Task Force Normandy: The Deep Operation That Launched Operation Desert Storm (Part 2)
President Bush secretly announced D-Day on 17 January 1991, the beginning of the air war against Iraq, and the whole world held its breath in anticipation of war.
In the first part, the beginning of the deep operation involving the Normandy Task Force during Operation Desert Storm and some details about the operation were mentioned. For those who could not read part 1 of the article or for those who want to remember it, I leave the relevant link below.
Task Force Normandy: The Deep Operation that launched Operation Desert Storm (Part 1)
Challenges of Joint Operations
Joint operations always come with long-standing challenges in bringing multi-service organisations together to work as a team. The AH-64A Apache and MH-53J Pave Low crews had never worked with each other prior to this mission, and both helicopter types had different unity of service, training and procedures (TTPs). There was also a natural and mutual mistrust between inter-service aircrews in the aviation community. Additional differences in equipment were that the AH-64A Apache operated at night using infrared and did not require ambient light, while the MH-53J Pave Low used night vision goggles (NVG) that required some ambient light; each helicopter had to find ways to accommodate the equipment differences.
The MH-53J Pave Low's mission was low-level, long-range, undetected penetration of enemy territory and was an excellent choice for Task Force Normandy. Photo; US Air Force Special Operations Command
The operational security (OPSEC) of the future Task Force Normandy mission was critical to providing classified training details and preventing any suspicion. Army and Air Force teams were not briefed on details or the precise target until hours before the mission. Both Lieutenant Colonel Cody and Lieutenant Colonel Comer conducted all training almost 700 miles from the actual target; crews never practised the actual route; movements to the actual operational base were classified. The Air Force and army crews planned to fly separately to the preparation base in King Khalid Military City.
Since each helicopter type independently conducted successful training flights in the autumn, the pressure from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and CENTCOM on the decision of the AH-64A Apache to complete the mission over other helicopters had to overcome the doubts of the personnel; AH-64A Apache was in combat for the first time and was not fully tested. One of the last training scenarios from above to justify the selection of AH-64A Apaches was tasked with flying a specific 1,000-mile route at night, arriving within firing range undetected, and blowing up some targets at a precise time, to the exact second. Lieutenant Colonel Cody and his selected crew performed, but were unaware that CENTCOM personnel were there. The 1-101st battalion operations officer (S3) was in the range tower with CENTCOM personnel, and with fifteen seconds to go, no one in the tower could see or hear the AH-64A Apaches passing by the tower in the darkness; a CENTCOM personnel asked S3 where the AH-64A Apaches were; three seconds before S3's exit he said, “I guess they won't make it?” and the area around the tower was instantly illuminated as all four AH-64A Apaches fired at the exact time specified. This demonstration finalised the decision: If the AH-64A Apaches could sneak so close to the people who knew they were coming and were looking for them, then they had the stealth for the real mission. All doubts in the minds that the AH-64A Apaches could fulfil this mission were erased.
After three months of training, Colonel Johnson personally informed General Schwarzkopf in late October that Task Force Normandy was ready to carry out the mission to destroy early warning radar sites in Iraq... and Colonel Johnson assured him that the mission would be 100 per cent successful. Schwarzkopf then replied, ‘OK, Colonel, then you can start the war.’ The date of the war mission had not yet been set and was to be determined by President George H.W. Bush.
A week before Christmas 1990, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and Secretary of Defence (SECDEF) Dick Cheney flew to Riyadh to personally review CENTCOM's war plans. General Schwarzkopf, while briefing the Task Force Normandy mission at SECDEF, brought Colonel Johnson and Colonel Gray and asked them meaningfully if they could guarantee 100 per cent success; they both said yes.
Task Force Normandy held a final rehearsal on 10 January 1991 and proceeded flawlessly as planned; this included actual timing and distances to detect any errors. Lieutenant Colonel Comer said: ‘We were eager for the flying mission. ‘Since special operations helicopters are given a better chance for a good mission, like Desert One in Iran.’ On 14 January, AH-64A Apaches and MH-53J Pave Lows departed separately for Al Jouf, a shared airfield about 130 miles south of the Iraqi border.
During the final exercise, Lieutenant Colonel Comer met with the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Air Unified Commander to recognise that Lieutenant Colonel Doug Brown, Commander of the 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), was at his best. He told him to ensure that his unit, not the 20th Special Operations Squadron, was the preferred aviation unit for the next mission. Lieutenant Colonel Comer identified the capability differences between the helicopter types to JSOC and almost lost the mission due to Brown's preference for his unit, but in the end Comer kept the mission.
