Gulf War and the M1 A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (Part 3)

In the previous part of this series, we discussed Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the management of logistical operations, the strategic planning of coalition forces and the general course of the Gulf War. The relevant part can be accessed from the link below.

https://strasam.org/savunma/kara-silah-ve-sistemleri/korfez-savasi-ve-m1-a1-abrams-ana-muharebe-tanki-bolum-2-3601

Cover image; The map depicting Operation Desert Storm during 24-28 February 1991 visualises the strategic deployment of allied troops, the routes of advance and the defensive positions of Iraqi troops, as well as the geographical deployment pattern of the troops in the operational area and the deployment and deployment changes during the operational phases.

Deception in the Desert / Deceiving Iraq in Operation Desert Storm

Operation Desert Storm was one of the shortest duration and lowest casualty victories in the military history of the United States. The Coalition campaign, which began in January 1991, was fuelled by five weeks of intense air strikes against both strategic targets and tactical units. After Iraqi forces were weakened by the air campaign, the ground offensive, launched on 24 February, forced Saddam Hussein to surrender, forcing Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait in less than 100 hours. This decisive victory was achieved with less than 250 casualties on the Coalition front.

The success of Operation Desert Storm was based on the clear superiority of US air and ground forces in training, equipment and leadership. Equally critical, however, was how senior coalition commanders used these advantages effectively against the Iraqi Army. The ground operation plan envisaged a comprehensive coalition offensive against Iraqi troops stationed in Kuwait. Simultaneously, armoured units with high mobility and high firepower advanced deep into southern Iraqi territory, targeting Iraqi Republican Guard divisions, Saddam Hussein's strategic reserve and the Republican Guard, and encircling the Iraqi Army from the west. This strategic encirclement was the final and decisive blow that led to the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and its disorganised retreat northwards into the Iraqi interior.

Deception played a vital role in the development of this plan. Given the size, capabilities and deployment patterns of the Iraqi Army, the deception of the Iraqi command structure at both operational and tactical levels became a critical requirement for coalition commanders. This paper analyses the development and implementation of coalition deception operations, the objectives of the operation, the methods and means employed to achieve these objectives, and the effectiveness of the operation in misleading Iraqi commanders.

On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi army launched a surprise attack on Kuwait, quickly seizing control of the small Persian Gulf state. To legitimise the invasion, Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait had historically been part of Iraq, but this claim was far from historical reality. The real reasons behind the invasion were Iraq's heavy debt burden after its long and costly war with Iran. Saddam Hussein sought to alleviate his debts or provide an emergency cash injection by gaining control over Kuwait's rich oil reserves.

Within three days, US Air Force aircraft were deployed just behind the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, while a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division secured strategic military bases in Saudi Arabia. Over the next two months, US ground troops continued to deploy to the region. These troops moved towards the Kuwaiti border in coordination with the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces in defensive positions against a possible Iraqi attack. By the end of September, the remaining elements of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived in the area, along with other key units of the XVIII Airborne Corps. These units included the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Mechanised Infantry Division, the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Marine Division. The expanded ground defence line was supported by extensive air power provided by the Saudi Arabian Air Force, the US Air Force and the US Navy. In addition, an amphibious task force of the US Marine Corps, consisting of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, was deployed in the Persian Gulf off the coast of Kuwait.

The operation, dubbed ‘Operation Desert Shield’, aimed at the defence of Saudi Arabia, quickly became a multinational operation. In the autumn of 1990, the Coalition, which had expanded to include Egypt, Syria, France and the United Kingdom, began to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia. By the end of October, coalition partners had deployed more than 200,000 troops to Operation Desert Shield, of which 130,000 were US personnel. Central Command (CENTCOM), under the command of US Army General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, served as the operation's main headquarters, assuming overall command and control. The bulk of the US ground forces were deployed under the command of the XVIII Airborne Corps and occupied strategic positions behind Saudi and other Arab allied troops on the front lines along the Kuwaiti border. However, CENTCOM kept its amphibious forces ready at sea and increased the number of Marine Corps units preparing to conduct operations along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi coastline in October.

