Task Force Normandy: The Deep Operation That Launched Operation Desert Storm (Part 1)

Operations in the deep zone include efforts to prevent unconnected or out-of-contact enemy manoeuvre forces from attacking in a coherent manner, or to prevent enemy facilitating capabilities such as fire and air defence from having an effect in the near zone. 

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

Task Force Normandy was one of the smallest, but one of the most successful and important, of the Joint Army-Air Force operations in the initial offensives of Operation Desert Storm. In the opening hours of 17 January 1991 in the Iraqi desert, Task Force Normandy consisted of eight US Army AH-64A Apache helicopters working with four US Air Force MH-53J Pave Low helicopters on a mission to destroy two Iraqi early warning (EW) radars. The radar sites were targeted to blind Iraqi air defences and open a twenty-mile wide air corridor in the first minutes of the air campaign. The task force operation was named Normandy after the site of the 101st Airborne Division's famous D-Day airborne deployment during World War II. This operation opened an unimpeded corridor for large numbers of fast-moving Navy and Air Force bombers to fly deep into Iraq and destroy key targets to launch Operation Desert Storm. Operation Desert Storm is one of the largest combat operations in US military history since the Vietnam War.

In the photo above, 2 MH-53J Pave Low IIIs fly together at night. The machine gunner of the MH-53J Pave Low III helicopter is at the 7.62 mm mini-gun as he searches for threats while the helicopter he is in refuels during a mission in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (the official name used by the US government for both the first phase of the War in Afghanistan (2001-2021) and the larger-scale Global War on Terrorism (2001-2014)). Photo by Manuel Trejo

In early August 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, with some 300,000 troops, ordered his army to invade and occupy the neighbouring border state of Kuwait, accusing Kuwait of ‘siphoning crude oil from their shared border oil fields and keeping oil prices low in order to help the Western states’. He also accused the Western oil-buying countries of ‘Kuwait is an artificial state carved out of the shores of the State of Iraq by the Western countries’.  General Norman Schwarzkopf was the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and led the United Nations and United States first-phase response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by establishing a deterrent defence force to prevent the Iraqi Army from advancing into Saudi Arabia. This defensive posture also bought valuable time for the UN and US militaries to build up more forces for a major offensive to remove Saddam's forces by force if he did not withdraw from Kuwait. The name given to the first defensive operation was Operation Desert Shield. Saddam Hussein defied United Nations Security Council demands to withdraw from Kuwait by mid-January 1991. 

Mission Analysis

As UN and US forces launched Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Shield reduced the Iraqi Army's immediate threat to Saudi Arabia and This operation allowed an initial planning cell from the US Air Force's 20th Special Operations Squadron to begin planning an air campaign with the primary mission of penetrating Iraq's air defences and providing freedom of manoeuvre for UN and US aircraft to conduct deep operations. To Iraq to reduce the risk management of crews.  The 20th Special Operations Squadron was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rich Comer, USAF, from the 1st Special Operations Base at Hurlbert Field, Florida, and consisted of multiple MH-53J Pave Low helicopters in Saudi Arabia to provide coverage; the primary mission of these helicopters was Search and Rescue operations. 

Iraq's air defence system consisted of French and Soviet air defence equipment. The Iraqis had built an integrated air defence system that included medium and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and short-range anti-aircraft guns. The multi-layered defence system provided overlapping coverage against high fixed-wing aircraft and low rotary-wing aircraft. The Iraqis were only able to establish this defence system through the use of powerful early warning radars, which provided important information on the size of the enemy air threat, the direction of attack and the speed axis of any enemy force.

Iraqi security operations centres will receive the early warning information and determine which air defence assets to use to maximise the effects. If a task force is able to destroy several early warning radar sites, this effort could disrupt the Iraqi security operations centres' ability to integrate air defences against enemy penetration. The tactical challenge was that Iraqi security operations centres were generally deep inside Iraq and well defended, and in order to minimise losses during any future air campaign, a military operation would have to destroy the eyes and ears of the Iraqi air defence system.

The recent arrival of global positioning system (GPS) technology played a crucial role in mission analysis. GPS technology began in the 1980s with the launch of a global network of GPS satellites into space orbit.  The new network of GPS technology provided accuracy of up to 100 metres 24 hours a day over Southwest Asia with GPS-enabled aircraft. This technological navigation advantage gave some aircraft (especially special operations helicopters such as the MH-53J Pave Low) unparalleled navigational accuracy in day, night and instrument flight conditions. 