By the afternoon of 16 January 1991, all last-minute diplomatic efforts by the UN and the Allies to avert any future conflict had failed, as the United Nations' January deadline to Saddam Hussein had come and gone. President Bush secretly declared 17 January 1991, D-Day, the start of the air war against Iraq, and the world held its breath in anticipation of war. In order to set the conditions for war and open an air corridor for bombers and fighters, General Schwarzkopf approved the Normandy Task Force's combat mission to destroy two early warning radar stations in the early morning hours of 17 January 1991. CENTCOM told all its forces that the battle would begin at 03.00 the following morning.
At 2130 Lieutenant Colonel Comer and Cody conducted a final mission update briefing for all AH-64A Apache and MH-53J Pave Low crews. The crews were highly professional and well trained and recognised the importance of their mission to future large-scale combat operations. At 2330 hours, the crew began pre-flight checklists and started the engines at midnight.
Execution of the Mission
Since the flight times required different take-offs, the ‘White Team’ AH-64A Apaches first left Al Jouf Airfield at 01:00; the ‘White’ MH-53J Pave Low lifted off at 01:13. The ‘White Team’ MH-53J Pave Low now linked up with the AH-64A Apaches to fly the eastern target designated as ‘California’. The red team's MH-53J Pave Low took the lead seven minutes later, and the crew joined the AH-64A Apaches en route to the western target, designated as ‘Nevada’. Lieutenant Colonel Comer flew as co-pilot in Red Squadron in MH-53J Pave Low and maintained communications with Colonel Gray and Colonel Johnson at the SOCCENT command centre. Lieutenant Colonel Dick Cody was a co-pilot in the White Squadron in the AH-64A Apache. There were also 2 MH-60 Black Hawks (55th SOS) for combat rescue support, a UH-60 Black Hawk with Apache mechanics, and a reserve AH-64A Apache if required in orbit north of Arar.
Figure 2. Knee card used by CW2 William B. ‘Brian’ Stewmon, 86-08977, sitting in the front seat of an AH-64A with the task force commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Cody. The card shows primary targets, which are communications and radar sites, and secondary targets, such as operations buildings and barracks where Iraqi troops are located. From the private collection of Brian Stewmon.
The Red and White Teams avoided any ground lighting in order to maintain operational security. The Red Team encountered an unexpected observation post that was extremely brightly lit, requiring them to change course slightly, and noticed small arms fire with no effect. At 0212 hours, Task Force Normandy crossed into Iraq, altering their flight path to avoid known or suspected enemy observation posts or Bedouin positions. The western target was thirteen miles farther away; the eastern target twenty-three miles.
Both teams flew in radio silence and crossed the border at 75 knots at an altitude of 120 feet, and the crews could see lights near the target forty kilometres away. The Iraqis had left the target's lights on. The flight slowed to 80 knots and descended to 15 feet as it approached the release point. Two minutes later, MH-53J Pave Low slowed and hovered and dropped the green chemical stick to mark the release point and then turned south. When MH-53J Pave Low left the south and entered a holding pattern, it was ready to provide combat search and rescue (CSAR) or extra firepower if required. The AH-64A Apaches slowly passed over the chemical lights and updated their Doppler navigation systems for the last 10 miles. They were running to their individual targets. Task Force Normandy reached firing position exactly 90 seconds early. Lieutenant Colonel Cody commented, ‘The waiting after arriving in Iraq aged it prematurely.’
AH-64A Apaches achieved complete surprise at Iraq's early warning radar sites. The AH-64A Apache crews also saw enemy troops around the structures. Suddenly the lights began to switch off and one of the pilots commented, ‘I think they know we're here’ as the AH-64A Apache crews switched on their ranged lasers. Radars were switched on to search for fixed-wing aircraft, without waiting for slow-moving helicopters. At exactly 02:37:50, White Team AH-64A Apache 2nd pilot Lieutenant Tom Drew keyed his radio and transmitted ‘Party in 10’ and Red Team transmitted ‘Joy’. Exactly ten seconds later, all teams began firing AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. Twenty seconds later, the deadly weapons began to explode towards the structures. First there were generators, then command bunkers and finally radar antennas. The pilots would attack the power sources first, silencing the radar site before alerting the Iraqi central control headquarters in Baghdad. Enemy soldiers were killed in the fighting. Intelligence-gathering aircraft at high altitudes monitored the areas and recorded the instant cut-off of all radar signals. Each AH-64A Apache had a primary target, and the primary target of another AH-64A Apache was a secondary target. Cody adjusted the primary and secondary targets to ensure that every part of the early warning radar site received an extra hit.
