The Gulf War and the M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (Part 14)
The Desert Storm Operation has been one of the most discussed and studied conflicts in modern warfare history in terms of friendly fire incidents. The results of the investigation into the friendly fire and fratricide incidents involving M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles during this operation may shed light on this field for those working in this area.
The performance of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank in the Gulf War is often evaluated in terms of superior technology and absolute victory. However, Chapter 13 takes a critical look at this narrative, meticulously analysing logistical vulnerabilities, inter-system integration issues, and technical weaknesses that have the potential to overshadow operational success. While acknowledging the Abrams' impressive combat performance, it reveals that the success of modern armoured units depends not only on equipment but also on a multi-layered, dynamic, and sometimes fragile structure. This chapter is an important read for those interested in military strategy and defence systems, offering insights into the realities on the ground.
For those who have not read the 13th part of our series, the relevant link is provided below.
In the Shadow of Victory: Friendly Fire Incidents in the Gulf War
In military terminology, ‘friendly fire’ or, more technically, ‘fratricide (fratrisid)’ refers to the accidental targeting of allied forces or forces operating on the same front during operations intended to target enemy elements. Such incidents can arise due to various reasons, including the incorrect identification of the target as an enemy, crossfire during engagement with the enemy, range errors in long-range engagements, and inaccuracy in firing.
Although it is an inherent risk of the war environment, friendly fire incidents have the potential to seriously undermine unit morale, combat effectiveness, and overall operational success. The Desert Storm Operation has been one of the most discussed and studied conflicts in modern warfare history in terms of friendly fire incidents.
In this relatively short-lived war, which resulted in low American casualties, friendly fire incidents accounted for an disproportionate percentage of total casualties, drawing significant attention. This article aims to conduct an in-depth analysis of friendly fire and fratricide incidents involving M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles during the Desert Storm Operation. The details of these incidents, their causes, effects, and lessons learned provide critical insights for future military operations.
Friendly Fire and Fratricide in Operation Desert Storm: An Overview
Friendly fire (blue-on-blue) is frequently recorded as an unintended but inherent consequence of modern military operations. In NATO and Western military literature, ‘blue’ generally represents friendly forces; therefore, the term ‘blue-on-blue’ refers to friendly engagement. Such incidents can arise due to various factors, including information chaos on the battlefield, target identification errors, and coordination deficiencies. In technical literature, such incidents are defined by the term ‘frateriside,’ derived from the Latin words “frater” (brother) and ‘caedare’ (to kill). Military forces are aware of the potential damage and tragic consequences that may result from the misuse of weapon systems with high destructive capabilities in the environment in which they operate.
Operation Desert Storm is considered one of the conflicts in which friendly fire incidents stood out in terms of both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. According to official records, 17% of total American casualties during the operation were caused by friendly fire, resulting in the loss of 46 soldiers and 72 personnel injured, including those involved in friendly fire incidents. This figure vividly highlights the impact of coordination deficiencies and identification errors on human losses in the battlefield. Excluding casualties caused by Scud missile attacks, the fratricide rate in the combat zone reached 23%. The fact that 77% of American military vehicles destroyed during the Gulf War were hit by friendly forces highlights tactical coordination deficiencies and combat zone identification weaknesses.
These statistics reveal that, despite the short duration of the war and the low total casualties, friendly fire incidents stood out proportionally and constituted a significant internal weakness despite operational success. Friendly fire incidents during the Gulf War resulted in notable losses for coalition forces.
According to official British data, 9 of the 16 British soldiers who lost their lives in the war were killed by friendly fire. Among these incidents, the targeting of two British Warrior armoured vehicles by a US Air Force A-10 attack aircraft stands out as one of the most notable events.
Similarly, U.S. military records indicate that 10 of the 46 American soldiers killed in combat were killed by friendly fire. These figures clearly demonstrate the impact of identification errors and coordination deficiencies on operational security in the battlefield.
Detailed Analysis of Friendly Fire Incidents Involving M1A1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Vehicles
During Operation Desert Storm, numerous friendly fire incidents involving M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and M2 Bradley armoured infantry vehicles were reported. These incidents primarily occurred under low visibility conditions, during intense combat tempo and rapid offensive advances, exposing deficiencies in target identification between units. In at least eight of the friendly fire incidents identified, depleted uranium (DU) munitions fired from M1A1 platforms were used, resulting in the contamination or destruction of six M1/M1A1 tanks and 15 Bradley combat vehicles by depleted uranium.
