Why is Foresight an Important Factor in Defense Planning?

In particular, Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) by US Minister of National Defense Mc Namara; After it was put into effect in 1961 to eliminate the disconnect between multi-year defense projects and annual budgets, defense planning activities and expenditures were brought under the control of the political authority to a certain extent. As a result-oriented decision-making and resource planning infrastructure, the system has produced useful results, albeit a little slowly. For this reason, although it was almost abandoned in 1971 due to the economic contraction in the world, it has been exported to more than 30 security partners of the USA, from Thailand to Saudi Arabia, since the 1990s. In fact, in 2003, the application dimension was added to the system and it became known as Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Implementation System (PPBUS).

However, before PPBUS is implemented for resource planning in the process, some elements necessary to defend the rights and interests of countries need to be determined. The elements in question are; After the "Defense Capabilities Initiative" implemented in NATO in April 1999, the concept of "capability", which has been discussed in the business world since Edith Penrose's book The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (original name: The Theory of the Growth of the Firm) published in 1959, has begun to be defined. The concept of talent is the whole of physical assets such as materials, facilities, personnel, and intangible assets such as technical, tactics, doctrine, leadership and organization required to perform a task. In this context, following the publication of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review document of the US Department of Defense, the concept of holistic capability began to be used instead of individual elements such as material/platform.

To determine the capabilities in question, three different approaches are proposed in NATO's Long-Term Defense Planning Handbook: threat, scenario and capability-based. However, although countries use different models for the content of approaches, especially in determining planning situations, many concepts within them have become confused with each other over time.

However, Devis states in his study that conditions have changed a lot compared to the past, and that the hybrid war environment that has emerged alongside traditional threats has increased uncertainty, and that a talent-based approach in particular can be a solution to this. For this reason, the military institutions of the USA, a global power, focus on quality and need, regardless of the cost of the systems, and ensure the supply of the talent stated to be needed, even if it is not in line with the Security Strategy. On the other hand, even countries such as the UK spend much less on military capabilities due to economic reasons, and although expert personnel are employed, strategic gaps arise for some needed capabilities.

In this context, in the most current capability-based defense planning approach, the estimation of targets is generally; It needs to be created with environmental future forecasts, talent priorities, operational concepts and scenarios. However, it is claimed that defense planning in the USA for the 2012-2017 period was made without future visions. In other words, strategic environmental forecasting studies should either not be carried out using scenario techniques, or the forecasts should remain at the operational level.

However, planning the skills that will be needed in the long term; It has to take into account the ever-changing environmental threats and power equations and turbulences in the international arena, the rapid developments of new weapons and equipment technologies, the changing nature and reaction time of political conflicts over time, and the allocation and effectiveness of resources over the years. In addition, the acquisition, production, upgrade and compatibility of weapon and equipment systems, especially those that cannot be sold off-the-shelf, with other systems often requires a long time. For this reason, military, economic, scientific and technological infrastructure and real sector activities require future foresight. Alright; Can defense planning be successful without knowing the political, technological, demographic, geographical and environmental factors that will occur in the future?

Capability Based Defense Planning

In fact, it is known that scenario-based operational planning studies have existed in the USA for many years. For example, II. Before World War II, war scenarios of orange against the Japanese, black against the Germans, and red against the British were prepared. However, in the following years, the increase in uncertainties about the future, especially at the strategic level, increased the number of scenarios created to an uncontrollable level and made it inextricable. In this process, although efforts were made to control the number of scenarios developed by operations research based on statistics and probability calculations, these efforts were limited at one point; The results obtained did not produce the desired benefit. Therefore, in defense planning, planning based on trends has been replaced by some uncertainties.

It is left to the logic of filling the fields with defaults.

In fact, although the concept of approach based on assumptions literally misleads people, it still requires a conceptual technical infrastructure. Because, first of all, the assumptions that will affect defense planning must be determined. However, defense planning and the defense industry that supports it; political, economic, demographic, technological, cultural etc. It is affected by all environmental and national elements. For this reason, many practitioners think that these issues are analyzed in detail during the concept preparation process.