On the Iraqi side of the border, Iraqi forces were in defensive positions. Iraqi archives captured in 2003 provide limited evidence of any serious intention by senior Iraqi leadership to invade Saudi Arabia in 1990. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein was determined to maintain his hold on Kuwait, and in August he began deploying additional forces to the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia border. By the end of September, 20 Iraqi divisions occupied Kuwait. Nine of these divisions were deployed along the border with Saudi Arabia, where they built complex defences consisting of fortifications supported by minefields.

Mobile mechanised units, equipped with modern weapons and capable of counter-attacks against possible attacks by Coalition forces, were deployed to reinforce these front-line divisions. As a precaution against a possible Coalition amphibious landing, the Iraqi military command deployed several infantry divisions along the Kuwaiti coastline. As a strategic reserve, Saddam Hussein deployed the Republican Guard Command, consisting of 8 elite divisions, to southeastern Iraq, just north of the Kuwaiti border. By early October, the total Iraqi force strength in Kuwait and south-eastern Iraq had reached about 430,000 troops.

Transition to Offensive

In mid-September 1990, when it became clear that Saddam Hussein no longer posed a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM began planning offensive operations with the objective of driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. The planning process intensified in the following month as the conviction grew that peaceful means would not lead to Iraqi withdrawal. In October, General Schwarzkopf's staff devised an air-land operation, initially based on forces already in Saudi Arabia and the region. In terms of ground operations, this included the XVIII Airborne Corps, the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Marine Division, and Arab, British and French forces. Early drafts of the plan presented an essentially simple concept: After an air offensive had destroyed command and control networks and other strategic targets, and had worn down Iraqi ground forces, Coalition forces would attack Kuwait directly along three main axes.

The main offensive would be directed against the Wadi al Batin, the dry riverbed that marks the western Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and has historically served as a major invasion route between the Arabian Peninsula and Mesopotamia, to encircle the strongest Iraqi defensive positions. This main force was to advance northwards along the valley to the northern border of Kuwait and isolate Iraqi forces in the southern part of Kuwait. Since the vast majority of the combat power included in the plan consisted of the XVIII Airborne Corps, this concept became known as the ‘One Corps’ concept.

However, no one within CENTCOM was happy with this plan. Iraqi military leaders had gained considerable experience in planning and implementing defence strategies in depth during their eight-year war with Iran. Moreover, it was obvious to Coalition commanders in October 1990 that Iraqi positions in Kuwait were complex and that the Coalition forces available for a ground offensive were being defended by an Iraqi force of approximately the same size. Even if the air campaign succeeded in wearing down the Iraqi fighting force in Kuwait, the ground offensive was still likely to meet fierce resistance. After the war, Schwarzkopf described the ‘One Corps’ concept as ‘an attempt at a “centre-attack” right in the middle of the Iraqi defences, lacking the element of surprise and likely to cause “significant” casualties to Coalition forces, thus weakening public support’.

On 11 October, CENTCOM staff presented this plan to President George H.W. Bush and his national security team. Neither President Bush nor his advisers were satisfied with the ‘One Corps’ concept. This encouraged Schwarzkopf to develop more innovative approaches. Four days later, the CENTCOM commander instructed his staff to develop a new offensive concept that included a second US Army armoured unit. Schwarzkopf's new vision envisaged a daring encirclement of Iraqi forces west of the Kuwaiti border. The Iraqi Army had established its defences along Kuwait's east coast and southern border. However, the Iraqi defence line ended just west of Wadi al Batin and no forces were deployed along Kuwait's western border. This defensive arrangement offered a right flank vulnerable to the kind of encirclement manoeuvre Schwarzkopf envisaged.