Colonel Jessie Johnson, Commander, US Special Operations Command Centre (SOCCENT), initially led Colonel (USAF) George Gray, Commander, 1st Special Operations Base (SOW), and staff planners to target two early warning radar sites in Iraq. They were positioned in the proposed air strike corridor, but the simultaneous complete destruction of these sites was critical to the success of the mission. These early warning radar sites had to be destroyed simultaneously to prevent any warning or alert to Iraq's larger air defence systems. Due to the overlapping coverage of early warning radars, the destruction of only one early warning radar site would leave enough capacity to threaten future attacking air forces. During this period of planning, the intelligence community had determined that the Iraqis had tactically moved the three radar sites 20, 27 and 40 miles away, respectively, further behind Iraq, and had reinforced them. 

Figure 1. AH-64 A Apache Attack on Radar Sites inside the Iraqi border on 17 January 1991. This opening Deep Strike launched Operation Desert Storm. 

During the initial mission planning, in which only MH-53Js were used due to efficient GPS navigation, the helicopters could attack two early warning radar sites with their 50 calibre machine guns. Colonel Johnson described this initial plan to General Schwarzkopf, who only approved the concept for further planning. Lieutenant Colonel Comer, however, was not convinced of the success of this initial plan because he believed that ‘50-calibre machine guns would not be powerful enough to satisfactorily destroy the sites’. In addition, the 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), contacted Colonel George Gray and suggested that Army MH-60s armed with 2.75-inch rockets and 7.62 mm mini-guns would be better than MH-53J Pave Low helicopters in terms of mission accomplishment. Colonel Gray and Lieutenant Colonel Comer rejected this proposal, believing that the Army special operations aviators were simply looking for a way to prevent the MH-53J Pave Low helicopters from being on the mission.

The initial planners proposed three courses of action to achieve the objective: Plan 1 was to deploy special operations forces on the ground. Plan 2 was to have Air Force MH-53J Pave Low helicopters attack and destroy the early warning radar site using only their 50-calibre machine guns; Plan 3 was to use cruise missiles.  Each of the action plans involved a certain high risk and mission failure, such as something surviving or being missed. The planners all agreed that using helicopters was the best option because their pilots could stay near the radar stations for a long time, assess the damage, and re-attack the targets until they were sure that nothing was left. The helicopter was seen as the best option to destroy the target, assess the damage, re-engage and provide a rescue option in any downed aircraft scenario. But the next step was which helicopters to use, what type and how many.

The best helicopter for navigation would be the MH-53J Pave Low, but the most accurate helicopter to destroy the early warning radar site was determined to be the AH-64A Apache helicopter. The AH-64A Apache helicopter was a new attack platform that replaced the US Army's Vietnam-era AH-1 Cobra helicopter. Lieutenant Colonel Comer discussed the mission in more detail and also strongly recommended that the mission include Army AH-64s with Hellfire missiles, Hydra-70 rockets and 30 mm machine guns to do the job. AH-64A Apache can carry a variety of weapons that can guarantee the destruction of both hard and soft targets. AH-64A Apache helicopters did not have GPS navigation capability like the MH-53J Pave Low helicopters, and flying in the desert and at night carried a high risk. The key to mission success was to destroy two Iraqi early warning radar facilities by attacking both sites simultaneously. This scenario required two helicopter crews to maintain a timely arrival at the target at night, which AH-64A Apache helicopters alone could not accomplish with their current navigation capabilities. AH-64A Apache helicopters needed assistance with precision navigation to reach the target in time to destroy the target.

AH-64A Apache and OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) are seen standing by at a forward operating base during Operation Desert Storm. Photo by Dean Wagner

As the plan was maturing towards a mix of MH-53J Pave Low and AH-64A Apache, CENTCOM intelligence reported that three Iraqi early warning radar sites were merging in two areas and were approaching the border as close as 10 miles.  The result was a hybrid option using MH-53J Pave Low helicopters in conjunction with AH-64A Apache helicopters. The MH-53J Pave Low's onboard GPS provides precise navigation, and the MH-53J Pave Low's radar, which can track terrain conditions, can provide extra safety for the AH-64A Apache helicopters along the route and maintain their precise speed. The planners took their modified plan, a mix of MH-53J Pave Low and AH-64A Apache, to Colonel Johnson at SOCCENT. Colonel Johnson briefed General Schwarzkopf, who then approved the use of Apaches from the 101st Airborne Division and allowed them to begin training en masse.

