Defence Industry Fictions - If I Were Me Series (2) Battleships Concept
In the near future, when UCAVs and UCAVs will be more widely used, how can the stealth feature expected from a naval platform change?
A New Lightweight Corvette Proposal Based on the MİLGEM Experience
One of the most serious military-technological debates of our time is the issue of stealth. Stealth, which can be defined as not being caught by radar and other sensors or being detected much later than its counterparts, has a nature that questions how applicable and sustainable it is in parallel with the developing technology. This is because countermeasures and sensor technologies are in a much more exponential development than stealth platforms. Undoubtedly, the time and effort difference between the realisation of a complex platform, from design principles to practical applications in software and hardware, and the development of a subsystem that addresses the weaknesses of this platform is a major factor in this.
Especially in our age, where unmanned aerial, naval and land vehicles have become widespread and network-centric and multi-domain combat concepts have come to the fore, the increasing need for two-way communication facilitates detectability in parallel with the amount of electronic emissions. In the near future, when UCAVs and UCAVs will be more widely used, how can the stealth feature expected from a naval platform change? You will read an article in which we will analyse this issue, including some suggestions.
Let's Analyse the Subject Accompanied by a Boat Form Imagination
If it is necessary to classify the threats in terms of surface, that is, surface combat platforms, we see that they should first be divided into two. Threats coming from under the sea and others. Submarine platforms, which have been in use for more than a century, can be referred to as the ancestor of stealth technology. In a vast area covered by water, both the eye and the sensor have a very limited detection, identification and countermeasure capability. For this reason, submarines have become one of the most strategic weapons of modern navies.
Based on the experiences we have gained within the scope of the MİLGEM project, let us assume that we are designing a new hull form. It would be useful to start with acoustics, which is the primary sensor technology of submarine combat. It would make sense to make this new design have a much lower acoustic signature, refined in the light of data. In short, stealth technology will continue to be vital for submarine applications.
As for the part of the platform above the sea, I do not see the need to apply stealth technologies. In fact, I believe that being recognisable will have certain advantages. Let's construct such a hull form that a person can step on foot from the nose to the stern. In fact, the railings on all sides of the hull can be easily mounted for weapon systems. The island(s) in the centre should be smaller than the hull in width but higher vertically. No helicopter hangar. The helipad should be flush with the deck and suitable for the landing and take-off of a maximum of a GÖKBEY class helicopter. In terms of tonnage, let's envisage a derivative 400-600 tonnes behind our ADA class corvettes.
In this way, we have a mental construct of our ship. While it is more easily recognisable by air, sea and land-based sensors, it is a much more difficult platform to detect for undersea sensors. The traceability of this platform will bring with it a higher probability of engagement by the enemy. Therefore, it will be necessary for the platform to turn this rising threat environment in its favour. The element of surprise required for this favourable change will be provided by the SIDAs with which it will conduct operations.
Wolves Hunt in Packs
We had designed the surface side of our light corvette without paying attention to stealth technologies, but we will design the hull-top form of the SIDAs that will operate under the command of this boat in a way to maximise the use of stealth technologies. In fact, if possible, SİDAs that receive all their vision from our hypothetical corvette like the mother ship, and keep their backup self-sensors under stealth protection to be used when necessary. Let's imagine boats that are equivalent to our hypothetical corvette in terms of sea stay, speed, operational capability, etc., and if possible, have a common infrastructure, especially the engine, and are slightly larger than our current SİDA families.
At the centre of this swarm, which can also accommodate derivatives such as air defence, guided missile and anti-submarine warfare, will be the consoles of the human operators (in shifts) in the combat centre of our hypothetical corvette. SİDAs, the type and number of which can vary according to the nature of the mission, will be assigned as an escort to this light corvette. All ammunition, whether on the main platform or on the SİDAs, can be guided by any part of the swarm within the framework of network-centric warfare. In fact, when necessary, this guidance management responsibility can be transferred to the Artificial Intelligence on the SİDA.
At least one of these stealthy SİDAs will have air defence features. It can carry IIR and active radar guided missiles, as well as indoor CIWS. It will provide an additional protection screen/layer between the target ship and the threat, whether it comes from the enemy's air elements or a guided missile salvo from a sea or land-based system. It will be able to do this with the advantage of optimising the distance between our hypothetical corvette.
An Alternative and Active Approach to Submarine Warfare
A warship using its sonar in active mode is like broadcasting "I'm here" to its enemies lying under the sea. For this reason, our hypothetical corvette will not have a hull-mounted sonar. It may be possible to strengthen the underwater stealth design even with rubber blocks. However, it will be able to overcome its deficiency in this respect through the use of SİDA. In the under-hull form, special attention will be paid to minimising the reflection of the acoustic signatures emitted by the SIDA as much as possible.
In this way, ASUW-oriented SİDAs will be able to use both towed or hull-mounted sonars and SONOBUOYs without hesitation. The detected enemy submarine can be targeted by both our light corvette and another ASUW, or it can pass to another platform. For this reason, ASUW SİDA will have elements hidden under stealth cover, from the rocket-assisted SONOBUOY dispensing system to the rocket-assisted false target and underwater bomb dispensing system.
Advantages of Making the Enemy Afraid to See
The essence of this concept is to keep the element of surprise in a cost-effective, sustainable and feasible manner by means of a fleet, or more precisely a swarm-based system. In this way, whether it detects an active/passive return (friendly sensor data) or an electronic trace with an identifiable signature, the enemy will experience doubt and waste time to think before engagement. If he needs to see and know what he is facing, he will lose even more time and manpower.
This will increase the survivability of even 40-year-old boats in our navy. Because the concept in question can also be renewed for these boats. Prior to this, within the framework of the concept that we have already produced and mastered all the technologies, electronic signatures that confuse the enemy will be able to be used on other boats to a certain extent. In this way, the potential enemy will have to divide a significant portion of its naval and air power into reconnaissance and forced reconnaissance activities.
In addition, naval warfare takes place not between ships, but between fleets. This swarm structure, which can join existing fleets and be separated when desired, will also offer tactical flexibility to our admirals in the field. (Those who need to understand the details have understood.)
Within the framework of this vision, let's take a closer look at the Turkish Type Fast Patrol Boat Project
To be honest, the place of the fast patrol boat platform in the naval wars of the future is a matter of debate. For this reason, it may be preferable to abandon this project and evolve it into a light corvette project based on the MİLGEM experience. In fact, this different light corvette approach can also be evolved into new generation platforms, particularly different offshore patrol vessels, and thus increase export opportunities.
Another alternative would be to analyse this approach and make some changes in the Turkish Type Fast Patrol Boat Project. Some elements of this concept, which is focused on the light corvette class, can also be applied to the fast patrol boat class. The experience gained from this application can be utilised on many different platforms in the future.
