How should the Turkish Foreign Military Sales System for the Turkish Defence Industry be?
Who are the actors and structures responsible for foreign military sales in the Turkish Defence Industry? Does Turkey, which has reached a certain level in the defence industry and is increasing its export efforts every day, need a system that will handle Foreign Military Sales in a holistic manner? If there is a need, what kind of a system can be established?
Introduction
Until the early 2000s, Turkey was not self-sufficient in the defence industry and had to meet its needs mostly from foreign sources. However, over the years, the level of indigenisation in the Turkish Defence Industry has reached a significant level. In addition, although Turkey still supplies military products and materials from abroad, it has also become a foreign seller. The annual export revenue of the Turkish Defence Industry reached approximately USD 3.7 billion as of November 2022. These figures do not include service and training revenues.
During the Ottoman Empire, various weapons and systems were procured from Germany, France and the UK. During the national struggle, weapons and equipment were received from Russia as military aid. During the foundation years of the Republic, personalities such as Nuri Killigil, Şakir Zümre and Nuri Demirağ took the first steps of the Turkish Defence Industry and made significant progress in the production of weapon systems and aircraft.
As a result of the Johnson Letter regarding Cyprus after the Cuban Crisis and the embargo imposed by the USA on Turkey after the Cyprus Peace Operation and poppy cultivation in 1975, the first initiatives to raise the defence industry in Turkey to its current level had begun. The "Turkish Naval Association" was founded in 1965 and led the "Build Your Own Ship" campaign, especially for the construction of landing ships. Similarly, the "Turkish Air Force Foundation" was established in 1970 to develop our national aviation industry. After the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, Turkey was faced with an arms embargo imposed on it, and in order to mitigate the negative effects of this embargo, the first steps of today's modern national defence industry were taken in this period. In the same year, the "Turkish Land Forces Strengthening Foundation" was established. Later, with the establishment of ASELSAN in 1976, Turkey took its first steps into the world-scale defence industry arena. Later on, in 1987, the TAFF was established, which gathered companies such as ASELSAN, ROKETSAN and HAVELSAN under its umbrella, and subsequently, these steps in the defence industry have grown in the recent period and initiated a process that has led ASELSAN to become the 49th company in the world in the field of defence.
Today, the Turkish defence industry has reached a level where it is able to produce almost all components of ships, helicopters, tanks, armoured vehicles and various weapon systems, except for engines. A great progress has been made in the production of engines to be used in land, naval and air vehicle systems. Currently, Turkey has reached an important level in unarmed and armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs/UAVs/UAVs), which is characterised as a "Game Changer". As a result, in recent years, Turkish Defence Industry weapon and vehicle systems have attracted great interest from abroad. Especially due to the performances of Turkish UAVs/UAVs in Syria, Libya, Karabakh and most recently in the Ukraine-Russia War, the interest in Turkish Defence Industry products in general has also increased.
It is understood that there is no problem for the Turkish Armed Forces to purchase combat weapon vehicles and systems from foreign countries, which are examined in detail in the following sections of the study. Moreover, the export potential of Turkish Defence Industry companies has increased considerably. Undoubtedly, the contribution of the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) to the creation of the export market is considerable. However, what is important here is that after a system is sold, the maintenance of that system in the country where it is sold, and the uninterrupted supply of spare parts for that system. In other words, all services must be provided to the user within the scope of Life Cycle Logistics. If this system is established successfully and without interruption, more defence industry products can be exported than at present, and the defence industry can become an important instrument of foreign policy.
It is also necessary to keep a very good record of all the records of the exported weapon systems at the sub-division level. This is because, although this issue does not pose a problem at the moment, it may lead to situations that may put Turkey in legal difficulties in the international arena in the years to come. Because understanding and ensuring that the weapons and systems sold are in the hands of the right end users is also an important prestige issue in the international system.
For many reasons such as user-specific technology management, geostrategy, commercial competition, international sanctions and mechanisms, it may be necessary to control and monitor the production, pricing, transfer/delivery and usage principles of exported critical defence industry products even while they are in the inventory of the country/institution to which they are delivered. In addition to these, it is very important that the defence industry is established on a sustainable basis. This is also a vital issue for the continuation of foreign military sales after the needs of domestic users have been met. In the meantime, it should be noted that Life Cycle Logistics is a concept that has emerged with the increase in technology in weapon systems in recent years. Accordingly, it is the provision of all necessary logistic support from the initial purchase of any system to the user until it is removed from the inventory.
The aim of this study is to examine the legal aspects, theoretical structure and actors of the Turkish Defence Industry's foreign procurement and sales system with a holistic approach. Then, according to the determinations to be obtained from this examination, it is to reach a conclusion by stating the problem areas and solution suggestions about how the Turkish Defence Industry Foreign Sales system can be.