The new CENTCOM plan, labelled the ‘Two Corps’ concept, took advantage of the open Iraqi flank. First, a support attack by the XVIII Airborne Corps, US Marines, and other Coalition troops would enter Kuwait directly to seize Kuwait City; this action would effectively pin down Iraqi forces. Finally, in what became known as the ‘Left Hook’, the newly added armoured units would move rapidly north into Iraq from attack positions west of the Kuwaiti border (on the Coalition's left flank) and cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait by attacking deep into the Euphrates River. The troops would then attack eastwards to destroy their main objective, the Republican Guard Command on Kuwait's northern border. On 8 November, President Bush formally ordered the US Army's VII Corps, consisting of two armoured divisions, a mechanised infantry division and an armoured cavalry regiment, to deploy from Germany to Saudi Arabia. Schwarzkopf would soon have the two corps in his hands, making his siege plan a reality.

As November progressed, concerns began to ariseat CENTCOM headquarters about the adequacy of the forces requiredfor the two main objectives of the encirclement operation: the isolation of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and the destruction of the Republican Guard Command. To address these concerns, the XVIII Airborne Corps was reinforced to increase the strength of Operation Left Hook. Four divisions of this corps were to serve as the westernmost elements of the siege operation and were to launch a deep offensive towards the city of Nasiriyah.

VII Corps was reinforced with the British 1st Armoured Division, bringing the corps' total combat strength to three armoured divisions, a mechanised infantry division and an armoured cavalry regiment. In addition, to increase the viability of an amphibious landing in Kuwait, General Schwarzkopf added the 5th Marine Expeditionary Unit (5th MEB) to the Marine Corps elements at sea.

The image above is a simplified representation of Operation Left Hook. The cover image is a more detailed map of Operation Desert Storm. The map in the cover image not only visualises the strategic deployment of allied troops, their routes of advance and the defensive positions of Iraqi troops, but also shows in detail the geographical deployment of troops in the area of operations, as well as their movement and changes of position during the operational phases.

The new ‘Two Corps’ concept drew its effectiveness mainly from the element of surprise, with the enveloping force as the new main effort. To help secure this element, the CENTCOM commander and staff began to develop a complex deception plan to conceal Coalition intentions at the operational and tactical levels. In CENTCOM's assessment, the Coalition's operation could not have succeeded without misleading the Iraqis about the real plan of the offensive campaign.

Deception Plan

The Magruder Principle formed the basic doctrine of this operation. By November 1990, the Iraqi defensive set-up in Kuwait was considered an important intelligence indicator of how Saddam Hussein and his generals perceived Coalition intentions. The Iraqi command had significantly reinforced defensive positions on the southern Kuwaiti border and along the Persian Gulf coast. Although they had deployed a few additional infantry divisions just west of Wadi al-Batin, they had taken no measures to protect their open western flank. For the CENTCOM deception cell, the most effective way to achieve the objective set by Schwarzkopf was to reinforce existing Iraqi prejudices against Coalition offensive operations.

To this end, CENTCOM planners determined that their main target was Saddam Hussein, who in 1990 directed all aspects of Iraqi military operations and made decisions, including the deployment of Iraqi forces to Kuwait and southern Iraq. The ‘scenario’ for the Iraqi leadership was simple: Coalition deployments, military mobilisations and official statements pointed to a combined operation involving an amphibious landing from the Gulf and simultaneous ground offensives from the south in the direction of Kuwait City and Wadi al-Batin.

In the autumn of 1990, a series of doctrinal reviews shaped the conceptual framework of these plans. In this context, the field manual FM 100-5 (Operations, 1986) stated that deception was an integral component of military operations and that simplicity and credibility were the basis for successful deception. The manual emphasises that deception plays a critical role in achieving operational objectives. In addition, the principle of deception, known as the Magruder Principle, focuses on using (exploiting) the enemy's existing beliefs and expectations (prejudices) for strategic purposes rather than changing them.