On 25 September 1990, Colonel Johnson called Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Cody, commander of the 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Brigade, to discuss mission capability and assurance of success, who was in the same location at King Fahd Airfield. After the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Comer met with Lieutenant Colonel Cody and they began to plan the mission in detail, not knowing when D Day (the day of the operation) or H Hour (the time set for the attack) would occur. The Task Force was officially named Task Force Normandy. 

The mission concept was that MH-53J Pave Low helicopters would fly lead using GPS technologies and terrain tracking radars, and AH-64A Apaches would follow them to the point of release and then proceed to the targets. The MH-53J Pave Lows would also be available to search for and rescue AH-64A Apache crews in the event of any downed helicopter.

The immediate challenges identified for this joint helicopter package were the fuel load limitation of the AH-64A Apache. With a full weapons load (AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, 70 mm Hydra 70 and 30 mm M-230A1 machine gun), the AH-64A Apache's mission could barely fly on internal fuel and would have no margin for error when required to avoid unexpected threats or bad weather. Tech Sgt. (USAF) Jeff Morrison, a crew member flight engineer, suggested an option where the MH-53J Pave Low could transfer fuel from its own fuel tanks to the affected AH-64A Apaches by landing on the ground and also ensure that each MH-53J Pave Low had the necessary equipment.  An additional option was to establish a forward arming and refuelling point (FARP) inside Iraq. This additional option was quickly abandoned due to its complexity and fears (a failed Joint aviation mission in Iran in 1980 resulted in the accidental collision and destruction of a helicopter and an aeroplane in Iran, killing eight crew members). The approved proposal was to replace the 2,75-inch rocket compartment with an external fuel tank. 

Another challenge was how to determine the release point; some of the best solutions came from enlisted crews. One of the gunners of MH-53J Pave Low recommended that the AH-64A Apaches take them to a predetermined location (release point) and then mark it with chemical night lights. AH-64A Apache pilots can determine the location of the chemical sticks and update their Doppler systems for the final study of their targets.

Two groups would fly to destroy early warning radar sites. The groups were named Red Team and White Team. The leader of the group would be the MH-53J Pave Low helicopter, which would lead the 4 AH-64A Apache helicopters in the field and provide combat search and rescue support.  Lieutenant Colonel Cody selected the crews of the helicopters in December to carry out the mission in two teams of 4 AH-64A Apaches. Lieutenant Colonel Cody had 24 AH-64A Apache crews to choose from and had only selected 8, but commented that any of the twenty-four could complete the mission; the crew averaged 26 years of age and included three warrant officers from outside the flight school. Lieutenant-Colonel Comer was to lead Red Team to the western radar site, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cody was to lead White Team to the other radar site. 

For the next three months, in the autumn of 1990, they would train for the mission in the Saudi Arabian desert. AH-64A Apache helicopters were only allowed access to a firing range in the Saudi desert that could fire up to 6 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. Crews on the mission were not briefed on specific targets or locations until two days before the operation, and there was to be one trained reserve AH-64A and one UH-60, with four trained mechanics on standby in case of need.

The White Team consisted of the 20th Pave Low crew of Captain Michael Kingsley and Major Robert Leonik and the AH-64A crew of Lieutenant Colonel Dick Cody, Chief Warrant Officer 2 William Stewmom, Lieutenant Tom Drew, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Tim Zarnowski, Chief. Midshipman 3 Ronald Rodriguez, Chief Midshipman 2 David Miller, Chief Midshipman 3 David Jones and Chief Midshipman 2 Thomas O'Neill. 

Red Team consisted of the 20th Pave Low crew of Captain Corby Martin and Major Ben Pulsifer and the AH-64A crew of Captain Newman Shufflebarger, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Tom Roderick, Warrant Officer 1 Tim Vincent, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Shawn Hoban. The reserve AH-64A consisted of Lieutenant Tim Devito and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Mark Ivey. 

The selected maintenance crew aircraft on the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter consisted of Chief Warrant Officer 3 Terry Seanor and Captain David Parker, as well as intelligence officer Lieutenant Russ Stinger, mechanics Staff Sgt. Robert Sparks and Staff Sgt. John Frady. Their mission would be to carry out rescue missions of the downed helicopter in the event that a helicopter crashed or was shot down.

Here we come to the end of Part 1. When reading the article, it is important to remember that the operation took place in 1991. The fact that the helicopters currently in use do not use GPS technology is seen as a major deficiency.  Part 2 will continue from where we left off.

Bibliography

Colonel Paul E. Berg and Colonel Kenneth E. Tilley (US Army), Chapter 8 of Deep Manoeuvre, Historical Case Studies of Manoeuvre in Large-Scale Combat Operations, edited by Jack D. Kem.