As the main problematic of the study; Who are the actors and structures responsible for foreign military sales in the Turkish Defence Industry? Does Turkey, which has reached a certain level in the defence industry and increases its export efforts every day, need a system that will handle Foreign Military Sales in a holistic manner? If there is a need, what kind of a system can be established? The issues have been determined. According to the results obtained as a result of the analyses and evaluations to be made while revealing the answers to the problematic, what needs to be done in order for the Turkish Defence Industry to make effective foreign military sales and its applicability have been concretely analysed.
Since defence industry issues are perceived as a technical subject in academic circles, the interest of social sciences academics in this field is generally limited. This is because the defence industry is generally approached on a system basis. For this reason, existing weapon systems and equipment are mostly handled on a project basis by those from within the sector or by academics working in the field of engineering in the academic world. Another reason for this approach is that in recent years, defence industry projects have become popular with the public and have attracted the attention of the younger generation. However, defence industry is one of the most important elements of foreign policy today. All countries with the potential to export defence industry, especially the USA, approach this issue systematically. For this reason, Foreign Military Sales are linked to a system and mechanism in the relevant countries. The main reason for this is that military relations affect political and economic relations. For this reason, in Turkey, there is a need to establish this field in a holistic and holistic manner that will involve all parties, will not cause interruptions, and will be state guaranteed and reliable. So far, in the academic world, the relationship between the defence industry and security and international relations in the context of social sciences is not at the desired level. For this reason, it is foreseen that this need can be met to a certain extent with this study and at least an awareness can be created in these areas.
The qualitative research method was mainly used in the article. The information and documents in the literature were examined, and then a conclusion was reached by analysing and evaluating the results of the information obtained by this method. Since the subject is still alive, developing and in need of development, both primary and secondary sources have been utilised equally. In addition, personal interviews were conducted with the experts of the subject and the technical dimension of the work was also discussed.
The study is expected to contribute to the academic literature in two areas: methodological and empirical. Methodologically, the Turkish Defence Forces military foreign procurement and sales system has been analysed and thus, the channels that constitute a large part of Turkey's foreign military procurement have been examined and the issues related to the establishment of a model have been revealed. Empirically, the Turkish Defence Industry foreign military sales system is presented as a model for the first time. According to the results obtained from the methodological and empirical propositions, the components of the system to be established in this regard are specified. Since the article is an original study in this field, it is foreseen that it will make a significant contribution to both the academic literature and the Turkish Defence Industry.
Following the above-mentioned introductory chapter, the second chapter presents the theoretical structure, the third chapter examines the Foreign Military Procurement and Sales System of the Ministry of National Defence (MND) and the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB), and the fourth chapter presents the proposed Turkish Foreign Military Sales System as a new model to be established. In the concluding section, the answer to the initial research question and a summary of the issues are summarised.
Theoretical Approach
Realism can be defined as the approach of countries to international relations in terms of power and balance of powers, and in cases where authority is lost, it can be described as ensuring the anarchic order in line with their own interests by using force. According to some theorists, realism is even used as the equivalent of realpolitik in international relations. Power and the balance of powers, which are important issues of realism, are very important for the continuity of international relations.
Dependency theory is a concept built on the interdependence of countries in international relations, especially in the economic field. However, dependence in the military field affects the relations of the related countries in almost all fields as a process. Traditionalists state that continuity and military dependence are very important in world politics and that this factor exists in today's world. Of course, as military dependence has become multidimensional today, economic, social and ecological dependence has also come to the fore.
Since the Cold War period, military dependence has come to the forefront as an instrument that the US has been involved in world politics. At that time, this phenomenon was perceived as a power against the Soviet and Chinese threats with realist approaches. Against these threats, the US provided assistance to the European States through the Marshall Plan, to Turkey and Greece through mutual agreements, and to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand in the Far East, both in terms of military supplies and defence and security.
It can be said that Turkey, and therefore the Turkish Armed Forces, started to meet its procurement needs from abroad within the scope of the Truman Doctrine. During this period of tense relations between Turkey and the USSR, on 21 February 1947, the UK informed US President Truman that it could not continue its aid to Turkey and Greece due to the difficulties it was experiencing and that it would cease this aid as of 01 April 1947. After the issue was put on the US agenda, the UK's proposal was presented to the US Congress on 12 March 1947 by President Truman on behalf of Turkey and Greece and urgent support was requested for these countries. In his speech to the Congress, Truman stated that the independence of Turkey and Greece was under threat from inside and outside the country, and that if the US did not help these countries, a totalitarian regime would emerge in Turkey and Greece and people would lose their freedom. It would be understood in the following years that these aids were not only intended to protect the independence of the countries, but also to prevent the spread of communism and to create a belt to encircle the Soviet Union. After the Truman Doctrine, the maintenance of the weapons and systems that entered the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) as grants and military aid led to the need for continuous procurement from the USA in the field of defence. Moreover, this issue led to Turkey's positioning in the Western camp and military dependence on the USA in the aftermath of World War II. This military dependence naturally led to the pursuit of politically pro-US and pro-Western policies. Because military dependence led to dependence or co-production of policies in almost every field.
