The Rise and Fall of Armored Units

Birth of Tanks:

Tanks, firstly was used in World War I. But they had just appeared on the battlefields. Therefore, they did not have a significant impact on the outcome of the war. But this weapon did not go unnoticed, and its potential for future battles was realized.  The most serious work on this issue has been done by the A lmans. The Germans not only improved the technical characteristics of the tanks, but also developed new doctrines and concepts for tanks.

World War 1 took place in the form of battles of attrition. This caused the duality of fire and movement to be  more  prominent than the firepower of movement. This made the battles stagnant and caused the war to be prolonged. There was only one way to break this stagnation: to use tanks, a weapon that  would not waste much time crossing wire barriers, so it  could quickly move to defensive positions and even behind the defensive line without being affected by dam fire and machine fire.

Within the framework of this basic idea, the Germans, on the one hand, improved the technical characteristics of the tanks and built armored vehicles to help the infantry adapt to the speed of the tanks, and on the other hand, they invented a new understanding of combat based on the concept of maneuver, which they called the Battle of Lightning .

This new understanding, proved its effectiveness in World War II, and the Germans began to expand their borders, rapidly defeating rival armies  through successive battles. This led other states to produce more tanks  and armored vehicles and  to form new armored units with them. This understanding continued after the war. As a result,  during the Cold War, the military forces of the Warsaw Pact and  NATO countries began to be compared to the number of units equipped with tanks and armored vehicles rather than the number of nuclear weapons.

Armored Personnel Carriers:

Over time, the infantry units that went on foot to the battlefields almost disappeared. Almost all of the infantry units were equipped with armored personnel carriers and armored combat vehicles mounted on a small cannon. A small number of infantry units were transformed into motorized infantry, equipped with enough wheeled vehicles to carry these units.  That is, maneuverability and superiority of movement came to the fore in the thought of war.  This situation continued until the end of the  Cold War. In fact,  for a long time after the Cold War, the strength  comparison of ground forces units in tactical classes in military schools was always based on the number of tanks and armored vehicles.

During the Gulf War, when the first serious post-Cold War battles took place, signs began to emerge that this situation was about to change. The fact that the American army expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait with a single short-term and decisive battle, or rather completely destroyed the Iraqi army in Kuwait, was the clearest indication of this.

This great achievement has led those who lead the world's armies to put their hats in front of them and rethink. The first thing they thought about was how important it was to dominate the airspace. Because it was clear that the armored units of the side, which could not  establish air dominance or at least achieve air superiority, were of no use. Attack helicopters also played an important role in the rapid neutralization of armored units.

America's second attack on Iraq inflicted a greater wound on the classic understanding of war based on armored units. In this war, concepts such as electronic warfare, propaganda, public relations, information warfare began to be discussed more in military circles than hot conflicts. I remember that at that time when I was studying at the Military Academy, these concepts were formulated and made more mysterious as a manifestation of the classical American military understanding.

Effects of Technological Developmentson Armies and Tanks:

In this context, the importance of C³, that is, Command, Control, Com munication (Command, Control, Communication) concept in battles was emphasized, and then the number of letters and superiors was gradually increased. As a result, the most important concepts for combat were C⁴ISR, i.e. Command, Control, Communication, Computers,  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

The eyes of the world were so impressed by the technological developments in these areas and their use on the battlefield that other developments on the ground did not receive much attention. Even applications related to the phenomenon of gun violence  , which is the classic dimension of combat, such as thebunker-piercing bombs of American planes and the precision-guided missiles launched from ships, were treated very superficially.

However, the use of precision-guided ammunition had a significant impact on the outcome of battles.  It was clear in both battles how lethal helicopters were for armored units. The planes' attacks on convoys and strategically important facilities were also significant. These made a significant difference not only in terms of technological development but also doctrinally.

But for some reason, everyone preferred to mention that Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles were technically inferior to American tanks and armored vehicles, that the Iraqi army's level of training was inadequate, that the Iraqi command board was inadequate, and that the Arabsdidn't understand how to fight.  But war is a very good teacher.  Teaching activity had not yet ended. It was even just beginning.