As part of the investigation, a team of experts from the Army Materiel Command (AMC) examined the vehicles that were hit to determine whether there were any uranium residues. Uranium traces were considered a definitive indicator that the firing was carried out using US-made ammunition, as it is known that Iraqi forces did not use such ammunition.
Friendly Fire Incidents Between Ground Units: (M1A1 Abrams vs. M1A1 Abrams/M2 Bradley)
According to official records, 61% of friendly fire incidents during Operation Desert Storm were caused by engagement errors between ground forces. Such fratricidal incidents typically occurred due to the limited performance of thermal imaging systems, inadequate target identification capabilities, and tactical information confusion in intense combat environments.
7th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Squadron – Friendly Fire Incident (26 February 1991, 15:00–17:30): During large-scale armoured combat on 26 February 1991, three M2 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CVF) belonging to the 4th Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment Fleet of the 7th Cavalry Regiment was hit by 120 mm depleted uranium (DU) sabot ammunition fired by allied M1A1 Abrams tanks between 15:00 and 17:30 local time.
Tactical Positioning and Field Structure:
During the relevant time period, the 3rd Armoured Division was advancing eastward with the 1st Brigade on the right and the 2nd Brigade on the left, while the 3rd Brigade was following behind. The security of the division's right flank was provided by the 4th-7th Cavalry Regiment. The Alpha Battalion of the Regiment was performing a protective role along the front line alongside the advance elements of the 1st Brigade. The 3rd Platoon of the Alpha Battalion was deployed on the front line, while the 2nd Platoon was positioned approximately 500 metres behind. After making contact with six enemy main battle tanks and 18 BMP-type armoured vehicles, the 2nd Platoon dispatched three Bradley vehicles to the right and left flanks of the 3rd Platoon.
Weapon Systems and Munition Types:
The M2 Bradley CFVs of the Alfa Battalion in action used 25 mm HEI (High Explosive Incendiary) and tungsten armour-piercing (AP) munitions against enemy targets, as well as TOW
(Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) anti-tank missile systems against enemy targets at ranges of approximately 100 to 800 metres.
Details of Hit Vehicles:
Technical information regarding each M2 Bradley CFV hit by DU sabot ammunition in the complex combat environment is listed below.
Case Analysis and Visual Conditions:
The events occurred under limited visibility due to sunset, intense sandstorms, and smoke on the battlefield; the platforms were either confused with Iraqi armoured elements or entered a crossfire zone within non-linear combat dynamics.
M2 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV) numbered A-24;
During the large-scale armoured engagement that took place between 15:00 and 17:30 on 26 February, it was the first vehicle to be hit by 120 mm depleted uranium (DU) sabot ammunition fired by an allied M1A1 Abrams tank. The tactical conditions at the time of the incident, combined with strong winds blowing sand and dense smoke during sunset, significantly reduced visual awareness. The 3rd Platoon, where A-24 was stationed, crossed a ridge in the terrain and made contact with a high-density target environment filled with enemy ground forces and BMP armoured combat vehicles.
Engagement Process and Damage Dynamics A-24 engaged enemy elements with its 25 mm turret gun and TOW anti-tank missiles; however, due to a jam in the gun mechanism, the vehicle commander temporarily withdrew the platform from the combat zone to repair the system malfunction and reload the TOW launcher. During this time, while the loader was inside the vehicle filling the launcher, the vehicle was directly hit by a single DU sabot round that entered through the centre of the left front turret and exited through the right rear exit point, causing the vehicle to catch fire almost instantly.
Personnel Casualties and Response As a result of the engagement, the gunner was killed, and the vehicle commander suffered severe injuries to his lower extremities. Two crew members sustained minor burns, while the third crew member escaped unharmed but re-entered the vehicle to retrieve personal equipment and evacuate the gunner's remains. A second Bradley CFV, numbered A-26, arrived at the scene for support but did not directly intervene with A-24.
