on F-35s without US Authorization?

Short Answer NO

Under current conditions, the ALIS mechanism does not allow a foreign system or part to be installed on the aircraft. This is not possible as the system is monitored autonomously from outside. In aviation, all sensors, systems, components, parts, etc. used in aircraft can be installed according to certification and qualification rules. The user countries of the aircraft cannot produce any part and install it on such aircraft as a 'sub-industry product' without making an agreement with the producer countries. It could not be installed even before ALIS. Nothing has changed in this area with the F-35. Industrial property and industrial rights protected by international law do not allow this. With the knowledge and permission of the US, a 'national and domestic' part can be installed on F-35s. The integration of the numerous munitions produced by the Turkish defense industry in recent years into the F-35s would be a problem area that would have to be solved when the aircraft were used by Turkey. Since applications such as the NATO universal interface would not be applicable to the F-35, other solutions would have to be sought from the US.

Is the F-35 a "Garbage Aircraft?"

Short Answer: NO

Since its first flight in 2006, the F-35 has flown a total of 613,000 flight hours. Approximately 23,000 of these flights have been test flights. More than 890 F-35s have already been delivered to users. In total, these aircraft are operating from 37 air bases (including nine aircraft carriers) in nine countries around the world, and continue to conduct training and operational flights by approximately 1,900 pilots, supported by some 14,000 aircraft maintenance personnel.

The cost of flying fifth-generation aircraft is much higher than fourth-generation aircraft. While the hourly flight cost of a single-engine F-16 is 25-28,000 USD, the F-35 will cost 71,000 USD for now and 60-65,000 USD in the near future. There is roughly double the cost. However, no one should expect the hourly flight cost of the twin-engine MMU, which Turkey aims to produce itself, to be lower than 60,000 USD. Therefore, it is misleading to see the F-35 as 'garbage' due to its high flight cost.

There have been a total of 12 aircraft accidents/crashes/incidents with all types of F-35s. Some of these incidents resulted in aircraft losses, while others were survived with minor problems (such as the collapse of the nose landing gear strut). In the end, in a fighter aircraft with over 600,000 hours of flight time, no one wants to see an accident, but I find it normal to a certain extent that such accidents/aircraft incidents occur. There are no accidents that would cause us to see the F-35 as 'useless, very problematic'.

There is a perception that F-35s have a high failure rate. However, I believe that this perception is based on forced interpretations based on the data of the aircraft during flight tests and the malfunctions that have occurred in three different models. The production of aircraft in three different versions at the same time is a new path that the US is also struggling with. In particular, the F-35B with vertical take-off and landing is a different aircraft from the other two versions. As of 2018, the aircraft has completed the majority of its flight tests, totaling 17,000 hours, but these tests are not yet complete. In accordance with the structure of the program, it is aimed to give the aircraft to the users before it is fully matured and to bring the aircraft to full operational capability with the feedback to be received from the flights in the field. The operational test and evaluation flight process of the aircraft continues. 

In the meantime, the activity rate of the aircraft assigned to mission flights has exceeded the target of 65%, and has succeeded in exceeding 80%, especially in the F-35A aircraft. The main reference here is ALIS data. HvBS system data is also valid for the Turkish Air Force. Since the new generation aircraft are flying computers, it is not possible to 'fly' the aircraft with the old manual methods and to keep the activity rates at high levels on paper. Today, it is possible to achieve more realistic activity rates with information systems such as ALIS and HvBS.

Aircraft have deficiencies that may hinder mission success in terms of operational testing and evaluation. These deficiencies are especially important for flight tests. As of 2022, it is known that there are 873 open malfunctions in total, only five of which are in Category 1B and are mainly caused by software problems. In terms of flight safety, these failures do not constitute an obstacle to flight. The F-35 does not have any Category 1A deficiency/fault that could cause the loss of the pilot or the aircraft. As such, the aircraft can be put into flight with 'exceptional malfunctions'. This is a common practice in military aviation.

The existence of such open failures, which are planned to be cleaned up after the implementation of the Block 4 software update package, does not make the F-35 a 'junk aircraft'. This point of view is flawed. If we start making comments from here, we would have to make similar comments about our national UAV, airplane and helicopter projects, which is also wrong. 