After all the AGM-114 Hellfire missiles had been exhausted, the AH-64A Apaches advanced a further four kilometres and began firing multi-purpose submunition (MPSM) rockets and opened up with their 30 mm chain guns four kilometres from the settlements, riddling what was left of the compounds with each shot. In addition, some of the rockets fired were rockets used to tear the wires and cables connecting parts of the site; nothing could be repaired, the entire attack, from the first shot to the last, lasted only a few minutes. Within four minutes, the radar sites and bunkers were completely destroyed and the mission was fully completed, after which Task Force Normandy returned home. Cody relayed ‘California AAA’ to Comer, who then relayed the message to CENTCOM stating that the White Team target had been 100 per cent destroyed and that there had been no casualties.Comer relayed ‘Nebraska AAA’ to CENTCOM, reporting that he had 100 per cent destroyed Red Team's site and had suffered no casualties. Task Force Normandy established a forty-kilometre corridor for Allied aircraft to begin air operations of Desert Storm. The sites were completely destroyed and were not to be reactivated during the war.
The radar facilities were destroyed 22 minutes before Hour H (called H-22), which was based on the estimated time by which the Iraqis' radar network would be able to detect the “Strike Force” as it moved towards the border. The gap in the Iraqi defence system reduced their ability to detect, identify and react to a Coalition attack.
The AH-64A Apaches had expended 27 Hellfire missiles, 100 Hydra-70 rockets and 4,000 30 mm shells. They turned south, rejoined MH-53J Pave Low and headed for home. En route, the crew observed the launch of two SA-7 missiles. The crew managed to evade them using onboard defence systems and some aggressive manoeuvres. Outgoing Lieutenant Colonel Comer radioed a coded message to SOCCENT headquarters, reporting complete success: ‘SOF targets destroyed.’ Colonel Johnson personally reported the results to General Schwarzkopf's command centre. ‘Thank God!’ the general replied.
While the Task Force Normandy helicopters were on their way back, the attack aircraft headed for Baghdad, on the Saudi border. The final danger for the aircraft was the need to stay low to the ground and not rise above 30 metres as the largest air armada since the Vietnam War raced towards Baghdad. A coalition of US and Allied aircraft began crossing Iraqi airspace, including the first mission of the F-117 Stealth Fighter aircraft in combat, with dozens of F-15s and F-111s joining the attack. Saudi and Kuwaiti F-15s, as well as British Toronado fighter jets, participated in the attack on Iraqi targets. There was so much light in the pitch darkness that Lieutenant Colonel Comer called the formation aluminium clouds. After crossing the border, the MH-53J Pave Lows disappeared to continue their CSAR mission, and the AH-64A Apaches returned to their home base. The 1-101st AH-64A Apaches rejoined the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Eagle and landed at 16:00.
The MH-53J Pave Low and AH-64A Apache combination worked as planned and the training paid off in full. In the clear night air, the returning helicopter could see above the numerous formations of US and Allied fixed-wing aircraft travelling towards the radar gap. The pilots recalled that: ‘You could look south and there were rows and rows of flashers... through the goggles you could see a long road... there were rows of anti-collision lights; it looked like the Los Angeles freeway... Then all of a sudden, when every aircraft switched off their lights to enter Iraqi airspace, there were no more lights. An F-15E fighter pilot wrote a letter of thanks to the crew of Task Force Normandy saying: ‘During our flight intelligence briefing, we realised that our flight path took us directly into an active radar site. We were told not to worry about it. FLIR (in our thermal target pod) we experienced great relief.
Operation Desert Storm is Taking Place
Just before 02:00 on 17 January, the shift non-commissioned officer assigned to the 101st Airborne Division main command post at Camp Eagle, King Fahd International Airport, Saudi Arabia, received a call from XVIII Airborne Corps G-3 personnel informing him that ‘At 0152 hours, the US Navy launched 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Iraqi targets and relayed a verbal order from ARCENT that “Operation Desert Storm is in effect”. 66 With this order, more than five months of training in the Saudi desert came to an end. The mission of Operation Desert Shield, the defence of Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression, was successfully completed and the 101st Airborne Division immediately began to implement its role in the liberation of Kuwait and the launch of Operation Desert Storm.