M2 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV) numbered A-31;
26 February 1991, Evening Hours One of the four M2 Bradley Armoured Fighting Vehicles in the 3rd Team, A-31, was dispatched to the conflict as part of the advance unit. The M2 Bradley CFV numbered A-36, positioned near A-31 on the battlefield, was rendered inoperable due to heavy machine gun fire hitting its transmission; the crew was ordered to evacuate the vehicle. During the evacuation process through the cargo hatches, the Bradley was hit again. According to crew statements, the bullet was fired from a T-72 main battle tank, striking the side of the vehicle and exploding, causing injuries among the soldiers who were being evacuated.
Shortly thereafter, A-31 arrived at the scene and evacuated the crew of A-36. Minutes later, the A-31 platform was hit by two 120 mm DU sabot rounds as a result of friendly fire. The rounds penetrated the right side of the hull from beneath the turret and exited through the left side behind the driver's seat. Seven of the eight personnel on board were injured with severe burns and/or shrapnel wounds. During and immediately after the clash, rescue units arrived at the scene and evacuated the injured personnel from the damaged but still functional vehicle.
Approximately 30 minutes later, the Team Sergeant and observer, who had been dispatched to the area earlier for assistance, returned to the side of A-31 and transported the platform to the base area. All personnel injured in the incident survived, and personnel with DU particles embedded in their bodies are currently under observation as part of the depleted uranium monitoring programme in Baltimore.
M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (CFV) No. A-22;
M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle No. A-22 was recorded as the last platform hit by friendly fire during the clashes on 26 February 1991. The vehicle, which was deployed in an easterly direction, was hit by 120 mm depleted uranium (DU) sabot ammunition fired from an allied M1A1 Abrams tank; the ammunition entered through the left rear turret section and exited through the right front turret exit line. As a result of the engagement, the gunner was killed; the vehicle commander and two infantry personnel were wounded by shrapnel. Among the wounded was a Senior Master Sergeant (SFC), who was positioned on the upper section of the vehicle at the time of the explosion and was thrown out of the vehicle by the blast, surviving the incident.
Crew Evacuation and Post-Operation Activities
Immediately after the vehicle was hit, two soldiers entered the platform to evacuate the surviving personnel. Although the CFV was still drivable, it was deemed to have lost its combat capability. A few hours after the incident, unit personnel returned to the vehicle to recover the A-22's radio system, ammunition, and sensitive equipment that could be reused at the battalion level.
According to his post-incident statement, the Senior Master Sergeant evacuated from the platform stated that the friendly fire incident was widely known within the unit; however, he stated that he was not aware that DU ammunition had been used during the incident. The relevant personnel have been included in the depleted uranium exposure monitoring programme conducted in Baltimore.
Personnel Exposure and Medical Evacuation
It has been assessed that a total of 15 or more soldiers may have been exposed to DU dust on three separate M3 Bradley CFV platforms struck by DU sabot ammunition during the relevant engagement. One M113 armoured medical ambulance registered in the Headquarters and Headquarters Team (HHT) inventory evacuated the wounded soldiers at the scene to the Fleet Assistance Station, accompanied by at least three medical personnel. In addition, it was stated that additional personnel who intervened in the vehicles and whose identities could not be determined were also at risk of exposure to DU particles.
Task Force 1-37 Armoured – Night Assault (26 February 1991, 20:00)
On 26 February 1991, at approximately 20:00, Task Force 1-37 Armoured launched a night assault on a position defended by part of the Talwakana Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard, which was reinforced with T-72 main battle tanks and BMP-class armoured combat vehicles. This operation was carried out by Task Force 1-37 Armoured as the southernmost element of a coordinated division attack by the 7th Corps in the southern sector, under the 3rd Armoured Division.
Battle Conditions and Platform Casualties
During the attack, low-altitude dense cloud cover and rain affected the area, significantly reducing visibility. Under these conditions, M1A1 Abrams tank No. B-23 was likely hit by Hellfire-type shaped charge munitions, resulting in a fire on the tank. The technical assessment of this casualty is detailed separately in the ‘Tank Fires’ section.
Task Force 1-37 Armoured – Friendly Fire Incident: M1A1 Abrams (C-12)
The M1A1 Abrams main battle tank numbered C-12, assigned to Company C, was hit by a 120 mm depleted uranium (DU) sabot round fired from behind by allied forces during a night assault on 26 February 1991, resulting in a loss of power.
