Would it be better without the supply of the F-16?

We are living in quite extraordinary times, at the center of very hot agendas. The times when the possibilities of military operations came to the fore and the elements of the military national power began to take precedence in weaving the veins leading to the fate and future of the country. In this period when all security alliances are forced, some of them are emptied, some of them change their identities; We see that conceptual changes begin to make intellectual efforts difficult. The difficulties experienced in the intellectual dimension also make it difficult to analyze and predict the future correctly.

Let's take our air force, which is one of the leading elements of military power. Except for the F-4E 2020 and F-16C/D aircraft, which are living their life extensions, the Turkish Air Force does not have a combat power. In other words, let alone NATO, there is a complete US dependency. Our air power is almost entirely American in concept, philosophy, organization, human resource, logistics and operational sense. The interesting thing is that it is the only country that has practiced this style for a long time, best outside the USA, and has combat experience.

The Turkish state mind seems to have finally realized how the USA targeted, excluded, and squeezed its "indispensable NATO ally" and intends to do much more in the future. In line with this planned process, it has also been noticed that the road stones have been laid for a long time. To tell the truth, we have been doing our best to strengthen our national defense industry for a while. However, it is seen that this development process was carried out in line with the western bloc, its school and its habits. While it has an effective and experienced army in NATO standards, it is a fact that the future of NATO (at least for our country) is starting to become doubtful.

The future is in the skies. The essence of the matter is "independence" is in the skies. In this direction, it is essential to conduct a study in which we will try to read the risks from a broader perspective. I would like to take a look at the subject on the axis of the possible Turkish-Greek War.

For the time being, our air force has no problems in the maintenance and maintenance of the existing F-16 combat aircraft fleet, and in the supply of spare parts. Yes, the issue of modernization is progressing in trouble and obstacles are being put in front of us. However, it is also a fact that after a possible war, we will have difficulty in sustaining the remainder of our F-16 fleet and we will face strong embargoes. I would like to especially emphasize the remaining part. Because, even if it ends in victory, our air force will be the element that will suffer the most and suffer losses in a war. The survivors of the planes, which will be forced beyond their limits, will also be logistically troubled. Therefore, in order:

1. To quickly heal the wounds of war. (Stay/become flyable, albeit minimally.)

2. Deciding on the calving and cannibalization processes.

3. Initiating a deeper maintenance, maintenance process.

4. Planning a new power structure for the remaining forces in this direction.

5. Complementing the missing ammunition and spare parts stocks for the remaining aircraft.

6. Planning at the point of supplying new aircraft to replace the missing aircraft.

7. To carry out all the necessary planning and applications from A to Z for the newly formed air force.

8. Human resources, logistics, platforms, ammunition, etc. remake the airforce from all angles.

It is certain that we will encounter problems. At all these points, it is "dreaming" to hope that our allies, especially the United States, will act prudently. MMU, Hürjet, Hürkuş, Red Apple, Akıncı etc. It is a fact that our manned or unmanned, domestic and national development programs will also be affected by this process. Delays, cancellations, new projects, changing demands and priorities will make the next critical 10-15 years quite chaotic.

Another effect of this subsequent process will be that revolutionary change and transformation alternatives will increase the chance of being put into practice. For example, I wrote in 2012 that the production of a high-quality business jet for our aviation industry is as important as the production of combat aircraft. Because I stated that many special missions (Electronic Warfare, SEAD, etc.) can be performed by these platforms without wasting much time on micro-enhancement efforts. I also mentioned the possibility that such aircraft could be a transport platform for larger, multiple long-range missiles. Now, the possibility of being a radar and command and control center (flying hub) for unmanned warplane fleets can be added to this. In other words, unconventional solutions that were previously avoided may seem more logical for Turkey after a war.

Along with all these alternatives, there is an undeniable reality. In the next 50-60 years, our air force will always have to maintain a minimum of 300 friendly, manned combat aircraft with modern technology and concepts. Although we are a manufacturer under license, the F-16 aircraft will have a hard time finding a place in this equation after a war.

Within this framework, many reasonable and logical suggestions can be considered. The modular aircraft with analog flights and digital components, which I discussed in the previous article, is just one of them. However, what would make sense is this. Our air force, which will be rebuilt after the war, will have to have a structure based on more than one source.

