Leading Readings of the Third World War: U.S.-China Naval Rivalry in the 2020s, Similar to the U.S.-Japanese Naval Rivalry of the 1920s

Will a rising sea power and an established sea power necessarily fight?

US interests and influence in the Western Pacific have been based on naval power for more than a century. However, China, today's rising military power, sees US naval power in the Pacific as a threat to its regional and even global rights and interests. For this reason, the Chinese leadership seems to be accelerating its quest to build an advanced naval power. This rivalry between an established naval power and an emerging naval power has historical precedents: The naval rivalry between Britain and Germany and between the United States and Japan ended in war. Nowadays, there is a rivalry between the USA and China. We are still at the beginning of this rivalry. I assess that the maturity point is 15-20 years away.

As David C. Gompert explains in his book Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific, a classic case of a rising maritime power challenging an established maritime power is currently taking shape in East Asian waters. This competition can lead to conflict, crisis or war. 

Mahan concluded that sea power is the key to world domination and requires the ability to protect access to the sea (sea control) and deny enemies access to the sea (sea denial). Mahan's ideas shaped the great sea power rivalries of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and were studied and applied by German and Japanese officers as well as proponents of American imperialism, including Theodore Roosevelt.

The United States and Great Britain provide an example of a rising maritime power challenging an established one in the late 19th century. Having established continental control and industrialised its economy, the United States turned to global naval power building to establish its global hegemony. Great Britain, which had a strong navy at the time, partly because it was dealing with more pressing problems elsewhere, and partly because of its growing economic interdependence with the United States, ultimately chose to pursue a strategy of refraining from seeing the growing naval power of the United States as a 'threat' to itself, given the convergence of the two countries' interests, including maritime security.

Meanwhile, Germany, Europe's rising power, saw Britain's naval power as a threat to its overseas reach and an obstacle to its emergence as a world power. As an extension of Germany's hegemonic potential in continental Europe, Britain calculated to co-operate with the American navy on a global scale in the face of Germany's challenge to the British navy at sea. On the other hand, it prioritised gaining power against Germany by forming an alliance with France, which, although a weak power in Europe, had a naval potential. This polarisation in Europe fuelled the arms race at sea and the growing Anglo-German enmity. Together with other factors, it contributed to the conditions that led to World War I.

The US-China Naval Rivalry in the 2020s is Similar to the US-Japan Naval Rivalry in the 1920s

Imperial Japan is also worth examining for its rising naval power in maritime history. In the 1920s, Japan, seeking to establish a regional hegemony by gaining control of East Asian waters, relentlessly expanded and modernised its navy to serve this purpose. In order to protect its own rights and interests in the Pacific against Japan, the US navy, somewhat belatedly, expanded its Pacific fleet and established advanced naval bases in the 1930s. The US Navy was deployed at points where it could interfere with Japan's expansionist operations and cut the logistic lines of the Japanese navy. In the face of the US strategy of denying Japan access to the sea in the Pacific (sea denial), Japan was forced to respond by attacking the US fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

Today, as for a long time, US interests and influence in the Western Pacific are based on naval power. The Japan of the 1920s has been replaced by China in the 2020s. Similar to Japan, the rising China sees the US naval power as a vital threat to itself and therefore seeks to expand its navy and modernise its capabilities as soon as possible.

In the Pacific, the US has a clear superiority over China in submarines and aircraft carriers. In contrast, the Chinese Navy plans to field five aircraft carriers and 10 nuclear ballistic missile submarines by 2030. It is known that China has the resources to reach this level of capability. It is covered in detail in various publications that China continues to search for "aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, logistics ships, strategic bombers, strategic transport and refuelling aircraft" until the 2030s for power projection away from its mainland.

The Chinese Navy's plan to deploy the Shenyang-developed twin-engine J-35 stealthy fifth-generation fighter jets, the F-35C equivalent of the F-35C, on Type-003 Fujian-class aircraft carriers continues as part of Chinese power building in the Pacific. These aircraft carriers are known as China's largest, most modern and most powerful aircraft carriers. With a tonnage of 80,000, Fujian is designed to be 318 metres long. Fujian; Unlike China's other two aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong, it stands out with its ski jump (a jump ramp on the bow of the ship that helps jets take off from the ship's short runway) and electromagnetic catapult launch systems (EMALS - electromagnetic aircraft launch systems). Except for the new USS Gerald Ford class, most of the US aircraft carriers still use old steam-driven catapults. In this respect, China's decision to use the EMALS system on Fujian class aircraft carriers, which is at the beginning of the road in aircraft carrier capability construction, is seen as a proper and correct step.

What does the Pentagon's 2023 Report on China's Military and Security Developments emphasise?

Published annually by the Pentagon, the '2023 Report on China's Military and Security Developments' defines China's national strategy in the context of a changing strategic environment and outlines the strategic objectives that guide its defence policy and military strategy. 

The report argues that the Chinese Army has made significant advances in military modernisation and continues to seek to expand China's navy to serve as an important catalyst in China's strategy for regional and global goals. The report states that Xi is continuing a rapid modernisation to achieve his goal of having a "world-class" military by 2049. 

The report emphasises that China is increasingly emphasising its military capabilities and accelerating its development in the Indo-Pacific region, including nuclear, space and cyberspace capabilities. In this context, the Chinese military is deepening its military ties with Russia and seeking to enhance its power projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. According to the report, China is expanding its nuclear arsenal much faster than expected. The report predicts that China's stockpile of nuclear warheads reached 500 by May 2023 and will have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030. The US has 3,750 active nuclear warheads.

The report also warns that China may be pursuing a new intercontinental missile system, which, if fielded, would allow Beijing to "threaten conventional attacks against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii and Alaska".