Evacuation Process and Secondary Damage Dynamics
While the crew was being evacuated, an anti-tank (AT) missile was detected striking the rear luggage rack area. This impact caused the backpacks, sports bags, and other personnel equipment stored outside the tank to catch fire, resulting in a local fire. No secondary explosions caused by mechanical or ammunition sources were observed inside the turret structure; no damage was observed in the fuel system.
Personnel Status and Rescue Information
No injuries were reported among the crew during the incident. The tank was rescued and evacuated by the unit on 4 March 1991. Although there are no records of the crew's identities, it is assumed that there were four personnel in the vehicle in standard configuration.
Battle of Norfolk (27 February 1991, Early Morning) 27 February 1991 - Friendly Fire Incident
2nd Armoured Division, 3rd Brigade Elements As part of Operation Desert Storm, the forward elements of the US 2nd Armoured Division's 3rd Brigade engaged in a large-scale friendly fire incident during an attack against the 37th Brigade of the Iraqi 12th Armoured Division on the night of 27 February. Brigade of the Iraqi 12th Armoured Division during an attack launched on the night of 27 February. The relevant brigade was transferred from Germany and incorporated into the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. The tank battle that ensued created a highly turbulent and chaotic battlefield characterised by 360-degree engagements. In the hours before dawn, low cloud cover, wind-driven rain and smoke from the fighting further complicated the visual environment.
Under these conditions, US combat units used thermal sighting systems to identify targets; however, this technology proved to be extremely challenging in distinguishing between friend and foe. As a result of the ensuing clashes, five M2 Bradley armoured combat vehicles and five M1A1 Abrams tanks were damaged or destroyed. Nine of these ten vehicles were directly hit by 120mm DU sabot ammunition fired by allied forces. Several platforms were also reported to have been hit by enemy fire.
Preconditions and Tactical Configuration:
Prior to the incident, the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment had completed the 73rd Eastern Battle, neutralising elements of the Iraqi 12th Armoured Division and Tawalkana Division; it halted its advance to allow two brigades of the 1st Infantry Division to pass through their positions on the night of 26 February. Since night-time line crossings with live ammunition were considered extremely risky during peacetime training, the units had limited preparation for such movements in the field. Moreover, most of the personnel had had very little rest in the previous 36 hours. Despite this, the crossings were carried out successfully without any accidents.
Following the movement, the 1st Brigade began a coordinated division-level assault toward the east, with the 3rd Brigade in the north and the 1st Brigade in the south. Due to the absence of distinct terrain features to physically separate the brigade sectors, the 92nd East/West grid line was designated as the tactical dividing line.
Engagement Dynamics and Battlefield
The 3rd Brigade carried out an advance with three battalions to clear the enemy area. Although the clear night sky and sufficient starlight may have increased the effectiveness of night vision systems, the battlefield remained highly scattered and disorderly.
Despite the intensive efforts of the command elements, the battalions were unable to align themselves on the same axis, resulting in weakened tactical coordination. Additionally, the enemy infantry elements infiltrated the US armoured platforms in a scattered manner, further increasing the chaos on the ground. Two Bradley vehicles from Task Force 1-41 Infantry Regiment, attached to Bravo Company, were the first elements to engage the enemy.
Due to technical malfunctions, the Company Commander was forced to change platforms, and during this process, the unit lost contact with the rest of the battalion for a short time. While attempting to re-establish contact, Bravo Company entered fortified positions held by the Iraqi army. At around 02:00 on 27 February, they came under rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack. Immediately following this contact, U.S. Abrams tanks opened fire on vehicles belonging to Bravo Company. Technical details regarding the three Bradley platforms hit during this engagement are provided below.
Bravo Company – Task Force 1-41st Infantry Regiment: M2 Bradley Platforms Hit by Friendly Fire (February 27, 1991)
M2 Bradley No. B-21
The M2 Bradley armoured combat vehicle, numbered B-21, was directly hit by two 120 mm depleted uranium (DU) sabot rounds fired by friendly forces during a night-time engagement on 27 February 1991. As a result of the engagement, three soldiers stationed on the vehicle were killed; at least three of the ten personnel on board were injured to varying degrees. Two of the injured sustained shrapnel wounds; the third personnel suffered severe thermal burns.