As a matter of fact, when Iraq was invaded and the cities were captured, something unexpected happened while everyone was saying "this is over". A resistance movement emerged in Iraq, first within the Sunni population and then within the Shiite Arabs in the south. This resistance spread rapidly, both in the built-up areas and in the countryside. The Americans and the British began to lose dozens of armored vehicles and soldiers every day.

They were confronted by irregular groups that had no proper weapons but could not be destroyed. These groups did nothave any planes, planes or helicopters. They didn't even have cannons, mortars, or proper anti-tank guns. With this, these groups were attacking the Americans and the British, using their weaknesses to their advantage.  For this, they  used whatever theyhad. Thus, they developed a form of struggle that did not need a regular supply system.

How Armored Personnel Carriers and Tanks Become EasyTargets:

They used infantry rifles, machine guns stolen from Iraqi army depots, and Russian-made RPG rocket launchers, which are not very deadly for most modern tanks and armored vehicles. Rocket launchers were effective on positions, motor vehicles and Humvee vehicles that the US military used extensively. The insurgents also used these weapons against these targets. But these were not the most insurmountable weapons. The most difficult threat to deal with was IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), some of which you can even learn from the internet today.

The insurgents also used the classic mines they seized from the looted warehouses of the Iraqi army, but it was the IEDs that inflicted the greatest losses on the American army. IEDs could be made with everyday materials, some of which were foodstuffs, that you could buy when you went to the grocery store or grocery store for household needs. On very little money, each Iraqi insurgent who bought a bag of manure, some salt, some sugar and tea, a few batteries for the radio in the house, and a few meters of cable to pull a lamp on a towel was able to destroy American and British tanks and armored vehicles worth millions of dollars. It was not possible to know who used what and for what purpose, since someone caught with these materials could say that he bought them for the needs of the household. 

The Americans and the British had the same experience in Afghanistan. This brought about some changes in vehicles and weapons. For example, instead of classic caterpillar  armored personnel carriers, light armored vehicles with tactical wheels  began to appear  in the inventories of armies in greater numbers every day. There were many reasons for this. Thefirst and most important reason for the A ma was the uneconomical nature  of tanks and classic armoured vehicles. The price of an American M-I Abrahams or British Challenger-2 tank, for example, is $8-10 million, along with continental cargo ammunition and other equipment. A resister, a terrorist or anyone else could spend less than 800-1000 pounds to neutralize these tanks with the IED.

Peacetime Problems of Tanks and Armoured Combat Vehicles:

Moreover, tanks and caterpillar armored personnel carriers or armored combat vehicles were not very useful except in classic battles. Caterpillar vehicles destroyed roads, costing them a constant cost of road maintenance. Fuel expenditures, maintenance and repairs of the vehicles were also costly. If a single pod was damaged in the coat, the vehicle wouldnot be able  to walk and would do nothing but be a target.  In the event of pallet failures, it was also difficult to replace the defective part or the pallet itself in a short period of time and to carry enough spare pallet material.

Moreover, these vehicles were not useful in built-up areas and narrow roads. They couldn't enter the narrow streets.  Even if they did, the tanks' guns could only shoot forward or backward through the narrow streets. Because on narrow roads, there was not enough space for the barrel to rotate. Not only the narrow streets, but also the electric poles on the sides of wide roads and many things used in residential areas restricted  the firing and maneuverability of the barrel with its rotation. Tank guns could not be fired at targets on the upper floors of multi-storey buildings in built-up areas.  The view range of tanks and classic armored vehicles was also very limited. For this reason, they were sensitive to tank destroyer teams.

Therefore, during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaign, as far as I can observe, the American and British armies used more armored tactical wheeled vehicles on the ground, while keeping tanks and APCs more in base areas for safety purposes. This has also affected the armies of most countries. For example, 2. The German army, which has not participated in any military operations since World War II, added a large number of tactical wheeled armored vehicles to its inventory when it began to participate in peace-support operations.

Effects of the Invasion of Georgia on Russian Armored Units:

In 2008, this trend faced a major shake-up. Because this year, the spirit of tanks and classic armored vehicles has almost re-awakened. This was caused by Russia's attack on Georgia and the capture of a large area in a short time. The Russian army attacked Georgia with the classic armored unit structure of the Cold War period and with Soviet doctrine. In the face of this attack, the Georgian army was forced to retreat without any resistance.

