What are the Pros and Cons of the F-35 Fighter Jet? Some Question Marks About the F-35: Part-4

Failure to Overcome the American Policy of Not Sharing Source Code with Partners

All kinds of tools, equipment and materials such as weapons, ammunition, platforms, equipment, equipment, etc. used in the defense industry, especially in the aerospace dimension, have undergone a fundamental change since the 1970s. Until this period, the defense industry had a hardware-dominated structure, but after these years, the added value of most defense weapons and systems began to be associated with the software rather than the hardware. Today, software is the most critical feature of almost all systems. A party with a unique software capability, for example, can quickly reach a level where it can find everything needed for a platform from other manufacturers and develop it more easily than software. 

Every country that adds or wants to add a fighter jet to its inventory wants to dominate everything about the F-35, for example, which it has paid for and for which it is a program partner. It sees this as its most natural right, and it should. No country wants to use a product that has restrictions that would hinder its operational independence. If they have to use it, it is because they do not have access to a better alternative product. 

Every F-35 user country wants to use the F-35 in daily operations in a way that preserves its operational sovereignty over the aircraft, to upgrade to the next version when necessary, to have no problems in logistic support, to perform its own maintenance, to integrate any weapon, ammunition and missile it wants, including those produced by itself, to equip it with its own unique electronic pills capabilities, to activate its own link system when necessary, and so on. 

When we look at the F-35 program, it is a so-called joint production aircraft. It is a joint product of all countries participating in the program. However, in the case of the F-35, the joint strike fighter, the joint approach can only be valid if it stays within the envelope defined by the US. The software and source codes of the aircraft are not accessible to other production partner countries other than the United States. This right has not been recognized by the US, and there has been no willingness on the American side to change this policy.

Source code is the key to the software and algorithms used in any system. Without the source code, it is not possible to intervene in any system with a classical engineering approach, staying within the rules. The fact that the source code is shared with others by the company and country that developed the product means that other user countries can modify and nationalize the software in line with their own needs, say, within the knowledge of the USA. Other developers can modify the software based on the source code. Countries that are authorized to access the source code can even improve their knowledge of the code and feed it back to the American side, while doing their own private work. In this way, the F-35 could serve each country as a truly 'joint' aircraft. However, the US is not in favor of giving the source codes in any way.

Every country wants its platforms, ammunition, command and control systems, etc. in the operational environment to perform uninterrupted missions under its own national control through IT/software independence. For this purpose, it is aimed that operational elements such as platforms, ammunition, EW and command and control systems, etc. should at least have "transparent" mission software, even if they cannot be indigenous. Thus, it is aimed to have as much national control as possible in the configuration management of such system software, and at least the program partner countries should have control over the content of the imported software codes used in the F-35.

On the other hand, no country other than the UK has, to our knowledge, been granted access to the source code by the US. The UK, too, has had this right, but only under certain constraints, following an agreement between the two governments in 2006. No other JSF participant country has enjoyed such sovereign rights. Despite the privilege granted to the UK, it remains dependent on the US for most software modules. 

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has a perception that the F-35 program provides a huge industrial benefit for the participating countries/partners. From the American perspective, this may be a correct claim. This is because the participating countries, in proportion to the share they receive from the production of the aircraft, also provide their own defense industry companies with production capabilities. New job opportunities have been opened. However, the fact that the US has adopted a policy of not sharing the source code (even in the form of modules) even with the UK, the largest partner and the largest participant in the program, and that it is unwilling to show any flexibility in this policy, in a sense, reduces all the industrial gains achieved through the program to 'zero'. This policy has called into question the institution of partnership and thus the commonality of the F-35 program. It has led to a general acceptance that the added value provided by the program is not very meaningful. It has even locked the program for some countries. Inevitably, the program partner governments had to face the debate in front of their own public opinion on whether to continue or not. 

Despite all the controversy and the demands of the partner countries, the US Department of Defense has made it clear that it will not give access to the source code, even to its closest allies. The question then arises: Is it possible to benefit from this model imposed by the Pentagon in line with national expectations without exiting the program?

The Pentagon was forced to grant the UK limited resourcing rights when a new situation arose in line with American interests. Here, the classic win-win principle came into play. 