B-26 M2 Bradley
The vehicle in question was actively taken over by the Company Commander due to a mechanical failure that occurred during the clash and continued to be used in the field. In the following process, 120 mm sabot ammunition fired at B-26 directly hit the vehicle; one soldier lost his life in the incident. Following the incident, the B-32 M2 Bradley platform arrived at the scene to provide evacuation support; it assisted in the removal of personnel from the vehicle and the safe removal and transport of sensitive equipment. During the intervention, a Sergeant Major on board the B-32 stated that his exposure to DU was minimal as he had only been on the B-26 platform for a short time.
M2 Bradley No. B-33
M2 Bradley No. B-33 was hit by 120 mm sabot ammunition during the same series of clashes; there were no personnel casualties. However, there is no clear information on how many soldiers were in the vehicle during the clash, the number of wounded, or the extent of their injuries. It has been reported that some modular equipment parts belonging to the platform were removed from the field after the engagement.
Evacuation of the Wounded and Intervention Process
The total number and identities of soldiers who entered the Bradley platforms after the engagement for various reasons, particularly for personnel rescue, cannot be confirmed at this time. The evacuation of wounded personnel was initiated immediately after the attack, and first aid was administered by soldiers with first aid certification at the combat site. However, ongoing enemy mortar fire interrupted the response efforts and endangered the situation. Despite this, no additional casualties were reported during the incident.
Delta Company Elements – Platforms Under Friendly/Enemy Fire (Between 04:00 and 05:00)
In the early hours of 27 February, elements of Delta Company, Task Force 1-41 Infantry, came under friendly and enemy fire with two M2 Bradley armoured combat vehicles.
Initially, one of the platforms became stuck in a three-sided earthen embankment constructed by Iraqi forces to protect armoured vehicles, temporarily severing the company's tactical link with the battalion. The unit then encountered Iraqi elements who had surrendered.
Shortly thereafter, the company engaged in combat with Iraqi infantry elements using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and returned fire. This engagement was assessed as enemy fire by personnel from the 1-34th Armoured Battalion stationed in the vicinity, and upon receiving authorisation from higher command, two Bradley vehicles were struck by friendly fire. Subsequent position-determination activities revealed that the Bradley platforms were actually within approximately 1 km of the 1st Brigade sector. Approximately 300 metres ahead of the two Bradleys, Iraqi army-fortified positions containing unexploded RPG munitions were identified. The following is known about the two M2 Bradleys damaged in this engagement.
D Company – Task Force 1-41 Infantry: Friendly Fire Incident – M2 Bradley (27 February 1991, Morning Hours)
D-21 M2 Bradley
The D-21 M2 Bradley armoured combat vehicle, with at least seven personnel on board, advanced throughout the night and entered a bomb crater at approximately 04:00 in the morning. While attempting to exit the crater under its own power, D-21 lost tactical formation and separated from the rear elements of D Company. In the subsequent process, the vehicle and its crew made contact with a fortified position where approximately 20 Iraqi soldiers had gathered. Upon receiving this information, M2 Bradley No. D-26 arrived to assist.
At this point, D-21 was targeted by M1A1 Abrams tanks belonging to another unit, which did not recognise it as a friendly unit, and the platform was hit in the side by three 120 mm sabot rounds. Two of these rounds penetrated the side walls of the vehicle and struck another Bradley armoured vehicle, D-26, which was parked 20 feet away. As a result of the hit, the driver of D-21 was killed, and the three personnel remaining in the vehicle were injured to varying degrees. The platform caught fire and was completely destroyed.
D-26 M2 Bradley
The D-26 M2 Bradley armoured combat vehicle was directly hit by two 120 mm sabot rounds while passing through the area where the D-21 platform had been located shortly before the incident described above. Only the driver was inside the vehicle, and he suffered multiple injuries, including severe injuries to the lower extremities.
The other seven personnel (crew and infantry elements) who were not in the vehicle had left it prior to the incident to clear Iraqi shelters that had been captured and to safely evacuate prisoners of war (POWs). Despite his serious injuries, the driver was able to exit the vehicle independently and was provided with emergency assistance by his teammates outside.
After being hit, the D-26 caught fire and, according to the driver's statement, was ‘buried in the ground,’ making it impossible for any personnel to re-enter the vehicle. Both the D-21 and D-26 vehicles were left where they were until the subsequent ground combat.
This concludes the 14th part of our series. We will continue to explore the ‘friendly fire’ incidents of the Gulf War from different angles in the coming episodes. See you in the 15th part.
