Do Recent Advances in Military Technology Facilitate the Possession of Nuclear Weapons?

There is a widespread view that technological advances in recent years have facilitated the production of nuclear weapons, and therefore the desire of some countries to possess these weapons has increased. In parallel with the expansion of the areas of use such as energy, medicine, etc., the fact that many countries have begun to acquire the technologies capable of making these weapons by disguising them for various purposes is seen as a factor that facilitates the possession of nuclear weapons. 

One of the potential sources of critical raw materials for nuclear weapons is the fuel rods stored after use in nuclear power plants. The enrichment of these rods at a rate of 3.5-4% is sufficient for nuclear power reactors, up to 20% is considered reasonable, and a further increase in the rate means producing weapons (Önder, 2013 p.37). Currently, 57 countries in the world have nuclear power plants and research reactors and some countries, including Turkey, are under construction. It is estimated that at least 40 of these countries will have the infrastructure and know-how to build nuclear weapons in 5-10 years or less.

Most of these plants are located in countries with nuclear weapons. The number of countries supplying fuel is also quite small. The International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) is authorized to inspect these plants. However, there is no inspection obligation for plants in countries that are considered legal nuclear states under the NPT. The NPT divides countries into two groups: those that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not, and prohibits those in the first group from transferring this technology and weaponry to others, while those in the second group are prohibited from conducting nuclear research other than for peaceful purposes. India, Pakistan and Israel are not signatories to the treaty. North Korea signed the treaty but later withdrew.

Another concern is that some of the equipment designed for other purposes could be used for weapons development. The most critical phase is the final stage of development, when testing is carried out for testing. To prevent this, some sanctions have been imposed under the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT), or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as it is known internationally. Considering the level of technological developments, there are concerns that weapons production technology can be acquired without conducting a detonation test and that the treaty is insufficient in this regard (Garwin, 1997). 

However, at this point, the distinction between intentions and capabilities is the area where the most attention is focused in terms of control. Some countries try to conceal their intentions through covert activities in order to avoid external repercussions and to gain the capability to produce nuclear weapons. One way to do this is to launch a large civilian nuclear program, including enrichment and reprocessing, and to use this program as a means to conceal the real intentions. There is no requirement for a governmental declaration of a proliferation policy and no obligation to inform other countries. In recent years, Iran has become the center of controversy with its activities in this context. The main point of contention regarding Iran is its failure to comply with the agreement as a signatory to the NPT and the allegations that it intends to change the level of enriched uranium from energy production to weapons production. Iran, on the other hand, claims that all of its work is related to nuclear energy, that any state can work to have this energy, and that it has no intention of producing nuclear weapons. 

What is the Impact of Ballistic Missile Developments on Nuclear Weapons?

Ballistic missiles have often been mentioned together with nuclear weapons. This is because these missiles are the most important means of delivery besides airplanes. In fact, missiles themselves are not weapons of mass destruction, but when used with warheads carrying weapons of mass destruction, they can turn into weapons of terror. The danger of missiles also stems from the difficulties in developing effective defenses against them. In recent years, the emergence of hypersonic missiles that can fly well above the speed of sound has exacerbated this threat. This is because existing defense systems are inadequate against the capabilities of these missiles. Even if a usable nuclear bomb is produced, it is not possible to send a message to the other side without a means to deliver it to the target. 

In order to have the capability of mutual destruction, capabilities that will enable the nuclear bomb to reach its target must also be developed. One of these is to carry it by airplanes and the other method is to deliver it to the target with missiles. Weapons carried on submarines are also delivered to their targets using missiles. One of the most technologically difficult aspects of the work is the downsizing of a nuclear bomb capable of detonating and placing it in the nose of a carrier missile. Therefore, the control of the means of delivery and transportation is as important as the nuclear weapons themselves. Space-based warning and guidance vehicles are a complementary and important part of these capabilities in guiding these missiles to their targets. 

As with weapons of mass destruction, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established between 1984 and 1987 to prevent the proliferation of missiles. According to the rules of the MTCR, restrictions were imposed on the production and export of missiles with ranges longer than 300 km and capable of carrying 500 kg warheads. This system was first established to regulate export rules among Western countries, and then other countries joined (Karen, 2023). The FTKR was initially aimed at preventing the proliferation of missile systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons, but was later extended to unmanned aerial vehicles-UAVs and space launch systems. 

There are also restrictions on Category 2 UAVs, which can fly 200 km or more and carry explosives above certain weights. The FTKR is not an international treaty. It is an initiative that restricts the transfer of missiles, missile technologies and equipment between member and non-member countries. In case of violations of the rules, there are unilateral sanctions imposed by individual member states and often unilateral sanctions imposed by the dominant power, the United States. Sometimes these sanctions are strengthened by UNSC resolutions. However, in examples such as South Korea, the UK, Israel, etc., the US has been the party that has broken the rules and granted flexibility to these countries (Alım, 2020). 

Defense measures against Ballistic Missiles require the development of capabilities in five different areas: deterrence, early warning, active defense, counterstrike and passive defense measures. The first of these, deterrence, is a matter of a country's political, economic and military power. The main objective of deterrence is to convince the other side that the cost of action will be too high and to dissuade it from its ambitions. For deterrence to be credible, it must be supported by force. At this point, nuclear weapons stand out as an important power factor for deterrence. On the other hand, when the balance of power is disturbed in international relations, the other side feels insecure, which triggers the desire to take up arms in order to have similar capabilities. 

Note: The author co-authored this article with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersoy ÖNDER.

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