What are the Effects of Having a Nuclear Weapon Capability on a Country's Defense?

For states that possess nuclear weapons, this capability does not always mean great power. Because it is not a tool that can be used for political purposes by taking calculated risks like other means. It is a weapon that, once used, may not be a winner. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the blocs was based on traditional power factors such as geographical location, population, technological sophistication, economic power and conventional military forces and the ability to deliver them to the desired location. 

In this equation, nuclear weapons have always been a last resort tool to balance the nuclear or conventional power of the other side. Until its collapse at the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union retained its nuclear power, but lost its superiority in the above-mentioned traditional elements of power and thus ceased to be a superpower. Similarly, it is difficult to say that France and Britain's nuclear weapons have strengthened their influence in the world. Their influence in world politics comes from their economic power and, to a large extent, their past imperialist legacy. Moreover, the protection and storage of these weapons and the possibility of their falling into the hands of non-state organizations require additional precautions on the part of those who possess them. 

In spite of all this, it would not be wrong to say that it was the level of destruction achieved by nuclear weapons and the associated deterrence that was behind the end of the Cold War without leading to a hot conflict that would directly confront the two superpowers. Some circles also refer to this period as the Cold Peace. In today's crises and the protection of regional interests, even countries in the same alliance have become unable to agree with each other, and the risk of conflict between strategic partners has become a potential danger. At the beginning of the 2020s, the world is experiencing a cold peace in which countries may not directly fight each other, but even those in the same alliance may face each other at any time and may harm each other economically or politically, if not militarily (Önder, 2020). It would not be wrong to state that without these weapons, it would be easier for one of the parties to risk the use of military force in some problems that cannot be solved politically. 

It is not correct to say that India's influence in world politics has increased since it conducted its first nuclear tests. It is also difficult to argue that Pakistan has strengthened its position with its nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, their nuclear weapons and means of delivery have become the sole elements of national power. In contrast, the two states that stood out in terms of power and prestige at the end of the last century were Germany and Japan. Both states possess the technology to achieve nuclear power. Although they have ostensibly declared that they do not intend to produce nuclear weapons because they have signed the NPT, the military restrictions imposed on them during the Cold War should not be ignored. 

It is also argued that NATO membership keeps Germany under control and prevents individual armament efforts. With the level of development both countries have, it would not be very difficult for them to acquire these weapons. Joining the nuclear club has its advantages as well as disadvantages. 

The impact of nuclear weapons on regional balances of power is different from their impact on global balances. While it is possible to achieve a balanced deterrence with these weapons, this deterrence is closely related to the specific conditions of the region. For example, US weapons did not deter China from going to war in Korea (Kissinger, 2015). 

Israel, a nuclear power in the late 1960s, could not prevent Egypt and Syria from going to war against it in 1973. Finally, the presence of these weapons did not deter its enemies from preventing the bloody raid carried out by Hamas on October 7, 2023. Although the circumstances of each case are different, it is possible to multiply these examples. 

For example, the tensions between Russia and China over a border dispute in the late 1960s and the conflicts between Pakistan and India show that deterrence with nuclear weapons is not always effective. On the other hand, it is not possible to argue that deterrence is completely ineffective. Pakistan, the country that can be considered the weaker side in the power comparison, sees its nuclear weapons as a strategic shield that will blunt India's conventional military superiority, and as a deterrent that will inflict enormous pain on the other side even in a nuclear war that it cannot win (Lieber and Press, 2023). 

A major risk is the inability to precisely calculate the destructive effect of its use. However, in recent years, improvements in targeting, guidance and detection means have increased the accuracy of strikes and, accordingly, the view has emerged that the damage that can be inflicted by nuclear weapons can be achieved in a more controlled manner. Defense against missiles moving at speeds well above the speed of sound has become more difficult. Efforts to develop capabilities to neutralize the nuclear weapons of the other side in the first shot have increased. While these capabilities do not guarantee that the party that decides on the first use will be the first to strike, they are developments that can encourage the first user. For this reason, the balance of power and deterrence created by other states possessing them in their own regions is now different from the deterrence between superpowers during the Cold War. 

Developments in recent years show that the weaker party, even if it possesses nuclear weapons, may choose to escalate the threat of using nuclear weapons in a way that puts its adversary in a dilemma, which increases the danger of nuclear war (Lieber and Press, 2023). For small countries, the possession of nuclear weapons has come to be seen as the most important deterrent against very powerful enemies that cannot be balanced with conventional weapons (Lieber and Press, 2013). Therefore, it is possible that Taiwan, which is known to be engaged in clandestine plutonium development activities against the Chinese threat and has significant know-how (Narang, 2016), will actively pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the future, and that the United States will turn a blind eye to such a development. 

Countries that invest in nuclear weapons also spend heavily on conventional weapons. This capability imposes on the country more than ever the necessity of obtaining preventive intelligence against its enemies and of being vigilant and alert at all times. For this reason, the idea that nuclear weapons can provide political and military superiority should be treated with caution. 

The presence of weapons of mass destruction in a region also leads to an arms race. Conflicts in regions where these weapons are present are more likely to be intervened by foreign powers. If superpowers have vital interests in these regions, the possession of nuclear weapons by countries in the region does not provide sufficient deterrence. Possession of these weapons may be beneficial for deterrence, but states that join this club also become rivals of other members of that club. 

What do nuclear weapons provide in terms of deterrence? 

1. It can prevent other countries from developing nuclear weapons programs. 

2. Prevent external threats. 

3. It can overcome conventional deficiencies. 

4. It can be used as a diplomatic tool to provide deterrence, status and address local weaknesses (Önder, 2013). 

The most important risk of joining the nuclear club with these weapons is becoming a potential threat to countries with similar weapons. 

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