The UK was the largest partner in the F-35 program. For many years, the UK was known for possessing a technology that the US did not have. The US and British governments reached an agreement to adapt the Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) technology used in Harrier fighter jets to the F-35. Accordingly, the British redeveloped this STOVL technology in line with the requirements of the F-35 aircraft, and solved the F-35's problem in this area. The agreement was put into effect to ensure that only the UK would produce the engine equipment and the integration mechanism, which are part of the solution, and that the source codes of the software used in this context would remain the UK's monopoly, and would not be shared even with the US government. This solution strengthened the UK's hand in the F-35 program, but did not give it the privilege of controlling the entire software of the F-35. The Pentagon did not allow this. 

Norway and Israel have also tried to follow the UK's lead and gain access to the F-35's source code, albeit in a limited way. Norway, for example, wanted this right in exchange for integrating its Joint Strike Missile (JSM) into the F-35. The JSM is a missile that is available to most program partners, including the US Navy. Norway estimated that the use of this missile in the program could generate between $3.3 billion and $4.2 billion in revenue. Despite the integration of the JSM into the program, the Pentagon has deliberately refrained from taking any steps towards resource allocation. Similarly, Israel, almost America's closest ally, has received a commitment from the United States to "plug-and-play" compatibility for a number of Israeli-made electronic warfare and other systems on the F-35. Still, the US was unable to get Israel to compromise on its insistence on sole control of the F-35 source code.

During its stay in the program, Turkey also made progress in adding the Stand-off Munition (SOM) missile to the F-35's family of weapons, but no progress was made in terms of access to the source code.

According to some assessments, Norway and Israel have received a small amount of privilege in return for the specific contributions and capabilities they have provided to the American side, even though they have not been able to obtain full source code access privileges. Since the parties did not share information, it is not known what the agreement between the parties was. However, there are claims that the situation of Norway and Israel is more unique in terms of source code than that of any of the partners. For each partner country, depending on the size and scope of their commitment to the JSF program and the country's long-standing status as a 'trusted' ally, it is at least possible that they will seek an agreement from the United States at least similar to Norway's and Israel's.

Lack of Interest in Transferring F-35 Technology 

The US is in favor of maintaining the same policy in the field of technology transfer as it has in the field of source code sharing. Consequently, it continues to create difficulties in sharing with partner countries in the F-35 program. 

For example, the US is supporting South Korea's KF-21 fighter jet program through Lockheed Martin. South Korea has applied to the US for the transfer of F-35 technology to KAI in a total of 25 areas. As a result of the negotiations, it was decided to transfer 21 technologies, but the US did not allow the transfer of four critical technologies, including the AESA radar, to South Korea. 

Question Marks Raised by the F-35's Single Pilot and Single Engine

One of the least understood aspects of the JSF program is the emergence of American claims and parallel questions about why it is so different from fourth-generation fighters. Since its first flight, the F-35 has been an increasingly automated development aircraft. As the aircraft's automation functions and capabilities increased, the workload of pilots and maintenance personnel tended to decrease. Thus, fewer human resources were deemed sufficient compared to the fourth-generation aircraft. 

Thanks to the great care taken in the design of the aircraft to increase automation and reduce pilot workload, it was decided that the F-35 would be a single-seat aircraft, similar to the F-16. The ergonomics provided in the cockpit and the pilot's convenience at his or her fingertips eliminated the need for a two-seat model. The pilot-sized approach was also reflected in the engine concept. In a sense, the F-35 has made progress by adopting the fourth generation F-16 approach. Thanks to the reliability in engine technology, the F-35 fighter jet can be flown safely and efficiently without the need for two engines. 

In fact, the element of trust behind both of these choices was the result of the advanced technologies being made available to the aircraft. These decisions are the direct product of advanced software. Advances in cockpit automation made it unnecessary to seat a second pilot on board. Again, with the monitoring of the engines from the moment they start on the ground until the aircraft lands and the engine is silenced, and the utilization of the concept of preventive maintenance to reduce the possibility of in-flight malfunctions, it was possible to produce a single-engine aircraft. 

Although there is generally no negative comment on the single-pilot aircraft, some criticisms have been made about the engine. It is strange that the F-35, which was developed after the twin-engine F-22, cannot reach a 'super cruise' speed on the scale of this aircraft. 

On the other hand, Lockheed Martin, while taking note of such criticisms, believes that the fact that former fighter pilots are criticizing the F-35 for its engine is due to the fact that the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin itself have failed to adequately explain the superior capabilities of the F-35. 