Every country seeks to protect its national interests through various means. One of these is the search for alliances. One of the important issues that determine which alliances countries will be involved in is the "Grand Strategy" of that country, that is, its own national policy. Another issue that determines the position of countries in the concept of alliance is the "Balance of Power" or "Bandwagoner-Wagon" status of that country. These countries need one or more locomotives, just like the wagons in a train carriage. Therefore, these countries are called countries that cannot make their defence on their own, and therefore need to participate where the majority and power centre is located in one or more countries in order to make their defence. Thus, while these countries need alliances to better defend themselves, countries with a balance of power want to have more say in the international system as a leading country.
The establishment of NATO and the Soviet Union's establishment of the Warsaw Pact had a significant impact on the defence industry becoming an effective foreign policy tool. Because after the alliances were determined in this way, the standards of the weapon systems and equipment used by these alliances were also determined with distinctive features. In the course of time, due to the high-tech nature of military systems and equipment, this divergence has become increasingly apparent and this situation has become the West-East or US-Russia axis. In recent years, China has also started to be included in this axis. At this stage, a country started to act politically and economically with the country whose weapon systems it uses. Because military systems consisted of expensive, complex, complex equipment that required a long time to be replaced, that is, equipment that required adaptation and specific training for use. In other words, even if a country wants to, it cannot give up the systems it uses in a short time and switch to the weapon systems of another country. The best example of this is that most of the weapon systems of the countries that were in the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War but are now NATO members are still Russian-made. In fact, countries such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria gave their Russian-made weapons and equipment to Ukraine for ease of use in the Russia-Ukraine War.
NATO member states can procure and use weapons systems produced by another country within the alliance or alliance, provided that they comply with the agreed military standards. In practice, the US arms industry, which is the largest producer, is the main supplier for other countries. As new systems enter the US military inventory as a result of military doctrine and technological developments, the old ones are transferred to other countries under the name of aid or exports, creating a system that creates continuous demand for defence industry companies. Thus, the existence of a common threat for the member states in the Western camp facilitated the consensus among the members for the development of similar weapon systems in armament and modernisation programmes against it. Related to this, Turkey was willing to receive more military aid in proportion to the magnitude of the perceived threat to itself during the Cold War.
The first academic consideration of the establishment of a Turkish Foreign Military Sales System was raised in a study conducted in 2019. In this study, it is stated that defence industry is one of the areas that need to be developed in Turkey's relations with Sub-Saharan African (SAA) countries after 2008. In order to ensure the sustainability of the defence industry relations to be established with SAA countries, it is foreseen in this study that a structure similar to the US FMS (Foreign Military Sales) system should be established.
Ministry of National Defence (MSB) Foreign Procurement and Sales System
There is currently no system and structure that manages the sales of Turkish Defence Industry products abroad with a holistic approach. For this reason, although this issue may not be fully realised at the moment, it is foreseen that some problem areas related to foreign military sales may emerge in the near future. It can be stated that these problems are the issues of ensuring the continuity, registration, inventory and end-user control of the weapons and systems sold to the relevant countries, and the use of the Turkish Defence Industry as a tool in foreign policy. Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces have experienced this issue especially in the early 2000s. At that time, a number of electronic equipment of various models and brands had been purchased from abroad as part of the fight against terrorism. Since the repair and maintenance of these systems was dependent on foreign countries, it took a long time for a malfunctioning system to be put back into service. This issue naturally led Turkey to other countries other than these countries and to channels such as domestic production. The same issue was also valid for the systems purchased from Russia as part of the fight against terrorism. Because there was no harmony in the logistics and supply system between Russia and Turkey. As a result, both the purchase from Russia was stopped and the spare parts of the existing vehicles were met with domestic or other external procurement opportunities. In other words, if Turkey fails to establish a state-guaranteed and state-organised structure for the war weapons and systems that it currently exports, it may cause the countries to which it sells arms to experience the same events that it has experienced before, and it may experience a reverse "deja vu" in this sense.
It can be stated that another issue that increases the need for this issue is related to the developments in the MoD and the SSB after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. In the aftermath of this attempt, while the structure of the General Staff was weakened, the structure of the MoD was further strengthened, and the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) was transformed into the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB), separated from the MoD and directly connected to the Presidency. Therefore, although the relationship between the two organisations (MSB-SSB), which support the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to a great extent in terms of external procurement, continues on a task and project basis, there is no longer a direct administrative link. For this reason, it is currently foreseen that there is a need for an intermediate unit that will regulate and keep records of export-oriented sales in the defence industry, and ensure the uninterrupted logistic needs of exported defence industry products in the relevant countries. This new system should be in a structure that will ensure that contract management, follow-up communication, international management and supervision activities between the MoD-SSB, the relevant company/companies and the relevant country/countries are carried out in a certain standardisation and visibility.