With the introduction of the adaptive engine option, it is aimed to eliminate all known malfunctions by 2028. Although it was aimed to overcome the problems caused by the ALIS system with a new system, ODIN, ODIN has been shelved for the time being due to the problems encountered in finding the new resources required to develop the new system. It has been decided to move forward with improvements to ALIS.

Is the F-35 an Invisible Stealth Aircraft?

Short Answer NO.

The F-35, with its angled surfaces, RAM application, materials used in the production of the aircraft, AESA radar and EW capabilities, is a fighter aircraft that claims 'think visibility' as a whole. The Radar Cross Section (RCS) value is quite small when the ammunition is carried in the internal chamber (0.0015-0.0005m2 RCS). With its sensor systems (DAS, EOTS, IRST, etc.), internal ammunition bay, etc., the F-35 is a pioneering aircraft with fifth-generation features such as the ability to act as part of networked operations, hit targets in enemy depths as invisibly as possible, and protect itself with electronic warfare capabilities. In the near future, the F-35 will be at the center of the concept of swarm UAV use. Despite the presence of all these capabilities, it does not claim invisibility against passive radars. Except for X band radars, its invisibility is no different from conventional aircraft.

Is the F-35 a plane that should be discussed?

Short Answer YES

The world's largest multinational aircraft production program is led by the United States. It is well known that within the American arms industry there is open competition between defense industry companies. In front of the eyes of the world, Boeing Military and Lockheed Martin, for example, are vying for a share in the production of fifth generation aircraft. Although Lockheed Martin has taken the lead with the F-35, the race continues. The most important factor muddying the waters here is the fact that the F-35 is being produced as a joint production project in three different variants for the three branches of the US military. Each force has its own areas of dominance and influence in the arms industry. The fact that the F-35 is a 'joint' aircraft has resulted in the expectations of the forces not being fully met. 

For example, while the US Air Force aimed to have a relatively simpler aircraft with the F-35A compared to the B and C versions, it is now adversely affected by the problems encountered with the B and C versions. Due to the method of finding common solutions to the failures that arise, the US Air Force is facing difficulties in having as many fighter jets as it wants. Having lost its autonomy in the production of fifth-generation fighters due to the discontinued F-22, this force is now looking for a new way forward by 'vilifying' the F-35. At first, it aims to solve its problems by modernizing 72 F-15EXs, then to reduce the US Air Force's share in the production of the F-35A, and finally to develop the Next Generation Air Dominance Aircraft (NGAD), a 6th generation fighter under its own control, to replace the F-22s. The Navy is also considering the F/A-XX to replace the Super Hornets.

It is impossible to keep the F-35 out of the debates in the US arms industry. The Russian Federation, for example, does not have the US approach, which does not see any harm in presenting these issues to the world media. The Su-75 Checkmate, which was exhibited for the first time at the Moscow Air Show (MAKS) in 2021, and which is intended to be produced as a fifth-generation aircraft equivalent to the F-35, or the fate of the Su-57 (equivalent to the F-22), which was expected to take its place in the skies in 2021 but did not. Do you think that the fact that these aircraft are not being discussed makes them better than the F-35?

Conclusion and Final Assessment

As of September 23, 2021, Turkey was unilaterally excluded from the F-35 aircraft production consortium, which it officially joined on January 25, 2007, by a unilateral decision taken by the United States. Although this exclusion is in violation of international trade law, it is the US government that Turkey can contact to resolve this issue, in accordance with the signed memorandum of understanding. Therefore, under the leadership of the Ministry of National Defence, negotiations with the US authorities have been ongoing, focusing on finding a solution to compensate for the USD 1.4 billion spent by Turkey under the program. It seems that the American side is using the 'flour on the line' tactic to prolong these talks and refuse to settle on a solution that would meet Turkey's expectations.

Turkey no longer has the possibility of returning to the F-35 program. Perhaps the option of purchasing may come to the agenda of the two countries in the coming years, but I do not see this as possible in the near term. 

I see not being in the F-35 program as a loss for Turkey. I do not see this aircraft as problematic, rubbish, making us completely dependent on the US, etc. Regardless of the past, if we were a country on the eve of the decision to buy the F-35 for the first time, I would be among those who say 'let's buy it for sure'. 