This has caused an illusion, especially in Russia.  The easy and costless success it achieved here led the Russian army not to change doctrines according to the needs of the time.  The army's armoured unit-based organizational structure was  also preserved almost unchanged in its Cold War-era form.     On the other hand, in the early days of the occupation of Georgia,  the established thinking in the Western world that Russia was no longer a threat  was shaken.  Because Georgia was a Caucasian country far away from Europe, they saw no need for tension with Russia for this small country.

Europe realized that this was a mistake only after the invasion of Crimea in 2014. At the request of the Ukrainian President, who lost power with the Orange Revolution, in the last days of his rule, Russian armored units quickly occupied Crimea.  This gave the impression that in both Russia and Europe, the classic army organization based on tanks and caterpillar armored vehicles was still working.  Upon this, in Europe and especially in NATO countries, a return to the classical tank and armored unit-oriented army order came to the agenda. Even a country that made constitutional and legal arrangements after World War II in order not to grow its army began to plan to increase defense spending and the numberof tanks. This idea of Germany did not pass to the stage of action,  but the  Eastern European countries, which had left the Soviet Union and felt the Russian threat on their necks, began to develop their armies to consist of armored units like the Russian army.

However, the developments that took place after this showed that this did not make much sense because dark clouds were appearing on the heads of tanks and armored vehicles.  In the al-Bab operation, the Turkish army faced fierce resistance and lost a significant amount of tanks and armored vehicles due to this resistance. The most important beneficiaries of the casualties were the new generation of Russian-made anti-tank  weapons. These anti-tank weapons, which were fired from the shoulder or  from the foot that could be carried by civilian pickups, also inflicted many casualties on the Syrian army. However, Syria received the real blow from a different place and a different weapon.

UAVs and Tanks:

Probably as a result of the attack of the Russian planes, the Turkish army suffered a significant amount of casualties, but the responsibility for the incident remained on Syria. The Assad regime, which continues to exist thanks to Russia, would also raise its voice against this,butit was. Turkey then decided to launch punitive strikes against Syria. Instead, droneswere used.

UAVs were not weapons invented in Turkey. First,drones were launched  from a platform and used for artillery forward surveillance and these American-made vehicles began to be used by the Turkish army during the Cold War period. Then, UAVs were produced in today's sense, and then UAVs were produced by attaching weapons to them. Turkey used these UAVs,  which it rented and purchased from Israel  , in the fight against terrorism. Later,  unique UAVswere developed by the Turkish state aviation company and then by a private company.

Until then, these UAVs had been used mostly in point operations to hit critical targets and against terrorists, i.e. personnel.  Perhaps with a reflex arising from an urgent need, Turkey put forward a new UAV doctrine for the first time in the world. Under this doctrine, UAVs were used en masse and like Air Force aircraft.  Turkish drones hit all Syrian targets they saw in the open for days. Tanks and armored vehicles were most affected by this practice. Russian air defense weapons and systems have not been effective against UAVs. For this reason, the Turkish army successfully destroyed a large number of Syrian tanks, armored vehicles and motor vehicles, as well  as artillery and air defense weapons.

These drone strikes were so effectivethat Syrian tanks  and vehicles tried to hide under bridges and even on the ground floors of buildings to avoid destruction, but they could not be saved.  Since a similar success was repeated in Libya,  the authorities  serving in the armies of the whole world began to follow this drone miracle withattention and amazement. Russia tried to downplay this success because its tanks, armored vehicles  and weapons were shot down  and pitiful, and claimed that UAVs could not achieve the same success in the face of its own defense systems, but it was not very convincing. Because all the targets that were hit were undeniably broadcast on the internet in video.

It  did not take long for the Russian claims to be definitively proven untrue. Before the battle of Karabakh, Azerbaijan  had purchased a large number of drones from Turkey and Israel.  Armenia, on the other hand, did not do the same thing because of its limited economic opportunities and its inability to read what was happening in the world well. Part of the reason for this was that Armenia believed in the story that the fact that it had many more tanks and armored vehicles than the Azerbaijani armywould be enough to achieve victory and, as Russia said, that the air defense systems in Armenia could neutralize the UAVs.