At 06.35 on 16 January, seven B-52 bombers took off from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, to join the first wave of Operation Desert Storm fighter-bombers. These B-52s and others from the continental United States flew a 35-hour, 14,000-mile combat mission, the longest air combat mission in history. The strategic air campaign was now in full swing as Allied aircraft poured over Iraq and Kuwait. On 17 January, the Turkish Government finally gave its approval to begin combat operations, and Colonel Gray was relieved to now have a personal rescue force for the northern part of the country for the remainder of MH-53J Pave Low.
While Task Force Normandy opened up the Iraqi western flank to allow Coalition air to launch precision bombing, Saddam Hussein continued to improve his defences in Kuwait, positioning forty-one Iraqi divisional headquarters for defence. Since November, Saddam Hussein had increased five divisions of infantry divisions participating in coastal and forward defences, and added an additional three regular army armoured divisions to complete the formation of two regular army units to serve as operational reserves.
Military analysts assessed the defensive strategy and assumed that Saddam had decided to accept the risk in the west because an attack from the west would be too difficult and the route too long for the Coalition to consider an option. Saddam's remaining forces in Iraq consisted of 24 divisions, largely recently mobilised infantry units of little military tactical value, and further reinforcement was unlikely. In retrospect, Saddam had left the back door open and apparently had neither the ability nor the intention to close it.
By the end of operations on 26 February 1991, 24 Iraqi divisions had been destroyed; Iraqi troops surrendered faster than CENTCOM could count, but the military police estimated the number of prisoners of war to be in excess of 30,000; the 24th Infantry Division had left its fuel trucks behind; and President Bush ordered a ceasefire to take effect at 08.00 on 28 February. With the ceasefire, UN and US forces destroyed almost all of the Iraqi ground forces; 3,847 of 4,280 tanks (90%) were destroyed, more than half of the 2,880 armoured personnel carriers and about 3,100 artillery pieces were destroyed; only 5 to 7 of the 43 combat divisions remained capable of carrying out any offensive operations; and about 60,000 Iraqi prisoners of war were held. US forces lost 147 men killed in action; Operation Desert Storm was the fastest and most complete victory in American military history.
Conclusion
Task Force Normandy succeeded beyond all expectations and set the conditions for future warfare with the complete destruction of both radar sites, and two days later an AC-130 gunship travelled to the radar sites to destroy everything that remained, leaving behind nothing to shoot at. The loss results on the first night of the air campaign were the true measure of success; planners had expected high losses among aircraft deep in the heart of Iraq on the first night, but the losses did not materialise.
Task Force Normandy represented several successful lines of effort for the Army from lessons learned from the Vietnam War; the success was a testament to the Aviation unit's ability to attract and retain extremely high quality airmen, train them to excellence, and allow them to become critical thinkers in highly stressful combat environments. The most important keys to their success were the gains made in key technologies since the end of the Vietnam War; most notable was the leap in technological capability that came with the AH-64 Apache helicopter, the laser-guided Hellfire missile and night vision devices. After this first combat mission of the AH-64 Apache, those who doubted the performance of the AH-64 Apache were silenced due to the ability of this helicopter to prepare and execute missions with a high level of preparedness for long periods of time under terrible environmental conditions. The most important technological advantage against increasing threats was the precision navigation with GPS, a task that only a year or two ago would have been considered impossible.
In the photo above; Commanders and staff of the 1st Battalion 101st Aviation Regiment (Assault) after the operation. Major General Richard A. Cody, then lieutenant colonel and battalion commander, sits in the centre.
Finally, Task Force Normandy demonstrated the effects of dramatic changes in thinking about the dimensional multi-domain battlefield and how to organise and fight in it. Task Force Normandy proved doctrinal ideas about deep strike operations in large-scale combat operations and aviation (in the 1990s). This deep manoeuvre mission also proved the importance of moving towards joint integrated operations, which is in the thinking of future Army doctrine and current ongoing large-scale combat operations. By destroying (EW) early warning radar sites that disrupted the enemy's command and control (C2), Task Force Normandy prevented the Iraqi Army from mounting air defences and allowed Allied air forces to create massive effects against key Iraqi capabilities to enable rapid movement into Iraq. It went down in history as an excellent example that defines today's large-scale combat operations.