Legal Dimension
In SD 1325 on the establishment and organisation of the Ministry of National Defence (MoND), among the duties of the MoND is the regulation of the logistics activities of the Turkish Armed Forces. In other words, there is no mention of foreign military sales in the law. In addition, SD 3212 covers the sale, grant, transfer and disposal of surplus goods and services of the Armed Forces; foreign and domestic purchases on behalf of other states; and foreign personnel to be trained. Therefore, both laws do not approach the issue of continuous, regular and controllable foreign sales in the Turkish Defence Industry in a holistic manner, and only address the issue of the TAF's surplus material and grants.
Following the transition to the presidential government system, the organisation and duties of the MoD were also redefined. In the new organisation, a Deputy Directorate General was established under the General Directorate of Procurement Services, and a Department of International Procurement was established under it. Therefore, international procurement is carried out under this department. However, it is understood that there is currently no unit in the Ministry of National Defence for International Procurement.
In general, one of the areas of co-operation in a military agreement with a country is "Co-operation in the Field of Logistics and Training". Of course, although it is not explicitly stated here, defence industry issues and related training issues may naturally be included in the content of this agreement. If one of the parties feels a need in this regard, it reveals its intention within the scope of the agreement, and long processes such as the preparation and implementation of a separate MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) are determined for each subject needed. In other words, the same procedures are repeated for each case. In addition, the registration issue remains in a vacuum. Such an approach may create dissatisfaction in the relevant country in the long run. Because the procedures are constantly repeated. If this is not done, then Turkey loses control over the systems it exports and may face unfavourable situations in foreign policy.
In the case of such cooperation or the sale of a military weapon/system by a defence industry company other than a subsidiary of the TAFF, the MoD or the SSB acts as an intermediary for the sale, the necessary permits are granted within the scope of the 5201 SD, and then the initiative is taken between the company and the relevant country authorities. In other words, although the MoD and the SSB have some duties especially in the initial phase of the foreign sale, they do not have duties and responsibilities in the control and supervision of the process. When a problem arises in the process, the MoD, the SSB and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) step in as the relevant authorities, but sometimes it is too late to solve these problems.
With the Presidential Government System, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) has been transformed into the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) and directly affiliated to the Presidency. Therefore, it is understood that the Ministry of Defence has almost no more authority, especially with regard to foreign sales, except for the issues specified in the 5201 SD. Currently, the MoD plays a decisive role in the majority of foreign sales. It is also understood that there is no duty related to foreign sales among the duties of the Presidency specified in the sixth article of the decree. However, it is understood that the International Cooperation Department, which carries out the promotion and marketing of the Presidency, carries out some of this task from the issues such as fairs, cooperation agreements, etc. that are shared with the public. However, it is understood that issues such as policy formulation, continuous life cycle, logistic support, record keeping, supervision and evaluation remain in the middle.
At the current stage, although the Ministry of National Defence does not have any enforcement authority, especially in the scope of exports, the "List of Materials Subject to Control" is published in the Official Gazette every year regarding the products to be imported and exported within the framework of the 5201 SDL. In other words, the authorisation procedures for both export and import of these products are carried out under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defence. Of course, the authorisation procedures are carried out on a "case by case basis" for each requirement.
MSB Foreign Procurement (Procurement) System Current Situation
The procurement of materials and services required by the TAF is generally carried out by the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Defence. In other words, TAF's foreign military procurement system also constitutes the foreign military sales system of the related countries and organisations. Therefore, a detailed examination of the foreign procurement system of the Turkish Defence Industry enables the study to be handled from two perspectives.
US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement and System:
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a system in which US-made military equipment is sold to the relevant countries. The Ministry of National Defence procures almost all of the systems to be procured from the USA through this mechanism. The characteristic of the system is that it is government-to-government. Therefore, since it is government-to-government, its reliability is quite high. The FMS system is managed by the "Defence Security Cooperation Agency" within the US Department of Defence. In other words, this unit is responsible for the entire process from the receipt of the request from the relevant country to the dispatch and delivery of the material to that country. How the FMS system works is explained in the table below.