The Armenian Army Relies on Tank Power:

In fact, Armenians were not wrong from a classical point of view. Because, as can be seen from the number of tanks and armored vehicles destroyed and captured by Azerbaijan in Karabakh, the number of tanks and armored vehicles in Armenia's hands was too high not only for the small Armenian army, but even for many armies in the world. Being aware of  this, Armenia did not hesitate to declare that it had put into practice an aggressive strategy called "new wars, new lands" by relying on this superiority. They alsothreatened A Azerbaijan, claiming that "if a new war breaks out, they will enter Baku in two or three days."  But when the battle began, it became clear that the goose's foot was not like that.

Equipped and trained by the Russian army, the Armenian army confidently entered the battle on the defensive lines,  which were organized in three stages according to classical Soviet doctrine  and  prepared in the form of a series  of resistance points. It also deployed its tanks and armored vehicles in prepared positions to support the defense and counterattack. The organizational structure of the Armenian army was dominated by armored units.  The Azerbaijani army, on the other hand, entered the battle with a force structure dominated by special forces, commando units and infantry units.

It soon became clear that tanks and armored vehicles were of no use. Because the region was mountainous and oaky, the mobility and maneuvering opportunities of the armored units  were not sufficientlyutilized. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani army, which learned from the practices in Syria and Libya and reflected this information on the battlefield, started to hit all tanks, armored vehicles, motor vehicles, artillery, mortars and missiles detected by UAVs from the very first day. These attacks were so effectivethat Armenian soldiers did not dare to ride tanks, armored vehicles and motor vehicles for fear of being hit. For this reason, the Azerbaijani army captured a large number of undamaged tanks, armored vehicles and motor vehicles.

These developments were closely followed by the Ukrainian army  and the United Kingdom and the United States, which trained it.  The Ukrainians, with the lessons they learned from this battle, procured weapons suitable for new developments. They organized their armies accordingly with a predominance of infantry. The army was deployed to combat attrition instead of the classical understanding of warfare. The Russians, on the other hand, did not make any changes to weapons, tools, organizations, doctrines and concepts, either because of the arrogance caused by the excessive confidence in their power or because they could not fully grasp the situation.  S-only, they organized their troops for combat in battalion groups consisting of a mixture of tanks, armored vehicles and wheeled vehicles used for logistical activities.

With this understanding, the Russian army, which made a plan according to the concept of maneuver and succumbed to the illusion that they would soon capture the whole of Ukraine, encountered a great surprise as soon as the battle began.  They began to lose a large number of vehicles and personnel with the attacks they were exposed to from the air, land, ground, that is, from all directions. Perhaps because they relied on short-term and decisive battles, the Russian army, which entered the battle without making proper logistical planning, lingered for days on the main roads, not knowing what to do. This gave Ukrainians the courage to step up their attacks.

Russia; Could not use tanks in Ukraine:

The result was frustration for Russia. In response, they were forced to withdraw their troops from the north. They concentrated their forces in a narrower area in the south. They fielded infantry soldiers from various Caucasian peoples, such as Chechens and Ingush. They made changes to their armored unit-based organizational structures. They fielded their special forces. But now what had happened had happened. As in the war museum built by Azerbaijan in Baku from Armenian tanks and armored vehicles, some of the Russian tanks and armored vehicles, of which thousands have now been destroyed, have also taken their places in the museum in Kiev.

The Russians began to achieve some successes in the south at a heavy costby making partial changes in their strategy, tactics and techniques, as well as in their organizational structures. They stopped smuggling tanks and armored vehicles into the cities alone. However, information that they still lose a large number of tanks and armored vehicles every day appears in the press organs. As long as the Russians continue to act with partial changes out of necessity, their casualties are likely to continue to increase. Because tanks and armored vehicles are  exposed to complex attacks from all directions. Unless we develop new doctrines, concepts, tactics and techniques to counter these attacks, it does not seem possible to prevent them.

In our next article, these attacks suffered by the Russian army will be examined.