The Chinese military is also investing heavily in space capabilities. The Pentagon said China carried out more than 60 successful space launches in 2022, a threefold increase from five years ago. On the other hand, more than 180 satellites were put into orbit through launches, a five-fold increase compared to 2017.

China's Perspective on Middle East Issues and Its Role in the Israel-Hamas Crisis

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and specifically in the Israeli-Hamas crisis that erupted on 7 October, as Baudrillard once said in Desperate Strategies, "We live in a world where everyone knows everything and does nothing, where everyone seems to be in solidarity with everything and does not move." 

On the Palestinian issue, China has taken the stance that it is endeavouring to somehow assume a role in the Palestinian issue, either by restarting peace talks or leading the de-escalation of the situation. However, I believe it is also aware that if it fails to do so, it may lose its level of engagement in the Middle East for a long time, because the deepening crisis in the Middle East is becoming a serious problem for China. On 10 March 2023, China achieved a serious level of engagement with the Saudi-Iranian normalisation led by Beijing, but in the current situation, it is evident that China is floundering due to the historicity and complexity of the problem. 

Although it initially adopted a very harsh rhetorical discourse in the Israel-Hamas crisis, Beijing has so far been unable to put it into practice, and Chinese rhetoric aimed at ending the conflict between the parties has not worked very well. The US presence at the table of five continues to be an obstacle for the UN system to achieve a ceasefire and, more importantly, to end the 'terror' of the Israeli state in Gaza. China, together with Russia, cannot overcome this structural and systemic obstacle. Similar to the Russia-Ukraine war, the US-led Western discourse cannot be overcome in the Israel-Hamas crisis. We are witnessing that China, whose military capacity and economic power have reached global dimensions, and Russia and others with whom it acts together, are unable to dominate the dynamics that can reverse a Western-led world politics. Although the construction of an anti-Western historical bloc has accelerated with BRICS-like organisations under the leadership of China, it continues to remind us of the fact that China is not yet as powerful as the US in influencing world politics. 

In a power politics where China could deploy at least a Fujian-type aircraft carrier as a balancing force in the Eastern Mediterranean, similar to what Washington has done, which today can send two aircraft carriers to the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent regional powers, especially Iran, from starting a war against Israel alongside Hamas or Hezbollah, with a clear message to the warring parties, we can predict that Netanyahu would not have the audacity to continue massacring innocent Palestinian civilians with such ease. The Chinese navy has a capacity far from this point, but the United States knows that the situation will change in favour of China in another 15-20 years, and the 2023 Pentagon report confirms this concern.

For the time being, by taking part in the exercises in the Gulf of Aden, China shows that it seeks to improve its capability and capacity to operate in regions far from its mainland. In these days of heightened tensions between Israel and Hamas, the warships that China has sent to the Middle East are in fact ships that it has declared to be in the region for some routine exercises. Although the arrival of a new escort group to the Gulf region and the deployment of two advanced 052D destroyers to the region at a time of heightened tension are remarkable, they are naval assets that do not count against American aircraft carriers. 

Conclusion

The growing Sino-American rivalry at sea harbours dynamics that could lead to a major war in the 2040s. As emphasised in the Pentagon's 2023 Report on China's Military and Security Developments, from the US perspective, China is seen as a revisionist military power that is constantly expanding its military capabilities and capacity and cannot be ignored. The Chinese military has advantages over the US in some areas and it is believed that the US needs to do something to counter the modernisation and growth momentum of the Chinese Navy, especially at sea. 

Nevertheless, a world politics centred on China is still in its infancy. The policy pursued by China, the actor behind the scenes of the Iran-Saudi Arabia détente that took place this year, and the accompanying countries, is quite weak against the political-military strategy of the Western world that condones Israel and supports it with aircraft carriers in the Israel-Hamas Crisis that erupted on 7 October and in the ongoing war. As a result, the West gets its way. I believe that China, which seems to have not yet built the power to change this situation, needs another 15-20 years to become a global player. As the axis of the world is shifting towards the East, I believe that untimely explosions such as the Israel-Hamas crisis provide the opportunity to test the power levels of the parties in the Sino-American rivalry and for the rest of the world to position itself accordingly.

References

Dario Leone, “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Could Have 5 Aircraft Carriers, 10 Ballistic Missile Subs by 2030”, The Aviation Geek Club, 23 Ağustos 2022, https://theaviationgeekclub.com/chinese-peoples-liberation-army-navy-could-have-5-aircraft-carriers-10-ballistic-missile-subs-by-2030/

Dario Leone, “A Chinese carrier strike group involving the aircraft carrier Liaoning and Type 055 missile destroyers has been conducting drills that simulate attacks on Japan’s Nansei Islands since Dec. 16, 2022.”, The Aviation Geek Club, 23 Aralık 2022, https://theaviationgeekclub.com/chinese-liaoning-carrier-strike-group-conducts-exercise-simulating-attacks-on-japans-nansei-islands/

RAND Corporation, “The Future of Sea Power in the Western Pacific”, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RB9700/RB9709/RAND_RB9709.pdf

https://twitter.com/China4Tech/status/1718839213859471484

South China, “China PLA stationed up to 6 warships in Middle East over past week amid rising tensions from Israel-Gaza war: reports”, 19 Ekim 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3238536/6-chinese-warships-present-middle-east-over-past-week

https://twitter.com/drhkorkmaz/status/1716019810423730405

A.Thayer Mahan, Deniz Harbi Üzerine (Çev: (E) Dz.Kur.Alb.A.Tunçer Büyükonat), Doruk Yayınları, 2013, İstanbul