Another feature of the FMS system is that supplies are procured from force commands and logistics-related units instead of companies. Most of the weapon systems and materials requested are systems in the inventory of the US armed forces or systems produced through programmes conducted by the Ministry of Defence. Naturally, the force commands procure these materials from the relevant companies. The recipient country deals with the Ministry of Defence, not with the companies. In this way, the buyer country not only purchases a material that has passed through the production and control systems of the US Department of Defence, but also receives support from the established systems in terms of training, maintenance, spare parts supply and usage procedures. In this way, the seller has the opportunity to maintain full control over the weapon and material. The FMS system is in fact a direct military foreign sales policy tool through which the US manages programmes in approximately 160 countries. The US has established, used and still continues to use the FMS system in order to implement its policies in the relevant countries, to maintain regional balances and to impose certain sanctions. FMS procurement requests from the relevant countries are submitted to the US Department of Defence after going through approval processes at various levels. For example, the sections of the request form filled in by the US authorities include questions such as Could the provision of this material change the balance in the region? Are the materials to be provided likely to be used against US elements? Forms evaluated according to these and similar questions play a role in the acceptance or rejection of procurement requests. The US continuously updates and publishes a document called the "Green Book", which describes how the system works, in order to update the FMS processes and to train the countries that will join the system. In this book, which is called 'Green Book' because of its outer cover, all forms and documents related to FMS are explained with examples.
The strengths of the FMS system can be stated as follows. Since it is an intergovernmental system, its reliability is recognised. The quality, safety and standards of the products are at a high level. In addition, even if the weapon system sold to the relevant countries ceases to be used in the US army, it allows uninterrupted supply to be maintained. Of course, a commitment is received from the relevant country as to how long this system will be used. In fact, it can be said that this is its most important feature. In other words, the country concerned, which purchases any weapon system, knows that it will not have any spare parts problems until it removes that weapon system from its inventory. In fact, in time, spare parts for some weapon systems are no longer produced in the USA. However, since the relevant country has a certain level of dependence on the USA in terms of military equipment, this dependence is maintained by switching to a higher model weapon system. Another advantage of the system is that FMS credits can be used. Since this loan is in the form of a government-to-government loan, the interest conditions are more attractive, and since the buyer party provides a treasury guarantee in return, the risk for the companies is eliminated.
The weakness of the system is that it has a complex process. The complexity of these problems is that the system is carried out with procurement practices and software that are not widely used in the Ministry of National Defence. Although it is mentioned in the Green Book that the 'cases' opened according to the product and system are closed, since a chapter remains open for decades for some spare parts, it may be difficult for the requirements authorities of the relevant country to control the source in each chapter. Another problem of the system is that the replenishment period sometimes takes an unreasonably long time. In the functioning of the system, an end-user certificate is requested from the receiving party. This document is a commitment. In this way, it is aimed to prevent a material sold or donated from falling into the hands of a user that the US does not want. This document is requested not only for the main material, but also for the sales of spare parts or units that make up the main material. For example, it is understood from the news in the press that the problem that arose during the sales process of ATAK helicopters to other countries was that the end-user approval of the helicopter engine supplied was obtained for Turkey.
From the US perspective, the system is important as it provides complete control over the defence systems it exports. However, despite this control, the issue of how Iran obtains spare parts for US-origin aircraft from the Shah era is constantly questioned in the international arena. Again, the scandals concerning the US arms sales to the contras in Nicaragua and to Iran in the past, involving Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, are still in the memory. In fact, both incidents are an indication of the use of the defence industry in foreign policy.
The US FMS system does not only cover weapons and systems or spare parts. The FMS platform also includes training and service procurement from large systems (ships, aircraft, etc.). In large purchases, joint production facilities, maintenance facilities, production under licence, etc. can be procured through the FMS channel within the scope of a project. In short, it includes all goods and service items related to defence industry and security whose source is the state or whose procurement is carried out under the mediation or supervision of the state. The use of FMS procedures is mandatory for the sales method of all goods and services whose source is any government unit and all goods and services that are permitted to be transferred only through this channel in the relevant legislation, even if they are of commercial origin. It is possible to prefer the FMS method in the procurement of any product that does not fall under this definition at the discretion of the buyer.
In the programme structure of the FMS procurement method, there is a pre-approval process at levels varying according to the nature of the scope, financial size and source. These approvals are defined at different levels, ranging from the relevant military unit to the need to inform the US Congress under certain conditions. Therefore, the interest of the FMS is to be used in projects and situations that have completed the legal process. In this respect, the FMS system is not a system that replaces the legislative and executive branches, but a system that regulates foreign military sales according to the rules set by the executive approval and authorisation.
