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Can Europe's, and Turkey's in particular, declining defense spending be questioned in Vilnius?

NATO is convening the Vilnius Summit (July 11-12, 2023). The expectation that Europe should take bold steps to bolster its security in four areas could be raised at the Summit: Increasing Defense Spending per Member, Enhancing Cooperation among Members, Increasing Joint Industrial Capacity and Building Defense Resilience. In this context, Turkey's declining defense spending is likely to be on the agenda.

NATO Vilnius Summit (July 11-12, 2023)

The NATO Summit will be held in Vilnius, Lithuania on July 11-12 with the participation of the heads of government or state of 31 NATO member states. Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian War on February 24, 2022, NATO's priority agenda item has been to ensure that logistical support for Ukraine's defense against the Russian Army continues to be provided by NATO countries. Ukraine will also be the priority issue at this summit. However, another topic may be the unification of European countries under the leadership of NATO, especially in the context of structuring the European Defense, which has emerged from this war. At this summit, NATO leaders are expected to take pioneering steps towards transforming European defense.

In the new post-1945 world order based on transatlantic relations, building European defense was seen as vital for NATO. It is desirable for NATO to have a strong European pillar to deter and/or punish any aggression against NATO on its territory. Since any step in this direction would reduce the burden of "Defense of Europe" on the United States, it has been brought up from time to time, especially by American politicians. In fact, fair burden or burden sharing is a principle that is in line with the first strategic concept of NATO, which was established on April 4, 1949, which states that "each country's contribution should be proportionate to its capabilities". NATO's DNA is coded according to the notion that each member should contribute to the common defense and security in proportion to its own capabilities. In today's world, where the main axis of US policy is now centered on the Asia-Pacific region and China as a country, the need to strengthen NATO's European leg and to ensure that it is as capable and competent as possible to defend itself without the military power and capabilities of the United States is frequently raised.

Despite the US squeeze on European countries, European defenses are still in a shockingly weak state. European forces are currently far from reaching the levels required to fulfill NATO's collective defense missions. Looking back over the last decade, Europe's defense spending has increased by 38% from 2013 to 2022, but the desired force size has not been achieved. In total, European countries will spend 345 billion USD on defense in 2022. As a result, Europe's force structure, based on combat battalion level units, has only increased by 4%. In other words, despite all efforts, the number of battalions has barely increased from 218 to 227 battalions.

Meanwhile, the considerable European military aid to Ukraine has also resulted in the European armies' own stockpiles of ammunition dwindling. The armies of the European countries do not hide the fact that they are running short of artillery ammunition and defense missiles, which have been spent like hot cakes in the Ukrainian war. 

At the Vilnius Summit, NATO leaders are expected to take bold steps in four areas to bolster Europe's security. Increasing Defense Spending per Member, Increasing Cooperation among Members, Increasing Joint Industrial Capacity and Building Defense Resilience. 

The main premise of these four articles is capability enhancement. In a way, a "Vilnius Declaration" could be signed in Vilnius, similar to the Prague Declaration that came to the agenda as a result of the 2002 Prague Summit, to strengthen NATO's European pillar.

In his speech in Prague on October 19, 1993, Nicholas Burns, the then American representative to NATO, emphasized: "NATO's mission is still to defend North America and Western Europe. But I don't think we can do it sitting on our hands. We have to turn all our attention and all our military forces to the south and to the east. I believe that the future of NATO is in the south and the east. It is in the Greater Middle East."

Now we do not have a US with such a clear stance. The BOP is no more. Declaring 20 years ago that it would build the Greater Middle East, the United States is now worried about how to prevent the Middle East from becoming China's sphere of influence in every aspect. Meanwhile, it continues to encircle and push China with its allies in the Pacific. Under these circumstances, I believe that the US has to give the European countries the message that "you should focus on developing your own capabilities for your own self-defense." It would not be wrong to say that Europe will be absolutely forced by the US at this summit to rebuild its own defense identity and future.

Increasing Defense Expenditures

If there is to be a transformation of Europe's defense, it will first and foremost be a process that depends on increasing defense spending. European countries have a tendency not to adhere to NATO's common goal of defense spending of at least 2% of gross domestic product. After the Cold War, European countries reduced their defense spending to 1.6% in 1995 and further to 1.3% in 2021. Meanwhile, Russia intervened in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, going so far as to seize territory from both countries despite NATO. Having finally had to accept that Russia was pursuing an aggressive policy, European countries have tended to increase their defense expenditures since 2014. However, only seven NATO member states in Europe have exceeded the 2% defense spending target. Twenty-three of the Alliance's members (31 countries in total) are part of the European geography. It is imperative for European solidarity and the collective construction of a defense identity that these 23 countries act collectively to increase their defense spending to 2% or more.

Increasing Cooperation

The transformation of European defense requires increased cooperation within Europe. Despite the existence of the EU mechanism, there is no full cooperation among the members on defense issues. This inevitably leads to the weakening of NATO's European leg. A similar approach to the EU's "Declaration of Versailles", which advocates cooperation and joint procurement among member states, adopted after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, could be on the agenda in Vilnius. 

