How Did Nuclear Weapons Emerge? Why were nuclear weapons developed?

In international relations, the main criterion for countries to have a say is power. In addition to military, geopolitical, economic, technological and cultural power, the possession of energy resources is another factor that increases the bargaining power of a country in international disputes. While having nuclear energy, one of these energy sources, is a resource that many states would prefer, it creates a different situation when the efforts to access this energy turn into armament. In this study, the possible effects of Turkey's desire to possess nuclear weapons are presented. Turkey was one of the closest targets of this threat during the Cold War. During the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban crisis, nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey were part of the agenda, but neither the domestic public nor military circles have adequately discussed the effects of these weapons on policy, strategy and military power. The aim of this study is to contribute to these debates.

With the delivery of fuel rods to the Akkuyu nuclear power plant on April 27, 2023, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant was declared a nuclear facility with a ceremony. In the speeches made at the ceremony, officials announced that the electricity to be supplied from this facility would meet 10% of Turkey's total electrical energy needs. At a significant time when the Republic is reaching its centenary, this development is also an important economic achievement. The nuclear fuel rods of the power plant will be stored in Turkey after use. In addition to its use in the field of energy, this immediately raises the question of whether it will be enriched and used in the production of weapons. 

Since their emergence, nuclear weapons have changed the balance of power in the world, their use is controversial in terms of moral and ethical values as they cause mass casualties, and their effects concern all of humanity due to the damage they cause to the environment. For this reason, efforts to acquire, disarm or prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons occupied the world public opinion during the Cold War. The discussions, which decreased for a while with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, have come back to the agenda more seriously than before due to the crises experienced in recent years. 

The subject of this study is not to examine the technical feasibility of such weapons by Turkey. The aim of this study is to reveal the possible effects of Turkey's nuclear weapons as an option within its security strategy. The study first examines the emergence of nuclear weapons, how they have changed the perception of threat, attempts to prevent their proliferation and testing, means of delivery, the nature of the power provided by these weapons, the reasons for countries' desire to possess nuclear weapons, and the need for Turkey to become a nuclear power. 

Turkey experienced the Cold War period as one of the closest targets of this threat. Although nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey were part of the agenda in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban Crisis (1962), their impact on policy, strategy and military power was not sufficiently discussed in domestic public and military circles. The limited number of discussions in the press and academic circles have mostly dealt with the political aspects of these weapons, while their military dimension has not been sufficiently analyzed. The aim of this study is to contribute to these debates. 

The Emergence of Nuclear Weapons in the World: 

The world was first introduced to nuclear weapons with the tests conducted by the United States in the last years of the Second World War. The US made this weapon ready for use in 1945 and was the first and last time it was used against real targets. India conducted its first test in 1974, followed by Pakistan in 1999 and finally North Korea. Israel is known to possess nuclear weapons, but no official announcement is made about their existence. Finally, in the recent operation against Hamas, an Israeli minister threatened to use nuclear weapons to completely destroy Gaza, which is a clear statement of ownership. 

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Although these weapons have been in the stockpiles of countries for a long time, their recent proliferation has raised concerns. Although the reasons for possessing nuclear weapons vary according to the conditions of each country, the prominent views are analyzed under four headings (Müller, 1997, p.62). 

Countries' Desire for More Independent and Nationalist Policies: 

In the power vacuum that emerged as a result of the disappearance of the ability of the former superpowers to control the countries in their bloc after the Cold War, the desire of some countries to gain power to ensure their security or to achieve their interests at the expense of the other side is accepted as one of the reasons that increase the risk of proliferation. In fact, although the world has been living with the threat posed by these weapons for nearly seventy years, discussions on their proliferation intensified in the period starting from the end of the Cold War. In addition, technological advances have made the construction of these weapons even easier, and improvements in ballistic missiles, which are their delivery vehicles, are other reasons for concern.

Rules and Compliance Problems in the Export of Nuclear Materials and Missile Technologies: 

Another danger that has emerged in recent years is the reluctance of some countries that possess nuclear materials to comply with the control systems for their export. In countries that have produced these materials for many years, state monopoly is no longer guaranteed. There have also been incidents of smuggling of these materials. Similarly, the spread of missile technologies cannot be fully prevented. 

Efforts to Fill the Power Gap: 

It has been argued that the power vacuum that emerged at the end of the Cold War encouraged countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. For Western Europe, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need to possess nuclear power decreased as the conventional threat emanating from the Soviet Union disappeared. This was because NATO had adopted a deterrence strategy that envisaged the use of nuclear weapons to balance the superior military power of the other side. However, with the war between Ukraine and Russia, the threat was revived in a stronger way and decisions were taken at the last NATO summit. Apart from those that already possess nuclear weapons, there has been no development in other European countries' desire to acquire nuclear weapons. 

After unification, it has been suggested that the Federal Republic of Germany might want to acquire such a capability for prestige reasons, but Germany has not yet worked in this direction. Due to the dominant role of the US in the European security architecture, Germany does not have much room for maneuver. The nuclear security umbrella that the US has committed to for Europe remains in place. In the event of a decline in the credibility or assurance of the alliance, other countries may also seek to develop weapons. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that if the European Union's efforts to create its own military force independent of NATO gain momentum, such a request could also be on the agenda. It should not be forgotten that one of the reasons why France produced its own weapons at the beginning of the Cold War was that it did not trust the protection provided by the United States. One of the reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war was Ukraine's desire to become a NATO member and Russia's threat perception that would change. In 1994, Ukraine returned its nuclear weapons to Russia under a treaty. After the cessation of hostilities, even if Ukraine is not accepted as a member of NATO, it can be predicted that it will seek to develop nuclear weapons against Russia. It has the know-how in this regard. It would not be wrong to think that the US may tolerate this request, even though it is against the NPT treaty. 

The emerging balance of power in eastern Asia after the emergence of China as a superpower may lead to some developments in the field of nuclear weapons. Japan, which has so far been protected by the security umbrella provided by the United States, is likely to want to acquire new capabilities that will reassure itself as it has a high potential to become a target in the growing tension between the two superpowers. After China and Russia conducted joint exercises near Japan, the Japanese Prime Minister made it clear that the level of threat to his country has greatly increased. The United States should not be expected to object too much to Japan's desire to do so as the competition intensifies. Its supply of nuclear submarines to Australia is a sign of this. 

When countries such as India, Russia and North Korea are taken into account alongside China, it is seen that nuclear armament efforts in Asia will be higher than in the rest of the world. It is noteworthy that four of the nine members of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (China, Russia, India and Pakistan) possess nuclear weapons, even though it does not yet have a NATO-like function. Iran, a new member of this organization, is also on the public agenda to develop weapons.

Note: The author cowrote this article together with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersoy ÖNDER.

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