Therefore, following a general agreement signed with the relevant country and approved by the legislature, the process is in a position to operate indefinitely if desired. However, it should not be inferred from this that every weapon system requested is met without question. The recent exclusion of Turkey from the joint production of the F-35 and the problems arising in the purchase of F-16s can be given as examples. In fact, the US FMS system is activated after the approval of such sales is decided. However, sometimes the US directs its foreign policy by invoking the FMS. In fact, in recent years, the US considers foreign military sales so important in foreign policy that it enacted the CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) law in December 2017 for situations where countries are against US policy and interests. Another example of the US using the defence industry as a foreign policy tool is the US National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA), which is passed in November every year and must be approved by the US President as soon as possible, specifying the US Department of Defence expenditures for the coming year. Especially after 2018, restrictions on military aid or arms sales to the relevant countries by opposition senators or political groups are included in this law. Therefore, since the US President has to sign this law, he may have to approve the restrictions included in this law by opposition senators or groups, even if he does not want to. However, if these restrictions were passed by the Congress through another law, the incumbent president or subsequent presidents would not approve the relevant law if they did not want to, and thus the wishes of the opposition senators would not be realised.
NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) Procurements:
These are the procurements made by the MoND through the NSPA, whose headquarters are located in Luxemburg. The process of these procurements is simpler. The process is as follows.
The country concerned notifies NSPA of its request directly through its own liaison staff. NSPA, in turn, procures systems, weapons, equipment and services on behalf of NATO to member states or programme member states. Although member states use this method as external procurement, in fact, the relevant systems and equipment are procured through various companies, member states and even FMS and supplied to the country in need. Sometimes, depending on the urgency of the situation, the required materials can even be purchased from the companies of countries with which Turkey has problems. Because NSPA uses all procurement methods, including tenders, on behalf of the relevant country. In other words, NSPA acts as an intermediary between the country in need and the company. In addition, in recent years, NSPA has also been providing service procurement in NATO operations. For example, in Afghanistan, NSPA has provided services such as base establishment, establishment of security systems, mine clearance, and funeral transport for countries in need.
Another striking issue in the NSPA system is that Turkish companies are not sufficiently effective in this system. In other words, Turkish companies are not effective in supplying products to NSPA to the desired extent.
Purchases made through the German Armed Forces Cooperation Office:
Purchases of weapons and systems supplied from Germany, especially Leopard tanks. This organisation is under the direct connection and control of the German Government. After the unification of the two Germans, surplus materials were disposed of through this system by way of donation or sale to support foreign policy. This organisation is still an important foreign policy instrument for Germany.
In order to further increase the widespread use of Leopard tanks, Germany has also established a group under the name of "Leopard User Countries - Leo User Nations - LEOBEN" to ensure that the logistics and training activities of Leopard tanks can be carried out jointly. Countries in this group can even exchange Leopard tanks among themselves. By combining the spare parts needs of the countries using Leopard tanks through this group, it contributes to more favourable contracts for the German industry. In addition, the user opinions provided through these groups also contribute to material development studies by providing the results obtained through the use of weapon systems in different geographies and operational environments as feedback to the manufacturer.
Procurement through Attaché Offices and Foreign Representative Offices:
The MoD sometimes makes purchases through military attaché offices or foreign representations in countries that do not have any permanent co-operation with Turkey or in countries where the materials it needs are located.
Purchases from Overseas Organisations and Companies:
OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement/Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation) is a convention established in 1982 between Germany, France and Italy to act jointly in the defence industry. Over time, the Netherlands-Belgium-Spain and the United Kingdom have also become members. Turkey has the status of "Non-Member, Participating State" in the group. So far, the group has produced many weapon systems and equipment, from the MILAN anti-tank weapon to the A400M aircraft. As a participating country, Turkey can procure some weapons and systems from the group, as in the case of the A400M. Current Status of the MSB Foreign Sales System The MSB does not have a unit that organises any foreign sales system in its current organisation. However, as mentioned before, the MoND controls the import and export of war weapons and vehicles within the scope of the 5201 SD. In addition, in accordance with the bilateral agreements signed with each other, it acts as a coordinator for the needs related to the defence industry and tries to meet the needs of the relevant country by repeating separate processes for each situation and need. In other words, there is no system in which the requirements from abroad can be accepted continuously and rapidly, every stage can be monitored, and institutional control over the materials can be ensured. This is because the establishment and authorisations of the MoD and the SSM do not legally specify such a duty. While such an issue may not have been on the agenda for the MoD, which met its needs largely through foreign procurement until a certain period, it is foreseen that this task is a priority need for the Turkish Defence Industry institutions and companies that have reached a high level of competence in domestic production.
Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) Foreign Procurement and Sales System Current Situation
SSB Foreign Procurement System:
The Presidency of Defence Industries also uses other external procurement methods and systems used by the MoD, primarily FMS and NSPA. While fulfilling the decisions taken by the Defence Industry Executive Committee, the SSB has the authority to take initiatives to purchase the necessary systems from abroad when necessary. Of course, what is important here is to meet the needs of civilian defence industry companies (excluding TAFF and SSB companies). Because FMS is a state-to-state system. In other words, it prevents both US companies and foreign companies from purchasing weapons systems or services directly from the USA. If a civilian defence industry company requires material from the FMS for a system to be supplied to the Turkish Armed Forces, it can usually meet this requirement through the SSB or the Ministry of National Defence.