This principle suggests that manipulating enemy perceptions is a more effective and feasible method than direct change of beliefs. An example often used to illustrate the Magruder Principle is the elaborate strategy developed by the Western Allies during World War II to mislead German forces about the true location of the invasion of France. Adolf Hitler and his staff had a strong belief that the landings would take place in the Pas de Calais area. To reinforce this prejudice, the Allies devised an extensive deception operation and used it effectively to support the success of the actual landings in Normandy. Normandy is more than 320 kilometres (200 miles) from Pas de Calais

The deception operations developed by the Western Allies in World War II to mislead German forces about the location of the landing zone prior to the Normandy landings are a classic example of this field. It also examines deception tactics employed by the US Army in recent operations such as Operation JUST CAUSE (intervention in Panama) and Operation DESERT STORM (liberation of Kuwait) in 1989. FM 90-2 (Deception of the Enemy) states that effective battlefield deception is based on three key elements:

Intelligence Support, Integration and Synchronisation, and Operational Security.

Deceptive troop deployments and manoeuvres; Coalition forces used deceptive military bases along the Kuwaiti coastline, empty vehicles, mock tanks and simulated ship movements to deceive Iraqi intelligence into believing that the main offensive would take place by sea. This tactic led Iraqi forces to reinforce coastal defences and shift resources away from the main offensive direction.

Misleading communications and electronic warfare; Coalition forces disrupted Iraqi communications systems and disseminated disinformation by generating misleading radio traffic and employing electronic warfare techniques. This resulted in Iraqi commanders receiving conflicting and erroneous information about Coalition intentions.

The most critical element of the deception plan involved the deployment and movement of the two US corps that formed the ‘Left Hook’. The positions of the VII and XVIII Airborne Corps had to support the deception scenario until such time as the Iraqi forces could not detect the possible movement of these corps to positions on the western flank. For this reason, both XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps remained deployed in tactical assembly areas dozens of miles south of the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait border until the start of the air campaign on 17 January 1991.

VII Corps' assembly area was located approximately sixty-five kilometres (forty miles) south of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, just east of Wadi al Batin. This location reinforced the Iraqi intelligence assumption that a possible US offensive would take place along this valley towards Kuwait. As part of CENTCOM's deception plan, air strikes at the start of the operation targeted and neutralised specific Iraqi intelligence sensors, including Iraqi surveillance and radar sites that could have detected the movement of the two US corps towards the western flank. During the same period, US Army counterintelligence assets moved into the area around the Saudi Arabian town of Hafr al-Batin to disseminate information to suspected Iraqi operatives that a US offensive was approaching from north of Wadi al-Batin.

After Coalition forces had largely established air superiority by 20 January, units of the XVIII Airborne Corps began moving west towards assault positions approximately 200 kilometres (125 mi) west of Wadi al-Batin, near the town of Rafha, Saudi Arabia. The move, which took place predominantly at night and involved both ground and air assets, was conducted under strict operational security protocols, and the corps completed the approximately 480 kilometres (300 miles) on 25 January. VII Corps' move west was delayed until 15 February, nine days before the planned start of the ground operation, for two reasons: First, the corps' attack position was much closer to the assembly area - about 65 kilometres (40 miles) west of Wadi el Batin. Secondly, the continued deployment of troops east of Wadi al Batin further reinforced the Iraqi belief that the coalition was planning a direct attack northwards towards Kuwait.

As the synchronisation of the deception plan across the entire area of operations was vital, the CENTCOM deception strategy coordinated the execution of a number of critical activities simultaneously with the deployment of the two corps to their attack positions. At the operational level, CENTCOM ordered Marine Corps elements stationed in the Gulf to intensify preparations and exercises for an amphibious assault in January and early February. General Schwarzkopf had used the amphibious exercises in the autumn to lead the Iraqi leadership to believe that the main offensive would come from the sea. The start of the air campaign was intended to reinforce this belief. The CENTCOM commander made the following statements after the start of the air campaign:

‘We continued our intensive operations at sea because we wanted the Iraqis to continue to believe that we would conduct a major amphibious operation in this area... We wanted him [Saddam Hussein] to concentrate his forces [in Kuwait], and that expectation was fulfilled.’