This idea may be true up to a point. Because the concept-based needs system; A methodical and schematic method that defines the possible conditions of the future for the procurement of contemporary, innovative, multi-dimensional capabilities that will provide strategic or tactical advantage in defense planning for the forces to fulfill their missions and the elements of the capability such as platform, fire power, facility, personnel, technique and tactics. It is the infrastructure of hypothesis suggestions. Although it is exploratory and explanatory in this context, it does not reveal a physical weapon system or technology.

However, the concepts were generally developed by General Maxwell D. Taylor at the US Army War College in 1981; It is a method used to close the strategic gap specified in the model formulated as tools, results and methods. The model is a widely preferred formulation, especially in the military strategy literature. However, this approach assumes and accepts that the environmental conditions that threaten the rights and interests of countries and the elements of national power used against them will remain static, without changing over time. It also states that it should be assumed and accepted that the process, including procurement, is always under control and predictable, and that there will be no political or financial crisis with the talent source. Therefore, it does not require any future prediction. In other words, during the defense planning period of an air platform that you procure against a threat over a period of 20 years, you think that your enemies will not make any technological advances, that you will not experience any economic crisis, and that you will not experience political and bureaucratic difficulties in purchasing the system13. This approach may be suitable for a global power that produces its own technology and directs the world economy with its own currency. However, it may cause unavoidable losses for foreign-dependent countries in the defense industry, even to allied countries.

On the other hand, although General Taylor's model is compatible with modern management approaches in which all command and control is in the hands of executive authorities, it does not represent the truth. Because although weapon systems are generally procured from friendly and allied countries after long processes, they may be disrupted due to the changing political interests of states from time to time. Moreover, the understanding of security of even the leading country in an alliance established to ensure security and the security expectations and perspectives of other countries may change depending on time. History has repeatedly shown that countries that come together under the defense plan of a particularly powerful state subsequently come into conflict with dominant countries. For example, after the success of the Trojan War, B.C. In 477, the Greek city-states came together under the leadership of Athens and formed the Attica-Delos Maritime Union. However, in the following years, after the leader Athens tried to govern other autonomous states and interfered in their internal affairs in order to protect its own interests, the Spartans applied for the dissolution of the union in 431 BC. For the next 35 years, there were bloody wars between the members, and subsequently, with the influence of the Persians, the union structure, which would be called the Athenian Empire in the coming years, collapsed.

Therefore, although Hayes tried to turn this model upside down and reformulate the process as means, ways and results, no model that does not match the facts can lead to the right result. Because this model is primarily against the principles of the military decision-making process. A strategy aimed at preventing damage to national rights and interests by a reputable adversary should not ignore the opportunities of the other party. On the other hand, many people will support the concept-based requirements system and capability-based defense planning, as General Taylor's model does not have to be used. However, none of the strategy formulation methods that lead to defense planning can achieve the desired result without future predictions. For example, even Chandler's SWOT analysis, defined as strength, weakness, opportunity and threat, remains static without future predictions. It cannot effectively tell you what methods the enemy will use against your capabilities in the future and what capabilities you should have to protect national rights and interests.

However, the biggest handicap of the concept-based needs system lies in its process rather than its starting point at US DoD Military Designation. When the dictionary of abbreviations and acronyms is examined, institutional, operational, functional etc. It will be seen that there are concepts at many different levels and names. There is even a hierarchy among themselves. Therefore, concepts should be prepared according to different areas of expertise and knowledge levels. From preliminary study to approval and implementation; It must include historical overview, technological foresight, threat assessment and other forecasts.

Political, economic, etc. strategic models that will provide the infrastructure for the concepts. It is obvious that there are no future predictions. While technological prediction was performed with subjective skills in the past years, it has recently begun to be performed especially with scientific numerical methods. For example, while the basic method is to monitor technologies from the embryonic period onwards, in the study titled "Alternative World Scenarios" published by Charles Taylor in 1993, the monitoring of the cost and feasibility of technologies was tried to be systematized in ten-year periods. In subsequent periods, this work was further developed and enriched with new techniques. However, these techniques often require expertise beyond military knowledge. Unfortunately, the number of experts and academicians in the world who know these techniques at the same time is not sufficient. Therefore, support from other state institutions is required for such analyses.