We see that Greece has been following a dual-channel supply strategy, originating from the USA and France, for a long time. In fact, many other countries in the world take similar approaches. In some of them, the situation has even gone so far as to cause more than two sources and thus logistical confusion and conceptual confusion. For example Egyptian American, French, Russian etc. returned to a fighter jet park. Many countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, have both Russian and western origin platforms. In our country, the situation will be different.

Turkey is taking serious steps towards creating a domestic and national defense and aerospace industry. In short, even if a second supply channel is opened, the existence of a third channel is an absolute necessity for national platforms. In short, after a war:

1. Remaining US and NATO origin platforms.

2. Platforms to be newly procured and preferably (desirably) compliant with NATO standards.

3. Domestic and national platforms.

It is quite possible to go to a three-channel structuring. All three channels have their own unique challenges, challenges and even challenges.

Of course, when it comes to combat air forces, it is not possible to exclude unmanned systems, air defense elements and power multipliers from the equation. However, these issues have been left out of our article in order not to distract our focus. Another reason for this is to make the points to be emphasized more understandable.

In the military aviation-savvy public, the most debated issue of the last decade was the prospects for the supply of new aircraft. Even fans of many warplanes of western or eastern structure were formed. However, the Turkish Armed Forces did not undertake a new aircraft purchase program, although it was heavily discussed in amateur circles. It had very logical and valid arguments. These:

1. Serious logistical problems that the procurement of a second aircraft type, even of Western origin, will bring.

2. High additional costs of infrastructure that needs to be acquired for maintenance/maintenance.

3. The fact that it will take time to train the aircraft and to operate the planes doctrinally.

4. Blood incompatibility problems, which are highly likely to be experienced by our force, which is completely shaped by the US school and turns it into a habit / addiction.

5. The fact that the F-16 is an adequate and satisfying aircraft. That is, even if a new type has advantages, they are too low to make a significant difference.

6. What we have is air refueling, early warning, electronic warfare, etc. that all force multipliers are designed according to the force structure we created on the basis of the F-16.

7. Within the framework of the planning of the JSF (F-35) aircraft, of which we are a project partner, there will be no problems at the crossing point from the F-16. As you know, both the manufacturer USA and the US manufacturer Lockheed Martin are the same in both planes.

8. The provision of a non-NATO platform will have serious political consequences, such as choosing a weapon, choosing a pact.

9. In the process of development of domestic and national munitions, first of all, our current F-16 fleet and then the next F-35 fleet will be taken as a basis. In other words, the procurement of a second aircraft type also includes significant difficulties in terms of the use of domestic ammunition.

10. If there is a need to strengthen the air force in terms of quantity, the most logical and easy way to do this is to deal with the supply of new and more modern F-16s with GE engines.

Frankly, our application to the USA was also the biggest indicator of these arguments. You know, the proposal that was rejected in the US Congress, where the Greek Prime Minister made a speech and was repeatedly applauded. It is a concrete fact that question marks have increased over this project, which includes the supply of new F-16s and the modernization of some of the existing ones. Even if it passes Congress and is put into practice.

In this case, we have to ask the following question: Let's say our request for 40 new F-16s and 80 modernization kits in the latest standards has been accepted. The implementation of this will take a very important time period. Does this mean that Turkey burying its head in the sand, dreaming of the best and positive future, wasting time?

Please consider this article as a belated entry. I plan to write more than one article focused on the subject. If you haven't read it, I would like you to review my previous article. Although it is a bit long, it also includes an important alternative approach that will be evaluated within this framework.

Whether we like it or not, whether we choose it or not, it is a fact that we are moving towards a fork in the road. It is a fact that we are a country that is placed on the target board, whether it is due to civilizational differences, the compulsion of some third party elements, or the mistakes we have made (?). Although we have seen strong signs of this for a while, it is also a reality that we choose not to see or believe. We must now accept the fact that we have come to the end of this pretend play. Because the extremely patient state mind of the Turk was able to reach this decision.

I would like to remind you of a phrase that I like very much. "Find a way. Make a way. Or get out of the way." In this context, I hope to meet you with new works.