In support of this initiative, CENTCOM allowed the press to film and report on Marine Corps amphibious operations exercises. General Schwarzkopf also openly visited Marine Corps amphibious units on 15 February, an action aimed at focusing Iraqi attention on the Persian Gulf. On 24 February, the opening day of the ground operation, the Marine Corps and Navy conducted an amphibious deception operation, with the battleship USS Missouri firing on an island just east of Kuwait City and SEAL teams detonating explosives on the Kuwaiti coastline, simulating the first phase of the Coalition amphibious landings.

CENTCOM also integrated the deception strategy at the tactical level, ensuring simultaneous execution. Two weeks before the start of the ground operation, General Schwarzkopf's staff held a deception planning conference and issued instructions to lower echelon units. These emphasised the larger objective: To reinforce the Iraqi forces' belief that their main offensive would be directed directly at Kuwait. In order to conceal the operational shift to the west, Iraqi intelligence had to continue to believe that both VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps remained deployed in their assembly areas and intended to attack Kuwait from east of Wadi al Batin.

The XVIII Airborne Corps integrated its own deception plan into the framework of the CENTCOM deception strategy. The corps deployed a deception cell of twelve personnel equipped with camouflage decoys, communications emulators and other equipment to the territory of Saudi Arabia. Each of the four divisions comprising the corps had its own deception teams and equipment. On 13 February, about 300 troops, including deception teams, psychological operations (PSYOPS) teams, a communications company, an engineer platoon, a smoke platoon, and an infantry platoon, deployed to so-called ‘deception tactical assembly areas’ near the Kuwaiti border. These forces conducted communications and operational activities that mimicked those of the main elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps. The units further reinforced the deception scenario by dropping leaflets calling for the surrender of half a million Iraqi troops just north of the deception assembly areas and spreading messages to nearby Saudi Arabian settlements about an impending offensive to the north.

The deception measures employed in the VII Corps Tactical Assembly Area included combat activities. On 20 January, the Syrian 9th Armoured Division began withdrawing from its positions on the Saudi Arabian border, just west of Wadi al Batin. The US 1st Cavalry Division, assigned as an area of operations reserve, replaced the Syrian troops and faced several fortified Iraqi infantry divisions across the border. The 1st Cavalry Division's mission was to draw the attention of the Iraqi forces and conceal the VII Corps' movement to offensive positions. The division's activities included aggressive patrolling of the line of demarcation by ground and air reconnaissance elements, as well as engineering work in preparation for a possible offensive. Division personnel periodically fired artillery or anti-tank guided missiles at Iraqi targets.

The intensity of these activities increased as the start of the ground offensive approached. On 19 and 20 February, the division commander moved mechanised units forward to the Iraqi border line and along Wadi al Batin to conduct reconnaissance. Finding that Iraqi forces had established fortified and complex defensive positions, the 1st Cavalry engaged in a five-hour battle using artillery and close air support. During the increased combat activity during this time, XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps moved to assault positions on the western flank, while Iraqi troops in the Wadi al Batin area continued to focus on the 1st Cavalry Division as planned.

An Assessment of the Ground Offensive and Deception Plan

On 24 February 1991, at dawn, a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division crossed the border into Saudi Arabia and began an air assault in the direction of southern Iraq. This action, which marked the beginning of the ‘Left Hook’ manoeuvre , sparked the ground operation. Advancing on the western front, the XVIII Airborne Corps units encountered minimal enemy resistance, while the Iraqi units that had been spotted were caught off guard by the Coalition forces' sudden raid. The rapid advance on this front led General Schwarzkopf to order VII Corps to attack ahead of schedule so that it could advance simultaneously with XVIII Airborne Corps. Divisions of VII Corps moved from their positions west of Wadi el Batin and encountered far less resistance than expected. As part of this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted the final phase of CENTCOM's deception operation. Simultaneous with the VII Corps advance, the 1st Cavalry Division simulated an attack north of Wadi al Batin, using artillery, attack helicopters and a full brigade-scale assault on Iraqi defences. When this deception operation reached its peak 15 kilometres north of the border, VII Corps in the west made a decisive entry into Iraqi territory.