There is also another problematic issue here. This is how a civilian defence industry company (excluding TAF and SSB companies) can procure the materials it needs from abroad. For example, how a civilian defence industry company can procure imported products for the systems it makes for a third country. In this case, the companies themselves contact and procure the materials and systems. However, this creates problems such as the recent Canadian government's refusal to supply the cameras used in IHAs/SIHAs due to "End User" conditions. For this reason, it is important to have a system for the procurement of especially critical systems required by civil defence industry companies. The structure to be established can also fulfil this need.
SSB Foreign Sales System:
Currently, the sale of Turkish defence industry products to foreign countries is based on the decisions taken by the Defence Industry Executive Committee (SSİK). This is because Presidential Decree No: 7 states that this will be done within the scope of "coordinating the export of defence industry products and offset issues". However, as stated in the same decree, the foreign sales responsibility of the Presidency is not fully specified. In other words, the Presidency concludes the process by coordinating each request from abroad with the Ministry of National Defense and the relevant foundation companies and defence industry companies. Therefore, the Presidency provides this system on a project basis, using similar methods for each situation. Here, the SSB actually acts as a kind of intermediary for the export of Turkish Defence Industry products. As mentioned before, the SSB actually takes the initiative to a certain extent in this regard. However, so far, a structure that can meet all needs in a holistic manner has not been established in accordance with this purpose. Naturally, when a problem area is encountered in these matters, the SSB can intervene in the matter. However, this problem solving is not based on a system and approach, and is done on a case-by-case basis.
In other words, the SSB either provides the necessary requirements for the maintenance and sustainment of any system that it mediates the export of abroad, either by including it in the project or by making a new effort for each individual case. Furthermore, it has no responsibility for the control and follow-up of the products sold over time. Because it does not have such an organisation and structure. Currently, it can fulfil this issue to a certain extent. However, if the Turkish Defence Industry continues to grow in this manner, it will reach a structure that cannot be sustained by the individual efforts of the companies. Therefore, it will become more important to meet all demands from abroad in a timely and continuous manner, and this will also be a reason for Turkish Defence Industry products to be preferred. In fact, what is important here is the establishment of a system in which the spare parts and even the training that a sold system will need will be provided continuously and in a short time, and which will not be sacrificed to bureaucracy. In other words, it is important to establish a proactive system that foresees the solution of problems before they occur and the continuity of the system.
Sometimes companies take the initiative in this regard and take initiatives within the scope of the existing legislation. However, sometimes the relevant company may also suffer losses from these initiatives.
Foreign Military Sales Systems and Structures of Other Countries
United Kingdom (DESA):
In the UK, the sale of surplus British Army equipment and new or refurbished military equipment is carried out by DESA (Defence Equipment Sale Authority) under the Ministry of Defence. This organisation is the only authorised organisation for foreign military sales in the UK. The objectives of DESA have been determined by the British Ministry of Defence as follows.
-To maximise the supply of the Ministry of Defence,
-Providing the necessary legal and environmental requirements,
-Creating opportunities for Foreign Military Sales,
-Creating development and growth opportunities for British industry.
DESA also states that it works closely with the British Defence Industry companies. It is understood that the organisation selects specific companies for each class of military equipment and shares them with potential customers (governments and companies) and conducts foreign sales within a certain system.
France (DGA):
The DGA (La Direction Générale d'Armement) in France was established in 1961 and meets all the needs of the French Armed Forces. The DGA is more similar to the SSB in Turkey. However, it is also responsible for the foreign sales of the materials used by the French Army and the French Defence Industry.
South Korea (DAPA):
The Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) in South Korea is a similar organisation to the SSB in Turkey. DAPA both produces military systems and equipment for the South Korean Armed Forces and coordinates the sale of South Korean Defence Industry products to foreign countries. An example of the projects managed by DAPA in this regard is the cooperation between the Turkish and South Korean Defence Industry companies in the production of the Turkish National Main Battle Tank ALTAY.
Russia (Rosoboronexport):
State-owned organisation engaged in the sale and purchase of all military products to be exported and imported by Russia. The company's mandate explicitly states that it is to "ensure Russian national policy in the countries to which it sells military equipment". This means that the Russian Federation also considers foreign military sales as an important instrument of its foreign policy. Through Rosoboronexport, the SSB imported the S-400 air defence weapon systems from Russia, which have also occupied the public opinion.