Even if we don't want to use rational reason in making such decisions, it may be enough to look at why Canada, which has been discussing this issue since 2015 and finally decided to buy 88 F-35s, reached this decision. Or why South Korea, which is developing its own national fighter jet, the KF-21, has purchased an additional 60 F-35s. More importantly, it is important to see why Greece is currently knocking on the American door to buy as many as 30 F-35s.

I believe that from now on, Turkey should focus on developing its own flying platforms, leaving aside meaningless discussions such as 'it is a good thing we left the F-35 program, the F-35 was an obstacle for projects such as MMU and Kızılelma'. Anyone familiar with the defence industry knows that under current conditions, neither MMU nor Kızılelma are at a point where they can become an F-35-compatible aircraft. Such a claim can only go beyond the ridiculous rhetoric of those who claim to be 'national'. I think it would be sufficient for those who make such claims to take a look at the 'Hürkuş Project' for some instructive lessons.

However, I believe that if the Turkish defense industry continues to take the right steps and moves, and if the right cooperation mechanisms can be established with the countries that have the necessary resources and high technology, the Turkish Air Force will be able to have a technological infrastructure in the long term (10 years+) that will undoubtedly be able to add fighter jets superior and more advanced than the F-35 to the inventory of the Turkish Air Force.

References:

1)     CRS Report, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, 2 May 2022.

2)     CRS Report RL33543, Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress.

3)     CRS Report R41761, Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges, by Jim Zanotti.

4)     CRS Report R45068, Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), by Heidi M. Peters.

5)     Danny Lam and Brian Paul Cozzarin, “The Joint Strike Fighter / F-35 Program A Canadian Technology Policy Perspective”, March–April 2014 Air & Space Power Journal.

6)     Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II Brochure9_2022

7)     “History”, The F35 Lightning II, http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jsf.htm

8)     Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2017 Annual Report, January 2018.

9)     Lockheed Martin official page https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-35.html

10)  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2019 Annual Report, December 20, 2019.

11)  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2017 Annual Report, Washington, DC, January 2018, p. 31, http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2017/

12)  U.S. Government Accountability Office, F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its Central Logistics System, 16-439, April 14, 2016.

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22)  Aaron Mehta, “After ‘Transformative’ Year, F-35 Program Focuses on Software, Quantity,” Defense News, January 14, 2014.

23)  Aaron Mehta, “No System in Place To Strip Canadian F-35 Participation,” Defense News, July 11, 2016.

24)  Patrick Tucker, “F-35 Will Fly Despite Auditor’s Fleet-Grounding Warning,” Defense One, April 17, 2016.

25)  Valerie Insinna, “Lockheed hypes F-35’s upgrade plan as interest in ‘sixth-gen’ fighters grows,” Defense News, June 21, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/paris-air-show/2019/06/21/lockheed-hypes-f-35supgrade-plan-as-interest-in-sixth-gen-fighters-grows/

26)  Valerie Insinna, “Turkey’s removal from F-35 program to cause hike in engine price”, DefenseNews, Air Warfare, 23 April 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/04/23/turkeys-removal-from-f-35-program-to-cause-hike-in-engine-price/

27)  Nur Özkan Erbay, “First F-35's delivered to Turkish Air Force in ceremony, defense capabilities upgraded”, Daily Sabah, Jun 21, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/defense/2018/06/21/first-f-35s-delivered-to-turkish-air-force-in-ceremony-defense-capabilities-upgraded

28)  Craig Hoyle, “An Italian view on the F-35,” Flightglobal.com/DEW Line blog, August 7, 2013.

29)  Sandra I. Erwin, “Next Battle for F-35: Bring Down Operations Costs,” National Defense (nationaldefensemagazine.org), April 6, 2014.

30)  Pat Host, “Pentagon faces major cost increase on F-35 Block 4 modernization,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 8, 2018, http://www.janes.com/article/78443/pentagon-faces-major-cost-increase-on-f-35-block-4-modernisation.

31)  Frans Osinga, “European Security and the Significance of the F-35”, AF Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, July 2017, Journal Edition 24.

32)  Anthony Capaccio, “Air Force Risks Losing Third of F-35s on Upkeep Costs,” Bloomberg News, March 28, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-28/air-force-risks-losing-third-of-f-35s-if-upkeep-costs-aren-t-cut

33)  Uğur Ermiş, F-35 Program and the Future of the Turkish Air Force, International Journal of Crisis and Politics, December 2021 5 (2) p.477.