On the eastern front of the CENTCOM offensive, the Arab and US Marines launched an attack against Iraq's main line of defence. On this front, progress was relatively slow due to the more intense resistance encountered. Nevertheless, by the second day of the ground offensive, Coalition forces were well ahead of schedule. XVIII Airborne Corps had taken control of a strategically important motorway near the town of Nasiriyah, 100 miles inside Iraqi territory. On the third day of the operation, VII Corps turned north-east to attack divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard. Marine Corps units to the east reached the suburbs of Kuwait City, captured thousands of Iraqi soldiers, and witnessed the retreat of the remaining Iraqi troops north into the Iraqi interior. By the fourth day, the VII Corps had almost completely neutralised the Republican Guard, Arab forces liberated Kuwait City and Coalition forces declared a ceasefire. The ground operation had successfully achieved all its objectives in less than 100 hours.

What was the effectiveness of CENTCOM's deception operation? The operational planners developed methods to verify at different levels whether their actions had the intended effect. To monitor the deployment of Iraqi troops, CENTCOM planners deployed both airborne surveillance (JSTARS) elements and special operations units and other intelligence sources. Towards the beginning of the ground campaign, CENTCOM intelligence analysts were confident that Iraqi forces were holding defensive positions against an amphibious landing and direct attacks on Kuwait. At the tactical level, the deception unit of the XVIII Airborne Corps received intelligence confirming their belief that Iraqi troops were deployed just south of the Kuwaiti border, not hundreds of miles west of the Coalition forces' “Left Hook” manoeuvre.

Immediately following Operation Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf described the deception operation as a critical success, particularly in relation to the Navy's deception of the threat of amphibious landings. As tangible evidence of the success of this deception, personnel and operational analysts involved in Operation Desert Storm highlighted the fact that Saddam Hussein had deployed a large number of divisions on the Kuwaiti coast, limited divisions west of Wadi al-Batin, and no divisions on the western front by 24 February 1991. This deployment pattern makes it clear that Iraqi forces failed to detect the presence of the coalition's two corps on the western flank.

Analysis of Iraqi archival documents captured since 2003 reveals a more complex story of the operation. These records show that as early as August 1990, Saddam Hussein and senior Iraqi commanders anticipated that Coalition forces would launch a combined air and ground operation to liberate Kuwait. In fact, senior Iraqi officials agreed that the main coalition offensive would be a corps-level operation along the Kuwaiti border line, through Wadi al-Batin. Concerns about a possible amphibious landing in Kuwait emerged in September 1990, when some Iraqi leaders expressed concern about possible coalition air operations north of Kuwait City. By January 1991, Saddam Hussein and his staff had clearly focused their attention on enemy forces deployed south of the Kuwaiti border and east of the Persian Gulf, expecting an offensive from both directions.

The image above shows the logistical capabilities of the US Army during the Gulf War on 20 January 1991. The M911 Tank Carrier, also known as the Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET), and its attached M747 Heavy Equipment Semitrailer played a vital role in transporting heavy armoured vehicles such as M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks to the deployment area. The image also shows a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), commonly known as a Humvee, being used by military police as a checkpoint on a convoy route in the Saudi Arabian desert. Photo by Robert Sullivan/AFP.

Around the same time, however, the Iraqi leadership began to receive intelligence reports that US forces were moving westwards. In this context, on 23 January 1991, Saddam Hussein received a report from the General Directorate of Military Intelligence (GMID). The report stated that it had detected ‘intensive movement of enemy elements by helicopters in the direction of Rafha’. The director of GMID stated that this intelligence coincided with information obtained from the Iraqi embassy in an unspecified country. In the light of these assessments, GMID interpreted this activity as a US attempt to secure the western flank during the anticipated ground offensive across the Kuwaiti border.