Increasing Industrial Capacity 

The idea that NATO could also help transform Europe's defense industrial base has been on the agenda since the end of the Cold War. In today's wars, it has become almost impossible for the armies of countries that have not achieved technological superiority in the military field to have an effective presence in war. In this context, increasing the industrial capacity that will provide the basis for an advanced defense industry can be identified as an important goal for Europe. Today, however, Europe's defense industrial capacity is far from meeting even Ukraine's demands. NATO defense ministers recognized this problem at their meeting in February of this year and committed themselves to a Defense Production Action Plan in Vilnius. This plan is expected to initiate a long-term investment to increase production in the defense industry and a multi-year procurement process that will allow NATO to increase its own stocks to strengthen NATO's deterrence, while guaranteeing to meet Ukraine's needs.

In this context, the European Union's Support to Ammunition Production initiative to increase the production of artillery shells is a good example. Nevertheless, there have been comments that the EU needs to do more. If EU member states act collectively, they can jointly take steps to increase industrial capacity in the defense industry. They can put forward a will in this direction. The belief that this could happen is based on the fact that the EU has demonstrated the potential to spend USD 869 billion to overcome the pandemic and USD 815 billion to mitigate the energy crisis. If Europe has been able to mobilize such resources for the pandemic and energy, it can easily allocate the resources to finance its own self-defense. In Vilnius, non-EU NATO leaders could invite European members of the Alliance to invest in their own self-defense. They can expect that a Europe that does so will significantly increase its contribution to NATO's security and collective defense.

Ultimately, strengthening Europe's defense and industrial capacity would enable allies to support Ukraine with military assistance without fear of reprisals.

Building Defense Resilience.

In 2016, NATO decided to include hybrid threats as part of its collective defense guarantee under Article 5. This means that there is a need to increase defense capabilities against non-military hybrid threats. Conventional deterrence elements are far from working against hybrid attacks. The need for NATO countries to ensure critical infrastructure resilience against hybrid attacks is raised at almost every summit. NATO and the European Union aim to join forces, especially in the field of cyber defense, and to establish resilience in defense.

Can Turkey's Declining Defense Spending be Questioned in Vilnius?

In the last 10-15 years, Turkey has embarked on a serious quest to increase its industrial capacity in the defense industry and has made considerable progress as a result. However, Turkey's defense expenditures remain below NATO's 2% target, indicating a remarkable regression. During the Cold War, Turkey stood out as a country that allocated between 3.8% and 5.5% of its gross domestic product to defense spending between 1970 and 1990.

Ratios of Turkey's Defense Expenditures between 1970-1990

Ratios of Turkey's Defense Expenditures between 1990-2010

In the post-Cold War period, similar to European countries, Turkey's defense expenditures have been on a downward trend. However, when we look at the period between 1990 and 2010, we see that defense spending ranged between 1.9% and 3.2%. These rates, which were high in the 1990s, were realized as 1.9% in 2010.

In the following years, for example, in 2018, Turkey was able to allocate 14 billion 168 million USD for its defense, but by 2022, despite its developing defense industry, it was only able to spend 12 billion 286 million USD on its armed forces. This amount of spending, which represents a serious downsizing, should also be seen as a consequence of the suspension of the F-35 purchase and the lack of progress in terms of spending on the F-16 package, which was estimated at USD 20 billion. Delayed projects such as the Altay tank can also be evaluated in this context. I believe that the decline in some defense expenditure items that Turkey had to postpone in a sense within the scope of these projects may be eliminated depending on the progress in these projects, and as a result, Turkey's defense expenditures may experience a noticeable increase in the coming years.

At the NATO Vilnius Summit, Turkey is unlikely to be pressured by other members to increase its defense spending, which remains below the NATO target of 2%. Turkey's quest to put its deteriorating economy back on track after the elections in May has not gone unnoticed by its allies. I do not expect the Turkish government to be criticized for increasing defense spending as it seeks a balanced budget by combating inflation, tight monetary policy and increasing taxation rates. 

Conclusion

The current level of military forces of European countries is not sufficient to fulfill the collective defense tasks that guide NATO's military and force planning. Supporting Ukraine will be the most urgent item on the agenda when NATO leaders meet in Vilnius next week, but a NATO decision to embark on a transformation of European defenses to at least guarantee their adequacy against a Russian attack would unquestionably increase NATO's global strength and resilience in the long term, while contributing to the development of security and defense capabilities. 

Turkey's burgeoning defense industry also has the potential to offer new gains and capabilities for NATO. Although Turkey's defense spending has been on a downward trend in recent years, given its efforts to increase its industrial capacity in the defense industry, I believe that Turkey can significantly increase its contribution to Alliance defense in the coming years. 

Reference

Max Bergmann, Sean Monaghan. "NATO's task in Vilnius is simple: Transform European defense", DefenseNews, July 7, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/07/07/natos-task-in-vilnius-is-simple-transform-european-defense/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=dfn-rss-zap

Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries, NATO website, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_216897.htm

Dr. Hüseyin Fazla
Ph.D. Hüseyin Fazla
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  • 09.07.2023
  • Time : 6 min
  • 2004 Read

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