Revealing that the F-35 is not as "invisible" as claimed

The most important feature that distinguishes the F-35 from other fighter jets (except the F-22) is its stealth capability. As I mentioned earlier, the F-35's invisibility against radar is only against radars operating in the X band. However, the F-35 is weak against L band or other VHF band radars. Its ability to 'hide' its signature against such radars in the same way as in the X band is currently problematic. While work is ongoing in this area, there have been occasional claims that the F-35 has been "spotted". 

For example, at the end of September 2019, the German company Hensoldt announced that its new generation radar had tracked the so-called "invisible" F-35 for 160 kilometers. Hensoldt's radar, called TwInvis, detected a US F-35 as it flew to Germany to participate in the Berlin Airshow as part of demonstration flights. The company, which tracked the F-35's maneuvers, argued that the passive radar it used was designed to track all electromagnetic emissions in the air, so it was not a problem for them to see the F-35.

Was there no point in all the efforts to reduce the aircraft's signature, the design improvements to cover/limit the hot spots on the airframe, the F-35-specific production techniques such as controlling hot exhaust gases to reduce the signature? In a sense, didn't the F-35 have stealth capability? 

Of course, no matter what is done to reduce signature, new technologies, including optically-based networked sensor technologies, can render 'stealth' moot. In the future, superior invisibility-disclosing technologies may also be deployed. However, Lockheed Martin continues to work on improving stealth in parallel, and is taking steps to develop countermeasures by taking into account new sensor technologies that invalidate the old generation stealth technologies.

Excessive and Complexity of the Lines of Software Code Used in the F-35

The F-35 claims to be the first aircraft designed not only to access sensor data, but also to be the first aircraft designed for the swarm UAV concept. The Software Lines of Code (SLOC) used in the production of the aircraft are highly complex and have been criticized for having an ever-increasing architecture, both in terms of the additional cost it imposes and the fact that it perpetuates dependence on the American side. It is predicted that the increasing trend in the software lines of code used in the aircraft will continue to increase with the life cycle of the aircraft, which disturbs the user countries. 

Even when compared to the F-22 program, the software used in the F-35 represents an enormous complexity. While the F-22 program uses approximately 1.9 million lines of software, it is noteworthy that the F-35 uses more than 9.5 million lines of code just for the part of the code used in the aircraft. Moreover, when other lines of software not included in the F-35 platform are added, this number exceeds 24 million lines in total. For comparison, the F-35 has approximately 3 times more onboard software lines than the F-22A and 6 times more than the F/A-18 E/F. 

Compared to the first F-35, the number of onboard software lines has increased by more than 50 percent since the first flight. This means additional workload for user countries. Moreover, mastering so many SLOCs is seen as almost impossible, and it is disturbing that even in this area, dependence on the US will continue.

Question Marks on the Implementation of the F-35 Swarm UAV Concept

The F-35 is no longer seen as a conventional fighter jet. Nor should it be. Produced as a fifth generation aircraft, the F-35 is not expected to excel in close air combat. Instead, it is expected to enter the operational theater with a different superiority through stealth, network-centric operations and the use of swarm UAVs. 

The US Air Force intends to use the F-35 fighter jets differently from conventional fighter interceptors. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, like the F-35, are an emerging field. Remote-controlled aircraft, which used to be flown by a pilot sitting at a ground control station, are about to be replaced by a new generation of unmanned aerial vehicles designed to fly themselves. Even under current conditions, UAVs that operate semi-autonomously without the need for a ground controller to "fly" them are about to enter service. While UAV product development processes in this area are ongoing, tests to develop the swarm UAV concept with existing UAVs such as the Predator MQ-1 are ongoing. An attack package composed of these UAVs is being "paired" with the F-35 aircraft. Thus, the swarm UAV concept aims to put an end to the criticism that the F-35 has to go to the target with a small number of bomb loads in order to maintain its stealth capability, and to turn the swarm UAVs into killing machines operating under the control of the F-35. This idea is about to become a reality in the near future. Thus, the high firepower of the F-35 when operating in 'beast' mode, without taking into account its stealth feature, can be achieved by swarm UAVs in stealth mode.

In the fifth part of this series, I will talk about the steps that need to be taken to improve the software of the F-35 aircraft, the improvements planned for the aircraft and its engine, and the global logistics support system, including ALIS.