On the other hand, it is a matter of debate how effective the historical perspective can be against the weapons created by new technologies. On the one hand, many tactics draw their sources from past practices. For example, the swarm tactic of mass use of rotary-wing drones actually dates back to World War II. It is a reflection of the wolf pack trap tactic of German U-Boats developed by Admiral Karl Donitz in World War II. Therefore, it is a concept for the future; It is considered a point where technique and art meet, always nourished by evolutionary experience and lessons gained from the past, rather than abstract and theoretical thoughts. However, this kind of historical development compulsion; For an opponent who properly analyzes past experiences, it will remove the element of surprise in a conflict and also cause the commanders' intentions and intentions to be easily guessed.

In addition, many new weapons and ways of using them actually include new, revolutionary practices that radically change existing understandings. However, unfortunately, these applications may be rejected or not used properly because they do not comply with old experiences. It is not known how true it is that submarines were not preferred in the early periods on the grounds that they did not comply with the honor and dignity of military service because they approached ships without being noticed. Similarly, in America, it is stated that a concept that does not fit the current conflict culture, which is basically based on the philosophy of controlling the tempo in order to win the war and maintain the initiative, will not be approved and will face intense resistance, even if it is evolutionary. However, for this very reason, it has recently been thought that concepts can mislead senior management for new applications and leaps and prevent different ways of thinking.

In addition, concept studies can be done by field experts as well as system software (decision support, machine learning, modeling, simulation, etc.), rich image analysis (big data for drills and operation areas and their execution), SWOT analysis, morphological analysis, dynamic system modeling, causal analysis. and should be supported by methods such as cognitive mapping, workshop facilities, optimization, cost-benefit analyzes and game theory. However, many of these areas are outside of military knowledge. However, considering the number of possible concepts in an institution, it is clear that countries cannot provide expert and academic personnel at this level for every study.

Conclusion

Considering the above-mentioned factors, it is thought that the process used to determine the talents needed in the future may not always provide the desired effectiveness, contrary to expectations. However, the atmosphere of defeat and trauma experienced by the Vietnam War, especially in the USA in the 1970s, clearly demonstrated that national rights and interests cannot be achieved only through weapons. Today, General Clausewitz's views that what is important is not the destruction of the armed forces but the will of the nation to defend its rights and interests are more popular than ever. So I am an enemy; If a nation can transfer the legitimate wealth inherited from its ancestors to its own interest groups through technological, social, economic, cultural and even demographic power methods, it does not have to occupy its lands.

On the other hand, it is clearly stated in Protocol No. I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions that the right of the parties to choose the means or methods of war is not unlimited, even in an armed conflict, and that civilian targets should never be the subject of a military attack. However, at this point today, like the USA, It is claimed that countries have technologies that can drag the whole world into disaster. For example, it is stated that the High Frequency Active Atmosphere Program (HAARP) technology, developed by US companies and working with the principles of a microwave oven, can change climates, melt glaciers, and have effects such as earthquakes, tsunamis and thermonuclear explosions. What's worse is the claim that not only the USA but also some countries such as Russia, Brazil, Norway and Puerto Rico may have the technology in question. If the allegations are true, it is clear that the mutual hostility of the countries in question could lead to the end of the world.

National rights and interests are under manipulation and pressure from non-conflict risks more than ever before in history. On the other hand, defense planning; economic, technological, demographic, even cultural etc. is sensitive to crises. Problems in this national power element will directly affect the security of states. In this context, it is vital to foresee these risks and take the necessary precautions.

For this reason, all institutions of the state should make short, medium and long-term future predictions for their constitutional areas, share them and consolidate them in a manner determined by the political authority. In the process, holistic strategies of countries should be made in accordance with these predictions. Even though it is predicted that capital in the world is increasingly spreading to the global level, it can be thought that this will destroy national economies in the long run. In this context, the state's support for the national industry and sharing its predictions appropriately may be a savior in the long run.

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