In early February, GMID compiled additional intelligence reports indicating a significant Coalition force concentration on the western front. One intelligence source reported that troops from the US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were deployed near the Saudi Arabian town of Arar, just west of Rafha. This area actually formed the western flank of the XVIII Airborne Corps' offensive position. In a memorandum sent to Saddam Hussein's office a few days later, the head of GMID argued that the previous assumptions about the coalition amphibious assault were probably a hoax. This information would undoubtedly have had a greater impact on Saddam and his senior command if they had not received intelligence about the concentration of US armoured units near Wadi al Batin and the imminent amphibious and air offensive in Kuwait, information which reinforced existing assumptions about the Coalition plan. Nevertheless, during the second week of February, reports from various sources that enemy forces were holding significant numbers of troops on the western front continued to reach the Iraqi high command, leading to confusion about the true intentions of the Coalition.

By 18 February, uncertainty had given way to certainty. On that date, the GMID submitted a report to Saddam Hussein's office which accurately analysed the general contours of the coalition's ‘Left Hook’ manoeuvre, including a warning that the enveloping force could easily penetrate deep into Iraqi territory and isolate Iraqi troops in Kuwait. In sum, a week before the start of the ground campaign, Saddam Hussein and his senior command had a clear picture of the Coalition threat on the western front and an accurate prediction of the intentions of these forces. However, Iraqi forces did not respond effectively to this threat. As with the attack on Pearl Harbor and the events of 11 September, sometimes accurate intelligence data can be ignored under the bombardment of disinformation.

The captured archival records do not reveal how Saddam Hussein and his senior command reacted to the GMID report or what strategies were considered to counter the ‘Left Hook’ manoeuvre. As one analyst of captured Iraqi documents noted, by mid-February 1991, Coalition air dominance meant that redeployment of Iraqi ground forces was not possible without risking their destruction. Moreover, the detection of the ‘Left Hook’ manoeuvre did not allay Iraqi concerns about the threat of amphibious landings and the concentration of enemy forces along the Kuwaiti border line, as Coalition forces had the capability to conduct all three operations simultaneously. Iraqi preconceived notions of Coalition intentions limited the ability of Saddam Hussein's army to operate effectively.

CENTCOM's deception operation was ultimately successful. The implementation of the Magruder Principle, which underpinned the plan, was the most critical factor in a successful deception operation. For more than five months, CENTCOM's formations and activities reinforced Iraqi assumptions about the coalition's methods of liberating Kuwait. CENTCOM's efforts to synchronise operational elements in a timely manner and to integrate deception at the operational and tactical levels, between land and naval forces, were the main reason why Iraqi prejudices persisted until February 1991. Clearly, CENTCOM did not succeed in fully preventing the Iraqi forces from shifting XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps westwards. However, in post-operation assessments, this shortcoming was relatively insignificant given Iraq's operational constraints, especially after the Coalition air campaign had established air superiority. All adversary forces have weaknesses, and effective military deception plans exploit these weaknesses to increase the chances of success on the battlefield. CENTCOM's deception served precisely this purpose, significantly increasing the probability of victory by misleading the enemy and preventing the coalition from obtaining accurate intelligence on the timing, location and scope of the operation to liberate Kuwait.

The above photograph shows M1A1 Abrams tanks travelling with a convoy of military vehicles in the Iraqi desert during the 1991 Gulf War.

Donald P. Wright, author of ‘Deception in the Desert: Deceiving Iraq in Operation Desert Storm' by Donald P Wright, ’Weaving a Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations' is the twelfth chapter of a comprehensive book entitled “Weaving a Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations”. I have painstakingly translated this article in order to make it understandable to as wide an audience as possible, and have utilised a variety of visual resources to make the content more engaging and illustrative.

We complete the 3rd part of our article series here. See you in Part 4

Bibliography

Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations (English Edition)

Edited by Christopher M. Rein / Army University Press

Deception in the Desert / Deceiving Iraq in Operation DESERT STORM Donald P. Wright