Establishment of the Turkish Foreign Military Sales System
First of all, the Turkish Defence Industry needs a structure to meet and organise its foreign sales needs. Although it is possible for this structure to be established under various names, it is foreseen that it is appropriate to establish it under the name of the "Turkish Foreign Military Sales (TFMS)" system, taking into consideration the similar systems in the world. Considering the existing bilateral agreements and the system implemented so far, it is clear that the MoD is currently involved in foreign military sales within the scope of bilateral agreements and the 5201 SD Law. Although the MoD does not have a direct duty and organisational structure to sell the products produced by the Turkish Defence Industry to foreign countries, it is understood that it is one step ahead of the MoD in terms of "De Facto". However, the approval authority for both exported and imported military equipment is still the Ministry of National Defence. In fact, the duties carried out by both institutions with the authorisation granted to them by law have given them this experience over the years. However, there is no system established for a continuous and uninterrupted logistics supply or life cycle logistics for the maintenance and sustainment of the exported systems in the relevant country. In fact, the Turkish Defence Industry also needs such a system. Therefore, it is envisaged that the unit that will carry out the Turkish Foreign Military Sales system will be established within the SSM, in liaison with the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Industry and Technology, and other institutions and organisations that may be needed. In this way, both the institutional structure and memory of the MoND and the dynamic foreign sales experience and flexibility of the SSM can be used to control, procure, support and keep records of all kinds of defence industry products sold to foreign countries according to the life cycle logistics system.
In the light of this analysis, an independent "Foreign Military Sales Assistant Department" under the Presidency of the SSB can be established. Within the scope of the Turkish Foreign Policy (TDP), this deputy should be in a structure that can carry out the tasks of ensuring the continuity of foreign sales of Turkish Defence Industry companies, establishing an uninterrupted logistics supply chain after sales to the relevant countries, keeping the inventory of the weapons sold and coordinating the "end user" status with the units of the relevant countries. The Ministry of National Defence can carry out two tasks in this system. The first is to approve the war weapons and equipment to be exported abroad within the scope of the 5201 SD, as is currently the case, and the second is an observer role. It would be appropriate to establish the observer duty of the MoD in such a way that it controls the entire system and, when necessary, coordinates with the SSB or relevant institutions and organisations, and steps in when there is a bottleneck in the logistical support, training and maintenance of the weapon system equipment purchased from Turkey by the relevant state.
Within the scope of this system to be established; with a "blockchain" based software that will prevent delays that may occur, minimise bureaucracy, and be widely used, a request, approval, supply and registration system can be provided to all stakeholder countries without wasting time. In this way, reliability is also ensured by ensuring that every stakeholder country enters this system. The structure of the Turkish Foreign Military Sales System (TYAS- Turkish Foreign Military Sales/TFMS) can be established according to the following principles.
Conclusion
As of the current situation of the Turkish Defence Industry, foreign military sales are carried out through long coordination processes and continuous efforts. However, there is no system in place to ensure uninterrupted and timely life cycle logistic support of the sold systems in the relevant country. Perhaps the system is currently being carried out by the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Defence. However, considering that there will be an increase in foreign military sales in the coming period, it is important to establish the system in advance with a proactive approach. This is because the defence industry is a field where international competition is at a high level.
The sale of defence industry products to foreign countries under state guarantee will provide both political and financial confidence and relief to the buyer side. As a result of this confidence created in foreign countries, the sustainability and competitiveness of the Turkish Defence Industry will also be ensured. Foreign military sales are not limited to newly produced products and systems from companies. It is also important that the systems and equipment currently used by the Turkish Armed Forces are donated or sold to countries that want them. The same applies to the equipment in the inventory of the Ministry of Interior. At the current stage, the Gendarmerie, Coast Guard and the General Directorate of Security within the Ministry of Interior have the same advanced warfare weapons and vehicles as the Turkish Armed Forces. These can also be sold to foreign countries when necessary, so that more modern systems can enter the inventory at a lower cost.
With the establishment of Turkey's new system for foreign military sales, a new legal arrangement may be required to fill the legal gaps in the various laws on military sales. If the duties and responsibilities are fully specified in this regulation, institutional memory and state assurance will be fully ensured. This issue eliminates hesitations in buyer countries.
It is an important issue to prevent bureaucracy and loss of time by establishing a secure and fast procurement system where Foreign Military Sales are supported by a blockchain-based software. Access to this system is made according to the organisations (MSB-SSB-Related Country Authorities-Producer Companies/Firms) that are parties to each order opened according to the demands of the relevant countries, providing flexibility.
Defence industry is one of the new and important fields for Turkey. For this reason, it is important that academicians of social sciences, as well as academicians of engineering background, carry out studies on defence industry. In conclusion, there is a need to use Turkish defence industry products, which are expected to increase in the coming period, as an effective foreign policy instrument, and to establish a "Turkish Foreign Military Sales -TYAS" system that will be established with a sustainable and holistic approach, will fill the gaps in the existing system, and will be supported by IT systems. Additional Declaration/ Declaration In all processes of the article, TESAM's research and publication ethics principles were followed. There is no potential conflict of interest in this study. The author declares that he/she has not received financial support for this study.
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